JGL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

JGL, FRANCINE GOMEZ-LEE, and )

MARK A. LEE, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:25-cv-04152-SLD-RLH

)

BRETT BOTTORFF, THE CHADDOCK )

SCHOOL, SUSAN HOLTSCLAW, )

GREGORY KELLETT, MADELINE )

STEWART, and FT. MADISON )

COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

In this case, Plaintiffs JGL, a minor, and his parents Francine Gomez-Lee and Mark A.

Lee bring claims against six defendants, all stemming from the alleged sexual harassment and

retaliatory treatment of JGL at school. Before the Court are the motion to dismiss brought by

Defendant Ft. Madison Community School District (“FMCSD”), ECF No. 22, and the motion to

dismiss, ECF No. 18, and motion for leave to file a reply, ECF No. 25, filed by Defendant

Madeline Stewart. For the reasons that follow, FMCSD’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART. Stewart’s motion for leave to reply is GRANTED and her

motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND1

JGL is a minor resident of Ft. Madison, Iowa, with an autism spectrum disorder and

learning disabilities. He is the son of Francine Gomez-Lee and Mark Lee. At all relevant times,

JGL had an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) under the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (“IDEA”). In May 2023, at the end of JGL’s eighth grade year, staff at FMCSD

recommended that JGL’s IEP involve a placement at The Chaddock School (“Chaddock”), a

private Illinois-charted school operating special education programs, for his high school

education. After further discussions with FMCSD staff, Defendant Brett Bottorff (principal at

Chaddock), and Chaddock Director of Education Corey Powell, JGL’s IEP was finalized to

involve attendance at The Chaddock School Carthage campus.

On August 22, 2023, JGL’s first day at Chaddock, Stewart, a paraprofessional at

Chaddock, rubbed and caressed JGL in a manner that was non-consensual and sexual in nature.

JGL recoiled and told her to stop. From August 22 through October 27, 2023, JGL also observed

Stewart engaging in inappropriate sexual contact with another male student (“Student X”). One

such incident involved Stewart entering a room where JGL and Student X had been sent

together. Stewart instructed both boys to lie on the floor and proceed to rub Student X’s back

and upper thigh. JGL attempted to intervene by blocking Stewart’s hand, but she responded by

striking JGL and verbally abusing him. This conduct caused JGL severe emotional distress. On

or about September 19, 2023, JGL reported that he did “not want[] to be here anymore” during a

counseling session. Compl. 7, ECF No. 1.

1 Unless otherwise stated, the facts described in this section are as alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint, ECF No. 1. For

the sake of ruling on the motions to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] as true all factual allegations in the . . . complaint

and draw[s] all permissible inferences in [Plaintiffs’] favor.” Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d 633,

639 (7th Cir. 2015).

On several occasions throughout this period, JGL reported Stewart’s misconduct to

Chaddock staff, including Bottorff and Defendant Susan Holtsclaw. Lee and Gomez-Lee also

reported concerns. On or about September 7, 2023, JGL, Lee, and Gomez-Lee met with Bottorff

and Holtsclaw to discuss regular calls from the school about JGL “acting out” and “not

listening.” Id. at 6. During that meeting, JGL explained that his behavior was in relation to his

objection to Stewart’s inappropriate conduct. Bottorf told Lee and Gomez-Lee that “there’s

nothing going on.” Id. JGL was disciplined almost daily for “acting out” and “not listening” in

retaliation for his reporting and intervention concerning Stewart’s misconduct. Id. at 7. This

discipline included removing JGL from instruction and confining him alone in a locked,

windowless room.

In early October 2023, Stewart and Defendant Gregory Kellett worked together to

prepare a sworn narrative to obtain a protective order against JGL. In the petition, Stewart

falsely accused JGL of threats and sexually suggestive remarks in order to deflect attention from

her own misconduct. After a protective order was issued on October 26, 2023, JGL was

suspended from Chaddock. As a result, Lee did not go to work so that he could care for JGL. At

no point before this did FMCSD ever follow up on JGL’s placement or safety at Chaddock.

FMCSD finally held a meeting about the placement on November 7, 2023, after the protective

order was issued. It is unclear when or how FMCSD became aware of these events.

During this time, law enforcement received evidence of Stewart’s misconduct, which

included explicit communication, sexual touching, and oral sex with Student X. The protective

order against JGL was dismissed. On or about November 29, 2023, Stewart was charged with

multiple counts of child sexual abuse. She pled guilty in September 2024.

In December 2023, JGL was withdrawn from Chaddock. He continues to suffer

significant trauma from these events. Because of JGL’s increased need for supervision, therapy,

and care, Lee resigned from his job and Gomez-Lee decided to forgo a promotion, resulting in

lost wages, benefits, and retirement contributions.

On August 22, 2025, JGL, Lee, and Gomez-Lee filed a complaint containing twelve

counts against six defendants, including four against Stewart and four against FMCSD. Against

Stewart they bring Count V, seeking recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of JGL’s

Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity; Count VII for sexual abuse, battery, and assault;

Count IX for abuse of process and malicious prosecution; and Count XI for parental loss of

society and services. Stewart seeks dismissal of Counts V, IX, and XI for failure to state a claim.

See generally Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Stewart, ECF No. 19. She contends (1) that Plaintiffs

cannot prevail on their constitutional claim because Stewart is not a state actor, (2) that the

complaint does not allege the necessary elements of abuse of process or malicious prosecution,

and (3) that Plaintiffs’ claim for parental loss of society cannot stand in Illinois because JGL did

not suffer a fatal injury. Id. Plaintiffs filed a response opposing Stewart’s motion in its entirety.

See generally Resp. Mot. Dismiss Stewart, ECF No. 23. Stewart seeks leave to file a reply to the

response, as is required by Civil Local Rule 7.1(B)(3). See generally Mot. Reply.

Plaintiffs bring four counts against FMCSD: Count II for disability discrimination in

violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; Count IV for a violation of the IDEA based on

FMCSD’s failure to ensure a safe placement at Chaddock; Count VIII for a breach of FMCSD’s

duty to provide appropriate oversight and monitoring of JGL’s placement; and Count XII

seeking recovery for the economic loss suffered by Lee and Gomez-Lee. FMCSD filed a motion

seeking dismissal of Counts II and IV because the complaint does not allege disability

discrimination or violation of the IDEA, dismissal of Count VIII because FMCSD had no

supervisory authority over Chaddock or its staff, and dismissal of Count XII because it cannot

stand if the other counts are dismissed. See generally Mot. Dismiss FMCSD. Plaintiffs oppose

the motion in its entirety. See generally Resp. Mot. Dismiss FMCSD, ECF No. 24.

DISCUSSION

I. Stewart’s Motion for Leave to Reply

Civil Local Rule 7.1(B)(3) states: “A reply to the response is only permitted with leave of

Court.” Circumstances justifying a reply include “the non-movant’s introduction of new and

unexpected issues in his response, and the interest of completeness.” Magnuson v. Exelon Corp.,

658 F. Supp. 3d 652, 658 (C.D. Ill. 2023) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). However,

“the Court does not typically permit the moving party to file a reply in order to introduce new

arguments or evidence that could have been included in the motion itself, or to rehash the

arguments made in the motion.” Shefts v. Petrakis, No. 10-cv-1104, 2011 WL 5930469, at *8

(C.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2011). Stewart claims that Plaintiffs’ response merits a reply because it

“advances legal and factual characterizations that warrant a reply to clarify the governing

standards and to address discrete issues raised in opposition.” Mot. Reply 2. Although Stewart

does not identify specific reasons why a reply is appropriate, the Court finds her conclusion

correct, particularly because Plaintiffs’ response raises a reasonably unexpected choice-of-law

question as an argument against dismissal, see Resp. Mot. Dismiss Stewart 7–8. As Plaintiffs’

response introduces a new and unexpected issue, Stewart’s motion for leave to reply is

GRANTED.

II. Motions to Dismiss

a. Legal Standard

A court will dismiss a complaint if it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To determine whether a complaint states a claim, a court

considers whether a complaint’s “well-pleaded factual allegations . . . plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. That is, a

complaint must provide more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A court conducting this review must

accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of the plaintiff. Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2012).

However, a court does not accept a complaint’s legal conclusions. Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co.

of Am., 714 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 2013).

b. Analysis

i. Stewart’s Motion to Dismiss

1. Count V: Substantive Due Process

Plaintiffs claim that “Stewart violated JGL’s constitutional right to bodily integrity by

subjecting him to unwelcome sexual touching and physical assault.” Compl. 13. They seek

recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a cause of action for Constitutional violations by

state officials acting under the color of state law. Stewart moves to dismiss this count because

she is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Stewart 3–6.

To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted “under

color of state law.” Wilson v. Price, 624 F.3d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 2010). This tracks the state

action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch.

Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 n.2 (2001) (“If a defendant’s conduct satisfies the state-action

requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the conduct also constitutes action ‘under color of

state law’ for § 1983 purposes.”); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) (“The

ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is the same

question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of

federal rights fairly attributable to the State?” (quotation marks omitted)). The state action

requirement is satisfied if there is a “sufficiently close nexus between the State and the

challenged action of the [private party] so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that

of the State itself.” Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); Brentwood Acad.,

531 U.S. at 295. Several categories of circumstances qualify as a “close nexus,” including when

the challenged action “results from the State’s exercise of ‘coercive power,’” Brentwood Acad.,

531 U.S. at 296 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)), “when a private actor

operates as a ‘willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents,’” id. (quoting Lugar

v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941(1982)); “when [a private entity] has been delegated a

public function by the State,” id. (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988)), and “when [a

private entity] is ‘entwined with governmental policies,’ or when government is ‘entwined in

[its] management or control,’” id. (quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 301 (1966))

(second alteration in original). See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 (describing “a number of different

factors or tests” for purposes of identifying state action that the Court has articulated in different

contexts).

Stewart asserts that Plaintiffs’ allegations do not suggest that she was a state actor since

she worked for Chaddock—a private school. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Stewart 4. Plaintiffs

identify four allegations that they claim raise a plausible inference that Stewart’s actions are

attributable to the state:

a. JGL attended Chaddock under an IDEA placement funded by a public school

district.

b. The public district remained responsible for ensuring educational access and

monitoring placement.

c. Stewart acted in her role as a paraprofessional within that publicly arranged

special-education placement.

d. After JGL repeatedly reported Stewart’s misconduct, Stewart pursued Illinois

court process (stalking no-contact order) that the school then relied upon to remove

JGL from school.

Resp. Mot. Dismiss Stewart 3–4. Plaintiffs suggest that these facts show that Stewart was a

“willful participant in joint activity with state officials” or that there was “pervasive

entwinement” such that Stewart’s actions are “fairly attributable to the State.” Id. at 3. The

Court finds that none of these allegations establish that Stewart was a state actor both because

Chaddock itself was not a state actor with respect to JGL’s IDEA placement and because Stewart

was not otherwise engaged with any state officials when perpetrating any of the alleged

misconduct.

Plaintiffs’ allegations (a) through (c) essentially contend that Stewart was a state actor

because she was Chaddock’s agent with respect to its provision of education to JGL. The

Court’s analysis of this argument must begin with Rendell-Baker, in which the Supreme Court

held that a similarly situated private school was not a state actor, 457 U.S. at 839–43. In that

case, the majority of the private school’s students were referred to it by public school committees

or agencies after the students struggled to complete public high schools. Id. at 832. The private

school even had a contract with a public school committee by which the school was required to

“carry out the individualized plan developed for each student referred to the school by the

Committee.” Id. at 833. Because of this system, the school’s income “derived primarily from

public sources” and it was “regulated by public authorities.” Id. at 831. Nevertheless, the Court

held that the school was not a state actor for purposes of its hiring and firing decisions because

“the relationship between the school and its teachers and counselors [was] not changed because

the State pa[id] the tuition of the students.” Id. at 841. That holding controls here. There is no

evidence that Chaddock’s level of entanglement with state actors or policies is any greater than

the school in Rendell-Baker, and there is no indication that the relevant actions of the school or

Stewart were “changed because the State pa[id] the tuition of [JGL].” Id.

Courts have regularly held that Rendell-Baker’s holding is not limited to hiring and firing

decisions; it also applies to § 1983 claims when the action at issue is the education of a student

placed at the private school by a public agency. See, e.g., Donlow v. Garfield Park Acad., No.

09-6248 (MLC), 2010 WL 1630595, at *1–6 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2010) (finding a private school not

a state actor with respect to misconduct including “plac[ing] [the plaintiff] into a windowless

disciplinary room” despite the fact that the plaintiff was placed at the school by a public school

district pursuant to an IEP); Charnesky v. Shallenberger, 06 C 50066, 2008 WL 11518032, at

*7–8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2008) (considering Rendell-Baker persuasive in concluding that a

preschool that mistreated the plaintiff during the course of educational programming was not a

state actor despite a cooperative preschool arrangement with a public school district); Robert S.

v. Stetson Sch., Inc., 256 F.3d 159, 162––66 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying Rendell-Baker to

allegations of physical and psychological abuse by school staff after the student’s placement at

the school by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services). As a result, a private school

does not act under color of state law merely because a student is placed there pursuant to his IEP

and the school performs educational functions to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA. See P.N.

v. Greco, 282 F. Supp. 2d 221, 238 (D.N.J. 2003) (holding that a school performing such

functions “does not act under color of state law for the purposes of § 1983”).

Plaintiffs rely on Brentwood Academy to argue that Chaddock was pervasively entwined

with the state. Resp. Mot. Dismiss Stewart 3–4. The Supreme Court in Brentwood Academy

considered “whether a statewide association incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic

competition among public and private secondary schools may be regarded as engaging in state

action when it enforces a rule against a member school.” Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 290. It

held that the association was a state actor, finding that the association was pervasively entwined

with the state. Id. at 299–302. In that case, 84% of the association’s membership was public

schools, State Board members served as members of the Association’s board of control and

legislative council, the association’s employees were eligible for membership in the state

retirement system, and the association played the same role as it had in the past when it was

expressly designated by the state as the regulator of interscholastic athletics in public schools.

Id. at 299–301. The situation here is not analogous. There are no allegations that Chaddock

enrolled any other students under a publicly-funded IDEA placement, that any state officials

served in any capacity at Chaddock or made any decisions for it, that Chaddock employees

received any benefits from the state such as the retirement benefits in Brentwood Academy, or

that Chaddock was expressly designated by the state to perform a certain function for public

schools or their students. See generally Compl.

The First Circuit has had opportunity to consider whether, under the logic of Brentwood

Academy, a private high school that contracted with a public school district acted “under color of

state law” when it suspended a student. See generally Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296

F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2002). In that case, about 80% of the school’s students were sponsored by the

public school district, school district contributions made up roughly half of the school’s budget,

and the school’s students were treated as public school students for purposes of extracurriculars,

transfer of records, and assistance with registration. Id. at 28. However, the court still found that

the school did not act under color of state law because it was not run by public officials and the

action at issue—discipline of students—was exclusively within the purview of the school’s

trustees. Id. Like in Logiodice, the complaint here contains no facts to establish that Chaddock

was operated by public officials or that the actions at issue were subject to state control.

No other state action theories make Chaddock a state actor. There is no public function

at issue, see Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842 (holding that education is not an exclusively public

function); accord Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354 n.9, and Chaddock did not have a sufficient

“symbiotic relationship” with the State since, on the face of the complaint, “the school’s fiscal

relationship with the State is not different from that of many contractors performing services for

the government.” Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 843. Consequently, JGL’s IDEA placement did

not make Chaddock a state actor with respect to its education of JGL, so Stewart’s role in that

arrangement cannot make her a state actor either. See P.N., 282 F. Supp. 2d at 238 (“It is self-

evident that [the agent of a private school] cannot have been acting under color of state law if

[the school] was not.”).

Even more damning for Plaintiffs’ claim, what matters is not whether a private party is a

state actor for all purposes, but whether the specific action at issue can be attributed to the state.

Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937 (“Our cases have . . . insisted that the conduct allegedly causing the

deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State.” (emphasis added)). In this case,

Plaintiffs sue over Stewart’s “unwelcome sexual touching and physical assault” of JGL. Compl.

13. Nearly all of Plaintiffs’ arguments in favor of state action rely on Stewart’s role in educating

JGL at Chaddock and say nothing about the specific misconduct at issue. See Resp. Mot.

Dismiss Stewart 3–4. The one additional line of reasoning—that Stewart made use of a state

judicial process to obtain a protective order, id. at 4—does not change this conclusion since

“merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party

a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980).

For the same reason, Stewart was not a “willful participant in joint activity with the State

or its agents.” Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296 (quotation marks omitted). To satisfy the

willful participation test, the private person must be “jointly engaged with state officials in the

challenged action.” Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27–28 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs make no allegation

that state officials had any role in the violation of JGL’s right to bodily integrity itself. There is

no indication that state actors even knew about the alleged violation until November 7, 2023, see

Compl. 8, after any alleged sexual misconduct ended, see id. (alleging that JGL was removed

from Chaddock on or about October 30, 2023). In short, Plaintiffs provide no reason to believe

that Stewart’s unwelcome sexual touching is fairly attributable to the state. Count V is therefore

DISMISSED as against Stewart because she was not a state actor.

2. Count IX: Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution

Plaintiffs’ abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims arise out of Stewart’s

pursuit of a protective order against JGL. Compl. 15. They allege that Stewart, with the

assistance of Kellett, falsely accused JGL of threats and sexually suggestive remarks in order to

obtain an ex parte order of protection, which an Illinois court issued on October 26, 2023. Id. at

8. After the issuance of this order, JGL was prevented from attending Chaddock. Id. Stewart

seeks dismissal on grounds that Plaintiffs do not plead the necessary elements of either malicious

prosecution or abuse of process. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Stewart 6–7.

a. Malicious Prosecution

In Illinois, plaintiffs must allege five things to state a claim for malicious prosecution:

“(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding by the

defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of

probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages resulting to the

plaintiff.” Swick v. Liautaud, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ill. 1996) (quotation marks omitted).

“The absence of any one of these elements bars a plaintiff from pursuing the claim.” Id. In this

case, Plaintiffs sufficiently plead each of these five elements.

First, Stewart commenced a civil judicial proceeding when she pursued a protective order

against JGL. See Shea v. Winnebago Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 746 F. App’x 541, 547 (7th Cir.

2018) (“[M]alicious prosecution in Illinois extends to civil proceedings such as requests for

orders of protection.” (citing Howard v. Firmand, 880 N.E.2d 1139, 1142–43 (Ill. App. Ct.

2007)).

Second, the proceeding was terminated in favor of JGL. The favorable termination prong

is satisfied only if the nature of the disposition “can give rise to an inference of lack of probable

cause.” Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology Int’l, 685 N.E.2d 1347, 1353 (Ill.

1997). The form of the termination is not dispositive; it instead “depends upon the

circumstances under which the proceedings are withdrawn.” Id. at 1352 (quoting Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 674 cmt. j (A.L.I. 1977)). Here, Plaintiffs allege that the protective order

was dismissed after law enforcement obtained evidence of improper sexual activity between

Stewart and Student X and “Stewart admitted to sexual touching and oral sex with Student X.”

Compl. 8. Stewart suggests that it would be speculative to conclude that the dismissal suggests a

lack of probable cause for pursuing the protective order and that Plaintiffs have not plead facts

necessary to plausibly support an inference of lack of probable cause. Reply Mot. Dismiss 4–5,

ECF No. 25-1. The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs allege that JGL reported sexual misconduct

against Stewart, that she sought a protective order by accusing JGL of threats and sexually

suggestive remarks, and that the protective order was dismissed after Stewart’s misconduct was

proven, effectively showing that JGL’s reports were accurate. Compl. 8. Though it is unclear on

what authority the protective order was dismissed, at the motion to dismiss stage, it is reasonable

to infer that the protective order was dismissed because the authorities believed that Stewart

obtained it deceitfully in order to conceal her misconduct. “Whether or not th[is] disposition[]

ultimately [is] proved by [P]laintiff[s] to be indicative of a lack of probable cause remains a

question of fact which cannot be answered at this stage of the litigation.” Cult Awareness

Network, 685 N.E.2d at 1354 (emphasis in original).

Third, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Stewart lacked probable cause. For an individual

to have probable cause to seek a protective order, she must have an honest belief at the time of

the action that a protective order was justified. Howard, 880 N.E.2d at 1142. Plaintiffs allege

that Stewart “falsely accus[ed] [JGL] of threats and sexually suggestive remarks” and drafted

language “designed to portray JGL as dangerous and to deflect attention from Stewart’s

misconduct.” Compl. 8. They allege that the purpose was “to silence and discredit a reporting

student, shift blame, and facilitate continuation or concealment of misconduct.” Id. at 15. The

allegations that Stewart lied to obtain a protective order for the sake of concealing her own

misconduct are sufficient to plead a lack of probable cause.

Fourth, the allegations show that malice was present. This factor is established by

showing that the person who initiated the proceeding was driven by improper motives. Rodgers

v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 733 N.E.2d 835, 842 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). In this case,

Plaintiffs allege that Stewart was motivated by a desire to discredit JGL, conceal her own

misconduct, and deflect blame. Compl. 15. Such improper motive, if proven, would establish a

presence of malice.

Finally, Plaintiffs have alleged damages. For a malicious prosecution claim to succeed,

the damages must be “beyond the usual expense, time or annoyance in defending a lawsuit.”

Cult Awareness Network, 685 N.E.2d at 1350. Here, Plaintiffs allege that JGL was not allowed

to attend Chaddock and was deprived of educational opportunities. See Compl. 8, 15. Such

damages plainly go beyond the usual damages incurred in defending against legal action.

Accordingly, the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint establish all five elements of a malicious

prosecution claim.

b. Abuse of Process

“Abuse of process is defined as the misuse of legal process to accomplish some purpose

outside the scope of the legal process itself.” Brian J. Wanca, J.D., P.C. v. Oppenheim, 226

N.E.3d 732, 747 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). To succeed on an abuse of

process claim, Plaintiffs must prove most prove (1) an ulterior purpose in pursuing judicial

action, and (2) an act in the use of legal process that is improper in the regular course of

proceedings. Kumar v. Bornstein, 820 N.E.2d 1167, 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “The elements

are strictly construed, as the tort of abuse of process is not favored under Illinois law.” Id.

Stewart argues only that the second element is not satisfied. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Stewart

7; Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss 5.

“In order to satisfy the second element, the plaintiff must show that the process was used

to accomplish some result that is beyond the purview of the process.” Kumar, 820 N.E.2d at

1173. This means that “the defendant must have intended to use the action to accomplish some

result which could not be accomplished through the suit itself” or that the defendant’s use of

process must have “compel[led] the party against whom it is used to do some collateral thing

which he could not legally be compelled to do.” Doyle v. Shlensky, 458 N.E.2d 1120, 1128 (Ill.

App. Ct. 1983).

Two analogous cases are instructive. In Erlich v. Lopin-Erlich, 553 N.E.2d 21, 22 (Ill.

App. Ct. 1990), the defendants received an ex parte temporary restraining order (“TRO”)

blocking the plaintiff from disposing of marital assets during the course of marital dissolution

proceedings. The complaint alleged that the TRO was obtained “for the ulterior purpose of

wreaking havoc with the plaintiff’s ordinary business affairs and damaging the plaintiff’s

reputation for financial integrity.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The court held that there was

no abuse of process because a TRO may rightly be issued during a marital dissolution

proceeding to prevent one spouse from disposing of marital assets. Id. That is, even if the TRO

was sought for an improper motive, its effect was within the typical scope of a TRO. Id. “The

fact that the representations made to the court were allegedly false does not alter our holding.”

Id. Similarly, in Ammons v. Jet Credit Sales, Inc., 181 N.E.2d 601, 604 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962), the

court affirmed a dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant wrongly brought a

garnishment demand that caused the plaintiff’s employer to withhold her salary. An abuse of

process claim could not stand because “[t]he withholding of wages is the normal consequence of

a demand in garnishment.” Id.

Like in Erlich and Ammons, the alleged effect of the protective order in this case was not

beyond the purview of the process. The removal of an individual from circumstances in which

they can continue to harm another is the very purpose of a protective order. JGL’s IDEA

placement does not displace this conclusion since regulations promulgated pursuant to the IDEA

empower schools to suspend special education students in certain circumstances. See generally

34 C.F.R. § 300.530. Even if JGL’s removal from Chaddock did not comply with the

requirements of the IDEA, the removal itself was within the purview of the protective order. In

short, though Stewart may have attained JGL’s removal from Chaddock for an improper reason,

the protective order was not used to accomplish some result which is not typical of a protective

order. Thus, Plaintiffs do not plead facts necessary to establish the elements of abuse of process.

Count IX is dismissed with respect to the abuse of process theory; it may proceed under a

theory of malicious prosecution.

3. Count XI: Loss of Parental Society

In Count XI, Plaintiffs seek recovery for deprivation of “society, companionship, and

services of their minor child.” Compl. 16. They allege that Stewart’s actions caused a “loss of

companionship, emotional distress associated with their child’s injury, and disruption of family

relations.” Id. Stewart argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for parental loss of society

because Illinois law only provides such a cause of action if the child suffers fatal injuries. Mem.

Supp. Mot. Dismiss Stewart 8. While Plaintiffs concede that “a parent cannot recover loss of a

child’s society for nonfatal injuries under Illinois common law,” they instead suggest that this

cause of action is cognizable under Iowa law, which the Court should apply based on Illinois

choice-of-law principles. Resp. Mot. Dismiss Stewart 7–8. Stewart contends that this is

inappropriate because Plaintiffs may not amend their complaint through arguments presented in

their brief. Reply Mot. Dismiss 5–6.

The parties are correct that Illinois common law does not allow parents to recover for loss

of their child’s society if the child does not suffer fatal injuries. See Dralle v. Ruder, 529 N.E.2d

209, 212–14 (Ill. 1988) (declining to extend recovery for loss of consortium to circumstances

involving non-fatal injuries); Vitro v. Mihelcic, 806 N.E.2d 632, 640 (Ill. 2004) (reaffirming

Dralle). However, before dismissing Count XI, the Court will consider Plaintiffs’ choice-of-law

argument. The Seventh Circuit has held that “district courts retain discretion to interpret new

factual allegations or claims presented in a plaintiff’s briefs as a constructive motion to amend.”

Schmees v. HC1.COM, Inc., 77 F.4th 483, 488 (7th Cir. 2023). And even before this rule was

announced, plaintiffs were generally permitted to alter the legal theories asserted in their

complaints as late as summary judgment briefing so long as doing so would not unduly prejudice

opposing parties. BRC Rubber & Plastics, Inc. v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 900 F.3d 529, 540 (7th Cir.

2018). In the response here, Plaintiffs do not introduce any new factual assertions and Stewart

does not suggest it would be unjust or prejudicial to consider their choice-of-law argument, see

Reply Mot. Dismiss 5–7. In any case, considering a new legal theory at the motion to dismiss

stage is appropriate since “a complaint need not plead legal theories,” Alioto v. Town of Lisbon,

651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011). Thus, the Court proceeds to determine whether Illinois or

Iowa law should govern Plaintiffs’ loss of parental society claim.

Federal courts “appl[y] the choice-of-law rules of the forum state to determine which

state’s substantive law applies.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Websolv Computing, Inc., 580 F.3d

543, 547 (7th Cir. 2009). Illinois uses the “most significant relationship” approach from the

Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Ingersoll v. Klein, 262 N.E.2d 593, 596–97 (Ill. 1970);

Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 898 (Ill. 2007). Under this approach, courts

begin by “isolating the issue and defining the conflict.” Townsend, 879 N.E.2d at 898. Only if

the laws conflict will the court make a choice-of-law determination. Id.

In this case, the applicable Iowa and Illinois laws conflict. Under Illinois law, parents

cannot recover for loss of their child’s society if the child does not suffer fatal injuries. Dralle,

529 N.E.2d at 212–14. In Iowa, however “[a] parent, or the parents, may sue for the expense and

actual loss of services, companionship and society resulting from injury to or death of a minor

child.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.206 (emphasis added); see E.L.K. v. Rohlwing, 760 F. Supp. 144, 148

(N.D. Iowa 1991) (denying motion to dismiss claim brought under Rule 1.206 predecessor for

loss of filial consortium damages incurred because of a child’s injury). Because Iowa and

Illinois law conflicts, the Court must make a choice-of-law determination.

The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws contains a general set of considerations

relevant to the choice of law:

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of

the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative

interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the

protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular

field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the

determination and application of the law to be applied.

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (A.L.I. 1971). The objective of this analysis is “to

apply the law of the state that, with regard to the particular issue, has the most significant

relationship with the parties and the dispute.” Townsend, 879 N.E.2d at 901 (quotation marks

omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(1) (A.L.I. 1971) (“The rights

and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the

state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and

the parties under the principles stated in § 6.”).

The Restatement also provides a set of “connecting factors” designed to apply the

principles of § 6 to the type of case at issue. Townsend, 879 N.E.2d at 901. In torts cases, four

types of contacts are to be taken: “(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the

conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of

incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any,

between the parties is centered.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2) (A.L.I.

1971). Finally, the restatement provides presumptions of what state’s law applies in particular

cases. Relevant here:

In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred

determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the

particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the

principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local

law of the other state will be applied.2

Id. § 146.

Applying these principles from the restatement, a choice-of-law determination under

Illinois law proceeds in two steps: “the court (1) chooses a presumptively applicable law under

the appropriate jurisdiction-selecting rule, and (2) tests this choice against the principles of § 6 in

light of relevant contacts identified by general provisions like § 145 (torts).” Townsend, 879

N.E.2d at 903 (quotation marks omitted).

Pursuant to § 146, the presumptively applicable law is that of the state of the injury. For

the purposes of a loss of consortium claim, this is generally considered the place of the family’s

domicile because that is primarily where the injury is “suffered and endured.” Jones v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 682 N.E.2d 238, 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). Here, that is Iowa. See

2 The Restatement does not give a presumption specific to loss-of-consortium claims. Courts regularly consider

them personal injury claims for the purposes of a choice-of-law analysis and apply § 146. See, e.g., Hefferan v.

Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc., 828 F.3d 488, 496 (6th Cir. 2016); Ambrose ex. rel. Ambrose v. Illinois-California Exp.,

Inc., 729 P.2d 331, 334–35 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Wright v. Minter, 736 F. Supp. 1024, 1026 (W.D. Mo. 1990).

Compl. 3. Under the considerations of § 6, as applied through the contacts listed in § 145, no

other state has more significant connections since “[t]he simple fact of domicile indicates the

jurisdiction’s superior interest in having its laws applied in order to give effect to [its] tort

policies.” Jones, 682 N.E.2d at 249 (applying Ohio law when an auto accident occurred in

Illinois that caused a loss of consortium for an Ohio family).

This is consistent with the majority rule that the state of the family domicile is the state

with the most significant relationship to loss of consortium claims. See, e.g., Wright v. Minter,

736 F. Supp. 1024, 1028 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (concluding that the majority view, that “the law of

the family domicile governs a conflicts question in an action for loss of either spousal or parental

consortium,” is proper under § 146); Ambrose ex. rel. Ambrose v. Ill.-Cal. Exp., Inc., 729 P.2d

331, 335 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (reasoning that the state of domicile “has considerable interest in

compensating its domiciliary plaintiffs”); Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Abrahantes, 559 So.2d

1262, 1264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (“Claims for loss of consortium are governed by the law of

the state where the marriage is domiciled, rather than by the law of the state where the injury

occurred.”); Felch v. Air Florida, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D.D.C. 1983) (“[U]nder the

District of Columbia choice of law rules, the law of the state of marital domicile rather than the

law of the state where the wrong occurred should control a loss of consortium action.” (citing

Linnell v. Sloan, 636 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1980)). But see Casey v. Manson Const. & Eng’g Co., 428

P.2d 898, 907 (Or. 1967) (concluding that although Oregon was the state of the family’s

domicile, Washington had the most significant relationship to a spousal loss of consortium claim

because the defendants were citizens of Washington and the underlying harm to the injured

spouse happened in Washington).

It is, of course, easier to find that the state of the family’s domicile has the most

significant interest when the only connection with another state is that the underlying injury

happened there. See, e.g., Ambrose, 729 P.2d at 335 (“Arizona’s connections with this case arise

solely because the accident occurred on its portion of the interstate highways.”). That is not the

case here: JGL attended school in Illinois, most of the defendants worked in Illinois, and the

underlying harm is alleged to be part of an extended series of wrongful acts, nearly all taking

place in Illinois. But there remain significant contacts with Iowa: the plaintiffs are domiciled

therein, FMCSD is an Iowa public school district, and JGL’s placement at Chaddock was

facilitated through FMCSD.

Illinois undoubtedly has a compelling interest in regulating the conduct that occurs within

its borders, as effectuated by the application of Illinois law to the underlying torts in this case.

But it has a significantly lesser interest in “maintaining the parent/child relationship” of Iowa

residents, Wright, 736 F. Supp. at 1027, in the rights and responsibilities that are attendant to

family status, Avis, 559 So.2d at 1264, and the rights of parents in Iowa to the “services,

companionship and society” of their children, Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.206. As a result, Iowa law

governs Plaintiffs’ loss of consortium claim. Since Iowa law allows parents to recover for loss of

society even if their child does not suffer fatal injuries, Stewart’s motion to dismiss as to Count

XI is DENIED.

ii. Ft. Madison Community School District’s Motion to Dismiss

1. Count II: Rehabilitation Act

In their first count against FMCSD, Plaintiffs claim that “[FMCSD] discriminated against

JGL on the basis of disability by: (a) failing to provide reasonable modifications and

accommodations to ensure his safety and access; (b) subjecting him to punitive and unlawful

seclusion; (c) responding with deliberate indifference to harassment that deprived him of

meaningful access to education; and (d) retaliating against him for protected complaints.”

Compl. 11. They appear to advance both disability discrimination and retaliation claims under

§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Under this section, “[n]o otherwise qualified

individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from

the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any

program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). FMCSD seeks

dismissal both because FMCSD had no notice of or control over the actions at issue and because

the harm JGL suffered was unrelated to his disability and is therefore not actionable under the

Rehabilitation Act. Mot. Dismiss FMCSD 2–4.

The Court first notes that it is unclear whether the Rehabilitation Act provides a cause of

action for retaliation. See Smith v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 159 F.4th 1067, 1078–80 (6th Cir.

2025) (holding that the Retaliation Act’s reference to the “standards” of the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213, only informs how claims are assessed and does not

create a substantive claim for retaliation). The Seventh Circuit has never assessed the propriety

of a retaliation claim under § 504, though it has long assumed that the Rehabilitation Act allows

plaintiffs to bring retaliation claims, see, e.g., Fuller v. McDonough, 84 F.4th 686, 690 (7th Cir.

2023); Burks v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 757–58 (7th Cir. 2006). The Court need

not challenge this assumption because Plaintiffs do not state a claim for retaliation even if they

can do so under § 504.

To state a claim for retaliation, Plaintiffs’ complaint must establish that JGL engaged in

statutorily protected activity. See McHale v. McDonough, 41 F.4th 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2022).

Reporting misconduct may be protected activity, but the reported misconduct “must be about the

[disability] discrimination.” Id. at 871–72; see also Miller v. Chi. Transit Auth., 20 F.4th 1148,

1155 (7th Cir. 2021) (“A complaint of discrimination is a protected activity under Title VII only

if the discrimination is based on a protected characteristic like race.”).3 “Merely complaining in

general terms of harassment or discrimination, without specifying a connection to a protected

class or providing facts to create such an inference, is insufficient.” McHale, 41 F.4th at 872.

Although JGL reported Stewart’s sexual harassment of himself and Student X, Plaintiffs make

no indication that JGL complained of harassment on the basis of disability or any other protected

status. See Compl. 5–7. The retaliation claim therefore cannot stand as the reported misconduct

was not about discrimination.

For similar reasons, Plaintiffs do not state a claim for disability discrimination. To

prevail on their disability discrimination claim, Plaintiffs must prove that “but for” the disability,

JGL would not have been excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the educational

programs. Culp v. Caudill, 140 F.4th 938, 943 (7th Cir. 2025); King v. Hendricks Cnty.

Comm’rs, 954 F.3d 981, 989 (7th Cir. 2020). In this case, the complaint establishes only that

JGL had a disability, Compl. 1, 3, that his placement at Chaddock was pursuant to an IEP created

under the IDEA, id. at 2, 5, and that Chaddock administration knew about JGL’s disability, id. at

5. But JGL’s disability status alone does not convert unrelated harms to disability

discrimination. The complaint nowhere alleges that the unwelcome sexual contact, the

retaliatory treatment, the protective order, the removal from Chaddock, or any other of the

alleged illegal conduct occurred because of JGL’s disability. Since Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded

allegations do not establish that any of the mistreatment that JGL suffered was related to his

disability, Count II is DISMISSED

3 If actionable, retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act is subject to the same standard as retaliation under Title VII.

Burks, 464 F.3d at 758 n.16.

2. Count IV: IDEA

In Count IV, Plaintiffs claim that FMCSD failed to fulfil its obligations under the IDEA.4

Compl. 12–13. FMCSD initially contends that dismissal is proper because it had no knowledge

of the actions at issue or control over any of the relevant actors. Mot. Dismiss FMCSD 2–3.

This argument cannot succeed at this stage because, under the IDEA, school districts remain

responsible for the provision of special education even when a student is placed in a private

school. The IDEA provides that in such cases, “the State educational agency shall determine

whether [private] schools and facilities meet standards that apply to State educational agencies

and local educational agencies and that children so served have all the rights the children would

have if served by such agencies.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(ii). While FMCSD is a local

educational agency, not a state agency, regulations passed pursuant to the IDEA suggest that all

local educational agencies also retain responsibility for the implementation of a child’s IEP. See

34 C.F.R. § 300.325(c) (“Even if a private school or facility implements a child’s IEP,

responsibility for compliance with this part remains with the public agency and the [State

educational agency].”); see also id. § 300.33 (defining “public agency” to include local

educational agencies). The Court is not aware of case law expounding on the contours of a

public school district’s liability when student’s education at a private school does not comply

with the IDEA, but FMCSD’s motion does not engage at all with the District’s continuing

4 The IDEA contains a requirement that plaintiffs exhaust an administrative process before seeking judicial remedy.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Plaintiffs suggest that the exhaustion requirement does not apply because they “seek

compensatory damages under non-IDEA statutes.” Resp. Mot. Dismiss FMCSD 4. The Court notes that the case

Plaintiffs cite, Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, 598 U.S. 142 (2023), does not address how the exhaustion

requirement applies to claims—such as Count IV—directly brought for a violation of the IDEA. It instead states

that the exhaustion requirement does not apply “where a plaintiff brings a suit under another federal law for

compensatory damages—a form of relief everyone agrees IDEA does not provide.” Id. at 147–48 (emphasis added).

Despite the Court’s skepticism that the exhaustion requirement would not apply to this claim, which directly alleges

a violation of the IDEA, the Court will not consider such an argument at this time since FMCSD has not argued that

the exhaustion requirement bars Plaintiffs’ IDEA claim, see generally Mot. Dismiss FMCSD.

responsibility under the IDEA, see generally Mot. Dismiss FMCSD, and thus has not

convincingly shown that Count IV should be dismissed on these grounds. As a result, the Court

proceeds to consider whether Plaintiffs’ complaint states a claim for a violation of the IDEA.

The IDEA creates three relevant obligations of school districts towards students with

disabilities. First, the IDEA’s “core guarantee” is the provision of a free appropriate public

education (“FAPE”). Fry v. Napoleon Cmty Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 158 (2017); see 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(a)(1). This means students with disabilities are entitled to education services that:

(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction,

and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (C)

include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education

in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized

education program required under section 1414(d) of this title.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). Second, school districts must develop and implement an IEP for each

student with a disability. See id. § 1412(a)(4). As the name suggests, IEPs are developed for and

tailed to the needs of each student. See generally id. § 1414(d). Finally, students with

disabilities are entitled to receive an education in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”). See

id. § 1412(a)(5). This means that children with disabilities must be, “[t]o the maximum extent

appropriate . . . educated with children who are not disabled” and that “removal of children with

disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of

the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary

aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).

Plaintiffs claim that “Defendants denied FAPE by failing to provide a safe educational

environment, by allowing sexual harassment and abuse to occur, by isolating and secluding JGL

contrary to law and his IEP, and by removing or restricting his access to education based on a

false protective order.” Compl. 12. FMCSD responds that the harm suffered by JGL was not

related to his disability and therefore is not actionable under the IDEA.5 Mot. Dismiss FMCSD

3–4.

The Court first considers whether the complaint states a claim for violating JGL’s right to

a FAPE. Preliminarily, the right to a FAPE concerns educational provisions and programming; it

does not create a freestanding right to be free of any inappropriate conduct. See Doe v. Dall.

Indep. Sch. Dist., 941 F.3d 224, 227 (5th Cir. 2019) (“‘FAPE’ is a statutory term of art and is

generally centered on a disabled student’s access to adequate education by a school.”); 34 C.F.R.

§§ 300.101–113 (regulating, e.g., the use of assistive technology, the provision of extracurricular

activities and fine arts, and access to extended school year services).

The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Doe is instructive. In that case, the court considered

whether a claim based on a school’s indifference to sexual assault of a disabled student by

another student sought relief available under the IDEA. Doe, 941 F.3d at 227. The Doe

plaintiffs brought claims under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688, but the IDEA was relevant

because it requires that plaintiffs exhaust a statutory hearing and appeal process before filing a

civil action “seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).

The court held that the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement did not bar the plaintiff’s claim because

“the gravamen of the complaint [was] not about the denial of a FAPE.” Doe, 941 F.3d at 228.

5 FMCSD unhelpfully discusses Plaintiffs’ IDEA claim together with their Rehabilitation Act claim. See Mot.

Dismiss FMCSD 3–4. FMCSD then cites two cases about interpreting the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with

Disabilities Act to support a general rule that the IDEA, along with these statutes, requires a plaintiff to “establish a

threshold matter that the alleged discriminatory conduct of the Defendant was related to or caused by the disability.”

Mot. Dismiss FMCSD 3 (citing Culp v. Caudill, 140 F.4th 938, 943 (7th Cir. 2025); A.J.T. ex rel. A.T. v. Osseo Area

Schs., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, 605 U.S. 335 (2025)). While the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require a plaintiff to

show “that but for the disability, he would have been able to access the services or benefits desired,” Culp, 140 F.4th

at 943, this has never been true of the IDEA. Unlike the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, which prohibit discrimination

against individuals with disabilities, see 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12132, the IDEA’s “core guarantee” is the

provision of a “free appropriate public education,” Fry, 580 U.S. at 158 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A)). As a

result, the IDEA is breached not when an individual is discriminated against on the basis of disability, but when an

individual does not receive the IDEA’s substantive and procedural guarantees related to the provision of education.

See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203–04 (1982)

(describing the rights guaranteed by the IDEA’s predecessor, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act).

“Were all traces of [the student’s] disabilities removed, Doe’s claim would look nearly identical

to what exists now: allegations that the school was deliberately indifferent to [the student’s]

sexual abuse.” Id. The court considered two hypotheticals presented by the Supreme Court in

Fry, another case on the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement:

“First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged

conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school—say, a public theater

or library? And second, could an adult at the school—say, an employee or visitor—

have pressed essentially the same grievance?” If the answers are yes, then the claim

is not likely about a FAPE since those hypotheticals take a claim away from the

core purpose of the IDEA.

Id. at 229 (quoting Fry, 580 U.S. at 171). The Doe court found it appropriate to add a third

question in the same vein: “Could a student without disabilities bring th[e] same claim?” Id. It

ultimately found that the plaintiff’s claim could have been brought by a non-disabled student, so

“the gravamen of her complaint was not about the denial of a FAPE” and the IDEA’s exhaustion

requirement did not bar the suit. Id. Unlike in Fry and Doe, the question here is not “whether a

lawsuit in fact seeks relief available under the IDEA” but “whether any remedies are available

under that law.” Fry, 580 U.S. at 169 (quotation marks omitted). However, these questions are

instructive in determining whether Plaintiffs’ claims are rooted in the denial of a FAPE.

Plaintiffs claim that FMCSD denied JGL a FAPE in four ways: “by failing to provide a

safe educational environment, by allowing sexual harassment and abuse to occur, by isolating

and secluding JGL contrary to law and his IEP, and by removing or restricting his access to

education based on a false protective order.” Compl. 12. Some of these claims, such as the

failure to prevent sexual harassment, could be brought by individuals at a different public facility

or adults at the school. However, claims regarding student discipline and suspension from

school could not be brought by adults or rooted in conduct at non-educational public facilities.

And while non-disabled students could complain of wrongful discipline and suspension, that

does not mean they could bring “essentially the same claim.” Fry, 580 U.S. at 171.

The Department of Education has passed regulations implementing the IDEA that govern

how schools are to discipline special education students. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.530–300.537.

For instance, section 300.530(c) provides:

For disciplinary changes in placement that would exceed 10 consecutive school

days, if the behavior that gave rise to the violation of the school code is determined

not to be a manifestation of the child’s disability pursuant to paragraph (e) of this

section, school personnel may apply the relevant disciplinary procedures to

children with disabilities in the same manner and for the same duration as the

procedures would be applied to children without disabilities, except as provided in

paragraph (d) of this section.

This section does not show that JGL’s removal from Chaddock per se violated the IDEA, but it

raises the possibility. If JGL’s suspension exceeded ten days, then he was entitled to a

determination of whether the behavior was a manifestation of JGL’s disability, see id.

§ 300.530(e), and he was entitled to continue receiving certain services during his suspension,

see id. § 300.530(d). These claims satisfy Fry’s litmus test since JGL’s claims flowing from

IDEA regulations could not be brought by any student regardless of disability status. Admittedly,

the factual allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint that would be relevant to this claim are scant. The

complaint does not state how long JGL’s removal from Chaddock lasted, and it does not address

whether he received a manifestation determination or continued educational services during the

suspension. See generally Compl. However, the complaint does allege that JGL was removed

from Chaddock and that he lost educational services as a result. Id. at 12. Though sparse, the

allegations are enough to “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that [FMCSD] is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

The complaint also plausibly alleges a failure to comply with JGL’s IEP. It specifically

alleges that Chaddock staff “removed JGL from instruction and confined him alone in a separate

room without windows, with a door that locked or otherwise secured such that he could not

leave, for periods of time that ranged from 20 to 60 minutes to the remainder of the school day,

on at least ten occasions.” Compl. 7. It further states that this isolation and seclusion “was not

authorized by JGL’s IEP.” Id. Additional details about the requirements of JGL’s IEP would be

necessary for Plaintiffs to ultimately prevail, but these allegations are sufficient to plausibly state

a claim for the violation of JGL’s IEP.

On the whole, while the complaint does not indisputably establish a violation of the

IDEA, FMCSD’s cursory argument that the harm JGL suffered was unrelated to his disability

cannot stand in the face of the extensive regulations governing discipline of special education

students and the requirement that JGL receive an education in compliance with his IEP.

Accordingly, FMCSD’s motion to dismiss Count IV is DENIED.

3. Count VIII: Negligent or Willful and Wanton Hiring,

Retention, or Supervision

Plaintiffs next claim that FMCSD breached its duty to ensure that Chaddock provided a

FAPE, “including appropriate oversight, monitoring, and response to parent complaints and

safety concerns.” Compl. 14–15. They argue that “[FMCSD] breached these duties by failing to

monitor adequately, investigate, or intervene despite notice.” Id. at 15. FMCSD maintains that

there are no factual allegations suggesting that it had any authority or control over Stewart or any

other Chaddock staff. Mot. Dismiss FMCSD 4.

There are three elements of negligent supervision in Illinois: “(1) the defendant had a

duty to supervise the harming party, (2) the defendant negligently supervised the harming party,

and (3) such negligence proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.” Doe v. Coe, 135 N.E.3d 1,

15–16 (Ill. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). FMCSD essentially argues that they have no duty

to supervise Stewart or any other Chaddock staff. The only duty that Plaintiffs point to, and the

only one of which the Court is aware, is FMCSD’s duty under the IDEA to provide a FAPE.6

Compl. 14–15.

As discussed above, the IDEA’s implementing regulations anticipate that public school

districts retain some responsibility to ensure children placed at private schools receive the rights

guaranteed them by the IDEA. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.325 (“Even if a private school or facility

implements a child’s IEP, responsibility for compliance with this part remains with the public

agency and the [State Educational Agency].”); see also Derrick ex. rel. Tina v. Glen Mills Schs.,

No. 19-1541, 2019 WL 7019633, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2019) (“Although under the IDEA

children with disabilities may be placed in a private school or facility as a means of providing

special education and related services, ultimate responsibility for the appropriate provision of

such services remains with the state or local education agency.”). Further, the IDEA provides

rights specific to student discipline. See supra pt. II(b)(ii)(2).

Based on the IDEA’s statutory and regulatory structure, it is reasonable to infer that

FMCSD had a duty to provide some oversight, at least as necessary to ensure JGL received the

rights guaranteed by the IDEA. In this light, FMCSD cannot defeat a negligent supervision

claim by arguing that FMCSD had no control over staff at Chaddock. See Mot. Dismiss FMCSD

4. In fact, the lack of practical mechanisms guaranteeing that JGL received his rights under the

IDEA could indicate that FMCSD breached its duty to ensure JGL’s rights were not violated.

6 Plaintiffs suggest that there may be additional “contractual, practical, or legal mechanisms to require staff

safeguards and corrective measures.” Resp. Mot. Dismiss FMCSD 5. But there are no facts alleged in the

complaint to support a plausible conclusion that a duty rooted in any other source exists.

It is worth highlighting the narrowness of this holding. The Court does not suggest that

FMCSD in fact breached its duty, nor does it address the contours of FMCSD’s duty to ensure

compliance with the IDEA at private schools. It holds only that the IDEA and its regulations

anticipate that public school districts have a continuing responsibility to guarantee compliance

with the IDEA. As a result, FMCSD cannot defeat a negligence claim with what amounts to an

argument that it had no duty whatsoever to oversee JGL’s IDEA placement. On this basis,

FMCSD’s motion to dismiss Count VIII is DENIED.

4. Count XII: Parental Economic Loss

Finally, Plaintiffs Gomez-Lee and Lee seek compensation for the economic loss related

to (1) Lee’s resignation from his job to supervise JGL and the related loss of wages and benefits,

(2) Gomez-Lee’s lost income from her declined promotion, and (3) out-of-pocket transportation,

counseling, and tutoring costs. Compl. 16–17. FMCSD appears to agree that such recovery

would be available but seeks dismissal because no other counts survive and recovery is only

available if the cost was caused by a tort against the minor. Mot. Dismiss FMCSD 4. Plaintiffs

respond, “[t]hat is not a basis for dismissal where Plaintiffs have plausibly pled underlying

statutory and duty-based claims.” Resp. Mot. Dismiss FMCSD 5. Because several of Plaintiffs’

claims against FMCSD survive the motion to dismiss, FMCSD’s argument cannot succeed. As a

result, FMCSD’s motion to dismiss Count XII is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendant Ft. Madison Community School District’s motion to dismiss,

ECF No. 22, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Count II is DISMISSED as

against Ft. Madison Community School District, while Counts IV, VIII, and XII survive.

Defendant Madeline Stewart’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 18, is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART. With respect to Stewart, Count V is DISMISSED, as is Count IX as it

relates to abuse of process. The remaining counts against Stewart survive. Plaintiffs JGL,

Francine Gomez-Lee, and Mark Lee are granted leave to file an amended complaint, if they so

desire, within fourteen days of the entry of this Order. Stewart’s motion for leave to reply, ECF

No. 25, is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to file the Reply, ECF No. 25-1, on the docket.

Entered this 20th day of May, 2026.

s/ Sara Darrow

SARA DARROW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE