BANKHEAD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

ACTORA MECONN BANKHEAD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:23-cv-02268-TWP-TAB

)

J. ERNEST, )

J. JACKSON, )

BROWN, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants J.

Ernest, J. Jackson, and Brown (together the "Defendants") (Dkt. 37). Plaintiff Actora Bankhead

("Mr. Bankhead"), an inmate in the Indiana Department of Corrections ("IDOC") initiated this

action alleging the Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to

unsanitary conditions of confinement while he was in restricted housing at Pendleton Correctional

Facility ("Pendleton"). (Dkt. 1). For the reasons explained below, summary judgment is denied.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court views the record in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Khungar v.

Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or

make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-

finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A court only has to consider the

materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need not "scour the record" for

evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017)

(cleaned up).

A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the basis for its motion

and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must

support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions,

documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in

opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered

undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a), the Court views

and recites the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Mr. Bankhead, and

draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Khungar, 985 F.3d at 572–73.

There are very few undisputed facts in this case. The parties agree that Mr. Bankhead is an

inmate in the IDOC, who has been and is currently incarcerated at Pendleton. From mid-May 2023

until December 2023, Mr. Bankhead was housed in G Cellhouse, which is a segregation unit at

Pendleton. (Dkt. 38-1 at 27:18-22; 34:5-6). When Mr. Bankhead first arrived in G Cellhouse, he

was placed in a "strip cell" until June 25, 2023. Id. at 34:8-9. While in the strip cell, he could not

have his own soap or cleaning supplies in the cell. Id. at 13: 17-23. The officers would give Mr.

Bankhead a cup of soap when they took him to take a shower. Id. The officers were supposed to

give Mr. Bankhead cleaning supplies in the strip cell, but they only brought supplies once after

another inmate flooded their toilet. Id. at 16: 1-19.

After June 25, 2023 Mr. Bankhead was moved to a regular cell in G Cellhouse, which had

a bunk, a desk, a toilet, and a sink. Id. at 9:8-9; 34:6-15. Everything was in working condition and

Mr. Bankhead did not experience any plumbing, lighting, or mechanical failures. Id. at 18:19–

19:1. Once Mr. Bankhead received his property on June 28, 2023 he was allowed to keep soap in

his cell. Id. at 14:16-19; 34:5-15. Because he is indigent, Mr. Bankhead receives a monthly hygiene

kit consisting of two razors, two motel bars of soap, two small deodorants, and two shampoos. Id.

at 42:16-25. On at least one occasion, Mr. Bankhead used his personal soap from the hygiene kit

to clean his cell. Id. at 42:5-25.

The Defendants all worked at Pendleton in G Cellhouse during the relevant time period.

Id. at 36:12-25. Sergeant Ashley Brown ("Sgt. Brown") was the Correctional Sergeant in charge

of G Cellhouse. (Dkt. 38-2 ¶ 3). Captain Jason Ernest ("Cpt. Ernest") was the Zone Captain over

G Cellhouse. (Dkt. 38-3 ¶ 3). Lieutenant Johnathan Jackson ("Lt. Jackson") was the Unit Housing

Lieutenant in charge of G Cellhouse. (Dkt. 38-4 ¶ 4).

The parties dispute the cleanliness of G Cellhouse and the cleaning protocols followed by

the Defendants and the officers that they supervised, but at this stage of the proceedings, these

disputes are resolved in Mr. Bankhead's favor—so the Court will discuss his version first.

A. Mr. Bankhead's Version of the Events

a. Insects

According to Mr. Bankhead, there was an infestation of cockroaches and spiders that

continuously climbed on everything in his cell as well as the cells of other inmates who were

incarcerated in G Cellhouse during the same time period. Dkt. 44-1 at 2 ¶ 9 (Bankhead Aff.); see

also id. at 5 ¶ 9 (Moore Aff.); id. at 8 ¶ 9 (Parrish Aff.); id. at 11 ¶ 9 (Smith Aff.); id. at 14 ¶ 9

(Cardosi Aff.); id. at 17 ¶ 9 (Bennett Aff.). Mr. Bankhead started noticing the issue with roaches

in June when he observed that the trays left out in front of the cells were collecting bugs and he

said something to Lt. Jackson or Cpt. Ernest. Dkt. 38-1 at 34:16–35:8. After that, Mr. Bankhead

saw roaches on a daily basis, and they would crawl up and down the range and into his cell. Dkt.

38-1 at 33:5-17; 35:9-15. When he turned on his light, he would see "a whole bunch of roaches"

crawling in his cell. Id. at 32:5-7; 33:5-15.1 He would kill them and bag them up to show the

evidence of the infestation. Id. at 32:11-17. When Mr. Bankhead told Cpt. Ernest and Lt. Jackson,

they never sprayed his cell. Id. at 33:18–34:3. Cpt. Ernest would ask Mr. Bankhead why he was

"bitching about some roaches" and that he should not have come to G Cellhouse if he wanted a

clean cell house since G Cellhouse does not have detail workers. Id. at 37:10–38:15; see also id.

at 59:4-20. Lt. Jackson would tell Mr. Bankhead that if he did not like how things were done in G

Cellhouse then he should not come back. Id. at 38:16–39:19. Sgt. Brown told Mr. Bankhead to

clean up the roaches himself. Id. at 40:7–41:1.

b. Trash

Trash from the inmates' meals was routinely left on the ranges for two days and at times

was left for "days on end." Dkt. 38-1 at 23:3-11; 30:17–31:6; 50:6–53:9. The available G Cellhouse

logbooks designated by Mr. Bankhead reflect that officers reported cleaning up trash from the

trays three times in May, four times in June, five times in July, four times in August, seven times

in September, and not once in October or December. Dkt. 44-1 at 44–728.2 The accumulated trash

1 Defendants claim that Mr. Bankhead's affidavit is a "sham" because he changed his testimony about roaches. Dkt.

45 at 11. Upon reviewing Mr. Bankhead's deposition testimony, the Court does not agree that Mr. Bankhead's affidavit

contradicts his deposition testimony.

2 The Court was only able to verify about half of these dates because most of the logbook entries are unreadable due

to how they were copied. Also, as Mr. Bankhead acknowledges, the logbooks are missing entries for half of August,

about 15 days in October, all of November, and about half of December. The Court includes Mr. Bankhead's references

led to roaches, which infested the range and Mr. Bankhead's cell. Id. at 65:4-15; Dkt. 44-1 at 2 ¶

10. When Mr. Bankhead complained about the trash to the Defendants, they generally told him to

stop bitching, that their officers know what to do, and if he was concerned then he should not come

to G Cellhouse. Id. at 58:14-24; 59:4-20.

c. Cleaning of the Ranges

In 2023, "detail workers" were not allowed in G Cellhouse so officers had to clean the

ranges. Dkt. 38-1 at 28:22–29:8. The ranges were rarely cleaned by the officers. The available

logbook entries reflect that some officers reported that they cleaned the ranges twice in May, eight

times in June, ten times in July, five times in August, ten times in September, once in October, and

twice in December. See Dkt. 44-1 at 44–728. Mr. Bankhead could see the range and some common

areas, including the showers, through his cell door because it had holes in it and by using his

mirror. Id. at 10:1-14; 11:4-16.

d. Cleaning Supplies

Mr. Bankhead and other inmates were only provided with cleaning supplies about five to

ten times from May to December of 2023. Dkt. 44-1 at 2 ¶ 8; see also id. at 5–17 (witness

affidavits). The available logbook entries reflect that officers did not report conducting a "mop out

sweep out" in May, October, or December. Id. at 44–728. Officers reported a "mop out sweep out"

in the area of the range where Mr. Bankhead lived three times in June, four times in July, twice in

August, and twice in September. Id. Mr. Bankhead repeatedly asked the Defendants for cleaning

supplies, but they ignored his complaints. Dkt. 44-1 at 2 ¶ 8; see also id. at 5–17 (witness

affidavits). When Mr. Bankhead complained to Lt. Jackson about cleaning supplies, he told him

to the available logbooks to the extent that they represent the date that these events were logged by officers in G

Cellhouse. Given the information presently available to the Court, it does not include the logbooks for the truth of the

matter asserted, or as evidence that these events actually happened on the dates recorded or did not happen on the

dates that were not recorded or on the unavailable dates. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2).

that he would get cleaning supplies when the officers decide to give it to him, not when he wants

it. Dkt. 38-1 at 46:22–47:1. Sgt. Brown told him to file a grievance. Id. at 47:4-11.

e. Cleaning of Showers

Mr. Bankhead did not witness the showers being cleaned from May to December of 2023.

Dkt. 64:10-18. The available logbook entries show that officers reported cleaning the showers once

in July, once in September, and once in December. Dkt. 44-1 at 44–728. Mr. Bankhead frequently

encountered trash, urine, feces, blood, and the residue of OC spray on the wall when taking

showers and when going in the shakedown booths. Dkt. 38-1 at 67:10–69:2; 72:14–73:6. Mr.

Bankhead repeatedly told Defendants about the conditions of the showers. Dkt. 38-1 at 65:4–

73:25. At one point, after Mr. Bankhead pointed out blood in the shower, Cpt. Ernest told Mr.

Bankhead that outside maintenance is supposed to clean the showers. Id. at 71:9-19.

f. Receipt of Complaints

Mr. Bankhead complained to each Defendant about the conditions of his cell, the range,

and the showers, but they ignored his complaints or told him to stop complaining. Mr. Bankhead

also submitted several grievances and requests for interview to the Defendants and other officers

describing his issues with not receiving cleaning supplies and the officers not cleaning up trash or

cleaning the showers. Dkt. 44-1 at 20–43.

g. Mr. Bankhead's Injuries

Mr. Bankhead suffered mental anguish as well as physical harm by having to clean his cell

without proper equipment and being exposed to mace in the shower stalls, which would make it

hard for him to breath and see. Dkt. 38-1 at 77:3-18; 62:9-11; 69:22–70:12. Mr. Bankhead

submitted healthcare request forms asking for help to mitigate the unsanitary conditions as well as

help to deal with the stress. Dkt. 44-1 at 28–30.

B. The Defendants' Version of the Events

a. Insects

Insects were present in some areas of Mr. Bankhead's range and cell. Id. at 32:20–36:2.

Lt. Jackson routinely performed pest control services by spraying inmate and staff areas. Dkt. 38-

3 ¶ 8. Lt. Jackson did not spray inside inmate's cells due to safety concerns about the pesticide.

Dkt. 38-4 ¶ 8–9. If an inmate reported pests, Lt. Jackson promptly took steps to spray the area. Id.

¶ 10. Sgt. Brown reported pest and sanitation concerns in shift reports and notified appropriate

supervisors. Dkt. 38-2 ¶ 8. Cpt. Ernest does not recall seeing infestation beyond "ordinary minor

insects" that were taken care of through routine spraying. (Dkt. 38-3 ¶ 14).

b. Trash

During the Defendants' shifts, staff collected trash and meal trays between meals. (Dkt. 38-

2 ¶ 13; dkt. 38-3 ¶ 12; Dkt. 38-4 ¶ 12). Cpt. Ernest did not see any food trays left out for extended

periods. (Dkt. 38-3 ¶ 13).

c. Cleaning of the Ranges

Sgt. Brown testified that officers in G Cellhouse swept and mopped the ranges "at least

weekly, and night shift staff was expected to sweep and mop daily." (Dkt. 38-2 ¶ 5). When Sgt.

Brown was working, she "ensured trays were collected and ranges were cleaned to the extent

staffing and security allowed." Id. If night shift did not complete their cleaning tasks, Sgt. Brown

"made efforts to ensure cleaning was completed" or she reported the issue. Id. According to Cpt.

Ernest and Lt. Jackson, cleaning responsibilities for showers and ranges were performed daily by

facility sanitation crews and if they could not be completed, the unit staff completed the tasks. Dkt.

38-3 ¶ 9; dkt. 38-4 ¶ 11 ("when sanitation staff were unable to reach the unit, correctional staff

completed cleaning tasks.").

d. Cleaning Supplies

According to Sgt. Brown, officers tended to offer inmates cleaning supplies every other

day. (Dkt. 38-2 ¶ 6). This usually occurred on the days that the inmates showered. Id. Sometimes

cleaning was hindered by issues with staffing shortages and security. Id. At some point, "a

designated cleaning time was put into place on Sundays" where inmates were provided with

cleaning supplies. (Dkt. 38-2 ¶ 14; dkt. 38-4 ¶ 19). According to Cpt. Ernest and Lt. Jackson,

inmates in G Cellhouse "were afforded an opportunity to clean their cells at least once per week,

commonly referred to as 'mop-out and sweep-out.'" Dkt. 38-3 ¶ 7; dkt. 38-4 ¶ 6. During this time,

inmates were given a mop, a broom, and a sanitation chemical such as Germ-Away Disinfectant.

Dkt. 38-3 ¶ 7; dkt. 38-4 ¶ 6.

Efforts were made to accommodate inmates who requested cleaning supplies. Dkt. 38-2 ¶

6. Sgt. Brown did not deny Mr. Bankhead cleaning supplies for "punitive reasons." Id. ¶ 7. Instead,

if Mr. Bankhead's request was delayed, "it would have been due to staffing, security events, or

other operational priorities[.]" Id. Cpt. Ernest and Lt. Jackson did not personally deny "any

incarcerated individual cleaning supplies[.]" Dkt. 38-3 ¶ 8; dkt. 38-4 ¶ 7.

e. Cleaning of Showers

According to Cpt. Ernest, the showers were cleaned every day after operations by facility

sanitation crews. Dkt. 38-3 ¶ 9. Cpt. Ernest did not witness any residue from OC spray, feces,

blood, or bodily fluids left in the showers. Id. ¶ 11. Residual OC spray was "not allowed" to be left

in the showers. Id. ¶ 10. Cleanup of any residual OC spray should be documented as part of the

required use of force report every time that an officer deploys OC spray. Dkt. 38-4 ¶ 14. If Sgt.

Brown became aware of residual chemical agents in the showers, she reported it so that sanitation

workers could respond. Dkt. 38-2 ¶ 9.

f. Receipt of Complaints

When Sgt. Brown and Lt. Jackson received verbal complaints from Mr. Bankhead about

sanitation, they told him to use the formal grievance system, and they documented concerns in the

shift reports and logbooks. Dkt. 38-2 ¶ 11; Dkt. 38-4 ¶ 15. Sgt. Brown and Lt. Jackson did not

have direct authority over sanitation resources and staffing. Dkt. 38-2 ¶ 11; Dkt. 38-4 ¶ 15. Cpt.

Ernest does not recall ever receiving complaints from Mr. Bankhead about sanitation. Dkt. 38-3 ¶

13.

g. Mr. Bankhead's Injuries

Mr. Bankhead suffered minimal physical harm from the conditions of G Cellhouse. On one

occasion, he had to clean his cell with his own hands, without any gloves or cleaning supplies.

Dkt. 38-1 at 77:13-18.

III. DISCUSSION

Under the Eighth Amendment, "prisoners cannot be confined in inhumane conditions."

Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 720 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

832 (1994)). An Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim includes both an objective

and subjective component. Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1051 (7th Cir. 2019). Under the

objective component, a prisoner must show that the conditions were objectively serious and

created "an excessive risk to his health and safety." Id. Conditions of confinement count as

objectively serious when they deny a prisoner "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,"

such as sanitation and adequate shelter. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Thomas v.

Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 614 (7th Cir. 2012); Vinning–El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2007).

Under the subjective component, a prisoner must establish that the defendants had a culpable state

of mind—that they "were subjectively aware of these conditions and refused to take steps to correct

them, showing deliberate indifference." Thomas, 2 F.4th at 720.

Defendants argue that Mr. Bankhead's Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement

claims fail as a matter of law because (1) he has not alleged that he sustained physical injuries; (2)

the conditions were not objectively serious; (3) the Defendants did not subjectively disregard any

serious risks to his health; and (4) the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (Dkt. 39). As

explained below, the Court rejects these arguments.

A. Failure to Allege Physical Injury

Defendants argue that Mr. Bankhead fails to state a claim because he did not allege that he

was physically injured by the conditions-of-confinement at issue in this lawsuit. (Dkt. 39 at 11).

They claim that this omission is fatal to his entire lawsuit. But this is not the law. The Prison

Litigation Reform Act imposes a "limitation on recovery," stating that "[n]o Federal civil action

may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or

emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury[.]" 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(e). The Seventh Circuit has continuously interpreted this provision to mean that "a

prisoner cannot obtain compensatory damages without proving a physical injury." Thomas v.

Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 614 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, psychological harms

alone may still give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation and provide a basis for a civil action

for nominal and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief. Id. (citing Calhoun v. DeTella, 319

F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also Byrd v. Hobart, 761 F. App'x 621, 623 (7th Cir. 2019).3

3 Defendants argue that Calhoun is inapposite because the case involved conduct designed to demean and harass the

plaintiff, not "imperfect sanitation and intermittent pests." Dkt. 45 at 12. The specific Eighth Amendment violation at

issue in Calhoun, however, does not change the conclusion that the plain language of § 1997e(e) "limits recovery for

'mental and emotional injury,' but leaves unaffected claims for nominal and punitive damages, which seek to remedy

a different type of injury." 319 F.3d at 941. Indeed, Calhoun explicitly states that, similar to First Amendment and

Due Process claims, "the violation of a person's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment" is a standalone

injury. Id. Thus, "[b]ecause nominal damages are awarded to vindicate rights, not to compensate for resulting injuries,

Therefore, Mr. Bankhead's claim can survive even without an allegation that he suffered a physical

injury.

In addition, as Mr. Bankhead points out, he does allege that he suffered physical harm by

having to clean his cell without protective equipment and breathing in residual OC spray in the

showers. (Dkt. 61:21–62:7). He also alleges that the physical harm is evidenced by his healthcare

request form that references having to take antibiotics and being sick by living in the unsanitary

conditions. See dkt. 43 at 3; dkt. 44-1 at 22. Moreover, as will be discussed below, Mr. Bankhead

alleges that the conditions put him at risk of future harm to his health. The Seventh Circuit has

held that the Eighth Amendment protects prisoners "from an official's deliberate indifference to

conditions posing an unreasonable risk of serious damage to the prisoner's future health.

Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846–47 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509

U.S. 25, 33–35 (1993)); see also Byrd, 761 F. App'x at 623–24 (reversing and remanding district

court's grant of summary judgment for defendants because pest infestation presented unreasonable

risk of serious damage to plaintiff's health).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Bankhead adequately pled his Eighth Amendment

claims. First, the allegations that he suffered mental anguish suffice to state a claim even though

he will not be able to recover compensatory damages unless he also proves that he suffered

physical injuries. Second, Mr. Bankhead does allege that he suffered actual physical harm from

his exposure to the OC spray and that he suffered the risk of future harm from having to clean

without proper cleaning supplies and from being exposed to cockroaches, blood, feces, and OC

spray.

we hold that § 1997e(e) does not bar a suit seeking nominal damages to vindicate Eighth Amendment rights . . . For

similar reasons we believe that § 1997e(e) does not preclude claims for punitive damages for violations of the Eighth

Amendment." Id. at 942. Nowhere does Calhoun limit its holding to the specific facts of the case.

B. Whether the Conditions in Mr. Bankhead's Cell Were Objectively Serious

Defendants argue that Mr. Bankhead's cell conditions did not present an objectively serious

risk of harm to him because the Defendants had cleaning protocols, Mr. Bankhead did receive

cleaning supplies, all the fixtures in his cell were working, the pest infestation was not extreme,

and Mr. Bankhead could use his personal soap from his monthly indigent hygiene kit to clean his

cell. (Dkt. 39 at 11–12.) Defendants also argue that Mr. Bankhead has not adequately supported

his assertion that he suffered a risk of future harm beyond speculating about the dangers of pests.

(Dkt. 45 at 12–13).

Contrary to the Defendants' assertion that Mr. Bankhead has not effectively disputed their

version of events, the Court finds that his testimony and records create disputes of fact over the

seriousness of the conditions that he endured, which preclude summary judgment. For one,

Defendants mischaracterize Mr. Bankhead's deposition testimony by stating that insects were

merely "present." Mr. Bankhead testified in his deposition that he saw cockroaches crawling all

over his cell on a daily basis. Dkt. 38-1 at 35:12-15 ("you would see [cockroaches] daily because

you got trash out here, so it's accumulating roaches, they bringing the roaches out. So it's always

roaches running around."). Second, Mr. Bankhead's testimony about the infrequency of trash pick-

up supports his assertion that the cockroach problem was serious, and Defendants and Mr.

Bankhead have completely different stories about how often trash was picked up. Third, Mr.

Bankhead and Defendants also have opposing accounts of how often he was given cleaning

supplies as well as whether the showers were ever cleaned and whether they frequently had blood,

feces, and OC spray. Resolving these factual disputes at summary judgment is inappropriate.

See Johnson v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp. 892 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2018) ("As we

have said many times, summary judgment cannot be used to resolve swearing contests between

litigants.") (internal quotation omitted).

These disputed facts are material to the resolution of the case, because if a jury believes

Mr. Bankhead's version of events, then they could find that his cell conditions were objectively

serious for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment. This is because courts assessing the objective

severity of prison conditions must consider their nature, duration, and the harm caused to the

plaintiff, in conjunction. See Thomas, 697 F.3d at 614–15. Furthermore, "[s]ome conditions of

confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation in combination when each alone

would not do so" when they have a mutually enforcing effect that deprives the plaintiff of a human

need. Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006); Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005

(7th Cir. 2016); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991). Sanitation is a human need. See Budd

v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Gillis, 468 F.3d at 493; Vinning–El, 482 F.3d

at 924). Moreover, "[h]ygienic supplies sufficient to meet basic needs are constitutionally

required." Gray, 826 F.3d at 1006.

Here, the conditions by themselves might not meet the objectively serious threshold.

Nevertheless, for six months, Mr. Bankhead experienced constant exposure to cockroaches and

trash in his cell as well as blood, feces, and OC spray in the shower stalls. During these six months,

he was only given cleaning supplies around five to ten times. The cockroaches and trash reinforced

one another to produce unsanitary living quarters that Mr. Bankhead could not clean on a regular

basis. Though Mr. Bankhead could have used his monthly indigent hygiene kit, that would have

meant that he would not have the limited supply of soap to wash himself. In addition, Mr.

Bankhead's exposure to feces, blood, and OC spray in the shower stalls exacerbated his inability

to clean himself and his surroundings. Considering all these conditions together, for six months, a

jury could conclude that the cell conditions deprived Mr. Bankhead of adequate sanitation. See

Gray, 826 F.3d at 1005–06 (finding that extensive pests combined with the lack of adequate

cleaning supplies and broken windows satisfied the objective component of the plaintiff's Eighth

Amendment claim because each condition exacerbated the situation); Rodriguez v. Martz, 2023

WL 5431754, at *2 n.3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 2023) ("[A]s a matter of logic, a pest infestation

amplifies the harm caused by a denial of cleaning supplies, and a denial of cleaning supplies

suggests deliberate indifference to the harm caused by a pest infestation.").

The combination and duration of Mr. Bankhead's cell conditions also makes Defendants'

cases inapposite. For example, in Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh

Circuit found that an unpleasant odor, peeling paint, lack of air-conditioning, and occasional

cockroaches that were consistently sprayed did not violate the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment

rights.4 In contrast, Mr. Bankhead alleged a continuous infestation of cockroaches combined with

mutually reinforcing conditions that are much more severe than peeling paint and unpleasant odor.

Furthermore, the plaintiff in Sain acknowledged that an exterminator frequently sprayed his cell

for pests. Here, Mr. Bankhead has not adequately disputed that Lt. Jackson exterminated the

facility, but his testimony creates a dispute of fact over the frequency. Also, Lt. Jackson concedes

that he did not spray inmates' individual cells. Similarly, Munson v. Kink, 2022 WL 17844068, at

* 2 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 2022) affirmed summary judgment where the plaintiff only complained about

pests and conceded that the defendants hired a monthly exterminator. Last, Chandler v. Neal, 2023

WL 4295306, at *2 (N.D. Ind. June 30, 2023) granted summary judgment to the defendants

because undisputed evidence showed that the defendant, the warden, was not deliberately

4 In Sain, the Court applied the deliberate indifference standard of the Eighth Amendment to the plaintiff's claims

since it predated the Supreme Court's decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015). Sain, 512 F.3d at

893–94.

indifferent to the pest problem. The court did not analyze the objective component of the Eighth

Amendment.

Last, in their reply Defendants argue that Mr. Bankhead has not adequately supported his

assertion that the conditions of his cell created a significant risk of future harm aside from

speculating about the dangers of cockroaches. (Dkt. 45 at 12–13). Defendants rightly point out

that Mr. Bankhead cannot rely on speculation; he must show "'to a degree of reasonable medical

certainty' that he actually faced an increased risk of injury." Byrd, 761 F. App'x at 624 (quoting

Gray, 826 F.3d at 1007). For the purposes of surviving summary judgment, Mr. Bankhead has

done so. Mr. Bankhead submitted a letter from the Center for Disease Control concerning the long-

term health effects of exposure to OC spray, including breathing and vision issues. (Dkt. 44-1 at

475).5 He also testified about how OC spray in the small, enclosed shower stalls got in his eyes

and made it hard to breath once it interacted with the shower mist. See (Dkt. 61:21–62:7). Thus,

the record contains evidence that Mr. Bankhead inhaled OC spray in an enclosed area, supporting

an inference that he could suffer health effects from the exposure. Moreover, as Mr. Bankhead

points out in his response, courts have recognized that exposure to cockroaches, feces, and blood

carry significant risk of future harm. See Byrd, 761 F. App'x at 624 ("[C]ockroaches can transmit

bacteria that aggravate asthma and cause other disease . . . ."); Thomas, 697 F.3d at 615 (collecting

studies reflecting the physical harm from cohabitating with cockroaches); Shannon v. Graves, 257

F.3d 1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[E]xposure to the human waste of others carries a significant

risk of contracting infectious diseases.").

5 Mr. Bankhead's citation to the CDC's article about the Ectobius vittiventris species of cockroach in

Switzerland does not support an inference that he faced an increased risk of injury because it deals with a

specific kind of cockroach in Swiss hospitals.

In sum, taking all inferences in Mr. Bankhead's favor, a reasonable jury could conclude

that Mr. Bankhead faced objectively serious conditions of confinement that created an excessive

risk to his health and safety.

C. Whether the Defendants Were Deliberately Indifferent

Defendants argue that the record does not allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the

Defendants acted with deliberate indifference because they had cleaning protocols, such as "mop

out sweep out," Lt. Jackson sprayed pesticides on a regular basis, and the Defendants logged

concerns about cleanliness. (Dkt. 39 at 14). As seen above, however, Mr. Bankhead's testimony

and records dispute these facts. Mr. Bankhead testified that he repeatedly complained to all three

Defendants and that they told him to stop complaining and that if he wanted a clean cellhouse he

should not come to G Cellhouse. His requests for interview also show that he personally wrote to

Lt. Jackson and Cpt. Ernest about his issues with cleaning supplies, trash, and pests. He testified

that he did not see or experience the Defendants and their officers adhering to the cleaning

protocols on a regular basis and that he never saw anyone clean the showers. Furthermore, although

Mr. Bankhead's testimony is no doubt limited to his personal experience, he testified that he could

see the range, including the showers, through his cell door and his mirror. Moreover, the

Defendants' testimony is not entirely consistent regarding how the ranges and showers were

cleaned. Sgt. Brown testified that the officers cleaned the ranges, while Lt. Jackson and Cpt. Ernest

testified that a sanitation crew was primarily responsible for cleaning. And, Mr. Bankhead testified

that "detail workers," inmates who perform sanitation duties, were not assigned to G Cellhouse

during the events in the lawsuit. As stated above, these are all factual matters that cannot be

resolved at summary judgment.

Taking all inferences in Mr. Bankhead's favor, a jury could find that the Defendants'

responses to Mr. Bankhead's complaints, coupled with the sparse cleaning, trash pickup, and "mop

out sweep out," demonstrates that the Defendants knew about the unsanitary conditions and

refused to do anything to mitigate them. In this way, a jury could find that the Defendants did not

act reasonably to respond to the risk created by the unsanitary conditions. See, c.f., Thomas, 2 F.4th

at 721 (explaining that the plaintiff did not satisfy the subjective component of his Eighth

Amendment claim because the record showed that the defendants promptly gave him an unsoiled

mattress and cleaning supplies to deal with his unsanitary cell conditions).

D. Qualified Immunity

Last, the Defendants assert that they are protected by qualified immunity. "[Q]ualified

immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct 'does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'"

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).

"Once the defense of qualified immunity is raised, a defendant is entitled to dismissal unless a

plaintiff comes forward with facts showing a constitutional violation and law showing his right

was 'clearly established' at the time of the alleged violation." Thomas v. Carmichael, 164 F.4th

1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2026) (quoting Siddique v. Laliberte, 972 F.3d 898, 902-03 (7th Cir. 2020)).

"The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that a right was clearly established at the time the

alleged violation occurred." Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2017). That said, the

Seventh Circuit has stated that "a plaintiff's failure to cite a case on point is 'not fatal by itself[,]'"

and instead the court has a duty to "determine qualified immunity in light of all relevant

precedents—both those cited by the parties and those we discover ourselves.'" Taylor v.

Schwarzhuber, 132 F.4th 480, 487 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Kernats v. O'Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171,

1176-77 (7th Cir. 1994)).

The "clearly established" standard ensures "that officials can 'reasonably . . . anticipate

when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.'" Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664

(2012) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987)). To be "clearly established," a

constitutional right "must have a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent." District

of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). Given this emphasis on notice, clearly established

law cannot be framed at a "high level of generality." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011).

"A rule is too general if the unlawfulness of the officer's conduct 'does not follow immediately

from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.'" Wesby, 583 U.S. at

64 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641). While "a case directly on point" is not required,

"precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate." White v. Pauly, 580

U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (cleaned up). Put slightly differently, a right is clearly established only if "every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Taylor v.

Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015). "The Supreme Court's message is unmistakable: Frame the

constitutional right in terms granular enough to provide fair notice

because qualified immunity 'protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.'" Campbell v. Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 546 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes,

584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (quotation marks omitted)). Qualified immunity thus "balances two

important interests— the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power

irresponsibly and the need to shield officers from harassment, distraction, and liability when they

perform their duties reasonably." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

This opinion has already described several Seventh Circuit opinions which are factually

similar to Mr. Bankhead's sanitation claim and predate it. Gray, 826 F.3d at 1005 (finding that

"myriad infestations" combined with a "lack of access to adequate cleaning supplies" deprived the

plaintiff "of the basic human need of rudimentary sanitation in violation of the Eighth Amendment"

where the plaintiff alleged that he encountered roaches, birds left droppings, mice ate his food, and

he only got a watered-down disinfectant spray); see also Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139–40

(7th Cir. 1989) (reversing summary judgment where prisoner was denied cleaning supplies and

confined for three days to cell that was smeared with human waste and lacked running water);

Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8–9 (2020) (denying qualified immunity because it was clearly

established that housing prisoners in cells with large amounts of human waste, even for only six

days, could violate the Eighth Amendment); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1433 (7th Cir.

1996) (only spraying for pests twice in sixteen months showed deliberate indifference when the

plaintiff complained of a severe infestation that impacted his sleep); Hardeman v. Curry, 933 F.3d

816, 821 (7th Cir. 2019) ("continued exposure to human excrement can violate the Eighth

Amendment.") (citing DeSpain, v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974-75 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Exposure to

human waste, like few other conditions of confinement, evokes both the health concerns

emphasized in Farmer and the more general standards of dignity embodied in the Eighth

Amendment.")). Furthermore, as seen above, the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly stressed that even

though some conditions may not violate the Eighth Amendment in isolation, mutually reinforcing

combined conditions violate the Eighth Amendment when they deprive the plaintiff of a basic

human need, such as sanitation. See Gillis, 468 F.3d at 493; Gray, 826 F.3d at 1005.

The Eighth Amendment violations that Mr. Bankhead alleges were therefore clearly

established when they occurred in 2023. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to qualified

immunity.

IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons explained in this Order, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,

Dkt. [37] is DENIED. This matter remains scheduled for Final Pretrial Conference on January

13, 2027 and trial by jury on February 8, 2027. Mr. Bankhead's Eighth Amendment claims will

have to be resolved through settlement or trial.

The Court reconsiders its previous denial of Mr. Bankhead's request to recruit counsel.

(Dkt. 16). Because his claims have survived summary judgment, Mr. Bankhead's Motion to

Appoint Counsel, Dkt. [12], is GRANTED to the extent that the Court will attempt to recruit

counsel to help Mr. Bankhead resolve this case through settlement or trial.

Once the Court recruits counsel, the Magistrate Judge is asked to schedule a telephonic

status conference to discuss further proceedings.

IT ISSO ORDERED.

Date: 5/18/2026 O Watton rath

Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

ACTORA MECONN BANKHEAD

914468

PENDLETON - CF

PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Electronic Service Participant — Court Only

20

James Bolen

Lewis and Wilkins LLP

bolen@lewisandwilkins.com

Eric Ryan Shouse

Lewis and Wilkins LLP

shouse@lewisandwilkins.com

Magistrate Judge Tim Baker