Hyers

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JON F. HYERS, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 26-286

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, ET AL. SECTION “R” (3)

ORDER

Before the Court is the complaint of pro se and in forma pauperis

plaintiffs Jon F. Hyers and Elizabeth R. Glass.1 The Court referred review of

the plaintiffs’ complaint to a U.S. Magistrate Judge for a report and

recommendation (R&R) on whether the complaint satisfies the requirements

of the federal in forma pauperis statute. Magistrate Judge Dossier found

that plaintiffs’ complaint did not meet the in forma pauperis requirements

and recommended dismissing the complaint without prejudice and with

leave to amend.2 The Court has reviewed the complaint, the record, the

applicable law, the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, and the plaintiffs’ objections.

For the following reasons, the Court dismisses the complaint without

prejudice and with leave to amend within thirty days of this order.

1 R. Doc. 1.

2 R. Doc. 12.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 9, 2026, Hyers and Glass filed suit against Jeffrey M.

Landry, the Governor of Louisiana, and Nancy R. Landry, the Louisiana

Secretary of State.3 Their complaint asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and for violations of

U.S. Constitution Article VI, Section 2; Article I, Section 2, Clauses 2 and 3;

and Article IV, Section 4.4 Plaintiffs assert that Governor Landry violated

their rights by signing Louisiana H.B. 17 of 2024 and Louisiana S.B. 1 of 2025

into law.5 The complaint makes no specific allegations against Secretary

Landry.

Magistrate Judge Dossier reviewed the complaint for frivolousness and

recommended that the Court dismiss it without prejudice and with leave to

amend within thirty days.6 She reasoned that sovereign immunity bars

plaintiffs’ claims that were made against Governor Landry and Secretary

Landry in their official capacities. Magistrate Judge Dossier further

determined that legislative immunity barred plaintiffs’ claims against

Governor Landry, as his actions in signing the bills in question were integral

3 R. Doc. 1.

4 R. Doc. 1.

5 R. Doc. 1.

6 R. Doc. 12.

steps in the legislative process. Judge Dossier also recommended that the

Court dismiss the claims on the ground that plaintiffs did not identify how

Defendants’ actions violated the Elections Clause and that the Guarantee

Clause does not provide the basis for a justiciable claim.

Hyers and Glass made four objections to the R&R.7 Plaintiffs did not

object to the R&R’s conclusion that the Court should dismiss the complaint

without prejudice and with leave to amend within thirty days of this order.

The Court considers the objections below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court applies de novo review to the parts of the R&R to which the

parties objected. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The Court is limited to plain-error

review of any part of the R&R not subject to a proper objection. Starns v.

Andrews, 524 F.3d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2008).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court first reviews de novo the parts of the R&R to which plaintiffs

objected. Plaintiffs’ first objection is to Judge Dossier’s description of their

complaint as asserting that closed primaries are per se unconstitutional.

Judge Dossier’s R&R states that plaintiffs’ “fundamental position appears to

be that closed primaries are unconstitutional and that the signature

7 R. Doc. 14.

requirements imposed by Louisiana law violate the Guarantee clause.”8

Plaintiffs object to the characterization of the system as “closed primaries”

instead of “semi-closed” primaries. The Court sustains the objection to the

description of the primary system, as the primaries are semi-closed. That

said, the objection does not remedy the fundamental problems Magistrate

Judge Dossier identified in the complaint that Governor Landry is immune

and that there are no allegations raised against Secretary Landry.

Second, plaintiffs object that the R&R did not address their First

Amendment or Equal Protection claims, which they bring under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Plaintiffs are correct that the R&R did not specifically address their

claims under the First Amendment or Equal Protection clauses, instead

citing other reasons requiring dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint. This is not

an error. The Court need not consider every possible reason to dismiss a

complaint and, as discussed below, sovereign immunity requires dismissal

of the complaint. See Every v. Jindal, 413 F. App’x 725, 727 (5th Cir. 2011)

(noting that a “district court need not reach the merits of any claim against

any defendant if dismissal is warranted on other grounds”). The Court

overrules this objection.

8 R. Doc. 12.

Third, plaintiffs object to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that their

allegations are insufficient to trigger the Ex Parte Young exception to

sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs seem to fear that the Magistrate Judge’s

ruling could be construed as holding that they could never satisfy the Ex

Parte Young exception to sovereign immunity as to Secretary Landry.

Magistrate Judge Dossier made no such finding. Magistrate Judge Dossier

instead found that plaintiffs’ allegations in the complaint were insufficient to

meet the requirements required for the Ex Parte Young exception as to

Secretary Landry. After de novo review, the Court finds that finding was

correct.

The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to bar

suits in federal court by private citizens against nonconsenting states. Bd. of

Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). This immunity

extends to protect state officers acting in their official capacities, who, under

the principle of state-sovereign immunity, are generally barred from suit.

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-69, (1974); McCarthy ex rel. Travis v.

Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2004). There is an exception to this

rule under the Ex Parte Young doctrine under which, “a federal court,

consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, may enjoin state officials to

conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal law.” Quern v.

Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979). Ex Parte Young requires that the

complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief

properly characterized as prospective, City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d

993, 998 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service

Commission of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)), and that the official in

question has a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the challenged act,

id. (quoting Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908)). The complaint must

meet both requirements to qualify for the Ex Parte Young exception.

After de novo review, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Dossier

was correct and that plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to meet the

requisite enforcement connection as to Secretary Landry. Plaintiffs’

complaint makes no claims about Secretary Landry at all, let alone that she

has a connection to the enforcement of the challenged acts.9 Without any

allegations that Secretary Landry is connected to the enforcement of the

challenged acts, plaintiffs do not meet the requirements of the Ex Parte

Young exception and sovereign immunity applies. The Court overrules

plaintiffs’ objections to the contrary.

Finally, plaintiffs object that the R&R did not cite to Bost v. Illinois

State Board of Elections, 146 S. Ct. 513 (2026), to establish that they had

9 R. Doc. 1.

standing to bring this lawsuit. Standing is not at issue in the R&R. This

objection is without merit. The Court overrules plaintiffs’ objection.

Having addressed plaintiffs’ objections, the Court examines the

remainder of the R&R for clear error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.

Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b) advisory committee’s note (1983). The Court finds no clear error.

Accordingly, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s R&R as its opinion

except its description of Louisiana’s primary system as “closed” instead of

“semi-closed.”

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court approves the Report and Recommendation of the U.S.

Magistrate Judge and adopts it as its opinion in this Matter, except as to the

description of the Louisiana primary system.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any amended complaint must be

filed within 30 days from the issuance of this order.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 11th day of May, 2026.

Aorwk Vart1er

SARAH S. VANCE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE