ELISENS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

BRENT ELISENS, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

v. ) 1:25-cv-00647-SDN

)

KENNEBEC COUNTY )

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, )

et al., )

)

Defendants )

RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER REVIEW

OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff filed a complaint in which he alleges that while he was incarcerated at the

Kennebec County Correctional Facility, he was harmed when jail personnel did not provide

him with his prescribed medication. (Complaint, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff also filed an

application to proceed without prepayment of fees (ECF No. 3), which application the

Court granted. (Order, ECF No. 5.) In accordance with the statute that governs actions in

which a plaintiff is permitted to proceed without prepayment of fees, a preliminary review

of Plaintiff’s complaint is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

After a review of Plaintiff’s complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915, I

recommend the Court dismiss the claims against all the defendants except for Plaintiff’s

claim against Defendant Pearson.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1

Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Kennebec County Correctional Facility from June

19, 2024, through August 12, 2024. When he entered the facility, Plaintiff had two

prescription medications, including one that was to treat post-traumatic stress disorder.

According to Plaintiff, jail personnel did not provide him with the medication as required.

As a result, he suffered severe neurological and gastrointestinal issues. Plaintiff asserts

that when he presented with his symptoms to Defendant Pearson, a member of the medical

staff, Defendant Pearson said she “was not going to do anything.” (Complaint at 2.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In accordance with § 1915, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines,” inter alia, that the action is “frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Dismissals [under § 1915]

are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective

defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).

When considering whether a complaint states a claim for which relief may be

granted, courts must assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff the

benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom. Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640

F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

1 The facts are derived from Plaintiff’s complaint.

face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The relevant question

... in assessing plausibility is not whether the complaint makes any particular factual

allegations but, rather, whether ‘the complaint warrant[s] dismissal because it failed in toto

to render plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief plausible.’” Rodríguez–Reyes v. Molina–

Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n. 14).

Although a pro se plaintiff’s complaint is subject to “less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the

complaint may not consist entirely of “conclusory allegations that merely parrot the

relevant legal standard,” Young v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 231 (1st Cir. 2013).

See also Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980) (explaining that the liberal

standard applied to the pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “is not to say that pro se plaintiffs are

not required to plead basic facts sufficient to state a claim”).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s federal claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would be governed by the

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Eighth Amendment prohibits

the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. From this

prohibition, “courts have derived the principles that govern the permissible conditions

under which prisoners are held and that establish the medical treatment those prisoners

must be afforded.” Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). “The Eighth Amendment, applied to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects incarcerated people from state corrections

officials’ ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Zingg v. Groblewski, 907

F.3d 630, 634-35 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Feeney v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 464 F.3d 158,

161-62 (1st Cir. 2006); see Perry v. Roy, 782 F.3d 73, 78 (1st Cir. 2015). To allege “a

claim of deliberate indifference based on inadequate or delayed medical care, ‘a plaintiff

must satisfy both a subjective and objective inquiry.’” Perry, 782 F.3d at 78 (quoting

Leavitt v. Corr. Med. Servs., 645 F.3d 484, 497 (1st Cir. 2011)).

To demonstrate a claim under the objective prong, a plaintiff “must show that []he

has a serious medical need for which []he has received inadequate treatment.” Kosilek,

774 F.3d at 85. For a medical condition to be objectively “serious,” there must be “a

sufficiently substantial ‘risk of serious damage to [the inmate’s] future health.’” Farmer,

511 U.S. at 843 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). This “requires

that the need be ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or

one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a

doctor’s attention.’” Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 82 (quoting Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem,

Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990)). However, this “does not impose upon prison

administrators a duty to provide care that is ideal, or of the prisoner’s choosing.” Id.

(citations omitted). “Rather, the Constitution proscribes care that is ‘so inadequate as to

shock the conscience.’” Id. at 83 (quoting Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 235 (1st Cir.

1991)).

Under the subjective prong, “a plaintiff must show ‘that prison officials possessed

a sufficiently culpable state of mind, namely one of deliberate indifference to an inmate’s

health or safety.’” Perry, 782 F.3d at 78 (quoting Leavitt, 645 F.3d at 497). Thus, “even

if medical care is so inadequate as to satisfy the objective prong, the Eighth Amendment is

not violated unless prison administrators also exhibit deliberate indifference to the

prisoner’s needs.” Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 83. “For purposes of this subjective prong,

deliberate indifference ‘defines a narrow band of conduct,’ and requires evidence that the

failure in treatment was purposeful.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Feeney, 464 F.3d at

162); see Perry, 782 F.3d at 79 (stating that deliberate indifference “requires evidence that

the absence or inadequacy of treatment is intentional”). A constitutional claim may arise

when “the treatment provided [was] so inadequate as ‘to constitute an unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Leavitt, 645

F.3d at 497 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)). However, “when a

plaintiff’s allegations simply reflect a disagreement on the appropriate course of treatment,

such a dispute with an exercise of professional judgment may present a colorable claim of

negligence, but it falls short of alleging a constitutional violation.” Feeney, 464 F.3d at

162 (alterations and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[p]rison officials ‘who actually

knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they

responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.’” Giroux v.

Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. 825 at 844);

see Burrell v. Hampshire Cnty., 307 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002) (recognizing that the focus

of the deliberate indifference analysis “is on what the jailers knew and what they did in

response”).

Plaintiff alleges that the medication was prescribed at least in part to treat post-

traumatic stress disorder. Plaintiff, therefore, has alleged that he has a serious medical

condition that requires medical care. Plaintiff also asserts that when the medication was

denied, his health suffered significantly. At this stage of the proceeding, Plaintiff has

satisfied the objective prong of the deliberate indifference standard.

To satisfy the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference standard, Plaintiff’s

allegations must also support a finding that the alleged inadequate medical care was

“purposeful.” Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 83. Plaintiff’s allegation that when presented with

Plaintiff’s symptoms, Defendant Pearson said, “she was not going to do anything,” is

sufficient at the pleading stage to satisfy the subjective prong. Plaintiff, however, has not

alleged enough facts that would support a deliberate indifference claim against any of the

other defendants. 2

CONCLUSION

After a review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, for the reasons discussed above, I

recommend the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against all the defendants except Plaintiff’s

claim against Defendant Pearson.

NOTICE

A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate

judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district

2 Plaintiff named the Kennebec County Correctional Facility as a party to this action. Although the jail is

not a proper party to this action, the Court can reasonably construe Plaintiff’s allegations as attempting to

assert a claim against Kennebec County. See, e.g., Gurhan v. City of Saco, No. 2:19-cv-00349, 2019 WL

5589044, at *1 n.2 (D. Me. Oct. 30, 2019). Plaintiff, however, has not alleged an actionable claim against

Kennebec County as the County cannot be liable for the alleged acts and omissions of Defendant Pearson.

For a governmental entity to be liable for a constitutional deprivation, the record must include evidence that

the entity’s policy, custom, or practice caused the deprivation. Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 941 (1st

Cir. 2008). The applicable standard requires a plaintiff to “identify a [governmental entity] ‘policy’ or

‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997).

Plaintiff has not identified a policy or custom that resulted in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional

rights.

court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen

(14) days of being served with a copy thereof.

Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right

to de novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court’s order.

/s/ John C. Nivison

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Dated this 19th day of May, 2026.