White

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

THEODORE WHITE, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 26-3138-SEM-DJQ

)

TYSON HOLSHOUSER, et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Theodore White, proceeding pro se, is an inmate with

the Illinois Department of Corrections currently incarcerated at the

Vienna Correctional Center. However, the alleged wrongs committed

against Plaintiff that form the basis for this lawsuit stem from his

arrest and detention in Montgomery County, Illinois. The Court

granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and the case is

now before the Court for a merit review of his claims.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on April 23, 2024, he was in Hillsboro,

Illinois, to attend the jury trial of Robert Tarr, which was being held

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at the Montgomery County courthouse. During the trial’s lunch

break, Plaintiff went across the street to his “air B&B hotel room” at

the Red Rooster Brewery. While in his room, 14 or more officers of

the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department barged in and

arrested him. Plaintiff alleges that there was no warrant for his

arrest and no probable cause to support the arrest. When he asked

why he was being arrested, no answer was provided. All of Plaintiff’s

gold jewelry was stolen from the hotel room, though he does not

explain when or by whom.

Plaintiff was subsequently transported to the Montgomery

County Jail, where he was held until late at night on April 27, 2024.

He was never brought before a court, for a probable cause hearing

or otherwise. No charges were ever filed.

Plaintiff’s vehicle was towed from the Red Rooster, and no one

told him where it was, who towed it, or how he could get it back.

Further, his wallet and cell phone were “kept, by Montgomery Co.

Sheriff’s Dept., because they told me ‘they wanted to hold onto

them.’” It was approximately six weeks before Plaintiff was able to

retrieve those items. Further, upon his release, Plaintiff was “forced

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to walk 12 miles” to Litchfield, Illinois, where he arranged for money

to be wired to him so that he could pay for a hotel room.

Plaintiff inquired about his wallet and cell phone with a judge

when he appeared in court in the apparently unrelated Case No.

2022-CF-388 in Montgomery County. The judge responded that he

did not know Plaintiff had even been arrested.

Plaintiff names three Defendants in his Complaint: John Doe,

Montgomery County Sheriff Tyson Holshouser, and Montgomery

County State’s Attorney Andrew P. Affrunti.

Throughout his Complaint, Plaintiff references a singular John

Doe, apparently as a stand-in for the 14 or more officers who

participated in his arrest. Plaintiff accuses Doe of arresting him

without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Plaintiff further alleges that Doe subjected him to cruel and

unusual punishment, deprived him of due process, and violated his

right to equal protection of the laws.

Plaintiff raises similar claims against Holshouser. Plaintiff

maintains that Holshouser knew that there was no probable cause

for his arrest or the seizure of his possessions. He contends that

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Holshouser failed in his obligation to bring Plaintiff before a court

for a probable cause determination within a reasonable amount of

time following his arrest. Plaintiff alleges that Holshouser’s

withholding of his wallet and cell phone for six weeks amounted to

cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, Plaintiff accuses

Holshouser of an equal protection violation.

Plaintiff asserts that Affrunti “was obviously aware” that

Plaintiff was arrested without probable cause and was held in jail

without charges. “Affrunti knew exactly what was happening,”

Plaintiff alleges, “because in a town that small he had to know who

was arrested[.]” Plaintiff maintains that Affrunti, no less than

Holshouser, had a duty to bring Plaintiff before the court in a

reasonable amount of time following his arrest.

Analysis

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must “screen”

Plaintiff’s complaint and, through such process, identify and

dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if

warranted. A claim is defective if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In reviewing a complaint, the court accepts the

factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the

plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir.

2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient.

Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422

(7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Statute of Limitations

“Generally, the failure to file a lawsuit within the applicable

statute of limitations period is an affirmative defense that must be

asserted and proven by a defendant.” Bracey v. Jackson, 2024 WL

173520, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2024); United States v. Lewis, 411

F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005), as amended on denial of reh’g and

reh’g en banc (Aug. 11, 2005) (“[C]omplaints do not have to

anticipate affirmative defenses to survive a motion to dismiss.”).

“The exception occurs where . . . the allegations of the complaint

itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative

defense, such as when a complaint plainly reveals that an action is

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untimely under the governing statute of limitations.” Lewis, 411

F.3d at 842. Thus, “a district court may dismiss a plaintiff’s

complaint at the merit review stage of the case on statute of

limitations grounds if the defense is obvious from the complaint.”

Bracey, 2024 WL 173520, at *1.

The “limitations period applicable to § 1983 actions brought in

Illinois is the two-year period for general personal injury actions set

forth in 735 ILCS 5/13-202.” Woods v. Illinois Dep’t of Child. & Fam.

Servs., 710 F.3d 762, 766 (7th Cir. 2013). In the instant case,

Plaintiff’s claim against John Doe for his unlawful seizure (and the

unlawful seizure of his property) accrued on the day of his arrest,

April 23, 2024. See Wallace v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 421, 425

(7th Cir. 2006) (“When a person’s Fourth Amendment rights have

been violated by a false arrest, the injury occurs at the time of the

arrest.”). Precise accrual dates for Plaintiff’s other claims against

Defendant Doe are difficult to pin down, given the undeveloped

nature of those claims; but, in any event, those claims would have

accrued, at the latest, four days after his arrest.

While Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on April 23, 2026—exactly

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two years from his arrest—Plaintiff’s use of a John Doe placeholder

creates a statute of limitations issue. “[A] plaintiff who uses

placeholders must take account of the clock: substitution must be

completed before the statute of limitations expires.” Rodriguez v.

McCloughen, 49 F.4th 1120, 1121 (7th Cir. 2022).1 In Rodriguez,

the court observed that the plaintiff “dug a hole for himself by not

filing suit until time was almost up[,]” pointing out that “[t]he

search occurred on November 2, 2016, and the complaint is dated

October 24, 2018.” Id.

Plaintiff in this case has dug an even deeper hole, naming a

John Doe defendant in his Complaint the day before the limitations

period governing the main claim against that defendant expired. At

this point, any amendment of Plaintiff’s Complaint naming the

officer (or officers) who arrested him would fall necessarily outside

of the statute of limitations. Under Seventh Circuit precedent,

because the replacement of a John Doe defendant will not “relate

1 As the Rodriguez court explained, this well-settled rule derives from Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), which allows the “relation back” of an

amended complaint where there was a mistake concerning the proper party’s

identity. “[T]he definition of ‘mistake’ under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) does not extend

to a John Doe scenario.” Herrera v. Cleveland, 8 F.4th 493, 498 (7th Cir. 2021).

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back” to the date of the original complaint, Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendant Doe are time-barred. See, e.g., Herrera, 8 F.4th at 494

(finding that prisoner-plaintiff’s amended complaint, replacing John

Doe defendants, did not relate back to original complaint and was

therefore untimely); Baskin v. City of Des Plaines, 138 F.3d 701,

704 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Mr. Baskin did not make a mistake concerning

Officer Sotirakis’ identity when he filed his original complaint; he

simply did not know the identity of the police officer who pulled him

over on January 26, 1995. Accordingly, when Mr. Baskin later

amended his complaint to name Officer Sotirakis as a defendant,

that amendment did not relate back to the filing of his original

complaint. Thus, because Mr. Baskin did not amend his complaint

to name Officer Sotirakis as a defendant until after the statute of

limitations had expired, the district court properly dismissed his

complaint against Officer Sotirakis as untimely.”).

Finally, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not present any basis upon

which the statute of limitations might be equitably tolled.

“Equitable tolling halts the limitations clock ‘when a litigant has

pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary circumstance

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prevents him from bringing a timely action.’” Herrera, 8 F.4th at

499 (quoting Xanthopoulos v. United States Dep’t of Lab., 991 F.3d

823, 831 (7th Cir. 2021)).

To be sure, “when a pro se incarcerated plaintiff seeks to

identify unknown defendants and has filed a motion that would

help him identify those defendants, and the statute of limitations

expires while the motion is pending, equitable tolling can be

appropriate.” Bryant v. City of Chicago, 746 F.3d 239, 243 (7th Cir.

2014) (finding that the district court “should have equitably tolled

the statute of limitations because Mr. Bryant acted with reasonable

diligence to obtain the missing information”). But Plaintiff here has

not described any attempts to identify any one of the 14 (or more)

officers who arrested him that he has made in the last two years—a

span of time which includes a period in which Plaintiff was not

incarcerated. By filing his Complaint at the last possible moment,

Plaintiff has precluded himself from filing the type of motion at

issue in Bryant, or otherwise learning the needed identities through

discovery. See Spears v. City of Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 157 (7th

Cir. 1996) (“When parties wait until the last minute to comply with

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a deadline, they are playing with fire.”).

In sum, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant John Doe are

time-barred because (1) Plaintiff can no longer substitute the proper

party within the statute of limitations, and (2) there is no basis for

the equitable tolling of the limitations period. Accordingly,

Defendant John Doe is DISMISSED as a defendant in this case.

Claims Against Holshouser

Plaintiff attempts to hold Holshouser himself liable for

Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest. But he does not allege that Holshouser

participated in the arrest or that Holshouser even knew Plaintiff

was being arrested, let alone knew that he was being arrested

without probable cause. It is well-settled that Ҥ 1983 lawsuits

against individuals require personal involvement in the alleged

constitutional deprivation to support a viable claim.” Palmer v.

Marion Cnty., 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003).2 Holshouser’s role

as sheriff does not meaningfully change the analysis, as supervisors

2 Though Plaintiff references Defendant Holshouser’s “official capacity” in his

Complaint, he includes no allegations that support—or even hint at—municipal

liability under an official capacity theory. See Luck v. Rovenstine, 168 F.3d 323,

326 (7th Cir. 1999) (detailing requirements for prevailing on an official capacity

claim against a county sheriff).

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will only be held liable under § 1983 where they are “personally

involved in the constitutional violation.” Bostic v. Murray, 160 F.4th

831, 841 (7th Cir. 2025). Plaintiff has not alleged that Holshouser

was involved in his arrest, either directly or indirectly. Plaintiff’s

claims of unlawful arrest against Holshouser will therefore be

dismissed.

Plaintiff’s unreasonable detention claim against Defendant

Holshouser fares better. “It is well-established that ‘the Fourth

Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of probable

cause as a prerequisite for detention.’” Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d

517, 527 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,

126 (1975)). This ordinarily requires a judicial determination of

probable cause within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest. Currie v.

Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626, 627 (7th Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff has alleged that he was held for four to five days

without being taken to court for a probable cause hearing.

Moreover, Plaintiff has alleged that Holshouser had personal

knowledge that there was no probable cause supporting Plaintiff’s

continued detention, which would satisfy the personal involvement

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requirement. See Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir.

1995) (“An official satisfies the personal responsibility requirement

of section 1983 if the conduct causing the constitutional

deprivation occurs at his direction or with his knowledge and

consent.” (cleaned up)); cf. Luck v. Rovenstine, 168 F.3d 323, 327

(7th Cir. 1999) (finding sheriff’s lack of actual knowledge of the

plaintiff’s unlawful detention sufficient to defeat individual capacity

claim for Gerstein violation).

The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim

against Holshouser for unlawful detention under the Fourth

Amendment.

As for Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, he alleges that

Holshouser subjected him to “cruel and unusual

punishment/treatment” when his wallet and cell phone were

withheld following Plaintiff’s release from the county jail.

“The Eighth Amendment protects convicted prisoners from

cruel and unusual punishments.” Perkins v. Johnston, 431 F. Supp.

2d 898, 901 (N.D. Ind. 2006) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,

535 n.16 (1979)). Thus, Plaintiff’s “Eighth Amendment claim falls

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away because that amendment applies only to a convicted prisoner

rather than a pretrial detainee whose rights receive the protection of

due process.” Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 570 (7th Cir.

1998).

To the extent Plaintiff may be claiming that the confiscation of

his keys and wallet amounted to a due process violation, he has

failed to allege that Holshouser himself played any role therein. He

alleges that, upon his release, his cell phone and wallet were “kept,

by Montgomery Co. Sheriff’s Dept., because they told me ‘they

wanted to hold onto them.’”

Finally, “to state a claim for equal protection based on race,

Plaintiff must allege that ‘he is a member of a protected class, that

he is otherwise similarly situated to members of the unprotected

class, and that he was treated differently from members of the

unprotected class.’” Martin v. City of Chicago, 2017 WL 782992, at

*3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2017) (quoting Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904,

916 (7th Cir. 2005)). While Plaintiff has alleged that he is Black, he

does not allege that he was treated differently—by anyone—from

otherwise similarly situated white arrestees. Nor has he alleged any

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facts from which it might be plausibly alleged that his race was the

basis of any of the conduct alleged herein. His equal protection

claim must be dismissed.

Claims Against Affrunti

Plaintiff cannot state a claim against Affrunti for unlawful

detention based on a Gerstein violation. Affrunti did not cause or

participate in Plaintiff’s detention in the county jail. See Hinsdale v.

Vill. of Westchester, Illinois, 2017 WL 991489, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar.

15, 2017); see also Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 579 (“[J]ailers hold not

only the keys to the jail cell, but also the knowledge of who sits in

the jail and for how long they have sat there. They are the ones

directly depriving detainees of liberty. . . . The jail acts at its own

peril if it passes responsibility off on another party—whether the

courts or the prosecutor.”).

Still, Plaintiff has alleged that Affrunti knew Plaintiff had been

arrested and knew that he had not been charged or brought to

court. In other words, Affrunti knew that there was Gerstein

violation in process, but did nothing.

“A failure to intervene under § 1983 requires only that

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plaintiffs allege that the defendants knew that a constitutional

violation was committed and had a realistic opportunity to prevent

it.” Fulton v. Bartik, 547 F. Supp. 3d 799, 816 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (citing

Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 342 (7th Cir. 2017)).

“Failure to intervene claims can cast a wide participant net[,]”

including prosecutors. Id. at 817 (finding the plaintiff stated a claim

for failure to intervene where it could be plausibly inferred that

prosecutors had opportunity to intervene); see Heidelberg v. Manias,

503 F. Supp. 3d 758, 791 (C.D. Ill. 2020) (advancing failure to

intervene claim against prosecutors past dismissal stage).

The court can plausibly infer that Affrunti, as State’s Attorney

for Montgomery County, even more so than a rank-and-file

prosecutor, had the realistic opportunity to arrange for detainees in

the county jail to be brought before the court. Accordingly, the

court finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim against Affrunti for

failing to intervene in his unlawful detention.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Pursuant to its review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

Complaint states a claim for (a) a violation of his Fourth

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Amendment right to be free from unlawful detention against

Defendant Tyson Holshouser, and (b) a failure to intervene in that

violation by Defendant Andrew P. Affrunti. Any additional claims

shall not be included in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on

motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2. The Clerk is directed to DISMISS John Doe as a

defendant in this case.

3. The Clerk is directed to effect service of process on

Defendants Holshouser and Affrunti pursuant to the Court’s

standard procedures.

4. This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is

advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before

filing any motions in order to give Defendants notice and an

opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be

denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the

Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.

5. The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing

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waivers of service to them. Defendants have sixty (60) days from the

date the waiver is sent to file an answer. If Defendants have not

filed answers or appeared through counsel within ninety (90) days

of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the

status of service. After Defendants have been served, the Court will

enter an Order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

6. With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the

address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant

worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said

Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, said

Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used

only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding

addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be

maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

7. Defendants shall file an answer within sixty (60) days of

the date the waiver is sent by the Clerk. A motion to dismiss is not

an answer. The answer should include all defenses appropriate

under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings

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shall be to the issues and claims stated in this opinion. In general,

an answer sets forth Defendants’ positions. The Court does not rule

on the merits of those positions unless and until a motion is filed by

Defendants. Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary or

will be considered.

8. This District uses electronic filing, which means that,

after defense counsel has filed an appearance, defense counsel will

automatically receive electronic notice of any motion or other paper

filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to

defense counsel copies of motions and other papers that Plaintiff

has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to discovery

requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not

filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and

responses directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or

responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled, unless they are

attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does

not begin until defense counsel has filed an appearance and the

Court has entered a Scheduling Order, which will explain the

discovery process in more detail.

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9. Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose

Plaintiff at his place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants shall

arrange the time for the deposition.

10. Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of

any change in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s

failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address or phone

number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice.

11. If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service

to the Clerk within thirty (30) days after the waiver is sent, the

Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through

the U.S. Marshal Service on that Defendant and will require that

Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

12. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified

protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act.

ENTERED May 19, 2026.

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s/ Sue E. Myerscough

________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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