EVANS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EDUARDO LEE HOOVER, SR.,

2:25-CV-00440-CCW

Plaintiff,

v.

TYLER EVANS, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION

Before the Court are Motions to Dismiss by Defendants Officer Tyler Evans, Chief

Matthew Tharp, and the Board of Supervisors of Mount Pleasant Township: George Rice, Gray

Farner, and Shane Maga (collectively, “Mount Pleasant Defendants”), ECF No. 22, and by

Officer Michael Pasquale, Chief Bernie Larue, and the Board of Supervisors of Smith Township:

Robert Cassidy, Timothy Green, Marie Ferguson (collectively, “Smith Defendants”), ECF No.

24. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the Mount Pleasant Defendants’ Motion

and will grant in part and deny in part the Smith Defendants’ Motion.

I. Background

This case stems from the officer-involved shooting and death of Eduardo Lee Hoover, Jr.

on the evening of April 2, 2023. ECF Nos. 16 ¶ 18, 23 at 2–3. The Plaintiff, Eduardo Lee

Hoover, Sr., is the father of the decedent, and brings this action as the administrator of the estate

of Mr. Hoover, Jr. ECF No. 16 ¶ 1. Defendants Officer Tyler Evans and Chief Matthew Sharp

are employed by the Mount Pleasant Township Police Department in Washington County,

Pennsylvania. Id. ¶¶ 4–6. Defendants Officer Michael Pasquale and Chief Bernie Larue are

employed by the Smith Township Police Department in Washington County, Pennsylvania. Id.

¶¶ 8–11. The remaining Defendants make up the Boards of Supervisors for Mount Pleasant

Township and Smith Township, respectively, at the time of the incident at issue. Id. ¶¶ 7, 12.

Mr. Hoover, Sr. has voluntarily withdrawn several claims, 1 and the remaining claims in

the operative Amended Complaint are: a § 1983 excessive-force claim under the Fourth

Amendment against Officer Evans in his individual capacity (Count I); a § 1983 claim against

Officer Pasquale in his individual capacity for unlawful deadly force under the Fourth

Amendment (Count II) and state-created danger under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count III); §

1983 Monell municipal liability claims against Mount Pleasant Board of Supervisors, Chief

Tharp, the Smith Board of Supervisors, and Chief Larue,2 all in their official capacities, based on

alleged policy and training failures (Counts IV and V); and state-law survival and wrongful

death claims against all Defendants (Counts VI and VII).3 See ECF No. 16.

The following factual allegations are accepted as true. On April 2, 2023, Mr. Hoover, Jr.

left his home in Burgettstown Borough driving a vehicle. Id. ¶ 18. A neighbor then called 911

to report Mr. Hoover, Jr. for driving recklessly. Id. ¶ 20. Officer Evans and Officer Pasquale

responded to a 911 dispatch and began to follow Mr. Hoover, Jr. on State Route 18 South, a two-

1 In his briefs in opposition to the Motions to Dismiss, Mr. Hoover, Sr. has expressly withdrawn his claims against

Officers Evans and Pasquale in their official capacities (portions of Counts I–III), and against Chiefs Tharp and

Larue in their in individual capacities (portions of Counts IV and V). See ECF No. 32 at 2; 33 at 4, 10.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss those claims as withdrawn.

2 The parties dispute whether the Monell counts in the Amended Complaint name Mount Pleasant Township and

Smith Township as Defendants. See ECF No. 25 at 15–17; ECF No. 32 ¶ 2. Mr. Hoover, Sr. asserts that the

Townships themselves are not named as Defendants in this case. ECF No. 32 ¶ 2. The Smith Defendants contend

that Smith Township is individually named in the headings of Counts IV and V within the Amended Complaint and,

accordingly, the claims against Chief Larue and the Smith Board of Supervisors are redundant of Monell claims

against Smith Township. ECF No. 25 at 15–17. The caption of the Amended Complaint does not include the

Townships themselves as Defendants. Nor does the “Parties” section of the Amended Complaint identify the

Townships themselves as Defendants. Mr. Hoover, Sr. neither requested a summons for nor served either

Township. However, because the headings of Counts IV and V do name the Townships, the Amended Complaint

creates some ambiguity as drafted. Having reviewed the case caption, the body of the Amended Complaint, and in

light of Plaintiff’s representations regarding the parties it intended to sue, the Court concludes that the Townships

themselves are not named Defendants in this case.

3 The Court has jurisdiction over the § 1983 claims, which raise federal questions, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and may

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

lane road. Id. ¶ 21. A chase ensued, joined by several other officers. Id. ¶ 25. During the chase,

Mr. Hoover, Jr.’s speed at times reached 80 miles per hour. Id. ¶ 28. His blood alcohol content

(“BAC”) was later determined to be .279, more than three times the legal limit for driving in

Pennsylvania. Id. The chase lasted approximately 17 minutes. Id. ¶ 29. During the chase, Mr.

Hoover, Jr. occasionally slowed to accommodate other vehicles. Id. ¶ 30. In the 600 block of

Jefferson Avenue in the city of Washington, PA, Officer Pasquale maneuvered his vehicle to

block Mr. Hoover, Jr.’s truck. Id. ¶¶ 30–31. Mr. Hoover, Jr. came to a complete stop, and

Officer Evans moved his vehicle behind Mr. Hoover, Jr., boxing his truck in. Id. ¶ 32–33.

Officer Pasquale exited his vehicle and pointed his firearm at Mr. Hoover, Jr., who was unarmed.

Id. ¶ 34. Mr. Hoover, Jr. placed his vehicle in reverse, striking Officer Evans’ vehicle. Id. ¶ 36.

At that time, Officer Evans was seated inside his vehicle. Id. ¶ 41. Either before or after Mr.

Hoover, Jr. struck Officer Evans’ vehicle, Officer Pasquale fired two shots to “disable” Mr.

Hoover, Jr.’s vehicle. Id. ¶ 35. Panicked, Mr. Hoover, Jr. pulled his vehicle forward, striking a

telephone pole. Id. ¶ 43. He then turned his steering wheel to the left and again placed the car in

reverse, accelerating slowly in an attempt to escape the officers. Id. ¶ 44. Officer Evans, still

seated in his vehicle behind Mr. Hoover, Jr.’s vehicle, exited his vehicle and fired two shots to

the head and neck of Mr. Hoover, Jr., killing him. Id. ¶ 46. Simultaneously, Officer Pasquale

fired two additional shots at Mr. Hoover, Jr. Id. ¶ 47. Mr. Hoover, Jr. was pronounced dead at

the scene. Id. ¶ 48.

The Smith Defendants now seek to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis that that Plaintiff fails to state a claim. ECF No.

24. The Mount Pleasant Defendants seek partial dismissal of the claims against Chief Tharp and

the Mount Pleasant Board of Supervisors in their official capacities. ECF No. 22.

II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of a claim. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true a complaint’s

factual allegations and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Phillips v.

Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need not contain

detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, it cannot rest on mere labels and

conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Id. Accordingly, “[f]actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” id., and be

“sufficient . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has established a three-step

process for district courts to follow in analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion: First, the court must

“tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should

assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for

relief.” Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v.

Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). That said, under Rule 8’s notice pleading

standard, even after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff need only

“allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her

claims.” Connolly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 788–89 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that “at

least for purposes of pleading sufficiency, a complaint need not establish a prima facie case in

order to survive a motion to dismiss.”).

III. Analysis

A. Mr. Hoover, Sr. Has Sufficiently Stated Claims of Excessive and/or Unlawful

Deadly Force Under the 4th Amendment (Counts I and II)

Mr. Hoover, Sr. asserts excessive force and unlawful deadly force claims against Officers

Evans and Pasquale in their individual capacities.4 To state an excessive force claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, “a complainant must, among other things, allege that the force used was

unreasonable.” Rodriguez v. Trenton Police Dep’t, 828 F. App’x 851, 852 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing

Brower v. Inyo Cnty., 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989)). And “to determine whether an officer’s use of

force was unreasonable, a court must consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances leading

up to the time that the officers allegedly used excessive force.” Id. (cleaned up). Thus, to

evaluate an excessive force claim, the Court looks at “whether a constitutional violation has

occurred using the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness test.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795

F.3d 410, 417 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). In

conducting this assessment, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight.” Cty. of L.A. v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 428 (2017) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at

396); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 207 (2001) (“Excessive force claims . . . are

evaluated for objective reasonableness based upon the information the officers had when the

conduct occurred.”).

4 The Court analyzes the “unlawful deadly force” claim under the same Fourth Amendment excessive force

framework. See Smith v. Grandsen, No. 08-4517 JEI, 2011 WL 5080320, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2011) (citing

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (“[T]here can be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force

is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”).

The Fourth Amendment excessive force “inquiry is highly individualized and fact

specific[.]” Santini, 795 F.3d at 417. There are several factors that the Third Circuit has said

district courts may consider when evaluating the reasonableness of a particular use of force,

including:

(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an imminent

threat to the safety of the police or others in the vicinity, and (3) whether the

suspect attempts to resist arrest or flee the scene . . . [and] [4] the possibility that

the persons subject to the police action are themselves violent or dangerous, [5]

the duration of the action, [6] whether the action takes place in the context of

effecting an arrest, [7] the possibility that the suspect may be armed, and [8] the

number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time.

Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (factors (1) through (3)) and quoting Sharrar v. Felsing, 128

F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997) (abrogated on other grounds) (factors [4] through [8]) (numbering

added)). Finally, this “inquiry is dispositive: When an officer carries out a seizure that is

reasonable, taking into account all relevant circumstances, there is no valid excessive force

claim.” Mendez, 581 U.S. at 428.

Here, accepting the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint as true and viewing

them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude at this stage that the

actions of the officers were objectively reasonable. See Rodriguez, 828 F. App’x at 852. The

Amended Complaint asserts that Mr. Hoover, Jr. led officers in a seventeen-minute chase with a

BAC of .279 and speeds reaching 80 miles per hour. ECF No. 16 ¶¶ 25–29. At the conclusion

of the chase, Mr. Hoover, Jr. came to a complete stop, and his vehicle was boxed in by the

officers. Id. ¶¶ 32–33. The Complaint further alleges that Officer Pasquale fired two shots at

Mr. Hoover, Jr.’s vehicle to “disable” it, and that Mr. Hoover, Jr., panicked by the gun fire,

pulled forward into a telephone pole and then slowly attempted to maneuver backward and

forward again to escape the officers. Id. ¶¶ 43–45. The Amended Complaint contends that the

manner and speed of Mr. Hoover, Jr.’s movements should suggest that Mr. Hoover, Jr. did not

intend to strike any officer or police cruiser. Id. The Amended Complaint further alleges that

Mr. Hoover, Jr. was unarmed, made no threats of violence, and gave no indication that he

possessed a weapon. Id. ¶ 34. Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the

Court concludes that the record as currently developed is unclear as to whether Mr. Hoover, Jr.

reasonably represented an imminent threat to the officers or others in the vicinity at the time the

officers discharged their weapons, ultimately striking and killing Mr. Hoover, Jr. Id. ¶ 34; see

Santini, 795 F.3d at 417.

Defendants correctly assert that the Amended Complaint pleads facts that support

dismissal, such as Mr. Hoover, Jr.’s high speeds, his BAC, and the collisions that occurred at the

conclusion of the chase, including with Officer Evans’ vehicle. ECF No. 25 at 6–7. But these

facts are insufficient to resolve the excessive force claims in Defendants’ favor at this early

stage. The Amended Complaint suggests that the danger presented by the chase was no longer

present at the time Mr. Hoover Jr. stopped his vehicle, boxed in by the officers and unarmed.

See generally ECF No. 16. These allegations plausibly allege that the officers’ use of force was

objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment in light of the totality of the

circumstances. See Jefferson v. Lias, 21 F.4th 74, 78–80 (3d Cir. 2021) (reversing the district

court’s grant of summary judgment and holding that a reasonable jury could find that the use of

deadly force against a fleeing motorist unconstitutional where a reasonable officer may not have

believed the driver posed an immediate threat); see also Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 290

(3d Cir. 1999) (reversing the district court and holding that the jury should have the opportunity

to make factual determinations regarding an officer’s decision to employ deadly force against a

fleeing suspect, stating “since we lack a clearly defined rule for declaring when conduct is

unreasonable in a specific context, we rely on the consensus required by a jury decision to help

ensure that the ultimate legal judgment of ‘reasonableness’ is itself reasonable and widely

shared.”). Thus, Plaintiff has stated a claim for excessive force.

The Smith Defendants argue in the alternative that Officer Pasquale is entitled to

qualified immunity. ECF No. 25 at 7–10. “[G]overnment officials performing discretionary

functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citations omitted). At the

motion to dismiss stage, government officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the

facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show a constitutional violation, and (2) the

alleged constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the violation. Thomas v. City of

Harrisburg, 88 F.4th 275, 281 (3d Cir. 2023). Courts may address these two prongs in any

order. Lozano v. New Jersey, 9 F.4th 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2021). Courts have interpreted “clearly

established” to mean that officers “are on notice their conduct is unlawful” prior to bringing a

lawsuit against them. Thomas, 88 F.4th at 281 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). A right is

clearly established where it “is sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that

what he is doing violates that [constitutional] right.” Id. at 284 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 231).

Moreover, officers bear the burden of establishing their entitlement to qualified immunity at the

motion to dismiss stage. Deivert v. Zartman, No. 4:23-CV-01964, 2025 WL 83747, at *4 (M.D.

Pa. Jan. 13, 2025) (citing Mitros v. Cooke, 170 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (E.D. Pa. 2001)); see also

Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 223 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The burden of establishing entitlement to

qualified immunity is on [the defendant].”).

The Third Circuit has acknowledged that “the imperative to decide qualified immunity

issues early in the litigation is in tension with the reality that factual disputes often need to be

resolved before determining whether the defendant’s conduct violated a clearly established

right.” Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2022). Here, the Court finds that the factual

record is insufficiently developed to determine whether Officers Pasquale and Evans are entitled

to qualified immunity. There are insufficient facts regarding the initiation of the pursuit, its

conclusion, and the specific events that led to the discharge of the officers’ weapons for the

Court to determine what the officers did or did not know at the time they acted. Thus, deciding

whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity at this time would be premature.

Vanderhoff v. City of Nanticoke, No. 3:18-cv-1071, 2018 WL 4565673, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 24,

2018) (denying motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity because “[a]t this stage of the

proceedings, it does not appear that qualified immunity exists as a matter of law on the face of

the Second Amended Complaint”); Newland v. Reehorst, 328 F. App’x 788, 791 n.3 (3d Cir.

2009) (“[I]t is generally unwise to venture into a qualified immunity analysis at the pleadings

stage as it is necessary to develop the factual record in the vast majority of cases.”); Janwoski v.

City of N. Wildwood, 259 F. Supp. 3d 113, 122–25 (D.N.J. 2017) (“[T]he totality of the

circumstances known to the officer must be established on the face of the complaint in order for

this Court to carry out its qualified immunity analysis.”). For the foregoing reasons, the Court

concludes that Mr. Hoover, Sr. has pled facts sufficient to state claims of excessive force against

Officers Evans and Pasquale in their individual capacities in Counts I and II.

B. The Amended Complaint Fails to Sufficiently Allege Monell Liability

(Counts IV and V)

In the Amended Complaint, Mr. Hoover, Sr. alleges Monell claims against the Chiefs of

Police and Boards of Supervisors for Mount Pleasant Township and Smith Township, arguing

that these Defendants failed to have policies in place which “adequately addressed the

reasonableness of shooting at fleeing motor vehicles[,]” and failed to adequately train Officers

Pasquale and Evans. ECF No. 16 at 15–17. As a threshold matter, the Court must address

whether the Defendants are properly named for the purpose of bringing Monell claims. Mr.

Hoover, Sr. does not name either Township in the case caption and, in briefing, affirmatively

states that he is not bringing suit against the Townships themselves. See supra note 2. That

position is in conflict with Mr. Hoover, Sr.’s apparent attempt to bring Monell claims against

municipal actors in their official capacities. “A suit against a governmental official in his or her

official capacity is treated as a suit against the governmental entity itself.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v.

Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 580 (3d Cir. 2004). Thus, to the extent Mr. Hoover,

Sr. asserts official-capacity claims against the Townships’ Chiefs of Police, those claims are

properly understood as claims against the corresponding municipalities, Smith Township and

Mount Pleasant Township, and are not properly brought against the Chiefs. As explained below,

however, these Monell claims fail on their merits. In addition to the Chiefs, Mr. Hoover, Sr.

names the Townships’ Boards of Supervisors as Defendants in the Monell claims. It is not clear

to the Court that the Boards of Supervisors are proper Monell Defendants where, as here, Mr.

Hoover expressly disclaims any suit against the Townships themselves. See ECF No. 23 at 7 n.3

(Mount Pleasant Defendants arguing that the Board of Supervisors was not properly named as a

party). In any event, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Boards are proper Monell

defendants, those claims also fail on the merits.

The Monell claims directed at the Mount Pleasant Defendants and the Smith Defendants

are factually analogous, and the Court will address them together. The Mount Pleasant

Defendants argue that a single incident alleged in a complaint is insufficient to show a municipal

policy, nor is it sufficient to demonstrate a failure to train, or that failure to train caused the

alleged injuries. ECF No. 15 at 13–15. Mr. Hoover, Sr. responds that “[e]ven if the Plaintiff’s

‘failure to train’ Monell theory is contains [sic] insufficient factual allegations[,]” his Monell

claims should survive under the policy theory. ECF No. 33 at 12. Accordingly, the Court will

construe Mr. Hoover, Sr.’s claim as a custom or policy species of Monell claim and address

whether the Amended Complaint states a custom or policy claim against the named Defendants.5

“[A] municipality can be held liable [for constitutional violations] when the ‘execution of

a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury.’” Bhatnagar v. Meyer, No. 22-2848,

2023 WL 5378834, at *3 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2023) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C.,

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). To sufficiently state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must identify “the

constitutional right at issue, identify the policy or custom at issue, identify the policymaker,

demonstrate deliberate indifference or evidence of knowledge and acquiescence by the

policymaker[,] and demonstrate causation.’” Long v. City of Phila., No. 15-00202, 2016 WL

192605, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2016) (quoting Glass v. City of Phila., 455 F. Supp. 2d 302, 342

(E.D. Pa. 2006)). Monell claims, therefore, are based on an underlying constitutional violation.

To satisfy the pleading standard, a plaintiff must “specify what exactly that custom or policy

was” that caused the constitutional violation. Rajab v. Westmoreland Cnty., No. 22-774, 2023

WL 11968042, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2023) (Dodge, M.J.) (quoting McTernan v. City of York,

564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2019)).

The Court concludes that Mr. Hoover, Sr. has failed to identify such a custom or policy

as his Amended Complaint only conclusorily states that the Defendants “failed to have policies

5 Plaintiffs’ Responses in Opposition to the Motions, ECF Nos. 32 and 33, focus almost exclusively on a custom or

policy theory. However, to the extent Mr. Hoover, Sr. asserts a Monell claim based on a failure-to-train, other than a

custom or policy, he has not plausibly alleged a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees”

in order to “demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,

62–63 (2011). Mr. Hoover, Sr. contends that, with respect to the Mount Pleasant Defendants, the Amended

Complaint identifies three instances of police chases ending in fatalities in the past three years. See ECF No. 85.

However, while Mr. Hoover, Sr. states that fatalities related to police chases occurred, he fails to allege that those

incidents involved constitutional violations or untrained employees. Id.; Connick, 563 U.S. at 62–63. Similarly, he

does not allege specific facts in those incidents, nor does he allege how the circumstances of those incidents are

similar to those in this case. Accordingly, Mr. Hoover, Sr.’s failure-to-train claims fail.

in place” which addressed situations like the car chase at issue in this case. ECF No. 16 ¶¶ 79,

88. He provides no further details identifying an unconstitutional custom or policy or how it led

to his injury; instead, his Amended Complaint “contains formulaic recitations of the legal

standards under Monell . . . and [is] predicated upon sweeping legal conclusions” which are

insufficient to state a claim. Baker v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 24-461, 2025 WL 33637, at *10

(W.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2025) (Stickman, J.). As a basis for his Monell claims, Mr. Hoover, Sr. argues

that Defendants failed to comply with Pennsylvania state law. ECF No. 16 ¶¶ 78, 87 (citing 75

Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6342 (“Each police department shall develop and implement a written

emergency vehicle response policy governing the procedures under which a police officer should

initiate, continue and terminate a motor vehicle pursuit.”)). But even assuming, arguendo, that

the Townships’ policies were deficient under Pennsylvania law, this alone does not constitute a

constitutional violation and is therefore an insufficient basis for a Monell claim. Hughston v.

McGee, No. 23-CV-1898, 2023 WL 4141040, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 2023) (“Violations of

state law . . . do not on their own amount to a constitutional violation.”) (citing Whittaker v. Cnty.

of Lawrence, 437 F. App’x 105, 109 (3d Cir. 2011)). Thus, the Court will dismiss the Monell

claims asserted in Counts IV and V of the Amended Complaint.

The Court notes that only the Smith Defendants moved to dismiss the Monell claims

against them in their entirety. See ECF No. 24. However, the Court’s reasoning similarly

applies to the Mount Pleasant Defendants. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss all Monell claims

made in the Amended Complaint. Talley v. Clark, 111 F.4th 255, 261 (3d Cir. 2024) (affirming

a district court’s dismissal of claims against moving and non-moving defendants alike where

“the claims against all defendants [were] ‘integrally related’ [and] . . . the non-moving

defendants [were] in a similar position to the moving defendants.”) (citations omitted). The

claims against the Chiefs in their official capacity are dismissed with prejudice because they are

substantively claims against the Townships, and amendments as to the Chiefs would therefore be

futile. The claims against the Boards of Supervisors are dismissed without prejudice, with leave

to amend to clarify the proper municipal defendant, i.e., each Township.

C. Because More Specific Constitutional Provisions Govern, the State-Created

Danger Claim (Count III) Must Be Dismissed

Mr. Hoover, Sr. alleges a due process violation through a state-created danger claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment against Officer Pasquale in his individual capacity. See ECF

No. 16 at 14–15. In their Motion, the Smith Defendants contend that the state-created danger

claim should be dismissed pursuant to the “more specific provision” rule. ECF No. 25 at 10–13.

Under the more specific provision rule, “if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific

constitutional provision, such as the Fourth . . . Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under

the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due

process.” DeLade v. Cargan, 972 F.3d 207, 210 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Lanier,

520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997)). The Third Circuit has expressly adopted this rule in cases

involving Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims brought with claims of other

constitutional violations that challenge the same conduct. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev.

Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 261 (3d Cir. 2010).

Here, because the more-specific unlawful deadly force claim under the Fourth

Amendment applies to the same conduct, Mr. Hoover, Sr.’s state-created danger claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment must be dismissed. The same incident and conduct form the basis of

Mr. Hoover, Sr.’s Fourth Amendment claim (Count II) and Fourteenth Amendment claim (Count

III) against Officer Pasquale. See ECF No. 16 at 11–14. Mr. Hoover, Sr. does not cite any case

law for the proposition that he may bring both substantive due process and Fourth Amendment

claims challenging the same conduct. In addition, Mr. Hoover, Sr.’s claims concern Officer

Pasquale’s alleged use of unlawful deadly force towards Mr. Hoover, Jr. Because these

allegations fit squarely within the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on a police officer’s

unreasonable use of deadly force, the Court concludes that the more specific provision rule

forecloses Mr. Hoover, Sr.’s substantive due process claim. See Est. of Paone v. Twp. of

Plymouth, No. 25-1029, 2026 WL 661978, at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 9, 2026) (“A police officer's use

of deadly force violates the Fourth Amendment when it is not ‘objectively reasonable.’”)

(quoting Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 76 (2025)). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Mr.

Hoover, Sr.’s state-created danger claim in Count III.6 Because the Court concludes amendment

of this claim would be futile, the state-created danger claim is denied with prejudice. O’Donnell

v. Scranton Sch. Dist., No. 3:20-CV-225, 2024 WL 1197517, at *19 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2024)

(dismissing a state-created danger claim with prejudice after concluding that leave to amend

would be futile).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Mount Pleasant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in Part is

GRANTED, and the Smith Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED

in part, as set forth fully in the accompanying Order.

DATED this 5th day of May, 2026.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Christy Criswell Wiegand

CHRISTY CRISWELL WIEGAND

United States District Judge

6 In light of the applicability of the more specific provision rule, this Court need not analyze Mr. Hoover, Sr.’s

arguments under the Fourteenth Amendment regarding the state-created danger doctrine. See Betts, 621 F.3d at 261

n.10.

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