The opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SUNEE LYNN MITCHELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
S277314
First Appellate District, Division Five
A163476
Mendocino County Superior Court
SCUKCRCR2021373081
May 18, 2026
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Liu, Kruger, Groban,
Evans, and Bromberg* concurred.
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
S277314
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
We are once again called upon to consider “the intersection
of [the] statutory scheme of plea bargaining and the
retroactivity rule of [In re] Estrada [(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.]”
(People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 971 (Prudholme).)
Defendant Sunee Lynn Mitchell accepted a plea bargain,
entered the standard waivers, and agreed to an upper term
sentence on one felony count of a multicount information. While
her case was pending on appeal the Legislature amended Penal
Code1 section 1170, which governs California’s determinate
sentencing law. The amendment now requires that the facts
used to justify an upper term be stipulated to or proven beyond
a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)
(hereafter section 1170(b)).) The parties agree this statutory
amendment applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments under
Estrada. Mitchell’s further assertion that the plea bargain, as
constituted, did not satisfy the current statutory requirements
is likewise not contested by the Attorney General.
The parties’ point of disagreement centers on the effect, if
any, of section 1170(b)’s provisions on the negotiated disposition.
Mitchell argues she should continue to have the benefits of her
plea bargain, including the dismissal of counts and insulation
from exposure to a substantially higher sentence. However, she
1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
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PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
urges the upper term sentence she agreed to should be reduced
to the middle term. The Attorney General argues the agreement
should be enforced in its entirety because the trial court did not
impose a sentence under the provisions of section 1170(b), but
rather upon the terms of the bargain.
We reject both positions. We hold that defendants like
Mitchell, who agreed to an upper term sentence as part of a plea
bargain, may seek the retroactive benefit of section 1170(b)’s
amended provisions to their nonfinal judgments. We reverse the
Court of Appeal’s contrary holding and direct that the matter be
returned to the trial court in a manner similar to the approach
adopted in People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 (Stamps). On
remand, Mitchell may either waive or invoke section 1170(b)’s
requirements. If she reaffirms her acceptance of the plea
bargain and waives the rights now conferred under section
1170(b), the court shall reinstate the original sentence as
negotiated by the parties. If she declines to enter that waiver,
in lieu of further proceedings the parties may agree to modify
the existing plea bargain and accept a midterm base sentence
on count 4, then seek the court’s approval of that downward
departure. Absent a modified agreement and approval,
Mitchell’s remedy is to withdraw her assent to the bargain, in
which case Mitchell’s plea will be set aside and the parties
returned to a pre-plea posture. At that point they would remain
free to renegotiate further if they choose or to proceed to trial.
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PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
I. BACKGROUND2
Early in the morning of November 29, 2020, Officer Saul
Perez of the Ukiah Police Department saw Mitchell driving a
Nissan Pathfinder. He watched as Mitchell backed up over a
curb, nearly hit pedestrians, and sped off. The officer spoke
briefly with the pedestrians, who reported that Mitchell had
been “doing donuts” in a parking lot and tried to hit them with
her car. The officer pursued Mitchell using his emergency lights
and siren. Mitchell drove through a red light, made an illegal
U-turn, then sped directly towards the officer’s patrol car. He
backed up to avoid being hit and Mitchell came within a foot of
running into his cruiser. Mitchell drove off, crossed the center
line, and continued driving in the oncoming traffic lane. With
Perez still in pursuit, Mitchell ran another red light and reached
speeds of about 70 miles per hour on city streets. When Mitchell
finally pulled over, she refused to step out of her car. An
assisting officer broke the driver’s side window in order to detain
her. Following her arrest Mitchell provided a breath sample,
revealing a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of 0.183 percent. In a
later interview, witness Jacob Waltrip confirmed that Mitchell
had been driving recklessly in a parking lot. As she backed out
of the lot and crossed the sidewalk Waltrip was unable to move
out of the way and Mitchell ran over his feet.
The district attorney charged Mitchell with four felonies:
count 1, assault on a peace officer (Perez) (§ 245, subd. (c)); count
2, assault with a deadly weapon (Waltrip) (§ 245, subd. (a)(1));
count 3, driving against traffic while evading a peace officer
2
Because there was no trial, we summarize the evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing, as did the Court of Appeal
opinion below.
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PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
(Veh. Code, § 2800.4); and count 4, driving with willful or
wanton disregard for safety while fleeing from an officer (id.,
§ 2800.2, subd. (a)). She was also charged with misdemeanor
driving under the influence (id., § 23152, subd. (a)), and
misdemeanor driving with a BAC of 0.08 percent or higher (id.,
§ 23152, subd. (b)). The information included sentencing
allegations that Mitchell drove with a BAC of 0.15 percent or
more (id., § 23578) and that she had suffered a prior strike
conviction for robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)–(d)).
At the time of her crimes, and today, the following
punishments apply: count 1 is punishable by three, four, or five
years imprisonment; count 2 by two, three, or four years; counts
3 and 4 by 16 months, two years, or three years.3 Then and now,
Mitchell’s prior robbery conviction brings her within the “Three
Strikes” sentencing scheme providing that her base prison term
be doubled. (§§ 667, subds. (d)(1), (e)(1), 667.5, subd. (c)(9).)
Counts 1 and 2 could be separately punished as crimes of
violence involving separate victims (People v. Oates (2004) 32
Cal.4th 1048, 1063; People v. McFarland (1989) 47 Cal.3d 798,
803–804; People v. Hall (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1089–1090)
and would constitute additional strikes exposing her to a 25-
year-to-life term should she commit a new serious or violent
felony in the future. (§§ 667, subds. (d)(1), (e)(2)(A)(ii), 1192.7,
subd. (c)(11), (31); People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 26–33.)
3
Penal Code section 245, subdivisions (a)(1) and (c); Vehicle
Code sections 2800.2, subdivision (a) and 2800.4; Penal Code
section 18, subdivision (a). Counts 2, 3, and 4 are “wobblers,”
meaning that a conviction may be punished as either a felony or
a misdemeanor, at the court’s discretion. (See People v. Park
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 789.)
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
In July 2021, pursuant to a negotiated disposition,
Mitchell entered pleas of no contest to the felony of driving with
willful or wanton disregard for safety while fleeing from an
officer (count 4), which is not a strike offense, and to the
misdemeanor of driving with a BAC of 0.08 percent or higher.
She also admitted that she had previously been convicted of
robbery, qualifying her for sentencing under the Three Strikes
law. To supply the factual basis for the plea, Mitchell admitted
that she “drove recklessly while evading a police officer.” The
punishment for the felony offense was 16 months, two years or
three years (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 18,
subd. (a)), and Mitchell stipulated to the aggravated term of
three years in state prison, to be doubled because of the robbery
strike conviction. Before accepting the plea, the court advised
Mitchell that “this is a stipulated plea agreement, which means
that when we come back for sentencing, you cannot argue for
less time, and the district attorney cannot argue for more time.”
Mitchell indicated that she understood. In light of the plea, all
additional allegations, including the assault charges, which
would carry longer potential sentences and would qualify as
strikes, were dismissed. The court found her guilty and imposed
the agreed-upon six-year prison sentence.
Mitchell appealed and, while her appeal was pending,
Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567)
went into effect. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731.) One of the amended
provisions, section 1170(b), now reads in part: “When a
judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute
specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound
discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the
middle term,” unless “there are circumstances in aggravation of
the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury
or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170(b)(1), (2).)4 The effect
of the amendment is to limit a sentencing court’s authority to
impose an upper term sentence. (People v. Lynch (2024) 16
Cal.5th 730, 763, 773 (Lynch).)
Mitchell argued in the Court of Appeal that amended
section 1170(b) applied retroactively, requiring reduction of her
sentence to the middle term. The Court of Appeal disagreed,
reasoning: “where there is a stipulated plea like here, there is
no occasion for the trial court to find any aggravating facts in
order to justify the imposition of an upper term at sentencing.
[Mitchell] agreed to a term of six years pursuant to a stipulated
plea and the trial court simply sentenced [Mitchell] according to
the terms of the plea agreement.” (People v. Mitchell (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 1051, 1059.) Accordingly, the Court of Appeal
concluded that amended section 1170(b) did not apply because
the trial court “had no opportunity to exercise any discretion in
deciding whether the imposition of the upper, middle, or lower
term would best serve ‘the interests of justice.’ ” (Mitchell, at p.
1058.)
4
Notwithstanding these provisions, the court “may
consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without
submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170(b)(3); see
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078–1086 [interpreting
the scope of the prior conviction exception].) Section 1170(b)(1),
(2) and (3), set out the requirements for imposing an upper term
sentence in their totality. For ease of reference, we will
sometimes employ an abbreviated reference to section 1170(b)
or 1170(b)(2).
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
We granted Mitchell’s petition for review. Since that time,
one published case has agreed with the Court of Appeal’s
reasoning here. (People v. Sallee (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 330,
337–340, review granted Apr. 26, 2023, S278690 (Sallee).)
Several others have rejected it. (People v. De La Rosa Burgara
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1054, 1061–1064, review granted Feb. 21,
2024, S283452 (De La Rosa Burgara); People v. Fox (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 826, 831–835 (Fox); People v. Todd (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 373, 377–382, review granted Apr. 26, 2023,
S279154 (Todd).) We reverse the Cout of Appeal’s judgment.
The resolution here does not turn on whether the trial court
exercised discretion in imposing the agreed-upon sentence.
Instead, it turns on the nature of the rights Mitchell waived
when she accepted the bargain. We conclude she cannot be said
to have waived the later-created right, which applies
retroactively to her nonfinal judgment, and of which she was
not, and could not have been, made aware.
II. DISCUSSION
A. California’s Determinate Sentencing Law
In Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pages 746–748 we
explained the evolution of California’s determinate sentencing
law. We summarize that explanation here.
As initially enacted in 1977, section 1170(b) required that,
when a statute specified three terms, “the court shall order
imposition of the middle term, unless there are circumstances
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.” (§ 1170, former
subd. (b); Stats. 1977, ch. 165, § 15, pp. 647, 648; see
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 276–278
(Cunningham).) The accompanying rule of court required that
those circumstances be proved by a preponderance of the
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
evidence. (Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 4.420(b).) “Under
that scheme the trial court, not the jury, determined the facts
bearing on aggravation or mitigation employing the lower
standard of proof.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 746.)
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court found this
sentencing scheme unconstitutional because “under the Sixth
Amendment, any fact [other than a prior conviction] that
exposes a defendant to a greater sentence must be found by a
jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt,
not merely by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Cunningham,
supra, 549 U.S. at p. 281, accord, Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000)
530 U.S. 466, 490.) The high court indicated California could
solve the constitutional conundrum by directly providing a jury
trial right with proof beyond a reasonable doubt for aggravating
facts, or it could change its sentencing structure to give trial
courts broader discretion without the need for additional judicial
factfinding. (Cunningham, at pp. 293–294.) California chose
the latter option. The Legislature responded to Cunningham by
no longer making the middle term the presumptive sentence
and instead conferring broad discretion on trial courts to select
any term from among a sentencing triad’s three options.
(§ 1170, former subd. (b), enacted by Stats. 2007, ch. 3, § 2, pp.
6–7.)
As of January 1, 2022, the Legislature decided to follow a
different course and again amended section 1170(b) as described
above. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) In Lynch, we held that the
amended sentencing scheme now dictates as a matter of
constitutional right that, absent a stipulation or waiver, any
aggravating fact other than a prior conviction relied on to
support an upper term sentence must be found true by a jury
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp.
755–767.)
B. Application of Section 1170(b)’s Amendments to Stipulated
Upper Term Sentences
The parties agree, as a general matter, that Senate Bill
567’s amendments to section 1170(b)(1), (2), and (3) are
ameliorative and, under the authority of In re Estrada, supra,
63 Cal.2d 740, the amendments apply retroactively to cases not
final on appeal. Indeed, the Attorney General explicitly states,
“[t]here is no dispute that the ameliorative amendments in SB
567 apply retroactively to nonfinal judgments.” In Lynch, we
accepted a similar concession by the Attorney General after
noting uniform agreement on that point in the Courts of Appeal.
(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 749.) We do so again here.
Despite this concession, the Attorney General argues that
defendants like Mitchell, who agreed to an upper term sentence
as part of a negotiated plea agreement, are not entitled to any
benefit from section 1170(b)’s amended provisions. As the
Attorney General sees it, “ ‘the issue before [the court] is not
whether Senate Bill No. 567 applies retroactively, but rather
whether it applies at all in the context of a stipulated plea.’ ”
(Quoting Sallee, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 335, fn. 3, review
granted.) Relying on the statutory text and well-established
principles governing plea bargains, the Attorney General argues
that a trial court imposing a negotiated sentence pursuant to a
plea bargain is not sentencing the defendant under the
provisions of section 1170(b), nor is it considering aggravating
or mitigating circumstances in order to justify the term imposed.
Instead it is merely imposing a valid sentence to which the
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parties have agreed. As noted, the Court of Appeal adopted a
similar analysis to deny Mitchell relief.
Mitchell, by contrast, contends that she is entitled to relief
from her upper term sentence under the retroactive application
of section 1170(b). She reasons that section 1170(b) only allows
an upper term when (1) the defendant admits to, or a trier of
fact finds, relevant facts to have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, and (2) the court concludes that the facts as
found justify the upper term. She argues that Senate Bill 567
did not provide for a blanket exception in the case of a plea
agreement that specifies an upper term sentence. Because
nothing in the record here satisfies the current statutory
requirements, Mitchell reasons that her upper term sentence is
legally unauthorized and the proper remedy is to reduce her
sentence to the statutorily permissible middle term, doubled
under the Three Strikes law.
We begin with the Attorney General’s claim that the
requirements of section 1170(b) do not apply to upper term
sentences negotiated by plea bargain. The Attorney General
focuses on the text of the provision, arguing that it applies only
when a trial court exercises its “sound discretion” in imposing
one of three possible terms (§ 1170 (b)(1)) and that a trial court
sentencing a defendant to an agreed-upon term pursuant to a
plea bargain does not select between the upper, middle, and
lower terms. But Lynch tells us that section 1170(b) is not so
limited. The statute, by its terms, governs sentences imposed
pursuant to a statutory triad. (§ 1170, subds. (a)(3), (b)(1).) It
sets forth several provisions governing such sentences. One of
those provisions, section 1170(b)(2), restricts the court’s
authority to impose a sentence “exceeding the middle term”
unless aggravating circumstances justify that term, and the
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by
the defendant or found true at a jury or court trial. Lynch held
that the effect of the statute is to make the middle term the
maximum term the court can legally impose absent the
additional findings the statute requires. (Lynch, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 759.) Here, the parties’ agreement specified an
upper term sentence on count 4, doubled pursuant to the Three
Strikes law, and the trial court imposed that sentence. At oral
argument, the Attorney General acknowledged that the trial
court, in accepting a plea bargain, is required to impose a
sentence authorized by law. (See People v. Kim (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 1355, 1363 (Kim).)
As we see it, the real question posed by the Attorney
General’s position is whether a defendant may waive section
1170(b)’s limitation on upper term sentences and permit the
trial court to impose such a sentence pursuant to the parties’
agreement and without the need to independently determine
whether aggravating facts “justify” the sentence. (§ 1170(b)(2),
italics added.) The statute provides that the defendant may
“stipulate[]” to the existence of facts, thereby permitting the
trial court to rely on those facts to impose the sentence. (Ibid.)
It also contemplates that the defendant may waive a jury trial
in favor of a court trial. (Ibid. [referring to facts found true “by
the judge in a court trial”].) It does not expressly address a
circumstance where the parties agree to imposition of an upper
term sentence as part of a negotiated plea bargain and the court
accepts the terms of that bargain.
That practice, however, was well established at the time
of section 1170(b)’s amendment in 2021. “ ‘Plea negotiations and
agreements are an accepted and “integral component of the
criminal justice system and essential to the expeditious and fair
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
administration of our courts.” [Citations.] Plea agreements
benefit that system by promoting speed, economy, and the
finality of judgments.’ ” (Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 970,
quoting People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 929 (Segura).)
“When parties enter a plea bargain, each side negotiates to gain
a benefit. The prosecution most often agrees to a term that is
less than the defendant’s maximum exposure, obviating the
need for a trial and thus lessening the burden on victims,
witnesses and the system itself while providing the certainty of
a conviction. As here, the defense often achieves the benefit of
counts being dismissed or reduced and gains the protection of a
more limited exposure to what would otherwise be the risk of
harsher punishment. The court may be actively involved in the
negotiations and, in any event, must approve the plea
agreement, making it the ultimate arbiter of whether the
disposition is fair and appropriate.” (Prudholme, at p. 970.)
Section 1192.5, subdivision (a) provides, with exceptions
not applicable here, that “[u]pon a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere to an accusatory pleading charging a felony, . . . the
plea may specify the punishment to the same extent as it may
be specified by the jury on a plea of not guilty or fixed by the
court on a plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or not guilty, and may
specify the exercise by the court thereafter of other powers
legally available to it.” “Although a plea agreement does not
divest the court of its inherent sentencing discretion, ‘a judge
who has accepted a plea bargain is bound to impose a sentence
within the limits of that bargain. [Citation.] “A plea agreement
is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the
prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound.” [Citation.]
Should the court consider the plea bargain to be unacceptable,
its remedy is to reject it, not to violate it, directly or indirectly.’ ”
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(Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 931.) Section 1192.5,
subdivision (b) expressly provides that once it approves a plea
agreement, “the court may not proceed as to the plea other than
as specified in the plea.”
Accordingly, in accepting a plea bargain that includes an
agreed-upon sentence, the trial court does not exercise its
discretion to select the appropriate term. Instead, the court
considers the more limited question of whether to accept or
reject the parties’ bargain. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 701,
705–707; Sallee, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 338, 340, review
granted.) In making that determination, the court considers
whether its approval of the plea bargain “represent[s] an
informed decision in furtherance of the interests of society.” (In
re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 941.) The court must also
satisfy itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and
that there is a factual basis for the plea. (§ 1192.5, subd. (c);
People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110, 112.) Ultimately, if the
court accepts the parties’ agreed-upon disposition, it need not
state reasons for its sentencing order reflecting that agreement.
(Sallee, at p. 340, fn. 4; People v. Villanueva (1991) 230
Cal.App.3d 1157, 1162; People v. Childress (1987) 189
Cal.App.3d 1220, 1222.) “It is an adequate reason for a sentence
or other disposition that the defendant, personally and by
counsel, has expressed agreement that it be imposed and the
prosecuting attorney has not expressed an objection to it.” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.412(a).)
“[T]he Legislature ‘is deemed to be aware of existing laws
and judicial constructions in effect at the time legislation is
enacted.’ ” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 634.) Absent
some indication in the statutory language or the legislative
history that the Legislature intended to supersede this well-
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established body of law, we presume the trial court remains
authorized to impose an upper term sentence pursuant to the
parties’ agreement. (See Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 701.)
Section 1170(b) itself does not mention negotiated
dispositions or section 1192.5 one way or the other. Section
1170, subdivision (a) includes a statement of legislative findings
and declarations addressing the purpose of incarceration, with
an emphasis on “rehabilitation and successful community
reintegration.” (§ 1170, subd. (a)(1).) To that end, the statute
declares that “[t]his purpose is best served by terms that are
proportionate to the seriousness of the offense with provision for
uniformity in the sentences of people incarcerated for
committing the same offense under similar circumstances.”
(Ibid.)
As with the statute itself, the legislative history of Senate
Bill 567 emphasizes the defendant’s ability to stipulate to facts
or to waive a jury trial in favor of a bench trial. The history sets
forth in detail the evolution of California’s determinate
sentencing law and the high court’s holding in Cunningham.
(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 567
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 20, 2021, pp. 4–5.) It
explains that “[t]his bill would allow a court to impose a sentence
for a criminal offense which exceeds the middle term only when
there are circumstances in aggravation that justify a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term and when those facts
have been submitted to the factfinder and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, or when admitted by the defendant. However,
this requirement would not apply to proving prior convictions,
which can still be proven by a certified record of conviction.” (Id.
at p. 5.) In addressing the burdens on the criminal justice
system, the analysis observes: “[I]n Blakely [v. Washington
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(2004)] 542 U.S. 296, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged that a defendant could waive his Sixth
Amendment right and consent to judicial fact-finding either as
part of a plea-agreement or as part of a bifurcated trial
[Citation.] As a practical matter, this procedure is often utilized
in California courtrooms. For example, although a defendant
has a statutory right to a trial by jury on his prior convictions
[citations], defendants often waive that right or admit the
priors. It should also be noted that most criminal proceedings
are resolved by plea. Therefore, while jury trial on aggravating
factors would impact the judicial system, not all cases would
result in these trials.” (Id. at p. 6.)
The legislative analysis also quotes the bill’s author. (See
Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 43, 60–61, fn. 19.) The author’s statement
explains that, under current law, sentencing judges are allowed
“ ‘to impose any of the three sentencing terms so long as they
state a reason for any of the sentences.’ ” (Assem. Com. on
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 567, supra, as amended
May 20, 2021, p. 3.) According to the bill’s author, this has “ ‘led
to individuals serving maximum prison sentences without the
opportunity to effectively refute alleged aggravating facts.’ ”
(Ibid.) The author’s statement urges the Legislature to reverse
the “ ‘mass incarceration trend’ ” by requiring that “ ‘the
harshest sentences receive the greatest scrutiny and
justification before they are meted out.’ ” (Ibid.) To that end,
the bill’s author emphasizes the need “ ‘to ensure that
aggravating facts are presented to the jury before a judge
imposes a maximum sentence as decided in Cunningham,’ ” and
to “ ‘ensure that the individuals facing time have the ample
ability to dispute information in the record that might not be
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
true.’ ” (Ibid.) The author also notes the defendant’s ability to
stipulate to aggravating facts or to waive jury trial in favor of a
court trial. (Id. at p. 4.) Another analysis, quoting the bill’s co-
sponsor, similarly states: “it is imperative that the law be
changed to ensure that aggravating facts are presented to the
jury before a judge may impose a maximum sentence. This will
help prevent individuals from serving maximum sentences
when a lower term is more appropriate based on the facts.” (Sen.
Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 9, 2021, p. 7.)
The legislative history does not expressly discuss
negotiated dispositions; but it does acknowledge that most cases
are resolved by plea. The expressed statements contained in the
legislative history emphasize the need for reliability and
factfinding before a trial court decides to impose the harshest
sentence. They do not demonstrate an intent to supersede
existing statutory and case law which allows the parties
themselves to negotiate the proper disposition, including an
upper term sentence, subject to the court’s approval of the
bargain in the interests of justice. Nor are the Legislature’s
stated goals in tension with this long-standing practice, which
generally reduces the defendant’s overall exposure to
punishment and avoids the additional cost and delay often
attendant upon a jury trial. (See Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 970.)
Accordingly, we hold that a plea bargain that includes a
stipulated upper term sentence absolves the trial court of its
duty to determine that the sentence is justified by facts found in
compliance with section 1170(b)(2)’s provisions. But this is only
true if the defendant, in entering the plea bargain, validly
waives section 1170(b)’s requirements. As the Court of Appeal
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
observed in Todd, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th 373, review granted,
“[a]bsent the finding and articulation of such justification and
facts, or a valid waiver of these new requirements, the imposition
of the aggravated term is outside the discretion of the sentencing
court under newly amended section 1170, subdivision (b).” (Id.
at p. 379, italics added.) Further, because section 1170(b)(2)
gives rise to a constitutional imperative (Lynch, supra, 16
Cal.5th at pp. 755–767) the defendant’s waiver must comply
with the requirements for waiving a constitutional right.
(Blakely v. Washington, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 310; see generally
People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 299–300; People v.
Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166; People v. Collins (2001) 26
Cal.4th 297, 304–305.)
C. Mitchell Is Entitled to the Retroactive Benefit of Section
1170(b)
Mitchell’s plea was valid when it was entered. (See Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 750–751.) But the law was
subsequently changed to her benefit, and she seeks retroactive
application of section 1170(b)’s new requirements to her
nonfinal judgment. The Attorney General has conceded
retroactive application of section 1170(b) in general, and we
have concluded that its provisions govern negotiated
dispositions absent a valid waiver. Accordingly, Mitchell is
entitled to the retroactive benefit of section 1170(b)’s provisions
notwithstanding her agreement to a specified term as part of a
plea bargain. We disapprove People v. Sallee, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th 330, 338–341, review granted, to the extent it is
inconsistent with today’s holding.
It is undisputed that the trial court did not comply with
the current requirements of section 1170(b)(2), which were not
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PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
in effect at the time of Mitchell’s original sentencing. The court
did not identify any properly proven aggravating facts that
would justify imposing an upper term sentence on count 4.
Instead, it simply accepted the parties’ agreement to that
sentence.5
Nor did Mitchell validly waive section 1170(b)’s new
requirements when she entered her plea. As we explained in
French, supra, 43 Cal.4th 36, “[a]t the time that defendant
entered his plea of no contest, he expressly waived his right to a
jury trial on the substantive offenses, but this waiver did not
encompass his right to a jury trial on any aggravating
circumstances.” (Id. at p. 48.) Similarly, when Mitchell entered
her plea, section 1170(b) gave the trial court broad discretion to
select among any of the three available terms of punishment,
thus eliminating any Sixth Amendment concerns as to the
imposition of sentence. (Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at pp.
293–294.) Mitchell’s “waiver of jury trial on the offenses in
connection with [her] no contest plea cannot reasonably be
interpreted to extend to proof of aggravating circumstances
when, at the time of the plea, no right to a jury trial on such
circumstances had been recognized.” (French, at p. 48.)
5
The Attorney General’s opposition to Mitchell’s claim of
error is limited to the argument that section 1170(b) does not
apply here, either as a matter of statutory interpretation or by
application of implied waiver and estoppel principles (discussed
post). He does not contest Mitchell’s assertion that the
requirements of section 1170(b) were not satisfied on this record.
Nor does he contend the omission was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768;
People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 52–54 (French).)
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
Anticipating this conclusion, the Attorney General argues
that, “[b]y agreeing to a specific term of imprisonment,” Mitchell
“implicitly waived” any right to be sentenced in accordance with
section 1170(b) and is therefore “estopped” from invoking that
statute “to challenge the imposition of the sentence [that] she
agreed to and . . . the court had — and still has — fundamental
jurisdiction to impose.” He relies on People v. Hester (2000) 22
Cal.4th 290 (Hester) for support. Hester is distinguishable.
There, the defendant pleaded no contest to several charges in
return for a stipulated sentence of four years. (Id. at p. 293.)
The trial court imposed the stipulated sentence on a burglary
charge and, without objection by the defendant, imposed a
three-year, unstayed concurrent term for a separate assault
charge. (Ibid.) On appeal, the defendant argued that the
sentence was unauthorized insofar as the three-year concurrent
term was not stayed under section 654, which “precludes
multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course of
conduct.” (Hester, at p. 294.) We held that the defendant’s
acceptance of the plea agreement and his failure to object or to
seek to withdraw his plea when the sentence was announced,
constituted “an implicit waiver of section 654 rights.” (Id. at p.
295.)
The Attorney General’s reliance on Hester is misplaced.
The rationale for our “implicit waiver” finding in that case was
“that defendants who have received the benefit of their bargain
should not be allowed to trifle with the courts by attempting to
better the bargain through the appellate process.” (Hester,
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 295.) The concern about trifling existed
in Hester because section 654’s limits were already well
established at the time the defendant in that case accepted the
sentence without objection. That concern is not at play here
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PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
because Senate Bill 567’s amendments to section 1170(b) were
not operative at the time of Mitchell’s sentence. They took effect
only after Mitchell was sentenced and filed a notice of appeal.
She could not have invoked those amendments at the time of
sentencing, and we decline to find that her acceptance of her
sentence was an implicit waiver of rights that did not exist at
the time.
In this respect, the situation is more akin to French, supra,
43 Cal.4th 36. There, the defendant waived his right to a jury
trial and entered a plea agreement before the Supreme Court’s
decision in Blakely v. Washington, supra, 542 U.S. 296. By the
time of sentencing, Blakely had been decided, but French did not
raise a Sixth Amendment claim at the sentencing hearing or
otherwise object to the sentence imposed. (French, at pp. 46,
48.) We rejected the Attorney General’s forfeiture argument,
noting that the question before us was not governed by forfeiture
principles, but rather by the requirement of a knowing and
intelligent waiver of the constitutional jury trial right. (Id. at
pp. 46–47.) At the time of the plea, French expressly waived his
right to a jury trial on the substantive offenses, but he had not
been asked to do so as to any aggravating circumstances,
because Blakely, which established the right, had not yet been
decided. (Id. at p. 48.) As a result, we concluded the Sixth
Amendment claim was properly raised on appeal. (Ibid.) A
similar conclusion follows here.
We draw further support from the provisions of section
1016.8, which the Legislature enacted in 2019. (Stats. 2019, ch.
586, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2020.) That statute prohibits the practice of
including plea bargain terms that would immunize the plea
from modification by future changes in the law. In doing so the
Legislature codified the following findings and declarations:
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PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
“[A]s a general rule, plea agreements are deemed to incorporate
the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact
additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public
policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not
have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that
the Legislature has intended to apply to them.” (§ 1016.8, subd.
(a)(1).)6 “[B]ecause of the significant constitutional rights at
stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a
defendant’s guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”
(§ 1016.8, subd. (a)(2).) For a waiver to be voluntary, intelligent,
and intentional it must relinquish a known right or privilege.
“Waiver requires knowledge that the right exists [citation].”
(Id., subd. (a)(3).) Subdivision (a)(4) of the statute further
declares that “[a] plea bargain that requires a defendant to
generally waive unknown future benefits of legislative
enactments, initiatives, appellate decisions, or other changes in
the law that may occur after the date of the plea is not knowing
and intelligent.” And subdivision (b) of that section states that
“[a] provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to
generally waive future benefits of legislative enactments,
initiatives, appellate decisions, or other changes in the law that
may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as
against public policy.”
By its terms, section 1016.8 governs plea bargains that
expressly waive unknown future benefits of ameliorative
legislation. Here, there was no such express waiver. But it
stands to reason that we should not, by implication, find a
6
Section 1016.8 codified our holding in Doe v. Harris (2013)
57 Cal.4th 64 and expressly cites Doe as authority for this
proposition. (§ 1016.8, subd. (a)(1).)
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PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
waiver of unknown future benefits that could not have been
entered into expressly. Interpreting the provisions of section
1170(b) in light of section 1016.8, we conclude that the fact the
parties entered into a plea agreement “does not have the effect
of insulating them” from the retroactive changes enacted by
Senate Bill 567. (§ 1016.8, subd. (a)(1); accord, Todd, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 379, review granted.) Were we to conclude
otherwise, we would render Mitchell’s plea bargain to a
stipulated upper term sentence “the very waiver of ‘unknown
future benefits of legislative enactments’ that the Legislature
has deemed void as against public policy because [her] entry of
plea on those terms was not ‘knowing and intelligent.’ ” (Todd,
at p. 380, quoting § 1016.8, subd. (a)(4).) The Attorney General’s
“implied waiver” argument fails.
D. Remedy
We turn to the question of remedy. Mitchell urges that
she is entitled to have her upper term sentence reduced to the
middle term, doubled under the Three Strikes law. She argues
that the remainder of the plea bargain should remain intact,
including dismissal of counts and insulation from exposure to a
substantially higher sentence. The Attorney General argues
that the case should be remanded for further proceedings.
Section 1170(b) now requires that facts, other than a prior
conviction, must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt,
before a court may rely on them to impose an upper term
sentence. As explained above, the trial court did not comply
with these new requirements, nor did Mitchell waive them when
she entered her plea of no contest and agreed to an upper term
sentence. In analogous circumstances, we have held that a
remand, permitting the defendant to either waive or assert her
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PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
right to jury trial, is appropriate. For example, In re Sutherland
(1972) 6 Cal.3d 666 held that the defendant’s guilty plea did not
comply with the new admonition and waiver requirements
articulated in Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 and In re
Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122. (Sutherland, at pp. 668–671.) We
concluded that the remedy was to permit the defendant to
withdraw his plea. (Id. at p. 672.) French, supra, 43 Cal.4th 36
held that, because the defendant’s no contest plea did not comply
with the newly recognized jury trial requirements of
Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. 270, the defendant was entitled
to a remand for resentencing. (French, at pp. 41, 46–52, 55.)
The Courts of Appeal have similarly found that when section
1170(b) is applied retroactively to cases involving stipulated
sentences, the proper remedy is a remand so that the defendant
may assert or waive section 1170(b)’s new requirements. (De La
Rosa Burgara, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1063–1064, review
granted; Fox, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 835; Todd, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at pp. 380–381, review granted.)
We agree with the lower courts that remand is the
appropriate remedy here. In reaching that conclusion, we find
our holding in Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th 685 instructive. There
the defendant argued that, under a 2018 amendment to section
1385, he was entitled to have a trial court “consider striking the
serious felony enhancement” to which he had stipulated in a
plea agreement “while otherwise maintaining the plea
agreement intact.” (Stamps, at p. 700.) We rejected this
approach. The amendment to section 1385, we explained, was
“silent regarding pleas and provide[d] no express mechanism for
relief,” which “undercut[] any suggestion that the Legislature
intended to create special rules for plea cases involving serious
felony enhancements.” (Stamps, at p. 704.) We further
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PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
concluded that “[n]othing in the language and legislative history
of” the legislation at issue in Stamps “suggest[ed] an intent to
modify section 1192.5’s mandate that ‘the court may not proceed
as to the plea other than as specified in the plea’ without the
consent of the parties.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, Stamps declined to
allow the trial court on remand to “ ‘unilaterally modify[] the
terms of [a plea] bargain without affording . . . an opportunity to
the aggrieved party to rescind the plea agreement and resume
proceedings where they left off.’ ” (Id. at p. 701, quoting Kim,
supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1361.)
We find the analysis of Stamps applicable here. As the
court in Fox, observed, “Although Stamps involved legislation
that conferred ‘new discretionary authority’ on trial courts, not
legislation that circumscribed the authority to impose a
particular term, [we] ‘perceive[] no reason to treat the two
circumstances differently.’ ” (Fox, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p.
833, quoting Todd, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 380, review
granted.) Here, Mitchell agreed to an upper term sentence
before section 1170(b) was amended. The appropriate remedy is
to allow Mitchell to reconsider her plea in light of the change. If
she chooses to keep the bargain she negotiated, she may affirm
her agreement and enter the appropriate waivers of section
1170(b)’s current requirements. Alternatively, she may
withdraw her assent to the bargain and return the parties to a
pre-plea posture, where the prosecutor will be held to its burden
of proof.7 In no scenario, however, is she entitled to a unilateral
reduction of her upper term sentence to the middle term.
7
In Stamps, the defendant’s remedy was to invite the court
to exercise its discretion under section 1385 to strike a prior
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PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
Mitchell argues that Stamps is inapposite, and urges us to
follow Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984 instead.
That case is distinguishable. In Harris, the defendant
petitioned for reduction of his felony theft conviction to a
misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47 (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4,
2014)), which reduced certain crimes from felonies to
misdemeanors. (Harris, at p. 988.) Applying Doe v. Harris,
supra, 57 Cal.4th 64, we rejected the Attorney General’s claim
that the reduction violated the plea agreement, and we declined
to allow the People to withdraw from the plea bargain. (Harris,
at p. 991.) We reasoned that Proposition 47’s express mention
of convictions by plea contemplated relief to all eligible
defendants. (Harris, at p. 991.) Proposition 47’s “resentencing
process,” we explained, “would often prove meaningless if the
prosecution could respond to a successful resentencing petition
by withdrawing from an underlying plea agreement and
reinstating the original charges filed against the petitioner.”
felony conviction, with the caveat that the court could not
unilaterally modify the terms of the plea bargain without
allowing the prosecutor to withdraw its consent. (Stamps,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 707.) Here, if Mitchell elects to invoke the
provisions of section 1170(b), her remedy is to withdraw her
assent to the bargain and return the parties to the status quo
ante.
This conclusion is consistent with our holding in Stamps,
supra, 9 Cal.5th 685 that a certificate of probable cause was not
required to assert the benefit of a change in the law, even though
the remedy could have consequences for the plea bargain. In
Stamps we explained that the defendant’s appellate claim “does
not constitute an attack on the validity of his plea because the
claim does not challenge his plea as defective when made.” (Id.
at p. 696, italics added.) Stamps sought relief “because the law
subsequently changed to his potential benefit.” (Id. at p. 698.)
The same is true here.
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PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
(Harris, at p. 992.) Mitchell contends that the Legislature’s
general goal to lower sentences by enacting Senate Bill 567
supports her contention that the Legislature intended to
unilaterally modify existing plea agreements. Not so.
Nothing in the text of amended section 1170(b) conveys a
legislative intent to reduce sentences across the board
regardless of the parties’ agreement. Section 1170(b) does not
single out specific offenses for reduced punishment or
distinguish between felonies and misdemeanors, as did the
legislation at issue in Harris. Nor do the provisions of section
1170(b) render an upper term sentence unauthorized for
Mitchell. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 751.) “The
sentence was authorized when it was imposed. It continues to
be permissible under the current statute so long as the
aggravating facts are either stipulated to by the defendant or
found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) We are
thus unpersuaded that Harris governs here.
Mitchell’s reliance on Senate Bill 567’s legislative history
fares no better. As summarized in detail above, the bill’s author
did express concern that the current state of the law has “ ‘led
to individuals serving maximum prison sentences without the
opportunity to effectively refute alleged aggravating facts.’ ”
(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 567,
supra, as amended May 20, 2021, p. 3.) But the legislation did
not seek to address the concern by abolishing upper term
sentences. Rather, it sought to ensure that “the harshest
sentences receive the greatest scrutiny and justification before
they are meted out” (ibid.) by requiring that aggravating facts
be litigated at trial or stipulated to before a maximum sentence
may be imposed (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen.
Bill No. 567, supra, as amended Mar. 9, 2021, p. 7). These
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PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
statements of purpose, which appear in legislative committee
materials, are entirely consistent with our conclusion that
defendants like Mitchell, whose cases were not final when the
statute was amended, may retroactively assert the protections
that section 1170(b) affords. But they do not support Mitchell’s
further claim that the Legislature has “done away with” the
aggravated sentence that Mitchell agreed to as part of her
bargain. Instead the Legislature has ensured that defendants
have the opportunity to dispute the existence of facts that might
be relied upon to justify an upper term by subjecting them to
adversarial testing before a judge or jury applying a beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard of proof. A remand here affords
Mitchell the opportunity to assert or waive that right.8
8
For similar reasons, we find our recent decision in
Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th 961 distinguishable. Prudholme
held that Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), which
limited probation to two years for most felonies, operated to
unilaterally shorten the defendant’s probation term even though
he had agreed to a longer probation term as part of a plea
agreement. (Id. at pp. 963, 977.) We explained that, while the
text of Assembly Bill No. 1950 was not as clear as Proposition
47 (which we examined in Harris), the legislative history
reflected an intent for the time limitation on probation terms to
extend across the board, such that a Stamps-like remand
procedure was not appropriate. (Prudholme, at p. 977.)
Reviewing the legislative history, we concluded that the
Legislature had “signaled its view that, for an eligible
defendant, a shorter period of probation generally serves the
public’s interests, regardless of how a conviction was secured.”
(Ibid.) Here, as explained, in Mitchell’s case an upper term
sentence remains authorized. It may lawfully be imposed for
her offense so long as the requirements of section 1170(b) are
met or waived. A Stamps-like remand for further proceedings
in compliance with section 1170(b) is the appropriate remedy in
this context.
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PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
Accordingly, we reject Mitchell’s request that we
unilaterally reduce her sentence to the middle term while
leaving the advantageous aspects of her plea bargain otherwise
intact. Instead, as in Stamps, the proper remedy is to remand
this case and permit Mitchell to pursue relief under the new
benefit that Senate Bill 567 confers. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th
at pp. 705–709.)
On remand, Mitchell may either waive or invoke the
requirements of section 1170(b). If she reaffirms her acceptance
of the plea bargain and enters a new waiver of section 1170(b)’s
requirements, the court shall reinstate the original sentence as
negotiated by the parties. If she declines to enter that waiver,
in lieu of further proceedings the parties may agree to modify
the existing plea agreement to specify a midterm sentence on
count 4, doubled under the Three Strikes law. (See Stamps,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 707.) If the court also accepts the
modification it shall sentence Mitchell accordingly. (Id. at p.
708.) If no such agreement is reached and approved, Mitchell’s
remedy is to withdraw her assent to the bargain. In that case
the court shall set aside the plea, the “matter shall proceed as to
[Mitchell] as if no plea had been entered” (Kim, supra, 193
Cal.App.4th at p. 1366), and the case shall be set for trial. At
that point the parties may, of course, renegotiate a disposition if
they choose.
We recognize, as we did in Stamps, that this is not the
remedy Mitchell has requested. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p.
708.) Accordingly, we emphasize that, “[i]n light of these
potential consequences to the plea agreement, . . . it is ultimately
defendant’s choice whether [she] wishes to seek relief under
Senate Bill [567]. . . . ‘Given that defendants in criminal cases
presumably obtained some benefit from the plea agreement, we
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PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
anticipate that there will be defendants who determine that,
notwithstanding their entitlement to seek relief based on the
change in the law, their interests are better served by
preserving the status quo. That determination, however, lies in
each instance with the defendant.’ ” (Stamps, at p. 708, quoting
People v. Ellis (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 925, 944.)9
9
Shortly before oral argument, counsel for Mitchell filed a
letter with this court identifying section 1171 as a new
authority. Section 1171, effective January 1, 2025 (Stats. 2024,
ch. 964, § 2) sets forth procedures governing a “ ‘postconviction
proceeding,’ ” which the statute defines as “a proceeding to
modify a sentence or conviction pursuant to an ameliorative
statute. Ameliorative statutes include, but are not limited to,
Sections 1170.18, 1172.1, 1172.6, 1172.7, and 1172.75.” (§ 1171,
subd. (a).) At oral argument, counsel for Mitchell urged that this
statutory definition broadly encompasses a remand to the trial
court in the context of a direct appeal under the authority of
section 1170(b) and Estrada. We decline to consider this
argument because we have concluded that Mitchell is entitled
to a remand under our established precedent in Stamps. We
express no view on the applicability of section 1171 to this case
or how it might affect the options described above. Mitchell may
raise this issue in the Court of Appeal or the trial court in the
first instance.
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PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
III. DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal in part
and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
CORRIGAN, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
BROMBERG, J.*
.
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution
30
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Mitchell
__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 83 Cal.App.5th 1051
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S277314
Date Filed: May 18, 2026
__________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Mendocino
Judge: Victoria I. Shanahan
__________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Paul F. DeMeester, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General,
Donna M. Provenzano, Bridget Billeter and Jalem Z. Peguero, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Paul F. DeMeester
Attorney at Law
1592 Union Street No. 386
San Francisco, CA 94123
(415) 305-7280
Jalem Z. Peguero
Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 510-3841