Corbin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

PORTLAND DIVISION

SAMANTHA CORBIN, an individual,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:25-cv-01012-YY

v.

OPINION AND ORDER

RUSSELL PALMERI; CLACKAMAS CO

SHERIFF’S OFFICE SERGEANT DOE; DOES 1-

4; DANIEL HILL; ANGELA BRANDENBURG;

JASON DAVIES; AND NATE HULSEY,

Defendants.

YOU, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff is the owner of a single-family home in Clackamas County. They1 live with one

adult tenant and two foster children under the legal custody of the Oregon Department of Human

Services Child Welfare Program. Plaintiff claims that an attempted robbery occurred at their

residence and the Clackamas County Sheriff’s Office (“CCSO”) intentionally discriminated

against them by failing to conduct an adequate investigation due to their sexual orientation and

the sexual orientation of the foster children.

1 Plaintiff is non-binary and uses they/them pronouns.

Plaintiff has brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against CCSO Deputy Russell Palmeri, an

unidentified Sergeant Doe (“Palmieri’s Sergeant”), Supervising Sergeant Daniel Hill, Lieutenant

Nate Hulsey, Lieutenant Jason Davies, Sheriff Angela Brandenburg, and Does 1-4, who are

members of the CCSO’s Professional Standards Unit (“CCSO PSU”). Am. Compl. ECF 17.

Plaintiff alleges violations of their Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection

rights, as well as their rights under Article 1, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. Id. ¶ 45-78.

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mot. Dismiss, ECF 5. A hearing was held on

November 13, 2025, at which the merits of the motion were discussed and the court granted

plaintiff’s informal motion to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff has filed an Amended

Complaint (ECF 17) and defendants have filed a second Motion to Dismiss (ECF 18). Because

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim for relief, the motion to dismiss is

granted and this case is dismissed.

I. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must contain sufficient

facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” such that the court can reasonably

infer the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In reviewing the

plausibility of the complaint, the court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as

true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Capp v. Cty.

of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068,

1072 (9th Cir. 2005)). However, the court is not required to accept as true allegations “that are

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Daniels-Hall v.

Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). A complaint

must be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Navarro v. Block,

250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

393-94 (1989) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Section 1983 liability “arises only

upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant” who, acting under color of state law,

deprived the plaintiff of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws” of the United States. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); 42 U.S.C. §

1983. “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts,

or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

II. Discussion

Defendants contend that plaintiff (1) fails to establish a violation of a substantive due

process right2; (2) cannot demonstrate an equal protection claim based on discriminatory intent;

(3) does not adequately allege supervisory liability; (4) fails to show personal participation by the

2 Defendants assume plaintiff’s purported due process claim to be a substantive due process

claim and plaintiff does not contend otherwise in their response. See Mot. Dismiss 6, ECF 18;

Resp. 12-13, ECF 21.

unnamed defendants, Does 1-4; and (5) lacks a private right of action under the Oregon

Constitution. See Mot. Dismiss 6–13, ECF 18.

A. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

Substantive due process “protects individuals from arbitrary deprivation of their liberty

by government.” Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2006). “Only the most

egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in a constitutional sense.” Id. (quoting Cnty.

of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 834 (1998)). Thus, to establish a substantive due process

claim, a plaintiff must show (1) a government deprivation of life, liberty, or property, and (2)

behavior by the government that shocks the conscience. Id; see also Gale v. SAIF Corp., No.

3:18-cv-00707-AC, 2020 WL 809381, at *6 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 2020), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 3:18-cv-00707-AC, 2020 WL 798142 (D. Or. Feb. 16, 2020).

Plaintiff alleges that on May 7, 2023, they left their house around 10:45 p.m. Am. Compl.

¶ 9, ECF 17. Shortly thereafter, one of their foster children came home. Id. ¶ 10. Upon entering

the house, the youth heard a loud crash from his bedroom and observed that the back sliding door

was open. Id. He went to his bedroom, where he found the window open and the screen missing.

Id. All the “furnishings surrounding the window were displaced, [his] personal property had been

moved, and the canopy over his bed was displaced[.]” Id. He called plaintiff, who then called the

police to report an interrupted burglary. Id. ¶ 11.

CCSO Deputy Palmeri responded to the scene with officers from the Lake Oswego

Police Department (“LOPD”). Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff alleges that, as the officers walked around the

house, Palmeri made dismissive statements about the youth and the household, suggesting the

youth “jumped out the window himself” and referring to the residence as a “group home.” Id. ¶

18. When Palmeri went to the youth’s bedroom, he took a few steps into the room and left

shortly after, stating “let’s get out of here.” Id. ¶ 20. Palmeri did not conduct further investigation

and did not contact plaintiff for more information. Id. ¶ 21.

Plaintiff alleges that when Palmeri called plaintiff later that night, he continued to be

dismissive. He insisted that it was the foster youth who had jumped out the window. Id. ¶ 23.

Plaintiff then called police dispatch to request that a different officer be sent to the house because

Palmeri “clearly didn’t believe a word that my kid said.” Id. ¶ 25. Palmeri’s sergeant declined,

offering to have Palmeri call again. Id. Palmeri called plaintiff again a couple of hours later and

continued to insist that the youth jumped out the window and that the youth was “too drugged to

remember.” Id. ¶ 26

The following morning, plaintiff sent various pictures to Palmeri showing the disarray of

the youth’s bedroom and a muddy footprint on his bed. Id. ¶ 27. Despite this, nobody followed

up with plaintiff. Id. A week later, CCSO released Palmeri’s incident report, signed by

Supervising Sergeant Hill. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff claims there were multiple instances of dishonesty

and substandard investigatory steps in the report. Id. ¶ 28.

A month later, plaintiff filed a formal complaint about the investigation with CCSO. Id. ¶

32. An investigator from CCSO PSU responded, stating a resolution timeline of “a minimum of

90 days.” Id. ¶ 33. Lieutenant Hulsey later informed plaintiff that CCSO had concluded that

“[Palmeri’s] actions were in conformance with policy and procedure.” Id. ¶ 37. Not satisfied,

plaintiff provided Hulsey with additional information. Id. ¶ 38. Plaintiff followed up with Hulsey

twice over the next few months but received no further acknowledgment. Id.

Two months later, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Oregon Department of Public

Safety Standards and Training (“DPSST”), which was forwarded to CCSO. Id. ¶¶ 39-40. CCSO

Sheriff Brandenburg subsequently signed a statement to DPSST, asserting that the complaint

“has been reviewed and handled in a manner deemed appropriate by [her] agency.” Id. ¶ 41. On

October 9, 2023, DPSST closed their investigation based on Brandenburg’s signed statement. Id.

¶ 42. Based on these alleged facts, plaintiff claims they were deprived of protection for their life

and the lives of the residents in their home because defendants did not provide the same level of

protection and diligence in their investigation as they did for their non-LGBTQ neighbors. Resp.

14, ECF 21.

Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim fails because an inadequate investigation does

not constitute a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. The Ninth Circuit and district courts in

this circuit have consistently held that there is no constitutional right to an investigation. See

Gomez v. Whitney, 757 F.2d 1005, 1006 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that inadequate investigation is

not a sufficient basis for a civil rights claim unless another recognized constitutional right is

involved); Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 40 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The

police have no affirmative obligation to investigate a crime in a particular way[.]”); Frisch v.

City of Eugene, No. 6:09-cv-06126-TC, 2010 WL 686754, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 24, 2010) (“There

is no statutory or common law right, much less a constitutional right, to an investigation.”);

Clark v. Milwaukie Police Dep't, No. 3:22-cv-00662-SB, 2022 WL 4473487, at *5 (D. Or. Sept.

15, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:22-cv-662-SB, 2022 WL 4466942 (D. Or.

Sept. 26, 2022) (“[The plaintiff] does not have a constitutionally protected right to have the

police investigate his report in a particular way.”); Hendrix v. City of Madera, No. 1:23-cv-

01212-JLT-BAM, 2023 WL 5985325, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2023), report and

recommendation adopted-, No. 1:23-cv-01212-JLT-BAM, 2023 WL 7022384 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 25,

2023) (“There is no constitutional right for an adequate investigation.”).

With respect to the second factor, plaintiff argues that the inadequate investigation was

motivated by bad faith, as defendants treated plaintiff “much differently from the non-LGBTQ

neighbors who were also victims of apparent burglaries.” Resp. 13-14, ECF 21. Plaintiff

contends this conduct shocks the conscience because the officers “treated one set of protected

members of society differently and caused fear and safety issues for [the] members of the

[LGBTQ] community[.]” Id. at 14.

But plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that Palmeri or the other defendants knew

plaintiff’s sexual orientation or gender identity. Plaintiff mentions that the “police officers were

able to view a sign on the front door that identifies the residents as supportive of a wide range of

minority groups” and that “[p]laintiff’s driver’s license reflects the gender marker as non-

binary.” Am. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF 17. Yet it is unreasonable to infer that defendants were able to

determine plaintiff’s sexual orientation from the sign that “police officers were able to view on

the front door.” Furthermore, the complaint alleges that Palmeri conducted an inadequate

investigation before he met plaintiff. Certain other defendants never visited the home, further

weakening plaintiff’s claim. Thus, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff,

they have failed to allege the type of arbitrary, egregious, and conscious-shocking behavior that

could support a substantive due process claim.

B. Equal Protection Claim

The Equal Protection Clause is a guarantee that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The

essence of that guarantee is that “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,

216 (1982)). To prevail on an equal protection claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and

prove either “the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff

based on membership in a protected class,” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th

Cir. 2001) (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)), or that the

plaintiff “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is

no rational relationship for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.

562, 564 (2000).

For purposeful discrimination to occur, the defendant must have knowledge of a

plaintiff’s identity. See Pariseau v. City of Brockton, 135 F. Supp. 2d 257, 263 (D. Mass. 2001)

(denying a race-based discrimination due to lack of evidence that the officer knew the plaintiff’s

race); Fagerstrom v. City of Savannah, Ga., 627 F. App’x 803, 805 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Without

knowledge of [the plaintiff’s] Asian racial identity, [the defendant] cannot have acted with an

intent to discriminate based on that identity.”) (emphasis in original); Pressley v. Haeger, 977

F.2d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Knowledge plays a role in forming or ascertaining intent. [The

defendant] could not discriminate against [the plaintiff] on account of race if he did not know

[the plaintiff’s] race.”).

Plaintiff has failed to establish that defendants acted with discriminatory intent because,

again, they have not alleged that any of the defendants knew of plaintiff’s or their foster youths’

sexual orientation. Also, importantly, plaintiff alleges no facts showing they were treated

differently from similarly situated individuals. While plaintiff mentions that “the neighborhood

grapevine was reporting a recent successful burglary on . . . the cross street opposite[e]

[p]laintiff’s driveway” (Am. Compl. ¶ 29, ECF 17) and that a LOPD captain “confirmed that

additional burglaries had been reported in the neighborhood” (id. ¶ 35), they fail to allege that

those neighbors were treated differently. Accordingly, plaintiff’s equal protection claim fails.

C. Supervisory Liability

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.

Liability under § 1983 “arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.”

Id. An official may be liable as a supervisor “only if either (1) [the supervisor] was personally

involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection exists between the

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Felarca v. Birgeneau, 891 F.3d

809, 819–20 (9th Cir. 2018).

In their amended complaint, plaintiff alleges supervisory liability against Sergent Doe,

Sergeant Dan Hill, Lieutenant Hulsey, Lieutenant Davies, and Sheriff Brandenburg. Am. Compl.

¶¶ 49, 51-61, ECF 17. Because plaintiff has failed to establish any underlying constitutional

violation, they cannot show that the supervisory defendants were personally involved in a

constitutional deprivation or that a causal connection exists. Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a

viable supervisory liability claim.

D. Oregon Constitutional Claim

As defendants correctly contend, “there is no private right of action for damages under

the Oregon Constitution.” Real Est. Exch., Inc. v. Brown, No. 3:20-cv-02075-HZ, 2021 WL

5855660, at *8 (D. Or. Dec. 9, 2021). “Oregon’s Bill of Rights provides no textual or historical

basis for implying a right to damages for constitutional violations.” Hunter v. City of Eugene,

309 Or. 298, 303 (1990). Therefore, plaintiff’s claim seeking damages for a violation of Article

1, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution must be dismissed. See Anderson v. Multnomah Cnty.,

No. 3:20-CV-0555-YY, 2022 WL 3219801, at *10 (D. Or. Jan. 4, 2022), findings and

recommendations adopted, No. 3:20-CV-00555-YY, 2022 WL 2452282 (D. Or. July 6, 2022)

(dismissing free speech and due process claims under the Oregon Constitution because no cause

of action exists); Gooding v. Zuercher, No. 3:18-CV-00015-YY, 2018 WL 4658710, at *4 (D.

Or. July 23, 2018), findings and recommendations adopted, No. 3:18-CV-00015-YY, 2018 WL

4658828 (D. Or. Sept. 27, 2018) (dismissing claim under Article 1, section 9 of the Oregon

Constitution because claims for damages may not be brought directly under the Oregon

Constitution); Calhoun v. Portland Police Bureau, Case No. 3:17-cv-01020-MO, 2018 WL

1413969, at *3 (D. Or. Mar. 21, 2018) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiff’s claims under the

Oregon Constitution because no cause of action exists under Hunter).

ORDER

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF 18) is granted and this case is dismissed with

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED May 8, 2026.

/s/ Youlee Yim You

Youlee Yim You

United States Magistrate Judge