Z. Leger v. G.L. Martin

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ziaire Leger, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 253 C.D. 2025

: Argued: April 13, 2026

Gregory L. Martin, Zimmerman Mulch :

Products, LLC, Andy Zimmerman :

a/k/a Andrew Zimmerman, and :

Bethel Township :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY

PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: May 19, 2026

Ziaire Leger (Leger) appeals the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of

Lebanon County (trial court), exited February 13, 2025, certifying as final the trial

court’s Order, exited January 27, 2025, granting the Motion for Summary Judgment

of Bethel Township (Township).1 In this tort action, Leger seeks to recover damages

for severe injuries sustained as a passenger in a motor vehicle crash within the

Township that Leger partially attributes to a dangerous condition at the intersection

where the crash occurred. The trial court granted the Township summary judgment

based on governmental immunity under Section 8541 of the Political Subdivision

Tort Claims Act (Act), 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541, reasoning Leger did not adduce evidence

to establish that the Township had actual or constructive notice of any dangerous

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Gregory L. Martin, Zimmerman Mulch Products, LLC, and Andy Zimmerman a/k/a

Andrew Zimmerman are not participating in this appeal.

condition at the intersection to defeat immunity. Leger argues the trial court erred

because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Township had

constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition at the intersection and the trial

court usurped the role of the jury in finding the Township lacked notice. After

review, the Court reverses the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the

Township and remands for further proceedings because there is a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether the Township had constructive notice of the alleged

dangerous condition at the intersection to defeat governmental immunity.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Crash

At approximately 5:14 a.m. on December 1, 2020, a motor vehicle crash

occurred between a sedan and a tractor-trailer at the intersection of Shirksville Road

and State Route 343, also known as Pine Grove Street, in the Township. The traffic

at the intersection of Shirksville Road and State Route 343 is controlled only by stop

signs on Shirksville Road; thus, traffic traveling on State Route 343 has the right of

way at the intersection. Before the crash, the sedan, in which Leger was the sole

passenger, traveled west on Shirksville Road toward the intersection with State

Route 343. At the same time, the tractor-trailer, operated by Gregory L. Martin and

owned by Zimmerman Mulch Products, LLC, traveled north on State Route 343

toward the intersection with Shirksville Road. As the sedan pulled into the

intersection to turn left onto State Route 343, the sedan and tractor-trailer collided.

Leger suffered severe injuries as a result of the crash.

Leger, by and through his parents, commenced a tort action against

Gregory L. Martin, Zimmerman Mulch Products, LLC, Andy Zimmerman a/k/a

Andrew Zimmerman, and the Township by filing a complaint on March 7, 2022.

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After a series of preliminary objections and an amended complaint, Leger filed a

second amended complaint on February 7, 2023. Following additional preliminary

objections, Leger and the Township filed a stipulation agreeing to revise or remove

certain paragraphs of the second amended complaint relating to the Township.

Relevantly, Leger averred that the Township’s negligence caused his injuries.

Leger alleged that the “Township had a duty to design, construct and maintain its

roads in a condition safe for travelers, including proper signage and intersection sight

triangles.” (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 29a.) Leger further alleged that sometime

before the crash, the Township “placed and/or directed to be placed” a stop sign at

the subject intersection “with a sight distance of approximately 300 feet instead of

the required intersection sight distance for the built environment of 500 feet.” (Id.

at 15a.) Leger averred that the stop sign created a dangerous condition at the

intersection, of which the Township had actual and constructive notice, and that this

dangerous condition caused his injuries. (Id. at 29a, 115a.) Leger alleged that the

Township negligently created this dangerous condition by failing to, among others,

install the stop sign on Shirksville Road at an appropriate location to maintain proper

sight distance along State Route 343, perform or comply with traffic and engineering

investigations into the safety of the intersection before installing the stop sign, design

and erect appropriate traffic controls or signage at the intersection, inspect and

maintain the roadways for safety, and install a proper traffic control device. (Id. at

30a-33a, 115a-18a.) Because the Township had notice of the dangerous condition,

Leger averred that the Township is liable under the trees, traffic controls, and street

lighting exception and the streets exception to governmental immunity pursuant to

Section 8542 of the Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542.

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B. Motion for Summary Judgment

After discovery, the Township filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on

August 26, 2024, arguing it is entitled to summary judgment for the following

reasons. To start, the Township argued that Leger did not adduce any evidence to

show the stop sign on Shirksville Road caused or contributed to his injuries. The

Township reasoned that Leger’s expert, Justin P. Schorr, Ph.D. (Dr. Schorr), did not

indicate any faults as to the placement, location, and design of the stop sign in his

expert report. Thus, the Township argued that it is entitled to summary judgment on

any claim related to the stop sign.

Next, the Township argued that Leger did not adduce admissible evidence to

show that the Township had notice of a dangerous condition at the intersection to

defeat governmental immunity. The Township asserted that it lacked notice because

its manager, Melissa Johnson (Johnson), and a road crew employee, Jay Bicksler

(Bicksler), both of whom Leger deposed, testified that they lacked knowledge of

prior accidents at the subject intersection. Additionally, the Township contended

that it “does not have its own police force and therefore would not receive notice in

that matter” and that there was no evidence to suggest the Township received notice

of prior accidents from the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP). (R.R. at 96a.) The

Township also argued an intersection crash document (Crash Report) produced by

Leger and the testimony of James Lesher (Lesher), an employee of the Pennsylvania

Department of Transportation (PennDOT) whom Leger deposed, did not establish

notice. Although the Crash Report showed that 19 reported crashes occurred at the

subject intersection from 2003 through 2019, the Township maintained that the

Report is inadmissible because it is hearsay and does not “show that the other

accidents occurred at ‘substantially the same place and under the same or similar

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circumstances.’” (Id. at 100a (citation omitted).) The Township further contended

that Lesher’s testimony on the Crash Report did not establish notice because Lesher

did not know how, why, or by whom the Report was created, could not explain

whether the prior crashes at the intersection were statistically significant, and did not

know if the prior crashes occurred under any of the same conditions as the crash in

this case. Therefore, the Township argued it is entitled to summary judgment based

on governmental immunity under Section 8541 of the Act.

Lastly, the Township argued it is entitled to summary judgment because the

intersection is not owned by the Township and is controlled by PennDOT. Citing

Lesher’s testimony, the Township contended that “the intersection is within

PennDOT’s right of way of [State Route] 343” and that “PennDOT maintains both

[State Route] 343 and the right of way.” (Id. at 103a.) Although “Lesher d[id] not

know who designed or constructed the intersection,” including the sight triangle at

issue here, the Township explained that according to Bicksler, “the intersection was

not designed by the Township[] and the sight triangle on the southeast corner is not

owned by the Township.” (Id. at 105a.) Additionally, the Township asserted that

the embankment and vegetation blocking the sight triangle is within PennDOT’s

right of way along State Route 343. Because the Township did not design or

construct the intersection and does not own or control the intersection, State Route

343, or the right of way, the Township argued that it is immune from liability and is

entitled to summary judgment.2

2

The Township also argued it is entitled to summary judgment on claims as to an

“Intersection Ahead” sign. (R.R. at 95a-96a.) Leger agreed that the parties struck from the second

amended complaint the claims as to an intersection ahead sign on Shirksville Road. (Id. at 367a;

see also id. at 116a (stipulation).)

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Leger responded that summary judgment in the Township’s favor is

inappropriate. To begin, Leger argued that Dr. Schorr’s expert report did indicate

faults with the stop sign on Shirksville Road, reasoning the report “concern[ed] the

‘stop-controlled departure sight triangle’ at the intersection.” (Id. at 365a.)

Moreover, Leger reasoned that in an affidavit filed after the Motion for Summary

Judgment, Dr. Schorr clarified that “[t]he use of a stop sign at the subject intersection

was never appropriate given the lack of sight distance” and that the “Township

should have identified the insufficient sight distance when they first placed the stop

sign.” (Id. at 366a (emphasis omitted).) In addition, Leger asserted that according

to PennDOT’s employee, Lesher, the Township “is responsible for installing and

replacing stop signs at the subject intersection.” (Id. (emphasis omitted).)

Furthermore, the Township’s own employee, Bicksler, testified that he determines

whether to replace stop signs within the Township, “he does not take measurements

while replacing signs to make sure they are appropriately placed,” he replaced the

subject stop sign on Shirksville Road three times on behalf of the Township, and

“that ‘whoever designed the intersection or the road’ has responsibility to insure that

stop signs were properly placed.” (Id.) Therefore, Leger argued the Township is

not entitled to summary judgment on the claims related to the stop sign.

Leger also argued that the record includes ample evidence to establish that the

Township had notice of a dangerous condition at the intersection to defeat

governmental immunity. Citing Dr. Schorr’s expert opinion, Leger asserted that the

Township should have had reasonable notice that the stop sign was negligently

placed on Shirksville Road, limiting the necessary sight distance along State Route

343, when it initially designed the intersection and erected the sign and each time it

subsequently replaced the sign. Moreover, Leger argued the Crash Report

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establishes notice, reasoning it shows that 13 of 19 crashes that occurred over the

preceding 17 years occurred at “substantially the same place and under the same

circumstances” as the crash involving Leger because the crashes occurred at the

same intersection and were also “angle” crashes. (Id. at 375a, 695a.) Contrary to

the Township’s claim, Leger asserted the Crash Report is “admissible because it can

be offered not for the truth of the matter, but to show that [the Township] had notice

of the subject dangerous condition of the municipal roadway and stop sign/sight

triangle.” (Id. at 374a.) Even if inadmissible, Leger contended that the data

underlying the Crash Report “need not be admissible to be relied upon by [his]

expert.” (Id.) As Dr. Schorr opined based on the “raw data” underlying the report,

Leger explained, the Township “had the best opportunity to recognize” that

“collision[s] consistently occurred at the subject intersection” and “should have

identified the insufficient sight distance when [it] first placed the stop sign.” (Id. at

375a-76a.) Accordingly, Leger argued the Township could reasonably be charged

with notice to defeat governmental immunity.

Finally, Leger argued a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the

Township is responsible for the intersection and sight triangle. Citing Dr. Schorr’s

report and Lesher’s testimony, Leger asserted that “Shirksville Road is a local

roadway under the ownership of [the] Township” and “[t]he intersection of

Shirksville Road and [State] Route 343 is the responsibility of [the Township]

according to PennDOT.” (Id. at 378a.) Furthermore, based on correspondence

between the Township and PennDOT introduced as an exhibit during Johnson’s

deposition, Leger reasoned that “the municipality is responsible for the intersection

operation, essentially since it is the municipality’s choice where and how to access

the State highway system.” (Id. at 382a.) Moreover, Leger argued summary

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judgment is inappropriate on this issue because the Township impermissibly relied

solely upon oral testimony, which it misquotes or misstates, to support its arguments

in violation of Borough of Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co. of New York, 163 A.

523 (Pa. 1932). For these reasons, Leger argued the trial court should deny the

Township summary judgment.

In reply, the Township maintained that summary judgment is appropriate on

the claims involving the stop sign. Citing Bicksler’s testimony, the Township

reasoned that it “did not ‘erect’ a stop sign” on Shirksville Road and “the only time

[it] touched the stop sign before the . . . Leger accident was when it put a new sign

on the same pole/post that had pre-existed the sign being knocked off the pole.”

(R.R. at 702a.) Further, the Township argued that “[Dr.] Schorr only state[d] that

[the] Township ‘would have been responsible for the original design,’ not that it

designed the intersection or the sight triangle.” (Id. at 703a.) Consequently, the

Township asserted that it cannot be held liable for “the design of the intersection,

including the placement of the stop sign and the [sight] triangle,” because it did not

“undert[ake] a discretionary duty to design the intersection.” (Id.) Additionally, the

Township argued that the Nanty-Glo rule does not apply in this case because the

Township relied on the oral testimony of Leger’s witness (Lesher) and the report of

Leger’s expert (Dr. Schorr). Therefore, the Township reiterated that it is entitled to

summary judgment based on governmental immunity.

Following a hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Leger filed a sur

reply requesting that the trial court consider this Court’s decision in Angell

v. Dereno, 134 A.3d 1173 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). Pursuant to Angell, Leger argued

that “whether a local agency had either actual or constructive notice of a dangerous

condition is a question of fact for the jury.” (R.R. at 755a (alteration and emphasis

8

omitted).) Because genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the Township

had constructive notice is a question of fact for the jury, Leger asserted that the

Township is not entitled to summary judgment.

The trial court subsequently granted the Township summary judgment in the

January 2025 Order. In an accompanying opinion, the trial court concluded that the

Township is entitled to summary judgment based on governmental immunity despite

the existence of genuine disputes as to whether the stop sign had faults or contributed

to the crash and whether the Township owned and controlled the intersection. The

trial court opined that the Township has governmental immunity because Leger did

not adduce evidence to establish that the Township had actual or constructive notice

of a dangerous condition at the intersection. The trial court reasoned that both

employees of the Township, Johnson and Bicksler, “testified that they did not have

knowledge of other accidents at the intersection at issue.” (Trial Court’s Opinion

(Op.) at 5.) Further, Johnson “testified that the first time she became aware of the

accident was when [Leger] sent notice after the incident had occurred” and “that the

Township does not keep track of collisions that occur within the Township because

it does not have its own police department.” (Id. at 7.) Moreover, the trial court was

“not persuaded by [Leger’s] argument” that the evidence established that the

Township had constructive notice, reasoning:

The main piece of evidence [Leger] relies on to argue the Township had

constructive notice of the dangerous conditions of the intersection was

the [Crash Report]. [Leger] has not provided any evidence to show who

created the [R]eport, when the [R]eport was created, or how the data

reflected in the chart was collected. Additionally, the [trial c]ourt finds

that the evidence of other accidents is insufficient to show the Township

had notice. The [trial c]ourt acknowledges that constructive notice

under the trees and traffic controls exception can be proven by evidence

of substantially similar accidents. However, [Leger] has failed to

adduce evidence that any of the alleged 19 accidents reflected on the

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[C]rash [R]eport occurred at “substantially the same place and under

the same or similar circumstance[s.”] The [C]rash [R]eport fails to

show whether the previous incidents involved a driver who neglected

to stop at the stop sign, where a vehicle was making a left turn onto

State Route 343 from Shirksville Road, if the collision took place at

night, or if there were concerns related to the stop sign, the placement

of the stop sign, the sight triangle, an embankment, or the topography

of the intersection. Furthermore, [Leger] has failed to produce any

evidence to show the Township ever received a copy of the [C]rash

[R]eport.

(Id. at 6-7.) Although genuine disputes existed on other issues, the trial court

therefore concluded that the Township is entitled to summary judgment based on

governmental immunity under Section 8541 of the Act.

Leger now appeals the trial court’s February 2025 Order certifying as final

the January 2025 Order.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standards

On appellate review, this Court “may reverse a grant of summary judgment if

there has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” Weaver v. Lancaster

Newspapers, Inc., 926 A.2d 899, 902 (Pa. 2007). A trial court may grant summary

judgment “only in those cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there is no

genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Sellers v. Township of Abington, 106 A.3d 679, 684 (Pa. 2014)

(citation omitted). Because summary judgment presents a question of law, this

Court’s standard of review is de novo. Id. “To the extent that this Court must resolve

a question of law, we shall review the grant of summary judgment in the context of

the entire record.” Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010).

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For purposes of summary judgment, the record includes “all pleadings, as well

as any depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and expert

reports.” LJL Transp., Inc. v. Pilot Air Freight Corp., 962 A.2d 639, 647 (Pa. 2009).

In considering summary judgment, “the trial court must take all facts of record and

reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party”

and “resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against

the moving party.” Summers, 997 A.2d at 1159. Moreover, under Nanty-Glo,

“[h]owever clear and indisputable may be the proof when it depends on oral

testimony, it is nevertheless the province of the [factfinder] to decide . . . as to the

law applicable to the facts.” 163 A. at 524 (citation omitted). In other words,

“testimonial affidavits and oral depositions of the moving party, without supporting

documents, are insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment” as “the

credibility of the testimony is still a matter for the jury.” Sanchez-Guardiola v. City

of Philadelphia, 87 A.3d 934, 937-38 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citation omitted).

Nevertheless, “[t]he Nanty[-]Glo rule does not preclude the grant of summary

judgment when the moving party relies on the testimonial evidence of an adverse

party.” Kniaz v. Benton Borough, 642 A.2d 551, 553 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). With the

foregoing in mind, the Court turns to the parties’ arguments.

B. Parties’ Arguments

On appeal, Leger argues the trial court erred in granting the Township

summary judgment for two principal reasons. First, Leger argues the trial court erred

by making a factual determination that the Township lacked constructive notice of a

dangerous condition at the intersection. Leger asserts that a poorly designed

intersection and a negligently placed stop sign, among other factors, created a

dangerous condition by limiting sight distance for vehicles traveling west on

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Shirksville Road looking south onto State Route 343. Leger contends that whether

the Township had constructive notice of this dangerous condition to defeat

governmental immunity is a question of fact for the jury, not the trial court. Based

on the record evidence, Leger argues that a jury could reasonably find that the

Township had notice of the dangerous condition because the Township designed the

intersection and is responsible for the safety of and installing and replacing signage

at the intersection. In addition, Leger asserts that the Crash Report establishes

constructive notice because it shows that 19 reported crashes occurred at the same

intersection over the past two decades, including 13 crashes that were “angle”

crashes similar to the crash in this case. (Leger’s Brief (Br.) at 20.) Nevertheless,

Leger maintains that it is not necessary to prove notice of the dangerous condition

because the Township created the condition by designing the intersection and

negligently placing the stop sign. Either way, Leger argues that it is for the jury to

decide whether the Township had constructive notice of the dangerous condition at

the intersection.

Second, Leger argues the trial court erred by not following summary judgment

standards. Leger asserts that the trial court usurped the role of the jury by concluding

that it was not “persuaded” by the evidence proffered by Leger. (Id. at 25.) Leger

also contends that in finding the evidence unpersuasive, the trial court focused on

the Crash Report while ignoring record evidence that the Township patrolled for

problems with stop signs. Furthermore, Leger argues the trial court’s conclusion

that the Township lacked constructive notice improperly relied on oral testimony

from the Township’s witnesses in violation of Nanty-Glo. Leger asserts it is for the

jury, not the trial court, to decide whether the witnesses’ testimony is credible.

Because the trial court decided to believe the oral testimony of the Township’s

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witnesses while ignoring Leger’s contrary evidence, Leger argues the trial court

erred and must be reversed on appeal.

The Township counters that the trial court properly granted summary

judgment. As for notice, the Township argues that Leger has not adduced any

admissible evidence to establish that the Township had notice of a dangerous

condition of the intersection. Focusing on the Crash Report, the Township asserts

that Leger did not produce evidence to show that the Township “had actual notice

of a dangerous condition or prior accidents at the intersection” because Leger did

not show that the Township “received or should have received notice of other

accidents at the intersection.” (Township’s Br. at 33.) The Township further asserts

that Leger did not prove that the other crashes at the intersection “occurred at

‘substantially the same place and under the same or similar circumstances’” to

establish constructive notice. (Id. at 32-33 (citation omitted).) The Township

contends that Leger’s expert did not establish constructive notice because Dr.

Schorr’s opinion that the Township was in the best position to recognize “that

collisions were consistently occurring at the subject intersection” is a “bald

unsupported assertion[]” as Dr. Schorr did not “point to specific facts or empirical

data . . . to support his opinion[].” (Id. at 33-35 (emphasis omitted).) The Township

also argues Lesher’s testimony and the Crash Report did not establish constructive

notice because neither Lesher nor the Report established that the prior crashes

occurred under the same or similar circumstances as the crash involving Leger.

Therefore, the Township asserts that the trial court “was correct in discounting” Dr.

Schorr’s expert report, Lesher’s testimony, and the Crash Report to conclude that

Leger did not establish that the Township had actual or constructive notice of a

dangerous condition at the intersection to defeat governmental immunity. (Id. at 38.)

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Moreover, the Township argues that neither the trees, traffic controls, and

street lighting exception nor the streets exception to governmental immunity are

available to Leger. The Township contends that the trees exception does not apply

because the vegetation along State Route 343 that Leger claims limited the sight

view from Shirksville Road is not “under the care, custody or control” of the

Township. (Id. at 21-23.) Similarly, the Township asserts that the streets exception

does not apply because the Township does not own the vertical curve along State

Route 343 that Leger claims contributed to the limited sight view. The Township

further argues that the traffic controls exception is not available to Leger because the

Township has no authority to remove the stop sign on Shirksville Road and

implement a different traffic-control scheme at the intersection with State Route 343.

Rather, the Township asserts that PennDOT is responsible for traffic control at the

intersection, and without PennDOT’s written approval, which was not forthcoming,

the Township cannot change traffic controls. Finally, while not raised before the

trial court, the Township argues it should not be held liable for Leger’s injuries

because the driver of the sedan in which he was a passenger caused the crash by not

stopping at the stop sign and yielding to the traffic with the right of way. For these

reasons, the Township argues the trial court must be affirmed.

C. Analysis

Pursuant to Section 8541 of the Act, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this

subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury

to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof

or any other person.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541. In other words, local agencies, including

townships, “are generally immune from tort liability, except in circumstances where

immunity is expressly waived.” Starr v. Veneziano, 747 A.2d 867, 871 (Pa. 2000).

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The General Assembly has expressly waived governmental immunity for local

agencies when two conditions are satisfied: (1) the damages would be recoverable

under a statutory or common law cause of action against a person unprotected by

governmental immunity, and (2) the negligent act of the local agency or its employee

that caused the injury falls within one of the enumerated categories listed in Section

8542(b) of the Act. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(a).

Relevant to this case, the trees, traffic controls, and street lighting exception

in Section 8542(b)(4) of the Act provides that a local agency may be liable for:

A dangerous condition of trees, traffic signs, lights or other traffic

controls, street lights or street lighting systems under the care, custody

or control of the local agency, except that the claimant to recover must

establish that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable

risk of the kind of injury which was incurred and that the local agency

had actual notice or could reasonably be charged with notice under the

circumstances of the dangerous condition at a sufficient time prior to

the event to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous

condition.

42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(4). Similarly, the streets exception in Section 8542(b)(6)(i) of

the Act provides that a local agency may be liable for:

A dangerous condition of streets owned by the local agency, except that

the claimant to recover must establish that the dangerous condition

created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was

incurred and that the local agency had actual notice or could reasonably

be charged with notice under the circumstances of the dangerous

condition at a sufficient time prior to the event to have taken measures

to protect against the dangerous condition.

42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(6)(i).

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To establish liability under the above exceptions to governmental immunity,

the plaintiff must prove that “the local agency had actual notice or could reasonably

be charged with notice under the circumstances of the dangerous condition.”

42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(4), (6)(i). Whether the local agency could reasonably be

charged with notice under the circumstances, i.e., constructive notice, “requires that

the dangerous condition be apparent upon reasonable inspection.” Dep’t of Transp.

v. Patton, 686 A.2d 1302, 1304 (Pa. 1997). “[E]vidence of similar accidents

occurring at substantially the same place and under the same or similar

circumstances may, in the sound discretion of the trial Judge, be admissible to prove

constructive notice of a . . . dangerous condition.” Stormer v. Alberts Constr. Co.,

165 A.2d 87, 89 (Pa. 1960) (emphasis omitted).

Generally, “[w]hether a local agency has either actual or constructive notice

of a dangerous condition is a question of fact for the jury.” Angell, 134 A.3d at 1181;

accord Medicus v. Upper Merion Township, 475 A.2d 918, 921 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984)

(explaining that whether a municipality has notice of a dangerous condition “is a

question for the factfinder”). The trial court may determine whether a local agency

has notice “only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusion.”

Angell, 134 A.3d at 1181-82 (quoting Patton, 686 A.2d at 1305). “[I]f there is any

dispute created by the evidence, the court is not permitted to decide the issue.” Id.

at 1182 (emphasis added) (quoting Patton, 686 A.2d at 1305).

In Angell, for example, this Court concluded that a trial court erred in granting

summary judgment to two municipalities because a factual dispute existed as to

whether the municipalities had notice of an alleged dangerous condition of a road.

Id. at 1183. In that case, the estate of a deceased motorcyclist sought damages

against the municipalities, attributing the motorcyclist’s death to a dangerous

16

condition of the road where the motorcyclist was clipped by a truck. On appeal, the

estate argued the trial court erred by making a factual finding as to notice and

discounting deposition evidence and an expert report. This Court agreed, reasoning:

[T]here is a factual dispute on the question of constructive notice.

Police officers from the [m]unicipalities patrolled near the crash site

prior to the fatal accident, and [the estate’s expert] opined that the

danger should have been identified on a routine inspection by the

[m]unicipalities. Constructive notice is a question of fact to be decided

by the jury, not the court. If the dangerous conditions, i.e., a too-narrow

street with limited sight distance, are deemed by the jury to be “apparent

upon reasonable inspection,” the jury could find that the

[m]unicipalities had notice.

Id. (italics omitted). Therefore, this Court held that “[t]he trial court erred in granting

summary judgment on the issue of actual and constructive notice.”3 Id.

By contrast, in Lamberson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation

Authority, this Court held that a trial court did not err in entering judgment against

the plaintiff because she did not produce sufficient evidence to establish constructive

notice of an alleged dangerous condition. 335 A.3d 423, 429 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025).

In that case, a portion of a Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority

(SEPTA) train platform collapsed without warning, injuring the plaintiff. After the

plaintiff rested her case during a jury trial, the trial court granted SEPTA a nonsuit.

3

The Township argues that Angell is inapposite to the case at bar because Angell involved

the intersection of two municipal roads and that our Supreme Court’s decision in Starr is

dispositive because, like in this case, Starr “concern[ed] an intersection between a state highway

and a township road.” (Township’s Br. at 26 n.8.) To the extent the Township argues that Angell

is inapposite and Starr is dispositive on the issue of whether the Township had notice of a

dangerous condition to defeat governmental immunity, we disagree. In Angell, this Court’s

decision on the issue of notice was not predicated upon the fact that the two intersecting roads

were municipal roads. 134 A.3d at 1181-83. Additionally, Starr did not concern whether a

township had sufficient notice of a dangerous condition to defeat governmental immunity, but

whether a plaintiff established a duty of care on the part of a township to install a traffic control

device at an intersection of a state highway and township road. 747 A.2d at 869, 872-75.

17

On appeal, the plaintiff argued the trial court erred “because she presented evidence

that, if believed by the jury, establishes that SEPTA had constructive notice that the

train platform was in disrepair and needed repairs before the accident.” Id. at 425.

The plaintiff asserted that “a video SEPTA took of the accident” and “three

photographs, showing a view of the location where she fell and the platform’s

substantial deterioration, . . . were sufficient to establish constructive notice.” Id.

We disagreed. This Court reasoned the plaintiff did not produce any evidence that

showed “the alleged dangerous condition was ‘apparent upon reasonable

inspection’” because “[t]he video did not reveal an observable defect or hazard on

the platform prior to the actual accident” and the photographs “were taken after the

accident not before it.” Id. at 426, 428 (emphasis and citations omitted).

Accordingly, this Court affirmed the trial court because “‘reasonable minds could

not differ as to the conclusion’ that [the plaintiff] did not establish constructive

notice.” Id. at 429 (citation omitted).

Here, Leger adduced sufficient evidence that creates a genuine dispute as to

whether the Township had constructive notice before the crash of the alleged

dangerous condition, i.e., a misplaced stop sign limiting the required sight distance,

rendering the issue of notice a question for the jury. For starters, Johnson testified

that the Township has “responsibility for . . . Shirksville Road” and is “responsible

for signage[,] . . . [i]ncluding the stop sign.” (R.R. at 501a, 503a, 513a.) Consistent

with Johnson, Bicksler testified that “one of [the] main concerns” of the Township

road crew on a daily basis is “looking for signs” that need “to get fixed” because the

sign is dented, crooked, worn, run over, or the like. (Id. at 583a, 585a-86a.) Indeed,

Bicksler testified that the Township replaced the stop sign at issue here

approximately 10 months before the crash involving Leger after a truck hit the sign,

18

“ripp[ing] it off the post.” (Id. at 601a-02a.) Additionally, Lesher testified that the

Township is responsible for Shirksville Road and the subject intersection, including

the location of the stop sign and installing and replacing signage. (Id. at 414a-15a.)

Moreover, Dr. Schorr opined that the “Township would have been responsible for

the initial design” of the intersection because “Shirksville Road is a local roadway

under the ownership of [the] Township.” (Id. at 396a.) And based on the raw data

underlying the Crash Report, Dr. Schorr opined that the Township “would have been

the entity which had the best opportunity to recognize, at some point during the 17

years preceding the subject collision, that collisions were consistently occurring at

the subject intersection.” (Id. at 369a, 399a.) Dr. Schorr also testified via affidavit

that the “Township should have identified the insufficient sight distance when they

first placed the stop sign and had opportunities to remedy their mistake during the

maintenance projects which occurred throughout the years prior to the subject

collision.” (Id. at 403a.)

Even without considering the Crash Report itself, reasonable minds could

differ as to whether the alleged dangerous condition was apparent upon reasonable

inspection before the crash involving Leger based on the foregoing evidence. The

evidence suggests that the Township is responsible for the subject stop sign on

Shirksville Road, patrolled for issues with stop signs, including at the subject

intersection, and should have identified the alleged danger caused by the location of

the stop sign. If the alleged dangerous condition is deemed by the factfinder to be

apparent upon reasonable inspection, the factfinder could find that the Township had

constructive notice. As Angell and Lamberson illustrate, any evidence that could

establish that a dangerous condition is “apparent upon reasonable inspection” before

the incident occurred is sufficient to render the issue of constructive notice a question

19

for the factfinder. Angell, 134 A.3d at 1183; Lamberson, 335 A.3d at 428. Because

Leger produced such evidence, whether the Township had constructive notice is a

question for the factfinder. See Angell, 134 A.3d at 1183; Lamberson, 335 A.3d at

428. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting the Township summary judgment

on the issue of notice.4 See Angell, 134 A.3d at 1183.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the

Township is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

4

This Court does not opine on whether the Township is entitled to summary judgment on

the other grounds advanced by the Township as either the trial court concluded factual disputes

remain on those issues or the Township raises the grounds for the first time on appeal.

20

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ziaire Leger, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 253 C.D. 2025

:

Gregory L. Martin, Zimmerman Mulch :

Products, LLC, Andy Zimmerman :

a/k/a Andrew Zimmerman, and :

Bethel Township :

ORDER

NOW, May 19, 2026, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon

County, exited January 27, 2025, certified as final by the Order exited February 13,

2025, is REVERSED, and this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge