The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ZAK SHAIK,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)
MARK MELTON, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
BESOSA, Senior District Judge.1
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)
issued by U.S. Magistrate Judge Gerald L. Jackson (Docket No. 170)
regarding defendants’ renewed motions to dismiss (Docket Nos. 134,
135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141, 142). The R&R also addresses
plaintiff Zak Shaik (“plaintiff”)’s motion for leave to file the
first amended complaint (Docket No. 143), motion for judicial
notice of invalid lien and related fraud (Docket No. 145), motion
for expedited discovery (Docket No. 151), and motion for sanctions
(Docket No. 152). This case is before the Court by designation
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(d). See Docket No. 146.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS IN PART and
REJECTS IN PART the R&R. Defendant Ben Flowers’s motion to dismiss
1 Senior United States District Judge for the District of Puerto Rico, sitting
by designation.
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 2
is DENIED IN PART. (Docket No. 137.) Defendants’ motions to
dismiss with respect to each defendant except Flowers are GRANTED.
(Docket Nos. 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 141, 142). Plaintiff’s
motion for leave to amend the complaint is DENIED. (Docket
No. 143.) Plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice of invalid lien
is MOOT. (Docket No. 145.) Plaintiff’s motion for expedited
discovery is DENIED. (Docket No. 151.) Plaintiff’s motion for
sanctions is DENIED. (Docket No. 152.)
I. Background
Plaintiff brought this suit against (1) Mark Melton, an
Oklahoma state court judge of the Murray County District Court,
(2) Wallace Coppedge, district judge of the Murray County District
Court, (3) James English, assistant district attorney in Murray
County, (4) Rebecca Johnson, an Oklahoma attorney, (5) Darin
Rogers, Murray County sheriff, (6) Don Helpingstine, Murray County
deputy sheriff, (7) Ben Flowers, an employee in the Murray County
sheriff’s office, (8) Kent McKinley, Murray County commissioner,
(9) Colt Williams, Murray County commissioner, (10) Darrell
Hudson, Murray County commissioner, (11) the Association of County
Commissioners of Oklahoma (“ACCO”), and (12) Kara Christy, a claims
adjuster for ACCO. See Docket No. 1, pp. 2-3; Docket No. 170 at
p. 2. The case arises from proceedings in Murray County District
Court over a limited liability company of which plaintiff was the
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 3
sole member. Plaintiff alleges that, during court proceedings,
opposing counsel Rebecca Johnson used disrespectful language
against him. (Docket No. 1 at p. 4.) When he tried to object,
Judge Melton was not receptive. Id. Plaintiff then “calmly”
expressed his intent to file an ethical complaint against Judge
Melton, which caused Judge Melton to hold him in contempt of court.
Id. Plaintiff was arrested by defendant Don Helpingstine while
District Attorney James English remained silent. Id. at pp. 4-5.
While being booked at the Murray County jail, plaintiff alleges
that he was strip-searched by defendant Ben Flowers and then held
in solitary confinement for three hours. Id. Plaintiff later
sought audio and video records of the courtroom from DA English,
who allegedly withheld some of the recordings. Id. at p. 5. He
also requested arrest records from the Murray County Sheriff’s
office, but his requests were either ignored or met with a “no
records available” response. Id. at p. 7. Plaintiff wrote on
multiple occasions to Judge Coppedge, complaining profusely about
his allegedly illegal arrest, but Judge Coppedge did not respond.
Id. at p. 6. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Johnson was
colluding with Judge Melton to orchestrate his case’s defeat. Id.
Last, without explaining exactly how the following relates to his
above claims, he argues that defendant Kara Christy wrongly denied
a claim he had before ACCO. Id. at pp. 5-6.
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 4
Plaintiff’s complaint asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
“against all defendants” for violations of his First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.2 Id. at pp. 7-9. He also asserts
judicial misconduct claims against Judges Melton and Coppedge,
prosecutorial misconduct against DA English, failure to intervene
to prevent constitutional violations against Darin Rogers,
Helpingstine and “other law enforcement defendants,” conspiracy to
violate civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against all
defendants, Oklahoma constitutional violations against all
defendants, false imprisonment against all defendants, intentional
infliction of emotional distress against all defendants, violation
of the Oklahoma Open Records Act3 against DA English, Rogers, and
the commissioner defendants, and violation of the Oklahoma
Governmental Tort Claims Act4 against all defendants. Id. at
pp. 9-13.
After various procedural developments not relevant here, each
defendant moved to dismiss. The magistrate judge recommends
granting each motion to dismiss, dismissing all of plaintiff’s
claims without prejudice. He finds that many of plaintiff’s claims
2 § 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of [law,] subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3 Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 24A.1 – 24A.40.
4 Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 151-258.
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 5
should be dismissed because the defendants possess immunities – in
the case of Judges Melton and Coppedge, absolute judicial immunity,
in the case of DA English, prosecutorial immunity, and in the case
of defendant Helpingstine, quasi-judicial immunity. See Docket
No. 170 at pp. 8-10 (Judges Melton and Coppedge); pp. 12-17 (DA
English); pp. 21-23 (Helpingstine). He recommends that the
section 1983 claims against defendant Johnson be dismissed because
she is not a state actor, notwithstanding plaintiff’s conclusory
allegation that she conspired with state actors. Id. at pp. 10-12.
He finds that all of plaintiff’s remaining claims (against Johnson,
English, the ACCO, Christy, Hudson, McKinley, Williams, Rogers,
and Flowers) lack enough information related to each defendant’s
conduct to state a claim. As for plaintiff’s motions, the
magistrate judge recommends denying his request to amend the
complaint because his proposed First Amended Complaint fails to
cure the defects of his original complaint. Id. at pp. 23-25.
The magistrate judge recommends finding plaintiff’s remaining
motions moot. Id. at p. 26.
Plaintiff makes four objections to the R&R. First, he argues
that the magistrate judge’s dismissal of claims that did not
adequately attribute specific conduct to specific defendants
applied an “overly rigid group pleading standard” that is
inconsistent with the lenience typically afforded to pro se
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 6
plaintiffs. (Docket No. 171 at pp. 1-2.) Second, he argues that
the magistrate judge erred in denying his request to amend the
complaint. Id. at pp. 2-3. Third, he argues that the magistrate
judge improperly found that the claims against Judges Melton and
Coppedge, DA English, and defendant Helpingstine were barred by
judicial, prosecutorial, and quasi-judicial immunity. Id. at
p. 3. Fourth, he argues that the magistrate judge erroneously
denied his request for expedited discovery. Id. at p. 4. The
defendants filed a joint objection to the R&R with a single
argument – that the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims should be with
prejudice, not without prejudice. See Docket No. 172.
II. Legal Standard
A district court may refer a pending motion to a magistrate
judge for a report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Any party adversely
affected by the report and recommendation may file written
objections within fourteen days of being served with the magistrate
judge’s report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “A party that files a
timely objection is entitled to a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which a specific objection is made.” Lowery
Wilkinson Lowery, LLC v. Illinois, No. 25-CV-22-RAW, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 268063, at *3 (E.D. Okla. Dec. 31, 2025) (citing United
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 7
States v. Raddatz, 446 U.S. 667, 673 (1980)). “The objections
must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to
which objections are being made” and “[t]he district court need
not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections.” Id.
(citing Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir.
1987)). In conducting its review, the court is free to “accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(a)(b)(1).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule
12(b)(6)”), a defendant may move to dismiss an action for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint
must contain enough factual matter “to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A court must decide whether the complaint
alleges facts which “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Id. at 555. “At the motion-to-dismiss stage, [the Court]
must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in a
complaint and view these allegations in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.” Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1141 (10th
Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 8
A pro se litigant’s pleadings should be held “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Tatten v. City & Cty. of Denver, 730 F. App’x. 620, 624 (10th Cir.
2018) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). On
the other hand, “a pro se litigant’s ‘conclusory allegations
without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a
claim on which relief can be based.’” West v. United States,
No. 25-3082, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 24165, at *5 (10th Cir. Dept. 18,
2025) (quoting Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991)).
III. Discussion
A. Judicial & Prosecutorial Immunity
The Court will start by addressing plaintiff’s objection
to the magistrate judge’s finding that defendants Melton,
Coppedge, English, and Helpingstine are immune from suit. (Docket
No. 171 at p. 3.) The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of
the claims against Melton and Coppedge pursuant to the doctrine of
absolute judicial immunity, against English based on prosecutorial
immunity, and against Helpingstine based on quasi-judicial
immunity. The Court agrees with the magistrate judge’s
recommendation dismissing these claims.
First, the claims against Judges Melton and Coppedge are
barred by absolute judicial immunity. “Except where a judge has
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 9
acted ‘in the clear absence of all jurisdiction,’ the doctrine of
judicial immunity shields that judge from liability for the judge’s
official adjudicative acts.” Lundahl v. Zimmer, 296 F.3d 936, 939
(10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57
(1978)). The actions that Judge Melton took in holding plaintiff
in contempt were clearly within the scope of his official
adjudicative acts and jurisdiction. Under Oklahoma law, judges
have the authority to “cite for contempt anyone who, in his
presence in open court, willfully obstructs judicial proceedings.”
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 565.1. Punishment for contempt may include
“imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six [] months[.]”
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 566. Because Judge Melton “had the general
power to control his courtroom and to hold individuals present
there in contempt[,]” his actions were within the scope of
jurisdiction, and “[w]hether he used that power appropriately is
not the relevant question.” Orta v. Repp, No. 3:22-CV-00359-JGC,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224633, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 13, 2022).
As for Judge Coppedge, plaintiff alleges without
explanation that he was responsible for supervising Judge Melton.
See Docket No. 1 at p. 2 (stating that Judge Coppedge “was
responsible for the training and supervision of [Judge] Melton.”)
If true, such conduct would clearly be within his official
adjudicative duties, and if not, it is hard to see how he could be
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 10
liable for actions taken by Judge Melton. In either case, the
claims against Judge Coppedge must be dismissed.
Similarly, the magistrate judge properly found that
defendant Helpingstine is protected by quasi-judicial immunity, at
least with respect to the claims stemming from plaintiff’s arrest
for contempt. “Absolute immunity, which has long been available
to protect judges from liability for acts performed in their
judicial capacity, has been extended to certain others who perform
functions closely associated with the judicial process.” Ward v.
Fisher, No. 24-5083, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7506, at *7 (10th Cir.
Apr. 1, 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Such immunity
is often called quasi-judicial immunity because it is applied to
someone other than a judge.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Quasi-judicial immunity has been extended to cover
“officials charged with the duty of executing a facially valid
court order[.]” Moss v. Kopp, 559 F.3d 1155, 1163 (10th Cir. 2009)
(citing Turney v. O’Toole, 898 F.2d 1470, 1472 (10th Cir. 1990)).
As discussed above, the arrest warrant for contempt was within
Judge Melton’s jurisdiction to issue. Plaintiff fails to present
any non-conclusory allegation that would render the arrest warrant
facially invalid. Accordingly, defendant Helpingstine is entitled
to quasi-judicial immunity against plaintiff’s claims related to
the contempt arrest.
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 11
As for defendant English, plaintiff cites two instances
of allegedly wrongful conduct – staying silent when plaintiff was
arrested for contempt of court, and alleged withholding of
documents related to his arrest and detention. See Docket No. 1
at p. 10. Any claim with respect to the first is clearly barred
by prosecutorial immunity. “Absolute immunity [is] recognized for
a prosecutor’s activities that are ‘intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Chilcoat v. San Juan
Cnty., 41 F.4th 1196, 1208 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). What DA English did or did
not do while sitting in court prosecuting a case is about as close
as one gets to conduct “connected with the prosecutor’s role in
judicial proceedings[.]” Id. at 1209.
With respect to the Open Records Act claim, DA English’s
alleged partial response fits less well into his prosecutorial
duties. This claim, however, fails for a different reason. The
Open Records Act requires “public bodies” and “public officials”
to keep records open for “inspection, copying, or mechanical
reproduction during regular business hours[.]” Okla. Stat.
tit. 51, § 24A.5. Any duty to produce documents that DA English
may have pursuant to the Open Records Act would arise from his
status as a public official – he has no duties in his individual
capacity. But plaintiff sued English in his individual capacity
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 12
only, not in his official capacity. Accordingly, plaintiff’s Open
Records Act allegations against English also fail to state a
claim.5
B. Claims Dismissed for Lack of Specificity
Next, the Court will consider plaintiff’s objection to
the magistrate judge’s recommended dismissal of his claims based
on lack of specificity as to each defendant’s wrongdoing.6 (Docket
No. 171 at pp. 1-2.) As the magistrate judge indicated, many of
plaintiff’s claims allege that defendants collectively violated
various laws. Relying on Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242 (10th
Cir. 2008), the magistrate judge rejected many of plaintiff’s
claims as failing to provide proper notice to the defendants with
what exactly they are being charged. See generally id. at 1250
(noting that “it is particularly important in [section 1983 cases
against multiple government actors] that the complaint make clear
exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each
individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against
him or her, as distinguished from collective allegations against
the state.”) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff argues that the
5 The same argument applies to plaintiff’s Open Records Act claims with respect
to the Murray County Sheriff’s office employees, who are only sued in their
individual capacities.
6 The magistrate judge’s lack-of-specificity argument applied to all of
plaintiff’s claims apart from 1) those dismissed due to judicial, quasi-
judicial, or prosecutorial immunity, and 2) the section 1983 claim against
defendant Johnson.
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 13
magistrate judge’s reasoning subjects him to an overly exacting
pleading standard, particularly given his status as a pro se
plaintiff.
The Court does not find fault with most of the magistrate
judge’s recommended dismissals for lack of specificity. Although
a complaint need not be highly detailed, it must be facially
plausible – in other words, it must “plead[] factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Without basic details as to who
did what, most of plaintiff’s claims do not allow the court to
draw such an inference. Instead, the complaint is rife with
conclusory allegations unsupported by any factual averment that
might render the claims plausible. See West, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS
24165, at *5 (conclusory allegations without supporting factual
averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be
based).
There are two claims where the Court disagrees with the
magistrate judge’s recommended dismissal based on lack of
specificity. The first claim is plaintiff’s Open Records Act
claims against the Murray County Sheriff’s office defendants -
Rogers, Helpingstine, and Flowers - though these are dismissed
because, as discussed above, the sheriff’s office defendants are
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 14
only sued in their respective individual capacities. See supra
n. 5. The second is plaintiff’s second 1983 claim against
defendant Flowers based on the alleged unconstitutionality of the
strip search. Plaintiff alleges that, after his contempt arrest,
he was booked at the Murray County jail. While being booked, he
was subject to a cavity search by defendant Flowers. After the
search, he was placed in “solitary confinement” for three hours
before being released.
In Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders,7 the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of performing a full body cavity
search prior to incarceration, but noted potential limits.
Particularly relevant here is the Supreme Court’s observation that
a strip search may be excessive for a detainee held without
assignment to the general jail population and without substantial
contact with other detainees. Id. at 338-39; see also id. at 341
(Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court does not hold that it is
always reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an arrestee
whose detention has not been reviewed by a judicial officer and
who could be held in available facilities apart from the general
population.”) Following Florence, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that a body-cavity strip search of a detainee which
7 566 U.S. 318 (2012).
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 15
takes place before deciding whether the detainee will be housed in
the jail’s general population violates the Fourth Amendment. See
Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 962 F.3d 1204, 1235-
39 (10th Cir. 2020).
Plaintiff’s complaint contains sufficient non-
conclusory factual allegations to demonstrate that the strip
search potentially violated the Fourth Amendment, and accordingly,
states a claim pursuant to section 1983. Plaintiff claims that he
was subject to a cavity search by defendant Flowers prior to being
held in solitary confinement at the Murray County jail. (Docket
No. 1 at pp. 4-5.) Interpreted in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, his allegations render it possible that the search
occurred before any determination that he would be placed in the
general population of the jail. Indeed, his allegation of
“solitary confinement” may be understood to indicate that he never
intermingled with the general population of the jail at all. If
so, the strip search was unreasonably invasive and violated his
Fourth Amendment rights.
Flowers’s defenses are not sufficient to defeat
plaintiff’s claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage. He cannot rely
on qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity insulates officials
from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 16
reasonable person would have known.” Hinkle, 962 F.3d at 1218
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Fourth Amendment rights
to unreasonable searches are clearly established, and both
Florence and Hinkle have been on the books for years. See Pray,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261919, at *27-28 (“The facts in Hinkle are
sufficient to put any reasonable officer on notice that it is
unlawful to strip search every arrestee who enters the booking
area before a determination to house the arrestee in general
population.”) Nor is it a defense that the complaint fails to
allege that Flowers knew plaintiff would not be placed in the
general population. For the strip search to be constitutionally
acceptable, the prison staff must have already determined that the
inmate will be placed in the general population. Plaintiff’s
allegations, interpreted in the light most favorable to him,
suggest that this may not have been the case.
Accordingly, the Court adopts in part and rejects in
part the R&R’s findings dismissing plaintiff’s claims for lack of
specificity. The Court rejects the lack-of-specificity argument
with respect to the Open Records Act claims against Rogers,
Helpingstine, and Flowers, though these are dismissed on other
grounds. The Court also rejects the lack-of-specificity argument
as applied to plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against defendant
Flowers over the strip search, and will allow this claim to proceed
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 17
past the motion-to-dismiss stage. Every other application of the
lack-of-specificity argument is adopted.
C. Denying Leave to Amend
Plaintiff also objects to the magistrate judge’s refusal
to grant him leave to amend his complaint.8 (Docket No. 171
at pp. 2-3.) As the magistrate judge indicated, “court[s] should
freely give leave when justice so requires, [] especially [] when
the plaintiff is proceeding pro se.” (Docket No. 170 at pp. 24-25)
(citing Panicker v. State Dep’t of Agric., 498 Fed. Appx. 755, 757
(10th Cir. 2012)). A court may refuse to grant leave to amend,
however, “upon a showing of futility of amendment.” Panicker, 498
Fed. Appx. at 757 (quoting Frank v. U.S. W., Inc., 3 F.3d 1357,
1365 (10th Cir. 1993)) (internal alterations omitted). “A proposed
amendment is futile if the complaint, as amended, would be subject
to dismissal.” Id. (quoting Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v.
Moody’s Inv.’s Serv., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 859 (10th Cir. 1999)).
8 Plaintiff’s motion requests leave to amend the complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Although a plaintiff may amend his or her complaint once as
of right, he or she must do so within 21 days of serving the original complaint
or 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or motion under Rule 12(b),
(e), or (f), whichever is earlier. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Plaintiff’s
request to amend the complaint was submitted in October 2025, over a year after
the first motion to dismiss was filed. See Docket No. 46; Docket No. 143. As
a result, plaintiff must obtain leave of the court before filing his amended
complaint. See United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 144 F. Supp.
3d 869, 877-79 (E.D. Va. 2015) (finding that “the time period for amending the
complaint as a matter of course under [Rule] 15(a)(1) beg[ins] when Defendants
filed their first motion to dismiss[,]” and subsequent motions to dismiss do
not toll the 21-day period).
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 18
The Court agrees with the magistrate judge’s finding
that plaintiff’s proposed First Amended Complaint does not cure
any of the deficiencies in his original complaint. As was the
case with his original complaint, most of the claims in plaintiff’s
amended complaint are built on conclusory allegations without
supporting factual averments. Indeed, his proposed amended
complaint generally contains less detail than the original.
Swapping the proposed amended complaint for the original complaint
would actively hurt his claim against defendant Flowers, the only
one plausible enough to proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage,
and would not save any of his other claims from dismissal.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s requested leave to
amend.
D. Denying Discovery Request
Plaintiff’s final objection to the R&R is to the
magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny his request for early
discovery. (Docket No. 171 at p. 4.) The magistrate judge found
that plaintiff’s request for early discovery was moot because his
complaints failed to state a single claim upon which relief may be
granted. Although the request for discovery is no longer moot due
to the survival of the lack of specificity claim against Flowers,
the Court rejects the request nonetheless.
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 19
“A party seeking expedited discovery in advance of a
Rule 26(f) conference has the burden of showing good cause for the
requested departure from usual discovery procedures.” Sirio v.
Stancil, No. 1:25-cv-02790-RMR-SBP, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13159,
at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2026). In plaintiff’s case, however,
each of his cited reasons for good cause relate to claims that the
Court will dismiss. See Docket No. 151 at p. 1 (citing fraudulent
lien activity, contempt arrest without lawful basis, and a joint
conspiracy between private and public actors as factors supporting
good cause). He provides no reason why expedited discovery is
justified for his section 1983 claim against defendant Flowers,
the only remaining claim. Accordingly, plaintiff’s request for
expedited discovery is DENIED.
E. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions
Although not specifically addressed by the parties’
objections, the Court must address plaintiff’s motion for
sanctions. In that motion, plaintiff argues that defendants’
motions to dismiss are legally frivolous in violation of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The magistrate judge found plaintiff’s
motion for sanctions moot because each of the defendants’ motions
to dismiss should be granted. Because the Court declines to grant
defendant Flowers’s motion to dismiss, characterizing plaintiff’s
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 20
motion for sanctions as moot is no longer appropriate. That said,
his request fares no better on the merits.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires attorneys to
certify that their pleadings are “not being presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation[.]” A pleading’s
“claims, defenses, and other legal contentions [must be] warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new
law[.]” Id. Before awarding Rule 11 sanctions, the Court “must
find that a pleading violates Rule 11.” Collins v. Daniels, 916
F.3d 1302, 1319 (10th Cir. 2019). “Rule 11 imposes an affirmative
duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law
before filing.” Id. at 1320. “Because our adversary system
expects lawyers to zealously represent their clients, the Rule 11
standard is a tough one to satisfy; an attorney can be rather
aggressive and still be reasonable.” Id. (internal alterations
omitted).
Weighed against that standard, plaintiff’s argument for
Rule 11 sanctions is meritless. Most of defendants’ motions to
dismiss will be granted – the very opposite of legal frivolity.
As for defendant Flowers’ motion to dismiss, it too was nowhere
near frivolous. Just because the Court did not agree with him
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 21
does not mean he failed to present legally cognizable arguments.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for sanctions.
F. Defendants’ Objection to Dismissal Without Prejudice
Defendants object to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation to dismiss plaintiff’s claims without prejudice.
(Docket No. 172.) Defendants argue that the claims should instead
be dismissed with prejudice.
Courts in the Tenth Circuit generally view dismissal
based on judicial and prosecutorial immunity as an adjudication on
the merits, and accordingly dismiss with prejudice. See, e.g.,
Roman Serpik v. Marsee, No. CIV-23-00148-JD, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
121342, at *8-9 (W.D. Okla. Jul. 14, 2023) (dismissing claims with
prejudice based on judicial and prosecutorial immunity); Eliason
v. United States DOJ, No. 2:24-cv-00064-HCN-JCB, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 149464, at *16 (D. Utah Feb. 13, 2025) (dismissal with
prejudice based on absolute judicial immunity). Accordingly,
plaintiff’s claims against defendants Melton, Coppedge, English,
and Helpingstine will be dismissed with prejudice. Dismissing
plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against defendant Johnson because
she is not a state actor, a conclusion to which plaintiff did not
object, is also properly with prejudice. See Lowrey v. Collela,
1:24-cv-00225-KWR-LF, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90212, at *1-2, 18-19
(D.N.M. May 9, 2025) (dismissing section 1983 claims against legal
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 22
aid attorneys with prejudice after the attorneys were found not to
be state actors). Plaintiff’s Open Records Act claims against
various defendants in their individual capacities should also be
dismissed with prejudice. These claims are dismissed on the merits
because the defendants lack individual duties under the Open
Records Act. The remaining claims are dismissed based on lack of
specificity and will be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s
lack of specificity in his complaint prevents the Court from
engaging with the merits of his claims.9 Cf. Montoya v. Colony,
No. 25-1217, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 21143, at *3-4 (10th Cir. Aug.
19, 2025) (affirming dismissal without prejudice of a complaint
whose “vagaries, its lack of specific claims for relief or
recitation of facts makes it impossible to give fair notice of the
basis of any claim without constructing arguments on her behalf.”)
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ADOPTS IN PART and
DENIES IN PART the R&R. (Docket No. 170). Defendants’ motions to
dismiss with respect to each defendant except Flowers are GRANTED.
(Docket Nos. 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 141, 142). Defendant
Flowers’s motion to dismiss is DENIED IN PART. (Docket No. 137.)
All of plaintiff’s claims against defendant Flowers are dismissed
9 Practically speaking, this also limits a future court’s ability to meaningfully
apply res judicata against future claims.
Civil No. 24-252 (FAB)___ __ 23
except for his section 1983 claim related to the strip search,
which is the only surviving claim in this case.
Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Melton, Coppedge,
English, and Helpingstine are dismissed WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against defendant Johnson is
dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s Open Records Act claims are
dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. The rest of the dismissed claims are
dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint is DENIED.
(Docket No. 143.) Plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice of
invalid lien is MOOT. (Docket No. 145.) Plaintiff’s motion for
expedited discovery is DENIED. (Docket No. 151.) Plaintiff’s
motion for sanctions is DENIED. (Docket No. 152.)
Partial judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 19, 2026.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE