Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAD SERVICES OF LOUISIANA, LLC * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 24-2446

DRAGADOS/HAWAIIAN DREDGING/ * SECTION “D” (2)

ORION JOINT VENTURE, ET AL.

ORDER AND REASONS

Pending before me is a Motion to Compel filed by Defendant Dragados/Hawaiian

Dredging/Orion, Joint Venture. ECF No. 98. Plaintiff LAD Services of Louisiana, LLC timely

filed an Opposition Memorandum, and Defendant timely filed a Reply Memorandum. ECF Nos.

101, 102. No party requested oral argument in accordance with Local Rule 78.1, and the Court

agrees that oral argument is unnecessary.

Having considered the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the

applicable law, Defendant’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART

for the reasons stated herein.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 10, 2024, Plaintiff LAD Services of Louisiana, LLC filed this diversity action

against Defendant Dragados/Hawaiian Dredging/Orion, Joint Venture asserting claims for breach

of contract, detrimental reliance, unjust enrichment, and deceptive trade practices relating to a

contract to build a floating dry dock for the U.S. Navy’s use and placement in Pearl Harbor,

Honolulu, Hawaii. ECF No. 1 §§ I, III ¶ 7, VI ¶¶ 34-57. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint

on October 25, 2024, a Second Amended Complaint on February 19, 2024, and a Fourth Amended

Complaint on December 31, 2025, with its request to file a Third Amended Complaint being

denied as a result of the request to file the Fourth Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 8, 23, 43, 51,

56, 79. The Fourth Amended Complaint added a sixth cause of action for Misappropriation of

Trade Secrets. ECF No. 80 ¶¶ 53-79.

The Court issued a Scheduling Order on April 23, 2025, and later continued certain dates.

ECF Nos. 35, 41, 42, 95. The current discovery deadline is July 21, 2026, with Plaintiff’s expert

reports due May 22, 2026, Defendant’s expert reports due June 24, 2026, and Plaintiff’s rebuttal

reports due July 7, 2026. ECF No. 95.

II. THE PENDING MOTION

Defendant has filed this Motion to Compel requesting that the Court order Plaintiff to

produce, within 7 days, (a) all discoverable documents and electronically stored information not

yet produced in this litigation in response to Defendant’s initial discovery requests propounded in

July 2025, and (b) comply with Local Rule 26.3’s initial disclosures requirements to produce the

information, documents, materials, and electronically stored information concerning the Fourth

Amended Complaint’s “Misappropriation of Trade Secrets” claim, requested through Defendant’s

second set of discovery requests propounded in February 2026. ECF No. 98. Defendant asserts

that Plaintiff’s production omitted internal communications (specifically Mr. Dragna’s texts and

messaging applications), has failed to preserve and maintain all electronically stored information,

failed to deliver a Trade Secret Identification Statement as required by Local Rule 26.3, and

provided only cursory responses to discovery directed to the trade secret claim. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 11, 15.

Defendant’s supporting memorandum repeats the history recited in its motion and argues

that Plaintiff’s failure to produce all responsive information is evidenced by the discrepancies

between its initial pdf production versus its later native format production, with the native format

version containing over 800 documents with only 30-40 overlapping documents, and the failure to

produce “routine and standard internal documents that can be expected” from any organization.

ECF No. 98-1 at 1-7, 10-11. Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff gathered files in

support of its claim and then produced its “claim file” rather than produce all responsive

information. Id. at 11. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s failures relate to First Set of RFP Nos. 1-

2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15-21 and Second Set of RFP No. 13. Id. at 8-9. Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s

failure to deliver the Rule 26.3 identification statement as well as its ambiguous discovery

responses identifying a category of documents, asserting Plaintiff’s alleged trade secret is

“undefined and nondescript.” Id. at 12-15.

In Opposition, Plaintiff asserts that it has produced all responsive, non-privileged

documents and ESI in its possession, custody and control, including both pdf and native format

productions, and supplemented when concerns were raised, and Defendant mischaracterizes the

discovery history, overstates the alleged deficiencies, and conflates ESI production with Rule

26.3’s identification statement requirement. ECF No. 101 at 1. Plaintiff argues that a 7-day

response deadline is unreasonable because Defendant does not identify, with specificity, what

categories of documents it believes exist but were not produced. Id. at 8. Plaintiff asserts the

parties’ waiver of initial disclosures included the Rule 26.3 statement and, in any event, it

sufficiently identified its trade secrets by specifying categories of (a) proprietary conceptual design

for constructing and transporting concrete floor units and (b) proprietary structural design and

engineering specifications for floating dry dock pontoon system, including but not limited to the

dimensional layout, freeboard calculations, ballast system configurations, and load distribution

methodology developed by Plaintiff, and producing engineering data and design documents. Id.

at 8-10. Plaintiff asks that, if a Rule 26.3 statement is required, it should be allowed 21 days to

provide same. Id. at 11.

Plaintiff contends that its native format production was not simply a “claim file” but

included all emails, documents and ESI dating back to 2009, including external communications

relevant to the dispute, engineering documents, design materials and related correspondence. Id.

at 4. It also asserts that the alleged “discrepancies” between the native format and pdf productions

resulted from predictable differences from converting the documents, not deliberate omissions. Id.

at 5. Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not identified any omitted material, and a motion to

compel based on suspicion and inference is improper. Id. However, Plaintiff appears to concede

it has not searched for and produced all electronic communications (e.g., texts or messaging app

communications), stating only that it produced all internal emails and later asserting that a search

for text messages and other communications from personal devices would entail lengthy forensic

efforts and a review that could not be accomplished in 7 days. Id. at 6, 8. Plaintiff also asserts

that it has not deleted or failed to preserve ESI, only that its vendor did not retain the search terms

it ran to gather the information. Id. at 6-7.

In Reply, Defendant asserts that the requests properly seek relevant evidence (i.e., internal

communications about the project, lawsuit, claims and defenses) proportional to the needs of the

case, and Plaintiff’s relevance and proportionality objections must fail. ECF No. 102. Defendant

disputes Plaintiff’s assertion that file formatting differences explain the inconsistent productions

because the initial production only covered July 2022 forward, whereas the second production

went back to 2009 and included 350 more documents. Id. at 3. Defendant reiterates that the

requests sought all communications but Plaintiff continues to limit its discussion to emails, that

there was no waiver of the Rule 26.3 trade secret identification statement because that claim had

not been urged when they agreed to waive initial disclosures required by Rule 26, and Plaintiff’s

responses to the second set of discovery directed to trade secrets are insufficient. Id. at 4-7.

III. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

The parties appear to agree that the requests at issue seek relevant information within the

scope of permissible discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). The dispute revolves around whether

Plaintiff has produced all information responsive to the requests with regard to electronically

stored communications other than emails and the alleged trade secrets.

A. Motion to Compel Production of Responsive Documents

The Court cannot compel a party to produce documents that do not exist.1 While Defendant

relies on discrepancies between the pdf production and native format production, Defendant fails

to demonstrate the particular discrepancies or how they suggest other failures to produce

responsive information beyond the date differences of the productions. Defendant does, however,

sufficiently establish (and Plaintiff appears to concede) that Plaintiff’s production was limited to

email communications rather than other electronic communications (texts, messaging applications,

1 Henderson v. Compdent of Tenn., Inc., No. 97-617, 1997 WL 756600, at *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 1997) (denying motion

to compel based on representation that documents that do not exist and noting other remedies are available if

representation is untrue); Goosehead Ins. Agency, LLC v. Guillory, No. 24-2146, 2025 WL 1397166, at *5 (E.D. La.

May 14, 2025) (court cannot compel party to produce documents that do not exist); Solorzano v. Shell Chem. Co.,

No. 99-2831, 2000 WL 1145766, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 2000) (“[A party or non-party] cannot produce what it does

not have.”); Rhyce v. Martin, No. 00-2623, 2002 WL 31496375, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 6, 2002) (denying motion to

compel where party did not have control of documents); Fernandez v. McDaniel Controls, Inc., No. 98-1040, 1998

WL 840014, at *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 3, 1998) (“Plaintiff cannot be compelled to produce what he certifies in a response

signed pursuant to Rule 26(g) he does not possess.”); Frught v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 07-5069, 2009

WL 10679979, at *1 (E.D. La. May 27, 2009) (defendant could not be compelled to produce materials which it certifies

are not in its possession, custody, or control); see also Butler v. La. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., No. 12-420, 2014

WL 3867552, at *1 (M.D. La. Aug. 6, 2014) (“[The court] cannot compel Defendants to produce documents that do

not exist.”); Payne v. Forest River, Inc., No. 13-679, 2015 WL 1912851, at *4 (M.D. La. Apr. 22, 2015) (“The court

cannot order the production of documents that no longer exist or, despite a diligent search, cannot be found in the

possession, custody, or control of a party.”); Callais v. United Rentals N. Am., Inc., No. 17-312, 2018 WL 6517446,

at *7 (M.D. La. Dec. 11, 2018) (“The Court cannot order the production of something the producing party suggests

does not exist.”); Terral v. Ducote, No. 15-2366, 2016 WL 5017328, at *2 (W.D. La. Sept. 19, 2016) (“The court

cannot order respondents to produce discovery that does not exist.”); Beth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-1024, 2014

WL 2918674, at *2 (W.D. La. June 26, 2014) (agreeing with proposition that a party cannot be compelled to produce

documents that do not exist); Alvarado v. Air Sys. Components LP, No. 19-2057, 2021 WL 2682870, at *3 (N.D. Tex.

June 29, 2021) (noting that a party is not required to produce any discovery it does not possess); Cardenas v. Dorel

Juv. Grp., Inc., 230 F.R.D. 611, 620 (D. Kan. 2005) (“The Court cannot compel the production of documents that do

not exist or that are not in the possession, custody or control of a party.”).

etc.). Indeed, Plaintiff’s assertion that it would take more than 7 days to search texts and messaging

apps for responsive communications reveals that same were not searched or produced.2

Defendant’s requests were not limited to emails. The requests seek all communications,

not simply emails. Text messages and communications through other applications fall within the

scope of RFP Nos. 9-12 and 40 of the first set and RFP No. 13 of the second set. ECF No. 98-4 at

8-9, 12; No. 98-13 at 9. Plaintiff is obliged to undertake an investigation of all reasonably available

sources for responsive information, which it has not done. Accordingly, it must produce any

responsive communications including electronic messages contained in texts or on other

messaging applications, such as WhatsApp or social media.

Defendant has not, however, established that Plaintiff failed to produce other unspecified

responsive documents. While Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not produced all responsive

documents because it failed to produce documents one would expect (ECF No. 98-1 at 11), a

party's mere disbelief or disagreement with a response is not a recognized ground for compelling

discovery.3 The requesting party's belief or suspicion that the response is incomplete or incorrect

must be supported by evidence that the responding party's production is not complete.4 To

establish a specific or material deficiency in the response necessary to require additional searches

or discovery efforts, or to obtain “discovery on discovery” that is “both relevant and proportional

to the needs of the case” under Rule 26(b)(1), the requesting party must provide evidence,

2 ECF No. 101 at 8 (indicating it would take more than 7 days to search Mr. Dragna’s text messages or other electronic

messaging services).

3 Tingle v. Hebert, No. 15-626, 2018 WL 1726667, at *5 (M.D. La. Apr. 10, 2018) (noting that mere speculation that

documents must exist is insufficient); see also Gordon v. Greenville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 13-178, 2014 WL 6603420,

at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2014) (“Although Plaintiff is not satisfied with this response, he fails to point to anything

that suggests such reports actually exist. The Court cannot compel a [responding party] to produce documents that do

not exist.”); McElwee v. Wallantas, No. 03-172, 2005 WL 2346945, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2005) (“[T]he Court

cannot order the Defendants to produce documentation that does not exist. Therefore, unless the Plaintiff can provide

proof that the documents exist, rather than mere speculation, the Court will not entertain motions to compel the

Defendants to produce documentation whose existence is nothing more than theoretical.”).

4 VeroBlue Farms USA Inc. v. Wulf, 345 F.R.D. 406, 420 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (cleaned up).

including through produced documents, that allows the Court to make “a reasonable deduction that

other documents may exist or did exist and have been destroyed” or must “point to the existence

of additional responsive material.”5 Defendant has failed to carry this burden.

Although Defendant has not established the existence of other unspecified documents that

would justify an order compelling production of anything other than the absent communications

reflected in text messages or other messaging applications, Defendant is entitled to an unequivocal

representation, under oath, that Plaintiff has produced all responsive documents in its actual or

constructive6 possession, custody or control and had not withheld any documents based on an

objection or otherwise rather than an ambiguous response that leaves Defendant guessing as to

whether all responsive documents have been produced.7 Plaintiff is thus required to certify and

confirm that, after undertaking reasonable effort to obtain and locate responsive documents, it has

produced all responsive documents and no additional responsive documents exist.8 In the event

that Defendant acquires additional documents to establish that Plaintiff’s representations were

false, other remedies may be sought,9 including imposition of costs or other appropriate sanctions

for the misconduct and to protect the judicial process.10

5 Id. at 420–21 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (citations omitted).

6 Counsel is reminded that Rule 34 encompasses “constructive” possession and thus imposes the obligation on Plaintiff

to produce documents that it has the legal right to obtain even though it has no copy and even if the documents are

owned or possessed by a nonparty. Becnel v. Salas, No. 17-17965, 2018 WL 691649, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2018)

(citations omitted); Est. of Monroe v. Bottle Rock Power Corp., No. 03-2682, 2004 WL 737463, at *10 (E.D. La. Apr.

2, 2004) (citation omitted).

7 Baker v. Walters, 652 F. Supp. 3d 768, 785 (N.D. Tex. 2023); Beasley v. First Am. Real Est. Info. Servs., Inc., No.

04-1059, 2005 WL 1017818, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2005) (“[D]efendant is entitled to an unequivocal

representation . . . that the documents specified in this request for production do not exist.”).

8 Goosehead, 2025 WL 1397166, at *6 (noting that, if a court has concerns about the reasonableness of a party's efforts

in responding to discovery, it may require a certification or confirmation that the discovery at issue does not exist);

Nguyen v. La. State Bd. of Cosmetology, No. 14-80, 2016 WL 67253, at *2 (M.D. La. Jan. 5, 2016) (requiring plaintiff

to “confirm that the requested information does not exist”); see Callais v. United Rentals N. Am., Inc., No. 17-312,

2018 WL 6517446, at *7 (M.D. La. Dec. 11, 2018) (ordering qualified representative to provide a sworn certification

that no responsive documents exist).

9 Henderson, 1997 WL 756600, at *1 (denying motion to compel based on representation that documents that do not

exist and noting other remedies are available if representation is untrue).

10 Snider v. L-3 Commc'ns Vertex Aerospace, L.L.C., 946 F.3d 660, 678-79 (5th Cir. 2019); Goodyear Tire & Rubber

Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 104-05, 107 (2017) (noting court may sanction dishonest discovery responses).

B. Trade Secret Identification Statement

Unlike cases involving intellectual property on file with the United States Patent and

Trademark Office, trade secrets are held by the plaintiff and, by definition, are not publicly

available. To enable the parties to prepare for trial, a particularized identification of trade secrets

more than that required in a complaint is necessary.11 A plaintiff must provide specific notice of

what the defendant is alleged to have misappropriated.12

To prevail on its trade secret claim, Plaintiff “must identify the trade secrets and carry the

burden of showing that they exist.”13 “It is self-evident that the subject matter of a trade secret

must be secret.”14 “Information that is public knowledge . . . or that is generally known in an

industry[ ] cannot qualify as a trade secret.”15 A primary reason for requiring a plaintiff to identify

the alleged trade secret with particularity is to separate it from matters of general knowledge in the

trade or of special persons who are skilled in the trade and to permit the defendant to ascertain the

boundaries within which the secret lies.16

(2017) (noting court may sanction dishonest discovery responses).

11 See Mfg. Automation & Software Sys. v. Hughes, No. 16-8962, 2018 WL 3197696, at *14 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2018);

InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Glob. Hldgs. Inc., 978 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2020); StoneEagle Servs., Inc. v. Valentine,

No. 12-1687, 2013 WL 9554563, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 5, 2013) (requiring reasonable particularity of alleged trade

secrets at issue so both defendants and courts will have no difficulty evaluating the relevance of discovery requests

and propriety of objections (citations omitted)); Source Prod. & Equip. Co. v. Schehr, No. 16-17528, 2019 WL

4752058, at *5-6 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 2019) (Ashe, J.) (stating trade secret identification with particularity avoids trial

by ambush).

12 Imax Corp. v. Cinema Techs., Inc., 152 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Next Commc’ns, Inc. v. Viber

Media, Inc., 758 F. App’x 48, 49 (2d Cir. 2018) (stating that plaintiff must identify the trade secret with sufficient

specificity to make the moving party aware of what information it has allegedly misappropriated).

13 Source Prod., 2019 WL 4752058, at *5 (quoting Hughes, 2018 WL 3197696, at *14 (quoting MAI Sys. Corp v.

Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 522 (9th Cir. 1993))).

14 Tewari De-Ox Sys., Inc. v. Mountain States/Rosen, L.L.C., 637 F.3d 604, 611 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

15 Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984)); see also Cajun Servs. Unlimited, LLC v.

Benton Energy Serv. Co., No.17-0491, 2020 WL 3188991, at *38 (E.D. La. June 15, 2020) aff’d, 855 F. App’x 771

(Fed. Cir. 2021); Flotec, Inc. v. S. Rsch., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1000 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (stating “trade secret law

does not protect information that is publicly available, including information that can be discerned with reasonable

effort by inspecting a product available for purchase on the market.” (citations omitted)).

16 AlterG, Inc. v. Boost Treadmills LLC, 388 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2019).

Recognizing the importance of specificity when addressing alleged trade secrets, the

Eastern District of Louisiana added Local Rule 26.3, effective January 1, 2024. Local Rule

26.3(A) requires a party asserting a misappropriation of trade secrets claim to include with its Rule

26(a) initial disclosures a trade secret identification statement that contemplates a greater degree

of particularity than the “short and concise” statement required by Rule 8. This statement requires

more than a description of the categories within which the trade secret information may fall, such

as that set forth in the publicly available complaint, and more than simple generalized descriptions,

such as formulas, plans, or drawings.17

The requirement of reasonable particularity serves to limit the permissible scope of

discovery by distinguishing the trade secrets from matters of general knowledge in the trade or of

special knowledge of those persons skilled in the trade.18 To identify a trade secret with reasonable

particularity, the plaintiff must provide concrete information that “clearly refer[s] to tangible trade

secret material.”19 Plaintiff cannot rely on “catchall phrases” or simply identify general categories

17 See DeRubeis v. Witten Techs., Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 679 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (stating that generally listing software,

data processing algorithms, and processes that a plaintiff developed, owned, or licensed is insufficient as such

disclosures only reveal the end results of, or functions performed by, the claimed trade secrets); Switch v. Commc’ns

Grp. v. Ballard, No. 11-285, 2012 WL 2342929 at *5 (D. Nev. June 19, 2012) (identifying various concepts, elements,

or components that make up designs are insufficient without a specific description of what particular combination of

components renders each of its designs novel or unique, how the components are combined, and how they operate in

unique combination); Ikon Off. Sols., Inc. v. Konica Minolta Bus. Sols., U.S.A., Inc., No. 08-539, 2009 WL 4429156,

at *3-5 & 3 n.3 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 25, 2009) (holding that lengthy, descriptive, but non-specific, paragraphs are

insufficient).

18 Cf. IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that 43-page description of

software package insufficient because it failed to separate the trade secrets from the other information that goes into

the software package that is known to the trade); Yeiser Rsch. & Dev. LLC v. Teknor Apex Co., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1021,

1044 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (quotation omitted). For additional cases requiring plaintiffs bringing claims of trade secret

misappropriation to identify, with reasonable particularity, the alleged trade secret at issue, see Arconic, Inc. v. Novelis,

Inc., No. 17-1434, 2020 WL 7247112, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2020); AgroFresh Inc. v. Essentiv LLC, No. 16-662,

2019 WL 563900, at *1 (D. Del. Feb. 4, 2019); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Mitek Sys., Inc., 289 F.R.D. 244, 246-

249( W.D. Tex. 2013), aff’d, 2013 WL 1867417 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2013); Switch, 2012 WL 2342929 at *4-6;

Powerweb Energy v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., No. 12–220, 2012 WL 3113162 (D. Conn. July 31, 2012); Ikon, 2009

WL 4429156, at *3-5; DeRubeis, 244 F.R.D. at 681-82; AutoMed Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 926 (N.D.

Ill. 2001).

19 InteliClear, 978 F.3d at 658; IDX Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d at 584 (“[P]laintiff must do more than just identify a kind of

technology and then invite the court to hunt through the details in search of items meeting the statutory definition.”).

of trade secrets.20 The details provided in the identification must be more than vague labels, high

level concepts, and rudimentary graphics.21 Further, the attachment of thousands of pages of

documents, while voluminous, does not equate to detail necessary to allow the court and defendant

to understand exactly what the plaintiff is alleging.22 A court should not be asked to wade through

thousands of pages of documents in an effort to ferret out a trade secret like a hidden acorn.23

Courts have been descriptive about what fails the “reasonable particularity” requirement:

a laundry list of general categories of alleged “trade secret” information or lengthy, descriptive,

but non-specific, paragraphs;24 a general list of software, data processing algorithms, and processes

that a plaintiff developed, owned, or licensed or disclosures that only reveal the end results of, or

functions performed by, the claimed trade secrets;25 and various concepts, elements, or

components that make up designs.26 In contrast, a plaintiff identifies its trade secrets with

reasonable particularity when it separately lists each of the individual alleged trade secrets and

identifies each claim so that the reader understands how it differs from public domain filings27 or

provides a specific description of what combination of components renders each of its designs

novel or unique and how the components are combined and operate in unique combination.28

20 InteliClear, 978 F.3d at 658 (internal quotations omitted).

21 Next Comm’cns, 758 F. App’x at 49.

22 InteliClear, 978 F.3d at 658 (“It is inadequate for plaintiffs to ‘cite and incorporate by reference hundreds of

documents that purportedly reference or reflect the trade secret information.’” (citation omitted)); IDX Sys. Corp. v.

Epic Sys. Corp., 165 F. Supp. 2d 812, 819 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (“Long lists of general areas of information containing

unidentified trade secrets are not substitutes for particularized and concrete trade secrets.”); VIA Techs., Inc. v. Asus

Comput. Int’l, No. 14-3586, 2016 WL 5930280, *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016) (noting that a trade secret plaintiff may

not use broad, catch-all language as a tactic to preserve an unrestricted, unilateral right to subsequent amend its trade

secret statement).

23 VIA Techs., 2016 WL 5930280 at *3 (noting that a trade secret plaintiff may not hide its trade secret in plain sight

by including voluminous attachments to its trade secret statement).

24 See Ikon, 2009 WL 4429156, at *3 & n.3.

25See DeRubeis, 244 F.R.D. at 679.

26 See Switch, 2012 WL 2342929, at *5.

27 See Mitek, 289 F.R.D. at 249.

28 See Switch, 2012 WL 2342929, at *5.

Essentially, plaintiff must do more than identify a technology or document containing a

potential trade secret “and then invite the court to hunt through the details in search of items

meeting the statutory definition [of a trade secret].”29 This is especially true in cases where the

trade-secret claim involves sophisticated, highly technical issues that the district court or jury, on

its own, is unlikely to have the expertise required to discern exactly what constitutes a trade

secret.30 Where the alleged trade secret consists of incremental variations or advances in the state

of art in a highly specialized field, a more exacting level of particularity may be required to

distinguish the alleged trade secret from matters already known to persons skilled in the field.31

Vague and overly inclusive descriptions that essentially assert that all information about software

constitutes trade secrets are not plausible.32

The parties dispute whether their early agreement to waive Rule 26 disclosures applied to

the obligation to provide a Rule 26.3 statement when a trade secret claim was asserted after that

agreement. Regardless, even if the parties had agreed to forego the Local Rule 26.3 statement,

Defendant’s second set of interrogatories and requests for production constitute sufficient demand

for Plaintiff’s identification of the trade secrets at issue. See ECF No. 98-12 at 8 (Int. No. 1); No.

98-13 at 7-8 (RFP Nos. 2, 4). Defendant asserts that “LAD failed to identify any trade secret;

failed to provide any information or documents demonstrating the existence of a trade secret

owned by LAD; failed to articulate any protections asserted by LAD at the time; failed to identify

any contemporaneous notice of the misuse issued by LAD; and failed to explain how any alleged

trade secret was supposedly misused by DHO.” ECF No. 98-1 at 14 (addressing Int. Nos. 1-4).

29 Source Prod., 2019 WL 4752058, at *7 (quoting IDX Sys., 285 F.3d at 583–84).

30 Id. (citing Imax, 152 F.3d at 1167).

31 Calendar Rsch. LLC v. StubHub, Inc., No. 17-04062, 2020 WL 4390391, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2020) (citations

omitted).

32 IDX Sys., 285 F.3d at 583.

Plaintiff's categorical reference*’ is precisely the type of generalized allegation regularly

found insufficient. Just as with a Local Rule 26.3 trade secret identification statement, listing

categories or delivering voluminous documents without specifying what portion of each document

constitutes the alleged trade secrets are insufficient. Plaintiff's response to Defendant’s

interrogatories should be informed by Local Rule 26.3’s explicit requirements regarding

identification of trade secrets, requiring Plaintiff to identify, with specificity, each allegedly

misappropriated trade secret rather than simply identifying categories. Plaintiff's current response,

and the incorporation of documents produced, does not fairly put the Defendant on notice of

precisely what information Plaintiff deems to be a trade secret as necessary to allow Defendant to

determine whether the alleged trade secret information is generally known to those in the industry

or publicly available. Accordingly, Plaintiff must provide supplemental responses to Interrogatory

Nos. 1-4 of the second set of discovery.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART as stated herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff deliver supplemental discovery responses

(including responses to the second set of discovery compliant with Local Rule 26.3) within 14

days.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 13th day of lb 2026. }

DO PHILLIPS CURRAULT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

33 See ECF No. 98-19 at 3-4 (response to Interrogatory No. 1 indicating Plaintiff is providing “categories of proprietary

and confidential trade secret information ... .”).

12