Gaiter

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

LATONYA GAITER, ) Case No. 1:25-cv-1728

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

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v. ) Magistrate Judge Reuben J. Sheperd

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CLEVELAND HEIGHTS– )

UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS BOARD )

OF EDUCATION, )

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Defendant. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

After she was sexually assaulted by a student in the school district where she

teaches, Plaintiff Latonya Gaiter filed suit against Defendant Cleveland Heights–

University Heights Board of Education. Defendant moves to dismiss. For the reasons

that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendant’s motion.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construing them in

Plaintiff’s favor, as the non-moving party, Plaintiff bases her claims on the following

facts.

Ms. Gaiter has worked for Cleveland Heights-University Heights as a teacher

since 2012. (ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 5, PageID #6.) She alleges that she was sexually

assaulted on March 6, 2023 and reported the assault to her supervisor on the same

day. (Id., ¶¶ 6 & 7, PageID #6.) The student was “convicted of a sexual assault

offense” in juvenile court. (Id., ¶ 7, PageID #6.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “failed to take appropriate remedial measures

to protect Plaintiff or discipline the student, demonstrating deliberate indifference to

Plaintiff’s rights under Title IX.” (Id., ¶ 8, PageID #6–7.) Ms. Gaiter received medical

and psychological treatment. (Id., ¶ 9, PageID #7.) She alleges that “her medical

provider. . . certified that she was disabled from work from March 6, 2023 through

March 6, 2025.” (Id.) Since March 6, 2023, she alleges that she has not been paid,

resulting in “financial hardship, inability to meet basic expenses, and severe

emotional distress.” (Id., ¶ 10, PageID #7.)

Ms. Gaiter submitted a written incident report, a medical certification, and a

worker’s compensation claim. (Id., ¶ 11, PageID #7.) She requested assault leave

under State law and the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. (Id., ¶ 12.) The

Cleveland Heights–University Heights Board of Education denied Ms. Gaiter’s

request. (Id., ¶ 13.) Plaintiff does not plead the date of the Board’s denial. The Board

charged Ms. Gaiter’s absences against sick leave, allegedly “depriving her of statutory

and contractual benefits and ultimately terminating her pay entirely.” (Id., ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff alleges that she exhausted all administrative remedies available under the

grievance procedures of the collective bargaining agreement. (Id., ¶ 15.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff sued Cleveland Heights–University Heights Board of Education in

State court, asserting three causes of action: (1) violation of Section 3319.143 of the

Ohio Revised Code for the denial of assault leave; (2) breach of contract; and (3)

violation of Title IX. (Id., PageID #8–9.) Defendant timely removed the action to

federal court. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant moves to dismiss. (ECF No. 3.)

ANALYSIS

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim

on which it may grant relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion under Rule 12(b)(6)

tests “the plaintiff’s cause of action as stated in the complaint” and is “not a challenge

to the plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 958–

59 (6th Cir. 2005). A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” into the “realm of

plausible liability.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557 n.5.

When analyzing a complaint under this standard, the Court construes factual

allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts them as true, and

draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Wilburn v. United States, 616

F. App’x 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2015). But a pleading must offer more than mere “labels

and conclusions,” because “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nor is a

court required to accept “[c]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading

as factual allegations[.]” Eidson v. Tennessee Dep’t of Child.’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631,

634 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Therefore, the Court must distinguish between “well-pled factual allegations,”

which must be treated as true, and “naked assertions,” which need not be. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v.

Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 375 (6th Cir. 2011) (determining that because some of the

plaintiff’s factual allegations were “not well-pleaded,” “their conclusory nature

‘disentitles them to the presumption of truth’”). A plaintiff need not include detailed

factual allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-Defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rule 8 “does not unlock

the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id.

at 678–79.

I. Title IX (Count 3)

Plaintiff alleges that the Cleveland Heights–University Heights Board of

Education receives federal funding and is subject to Title IX. (ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 2,

PageID #6.) That statute provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the

basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be

subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving

Federal financial assistance[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). In its answer, Defendant “admits

that it receives federal funding.” (ECF No. 10, ¶ 2, PageID #213.)

Plaintiff’s Title IX claim for deliberate indifference to student-on-teacher

harassment presents a question of first impression. (ECF No. 1-1, ¶¶ 22–25, PageID

#8–9.) On its face, it does not appear that the statute sweeps as far as offering

workplace protections to teachers—at least not without an allegation that an actual

or constructive adverse workplace action affects the availability of or a student’s

participation in an education program. After all, the statute aims at providing equal

educational opportunities based on sex, and other statutes offer protections in the

workplace. Assuming, without deciding, that Title IX covers a claim of the type at

issue here, the question becomes what standard applies.

It could be the standard for student-on-student harassment under Title IX. In

Kollaritsch v. Michigan State University Board of Trustees, 944 F.3d 613, 623–24 (6th

Cir. 2019), the Sixth Circuit held that a claim of deliberate indifference to student-

on-student harassment requires a plaintiff to plead “an incident of actionable sexual

harassment, the school’s actual knowledge of it, [and] some further incident of

actionable sexual harassment.” Under this standard, “the further actionable

harassment would not have happened but for the objective unreasonableness

(deliberate indifference) of the school’s response, and . . . the Title IX injury is

attributable to the post-actual-knowledge further harassments.” Additionally, “peer

harassment under Title IX, require[es] plaintiffs in that context to demonstrate that

the harassment suffered was ‘so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it

denies its victims the equal access to education that Title IX is designed to protect.”

Wamer v. Univ. of Toledo, 27 F.4th 461, 468 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Davis v. Monroe

Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652 (1999)).

Or the standard for teacher-on-student harassment under Title IX might

apply. Under this standard, a plaintiff must plead that “(1) she was sexually

harassed by a teacher or professor, (2) an official with authority to take corrective

action had actual notice of the harassment, (3) the school's response was clearly

unreasonable, and (4) the school's deliberate indifference caused her to suffer

discrimination.” Wamer, 27 F.4th at 471; see also id., at 469 (stating that Kollaritsch

did not apply the post-notice harassment requirement to teacher-on-student

harassment claims, finding that the court “used careful language specifically cabining

its holding to the context of student-on-student sexual harassment claims.”).

Possibly, some other standard applies. But for purposes of analyzing

Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court assumes that, if the statute permits

Plaintiff to state a claim on the facts alleged, the most liberal standard applies. Of

the available options, that is the standard for teacher-on-student harassment.

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet even that low bar.

I.A Sexual Assault

A plaintiff seeking to establish a deliberate indifference claim based on

teacher-on-student harassment must allege sexual harassment. Wamer, 27 F.4th at

471. Plaintiff alleges that she was sexually assaulted by a student (ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 6,

PageID #6) and that the student “was convicted of a sexual assault offense in” juvenile

court. (Id., ¶ 7, PageID #6.) Accordingly, Plaintiff pleads the first element of her

Title IX claim.

I.B. Actual Notice

Next, a plaintiff must allege that an official with authority to take corrective

action had actual notice of the harassment. Wamer, 27 F.4th at 471. “Only when an

appropriate person at a school knows about sexual discrimination does the school

have actual knowledge.” Kesterson v. Kent State Univ., 967 F.3d 519, 527 (citations

omitted). “An appropriate person is someone who ‘at a minimum has authority to

address the alleged discrimination . . . on the [school’s] behalf.” Id. (quoting Gebser

v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998)). Further, an appropriate

person must be “high enough up the chain-of-command” that her decision constitutes

the school's decision. Id., at 529. “[A] university employee’s ability to mitigate

hardship or refer complaints does not make that employee an ‘appropriate person.’”

Id. at 528. To establish actual notice at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff must

“allege (1) the identity of an appropriate person, namely someone who has authority

to address the alleged discrimination on the school’s behalf and (2) the actual notice

was sufficient to alert the appropriate person of the possibility of [p]laintiff’s sexual

harassment.” Chapman v. Seuffert, 713 F. Supp. 3d 425, 435 (N.D. Ohio 2024)

(citations omitted).

Even construing the complaint in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff fails to allege that

an appropriate person with the authority to take corrective action on behalf of the

school district had actual notice of the harassment. Plaintiff alleges that she reported

the sexual assault to her “supervisor.” (ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 7, PageID #6.) But the

complaint fails to identify the supervisor or plead any facts regarding the supervisor’s

authority to address the sexual assault on behalf of the Board of Education. It alleges

only that Ms. Gaiter “immediately reported the assault to her supervisor on March 6,

2023, providing full details and requesting protective and remedial action.” (ECF

No. 1-1, ¶ 7, PageID #6.)

Without citing any authority, Plaintiff argues that “the Sixth Circuit has made

clear that the ‘appropriate person’ (who counts as an official with authority) is fact-

intensive and cannot be reduced to magic words in the complaint.” (ECF No 17,

PageID #246.) Fair enough. But no allegation in the complaint suggests, even by

inference, that the supervisor to whom Ms. Gaiter reported the sexual assault was

sufficiently high in the chain-of-command or, in turn, elevated her complaint to such

a person to make the decisions challenged in this lawsuit those of the Board.

Plaintiff’s allegations fall short of this mark and fail to put Defendant on notice of the

basic claim against which it must defend.

Plaintiff argues that she “alleged the key facts: she reported the assault to her

immediate supervisor in the school hierarchy, and the institution did nothing

meaningful in response.” (ECF No. 17, PageID #248.) Further, she maintains that

“[i]t is entirely plausible that this supervisor either (1) had authority to act; or (2)

relayed the information to someone who did. That is enough at the pleading stage.”

(Id.) “When deciding whether a complaint fails ‘to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted,’ a court should typically limit itself to the well-pleaded allegations within

the complaint's four corners.” Blackwell v. Nocerini,123 F.4th 479, 486 (6th Cir.

2024). Those allegations do not include either of the matters that Plaintiff asks

Defendant and the Court to assume. Nor does the allegation, without more, give rise

to an inference that one of those things occurred. In fact, it is just as plausible that

Ms. Gaiter failed to advise a person within the school district who had the authority

to make decisions on its behalf or who failed to elevate it to such a person.

But the price for obtaining discovery is a well-pleaded complaint that complies

with the basic requirements of Rule 8. “[A] plaintiff must state a plausible claim

before she can invoke a right to discovery. In other words, a plaintiff can open the

door to discovery only if she first alleges ‘enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’” of a Title IX violation. Parker v.

Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Plaintiff

fails to allege such facts. In many respects, the allegations in this case look like those

in Twombly. There, the complaint alleged antitrust conspiracies. Because the

allegations were alternatively consistent with either a conspiracy or lawful parallel

conduct, the Supreme Court held that the complaint failed to meet the Rule 8

pleading standard because it did not make a showing of an entitlement to relief. 550

U.S. at 556–57. Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest a conspiracy, and a

conclusory allegation of an agreement did not raise the right to relief above the

speculative level. So too here. Without more, Plaintiff might have a claim under

Title IX, assuming the statute applies, but alternatively the Board might have taken

the actions complained of because the supervisor whom Ms. Gaiter advised of the

sexual assault was not someone whose decisions are attributable to the Board or did

not report the assault up the chain.

At bottom, the complaint fails to state a claim for a violation of Title IX. It is

not clear that the statute contemplates a cause of action like the one Plaintiff brings.

If it does, the standard for pleading such a claim is unsettled. But the complaint fails

to meet the basic, unadorned Rule 8 standard for the second element of her Title IX

claim. Therefore, the Court need not proceed further under whatever standard might

apply and GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count 3.

II. State-Law Claims (Counts 1 and 2)

Plaintiff brings two State-law claims against Defendant. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID

#8.) The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over these State-law claims pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Under federal law “the district courts shall have supplemental

jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within

such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under

Article III.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). This grant of jurisdiction brings all claims arising

from a common nucleus of operative fact before the Court. Soehnlen v. Fleet Owners

Ins. Fund, 844 F.3d 576, 588 (6th Cir. 2016).

Even then, a court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” in

certain circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine

of discretion.” United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

To determine whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, “a federal court should

consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of

judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity[.]” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.

Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); see also James v. Hampton, 592 F. App’x 449, 462–

63 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1882

(6th Cir. 1993)). Section 1367(c)(3) provides that a district court may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction where “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex

issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims

over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional

circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.”

Because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal claim, the Court may, in its

discretion, either retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State-law claims and proceed on

the merits, Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639–40 (2009), or

decline jurisdiction and dismiss the complaint without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to

pursue the remaining claims in State court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “[G]enerally

‘when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations

usually will point to dismissing the [S]tate law claims.” Packard v. Farmers Ins. Co.

of Columbus, 423 F. App’x 580, 585 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Musson Theatrical v. Fed.

Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254–55 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also Juergensen v. Midland

Funding, LLC, No. 5:18-cv-1825, 2018 WL 5923707, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2018).

Based on its review of the record and because the case remains in its early

stages, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s two State-law claims. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES those claims

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiffs Title IX claim (Count 3) and DECLINES to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs two State-law claims (Counts 1 and 2). Based on this

disposition, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs motion for a

preliminary injunction (ECF No. 5-1.) Accordingly, the Court REMANDS the case

to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 10, 2026

J.PhilipCalabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

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