People v. Brown

NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 250718-U

This Order was filed under FILED

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0718 May 19, 2026

not precedent except in the Carla Bender

limited circumstances allowed

IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate

under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of

v. ) McLean County

ALLEN BROWN JR., ) No. 11CF1145

Defendant-Appellant. )

) Honorable

) John Casey Costigan,

) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Knecht and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for leave to file a

successive postconviction petition where defendant failed to establish cause and

prejudice.

¶2 Defendant, Allen Brown Jr., appeals the trial court’s denial of his pro se motion

for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Defendant argues that he established cause

and prejudice with regard to his claim that his two convictions for armed robbery violated the

one-act, one-crime rule. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In 2011, defendant was charged with two counts of armed robbery (720 ILCS

5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2010)) in that, while armed with a firearm, he took property (namely, United

States currency) by use of force or the threat of imminent use of force from the presence of

Ashley Bennett and Brandi Gordon, respectively. He was also charged with aggravated battery

(id. § 12-3.05(f)(1)).

¶5 In 2012, a jury found him guilty of all three counts. The trial evidence showed

that defendant and Keisean Ellis robbed a Casey’s General Store (Casey’s) in 2011. Bennett and

Gordon were working there at the time of the incident, and one cash register had been assigned

to each of them. Bennett testified that two men wearing ski masks entered the store on the night

of the incident. One was carrying a gun, and one was carrying an object that appeared to be a tire

iron. The man carrying a gun hit her in the face with the gun, injuring her face. Bennett opened

her cash register and put all the money from the register into a bag the man with the gun had

brought with him. Gordon then opened her cash register and gave the man the money from that

register. After that, the man with the gun walked behind the counter and took two cartons of

cigarettes from the shelf. He asked if there was a safe, and Bennett told him there was. She

unlocked the safe, and the man removed several “money bags” from it. The men left, and

Gordon called the police. Later that evening, an officer apprehended defendant and Ellis during a

traffic stop. Officers located in their vehicle National City money bags, a lot of loose change,

several cartons of cigarettes, and a firearm. Gordon later identified defendant and Ellis as the

robbers during a show-up based on their clothing.

¶6 The trial court sentenced defendant to 35 years’ imprisonment on each count of

armed robbery and 10 years’ imprisonment for aggravated battery. The court ordered that all

three sentences were to run consecutively and that defendant was to serve 85% of the sentences.

During the sentencing hearing, the court stated:

“The defendant was found guilty of two counts of armed robbery, and

neither counsel really addressed this point, but I want to just mention it for the

record. The court believes that the two counts of armed robbery in this case are

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based on two separate physical acts. While they were conducted or committed one

right after the other, one of the armed robberies was from one clerk and one was

from another, they were from different cash registers. The defendant had to

essentially engage in different physical acts to conduct each of the arm[ed]

robberies, so, therefore, the court is of the opinion that each of these armed

robberies are separate criminal offenses. They are not confined by the one act, one

crime rule, and, therefore, the court shall be imposing sentences on both Counts

One and Two for that reason.”

¶7 On direct appeal, defendant argued that (1) the trial court violated his

constitutional right to self-representation, (2) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of armed robbery, (3) the sentences for armed robbery violated Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), (4) his conviction and sentence for aggravated battery violated

the one-act, one-crime doctrine, (5) the court erred by imposing an extended-term sentence for

aggravated battery, and (6) the 80-year aggregate sentence was excessive. People v. Brown, 2015

IL App (4th) 130192-U, ¶ 3. We found that the trial court erred by imposing an extended-term

sentence for aggravated battery and reduced the sentence on that count to five years’

imprisonment. Id. ¶ 84. We otherwise affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. ¶ 98.

¶8 On September 15, 2016, defendant, pro se, filed a postconviction petition

asserting that his constitutional rights were violated where the trial court denied his requests to

represent himself without admonishment, failed to hear and rule on trial counsel’s motion to

withdraw, and failed to make an appropriate ruling after a court-appointed psychiatrist filed his

first report on the issue of fitness. Defendant also argued that trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to fully investigate a defense of insanity or guilty but mentally ill, obtaining

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incomplete mental health records from defendant’s mother “to be relied on for a fitness/insanity

assessment,” failing to allow defendant to review “tangible evidence” after defendant requested

to do so, failing to interview witnesses, failing to call character witnesses, and refusing to relay

defendant’s request to plead guilty but mentally ill and instead forcing him to present a

fraudulent alibi defense. Defendant also asserted that the prosecutor unlawfully restrained him

and kidnapped him by directing jail officials to shackle him to a wheelchair to bring him to court.

¶9 The trial court dismissed the pro se postconviction petition on the basis that it was

frivolous and patently without merit, and this court affirmed the summary dismissal. People v.

Brown, 2019 IL App (4th) 160941-U, ¶ 34.

¶ 10 On July 26, 2024, defendant, pro se, filed a motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition, which is the subject of the instant appeal. Defendant sought to raise,

inter alia, a claim that the trial court erred by failing to vacate one of his armed robbery

convictions under the one-act, one-crime doctrine because he only took property belonging to

Casey’s rather than property belonging to either of the two victims personally. Defendant also

asserted that “counsel was ineffective for not raising these issues previously.” Defendant asserted

that cause existed for failing to raise this claim in his initial postconviction petition because

(1) he was a layperson who had only recently discovered the authorities upon which he relied

and (2) he had been diagnosed with “a serious mental illness and functional impairment with

[his] mood and thought process.” He asserted:

“The legal process makes me suicidal and I try and kill myself alot because I am

easily overwhelmed and deeply affected by my legal struggles. Hopeless. I have

been diagnosed and housed in a mental health residential treatment unit within

[the Illinois Department of Corrections] continuously since [2012] ***. I am

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constantly in and out of the hospital for self harm and suicide attempts, and I

spend a great deal of time in crisis level of care where my property is restricted to

just a blanket and safety smock.”

Defendant also asserted that the one-act, one-crime claim so infected the judgment that his

sentence violated due process and the constitution.

¶ 11 On March 12, 2025, the trial court entered an order denying defendant’s motion

for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, finding he had failed to show cause and

prejudice. This appeal followed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for

leave to file a successive postconviction petition. He contends that he established cause for

failing to file his successive postconviction petition by alleging that his serious mental illness,

hospitalizations, lack of access to his records, and suicide attempts impeded his ability to raise

his one-act, one-crime claim in his initial postconviction petition. He also argues that he

established prejudice because his two convictions for armed robbery violated the one-act,

one-crime rule.

¶ 14 Section 122-1(f) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act(725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West

2024)) provides:

“Only one petition may be filed by a petitioner under this Article without leave of

the court. Leave of court may be granted only if a petitioner demonstrates cause

for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial post-conviction

proceedings and prejudice results from that failure. For purposes of this

subsection (f): (1) a prisoner shows cause by identifying an objective factor that

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impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial

post-conviction proceedings; and (2) a prisoner shows prejudice by demonstrating

that the claim not raised during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings so

infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.”

¶ 15 A motion for leave to file a successive petition satisfies the cause and prejudice

test if it “adequately alleges facts demonstrating cause and prejudice.” People v. Smith, 2014 IL

115946, ¶ 34. That is, “the court must determine whether [the] defendant has made a prima facie

showing of cause and prejudice.” People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24. However, a defendant

must “submit enough in the way of documentation to allow a circuit court to make that

determination.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35.

“[L]eave of court to file a successive postconviction petition should be denied

when it is clear, from a review of the successive petition and the documentation

submitted by the petitioner, that the claims alleged by the petitioner fail as a

matter of law or where the successive petition with supporting documentation is

insufficient to justify further proceedings.” Id.

¶ 16 A trial court’s assessment of cause and prejudice is reviewed de novo. People v.

Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 47.

¶ 17 A. Cause

¶ 18 Defendant argues he has established cause for failing to raise his one-act,

one-crime claim in his initial postconviction petition because he alleged that he had been

diagnosed with a “serious mental illness that causes functional impairment to his mood and

thought process,” legal proceedings overwhelmed him and made him suicidal, and he had been

housed in a specialized unit for mentally ill offenders since 2012. Defendant also alleged that he

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spent extended periods in crisis care, where he was restricted to a blanket and “safety smock.”

Defendant argues that the record—including the presentence investigation report (PSI), an

Indiana order indicating he suffered from a mental condition, and a fitness evaluation report

authored by a psychiatrist—supported his allegations that he suffered from mental health

disorders.

¶ 19 To establish cause, a defendant must show that some objective factor external to

the defense impeded his ability to raise the one-act, one-crime claim in an earlier proceeding. Id.

¶ 60. A defendant’s subjective ignorance of the law does not constitute “cause” for purposes of

the cause and prejudice test. People v. Evans, 2013 IL 113471, ¶ 13.

¶ 20 We find the allegations in defendant’s motion for leave to file his successive

postconviction petition were insufficient to establish cause for failing to raise his one-act,

one-crime claim in his initial postconviction petition. Defendant failed to attach any

documentation to his petition concerning the nature of his mental illness, and his allegations

concerning the nature of his mental illness and the manner in which it prevented him from

raising his claim earlier were vague. While defendant alleged that he had been in a “crisis level

of care” with property restrictions for “a great deal of time,” defendant did not specify when and

for how long his property was restricted. Significantly, defendant was able to file an initial

postconviction petition in 2016 raising numerous claims, despite his mental health issues, and he

did not explain in his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition how his mental

illness prevented him from raising the one-act, one-crime claim in the initial petition. See People

v. Maclin, 2021 IL App (1st) 172254, ¶ 15 (“In the absence of specific and objective information

as to the nature of his mental illness during the relevant time period that would have prevented

him from raising this claim in an earlier proceeding, we cannot conclude that the defendant has

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shown cause.”).

¶ 21 While defendant argues that the trial record supports his claim that he suffered

from a serious mental illness, we note that the record is not entirely clear on this matter. There is

evidence in the record that defendant has been diagnosed with mental illnesses, but the nature

and severity of defendant’s mental health issues is unclear. For example, the psychiatrist who

conducted a fitness evaluation prior to the trial concluded that there was “a lot of reason to

believe that [defendant was] not psychotic but [was] malingering psychosis in order to avoid

consequences for his actions.” Similarly, according to the PSI, records indicated that defendant

was “manipulative in some of his suicidal gestures” in jail, as he wanted to be housed in certain

areas of the jail or alone.

¶ 22 B. Prejudice

¶ 23 Even if we were to find defendant established cause for failing to raise his

one-act, one-crime claim in his initial postconviction petition, defendant has not shown

prejudice. To show prejudice, defendant was required to show that the one-act, one-crime claim

“so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.” 725 ILCS

5/122-1(f) (West 2024).

¶ 24 Under the one-act, one-crime rule, “a criminal defendant may not be convicted of

multiple offenses when those offenses are all based on precisely the same physical act.” People

v. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 11. In determining whether a one-act, one-crime violation occurred,

courts first consider whether the defendant’s conduct consisted of a single physical act or

separate acts. Id. ¶ 12. If the defendant committed multiple acts, the court then considers whether

any of the offenses are lesser-included offenses. Id. “[A]n ‘act’ [is] any overt or outward

manifestation that will support a separate offense.” People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 341

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(2001).

¶ 25 The offense of armed robbery, as charged in this case, required the State to prove

that defendant knowingly took property from the person or presence of another by the use of

force or threatening the imminent use of force while armed with a firearm. 720 ILCS

5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2012). “The ownership of the property taken is unimportant; its possession by

the victim is adequate for the purpose of establishing the crime [of armed robbery].” People v.

Scott, 23 Ill. App. 3d 956, 967 (1974). “Under well-settled Illinois law, multiple armed robbery

convictions cannot lie when there is a single taking of property, even when multiple individuals

are present and threatened.” People v. Scott, 2015 IL App (1st) 133180, ¶ 16.

¶ 26 Here, defendant argues that his convictions for two counts of armed robbery

violated the one-act, one-crime rule. He asserts the evidence showed that there was only one

taking of property belonging to the store during a single continuous act. Defendant contends that

the fact that there were two cash registers assigned to two different employees did not create two

distinct takings, as the robbery was one continuous criminal episode directed at the store.

¶ 27 In support of his argument, defendant relies on People v. Mack, 105 Ill. 2d 103

(1984) (vacated on other grounds, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987)). In Mack, the defendant was convicted

of two counts of armed robbery for taking money from the person and presence of a bank’s

security guard and loan officer. Id. at 134. The trial evidence showed that the defendant shot the

security guard twice and ordered the loan officer to sit on the floor while brandishing a weapon.

Id. The defendant’s accomplices then “jumped over the partitions of the teller’s [sic] cages and

scooped up the money.” Id. at 135. The Mack court held that the defendant should have only

been convicted of one count of armed robbery because “there was but one taking of money.” Id.

at 136. The Mack court found that the case was distinguishable from cases involving multiple

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takings from multiple victims, where multiple convictions of armed robbery were proper. Id. at

135.

¶ 28 Though not cited by the parties, we find the decision in People v. Waldron, 219

Ill. App. 3d 1017 (1991), to be instructive. In Waldron, the defendant was convicted of first

degree murder and two counts of armed robbery for an incident during which he shot an

individual while robbing a gas station. Id. at 1029. On appeal, the defendant argued, inter alia,

that one of his armed robbery convictions must be vacated because the evidence showed there

was only one taking of property. Id. at 1042. The court disagreed, finding that evidence had been

presented at the trial indicating that the defendant had ordered a gas station employee to give him

money and the employee emptied a cash register. Id. at 1043. The defendant then shot the

employee and told a different employee to give him the rest of the money, which he did. Id. The

Waldron court found these facts supported the finding that two separate armed robberies

occurred, noting the offense of armed robbery is complete when force or threat of force causes

the victim to part with possession or custody of property against his will. Id. The Waldron court

distinguished Mack, finding that, unlike in Mack, multiple takings had occurred. Id. at 1044.

¶ 29 In the instant case, like in Waldron, the evidence showed that multiple takings

occurred. Specifically, the evidence showed that defendant threatened both Bennett and Gordon

with a gun and struck Bennett in the face with the gun. At defendant’s direction, Bennett emptied

one cash register and put the money in a bag, and Gordon then emptied the second cash register.

Although all the property taken by defendant was owned by Casey’s, defendant threatened both

Bennett and Gordan and separately took property from the possession of each of them.

¶ 30 Because there were two separate takings in this case, it is distinguishable from

Mack. While the Mack court noted that money was taken from multiple tellers’ cages and that all

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the money taken was property of the bank, it appears, based on the Mack court’s description of

the offense, that both the loan officer and the security guard were merely present in the room

while the defendant’s accomplices took money from the tellers’ cages. See Mack, 105 Ill. 2d at

134-36. There was no indication in that case that the defendant or his accomplices separately

directed the loan officer to turn over some money and the security guard to turned over

additional money, as occurred in the instant case and in Waldron.

¶ 31 Based on the foregoing, we find the trial evidence showed that defendant’s two

armed robbery convictions were based on separate physical acts. As armed robbery is not a

lesser-included offense of itself, defendant’s one-act, one-crime claim fails. See Coats, 2018 IL

121926, ¶ 12. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding defendant had failed to establish

prejudice with respect to his failure to raise the one-act, one-crime claim earlier.

¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 33 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 34 Affirmed.

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