YASIN

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MOHAMED S. YASIN

Civil Action No. 25-02389 (SDW) (JRA)

Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.

March 6, 2026

SAJEDA JAMHOUR, et al,

Defendants.

WIGENTON, District Judge.

Before this Court are three motions to dismiss Plaintiff Mohamed S. Yasin’s Amended

Complaint (D.E. 16 (“Am. Compl.”) for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) by Defendants: the Passaic County Sheriff’s Office (the “PCSO”);

the Passaic County Prosecutor’s Office (the “PCPO”); and Defendants the City of Paterson, the

City of Paterson Police Department, Officer Abdalaziz Yousef, Detective Sharom Mallqui,

Sergeant Jason English, Detective Sergeant Michael McDonald and Lieutenant Abdelmonim

Hamdeh (collectively, the “Paterson Defendants”). Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331. This opinion is issued without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78. For the reasons stated

herein, the Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant matter arises from the death of Plaintiff’s brother, Nadil Yasin (“Mr. Yasin”),

and the subsequent police investigation of Mr. Yasin’s death. According to Plaintiff, in the month

preceding his death, Mr. Yasin and his then-wife, Sajeda Jamhour (“Jamhour”) were involved in

intense marital disputes. (Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) After Mr. Yasin initiated divorce proceedings against

Jamhour, Jamhour allegedly threatened to kill him, which left Mr. Yasin with a “genuine fear for

his life.” (Id. ¶¶ 16–18.) Subsequently, on April 9, 2023, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Yasin was

found deceased in his home “under highly suspicious circumstances.” (Id. ¶ 12.) When Paterson

Police Department officers arrived at the scene, the investigating officers did not treat Jamhour as

a suspect and allegedly failed to secure the crime scene properly. (Id. ¶¶ 26–32.) Defendant

Officer Abdalaziz Yousef was the first to arrive at the scene. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the

inadequate investigation was due to Officer Abdalaziz Yousef having engaged in an extramarital

affair with Jamhour. (Id. ¶¶ 43–44.) Several days after Mr. Yasin’s death, Jamhour fled to the

State of Palestine. (Id. ¶ 37.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff initially filed a complaint in this Court on April 7, 2025.

(D.E. 1.) Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint on August 18, 2025. (D.E. 16.) The

Amended Complaint asserts claims for: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 deprivation of constitutional rights;

(2) violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (the “NJCRA”); (3) wrongful death pursuant to

the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:31-1 to -6; and (4) the New Jersey

Survivor's Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-3. Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the

Amended Complaint. (D.E. 22, 26, 28.) All briefing was timely completed.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id.

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, federal courts “must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as

true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff,” and determine “whether [the]

plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Mayer, 605 F.3d

at 229. Determining whether a complaint’s allegations are “plausible” is “a context-specific task

that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679. If the “well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct,” the complaint should be dismissed for failing to show “that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “[L]abels and conclusions” or a

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient to withstand a motion

to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The PCSO’s Motion to Dismiss

The PCSO moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserting that the Amended

Complaint fails to set forth any factual allegations suggesting that the PSCO was involved in the

death of Mr. Yasin or the investigation of the same. This Court agrees with the PCSO.

Plaintiff’s claims against the PCSO fail to comply with Rule 8. Rule 8 requires a complaint

to be simple, concise, direct, and set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). With regard to Rule 8, it appears that

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants acted in unison, without delineating the actions of each

Defendant or explaining under what circumstances they acted or failed to act. On the other hand,

it also appears that Plaintiff is alleging that the Paterson Defendants committed a wrong but

somehow all of the Defendants are responsible. (See e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55, 62.) There are no

specific factual allegations as to the PCSO’s involvement in the death of Mr. Yasin or the

investigation of the same. Rather, Plaintiff relies on nothing more than improper group pleading,

stating that “all captioned Defendant law enforcement agencies” are liable without specifying

which Defendants engaged in what wrongful conduct. See Roman v. Cnty. of Hudson, No. 23-

2811, 2024 WL 1757150, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 23, 2024); see also In re Ojo, No. 21-11357, 2021

WL 3732904, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2021) (“When a number of defendants are named in a

complaint, plaintiff cannot refer to all defendants ‘who occupied different positions and

presumably had distinct roles in the alleged misconduct’ without specifying ‘which defendants

engaged in what wrongful conduct.’ ”) (citing Falat v. County of Hunterdon, No. 12-6804, 2013

WL 1163751, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013)).

Next, it is well established that “threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements,

supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is

ripe with conclusory allegations that fail to connect the PCSO to the alleged wrongdoing in a

manner sufficient to put them on notice of what the PCSO is alleged to have done. Although the

PCSO is a named Defendant, Plaintiff fails to mention the PCSO throughout any of the Amended

Complaint’s factual allegations. Notwithstanding, Plaintiff inappropriately attempts to assert

additional facts regarding the PCSO’s involvement in his opposition. Plaintiff cannot cure

deficiencies in his Amended Complaint in this manner. “[I]t is axiomatic that the complaint may

not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Janowski v. City of N.

Wildwood, 259 F. Supp. 3d 113, 120 (D.N.J. 2017) (citing Com. of Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v.

PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the PCSO

are dismissed.

B. The Paterson Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

i. Deprivation of Constitutional Rights (Counts I and II)

a) Individual Defendants

Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the

NJCRA, alleging that the Paterson Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. To state a

§ 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead deprivation of a constitutional right and that the constitutional

deprivation was caused by a person acting under the color of state law. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d

1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). The NJCRA was modeled after 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and courts in this

district have interpreted the NJCRA analogously to § 1983. See e.g. Janowski v. City of N.

Wildwood, 259 F. Supp. 3d 113, 121 (D.N.J. 2017); Coles v. Carlini, 162 F. Supp. 3d 380, 405

(D.N.J. 2015); see also Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417, 443 (D.N.J. 2011)

(collecting cases). Since the NJCRA is interpreted analogously to § 1983, NJCRA claims “rise

and fall with the parallel § 1983 claims.” See Southey v. Twp. of Vernon, No. 21-11844, 2025 WL

1341742, at *10 (D.N.J. May 7, 2025) (citing Mervilus v. Union Cnty., 73 F.4th 185, 193 n.4 (3d

Cir. 2023)).

Here, Plaintiff contends that Officer Abdalaziz Yousef, Detective Sharom Mallqui,

Sergeant Jason English, Detective Sergeant Michael McDonald and Lieutenant Abdelmonim

Hamdeh (the “Individual Defendants”) violated his constitutional rights by failing to conduct an

adequate investigation into the death of Mr. Yasin. However, at the outset, this Court notes that

Plaintiff’s claims against the Individual Defendants suffer the same pleading defects as his claims

against the PCSO. With the exception of Officer Abdalaziz Yousef, the Individual Defendants are

named as defendants, but Plaintiff fails to state how each Defendant violated his constitutional

rights. Plaintiff merely states that the Individual Defendants are liable without identifying the

conduct of each individual officer. See Est. of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2005)

(“To prevail on a § 1983 claim against multiple defendants, a plaintiff must show that each

individual defendant violated his constitutional rights.”) Again, Plaintiff relies on impermissible

group pleading, which fails to satisfy the pleading standards articulated in Iqbal/Twombly.

Plaintiff also does not adequately plead a cause of action against the Individual Defendants

because Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a constitutional violation as there is no recognized

constitutional right to a criminal investigation. See Murphy v. Middlesex Cnty., 361 F. Supp. 3d

376, 391 (D.N.J. 2019) (citing Fuchs v. Mercer Cnty., 260 Fed. App’x. 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2008));

see also Ogrod v. City of Philadelphia, 598 F. Supp. 3d 253, 268 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (“[C]ourts in

[the Third] Circuit have stated without qualification that ‘there is ‘no constitutional right to a police

investigation.’ ”) (collecting cases). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s constitutional claims against the

Individual Defendants are dismissed.

b) Monell Liability

When a suit against a municipality is based on § 1983, the municipality can only be liable

when “the alleged constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, regulation or

decision officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by custom.” Beck v. City

of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A government policy or custom can be established in two

ways:

Policy is made when a ‘decisionmaker possessing final authority to

establish a municipal policy with respect to the action’ issues an

official proclamation, policy, or edict. A course of conduct is

considered to be a ‘custom’ when, though not authorized by law,

‘such practices of state officials are so permanently and well-settled’

as to virtually constitute law.

McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). A

custom requires proof of knowledge and acquiescence by the decisionmaker. Id. (citing Watson

v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir.2007)).

This Court finds that Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded facts sufficient to impose liability

on the City of Paterson.1 Here, dismissal of Plaintiff’s Monell claim is warranted because Plaintiff

has not set forth facts demonstrating a constitutional violation. Next, Plaintiff fails to specify the

relevant “custom” or “policy.” See McTernan, 564 F.3d at 658 (“To satisfy the pleading standard,

[Plaintiff] must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was.”).

Moreover, even if Plaintiff had done so, Plaintiff does not identify a single decisionmaker with

final authority or alleges any pattern of similar incidents as a result of the purported policy or

custom. Plaintiff's allegations are entirely conclusory and lack any factual support. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s Monell claim is dismissed.

ii. New Jersey’s Wrongful Death Act and Survivor Act (Counts III and IV)

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts claims for relief under both the New Jersey

Wrongful Death Act (“WDA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:31-1 to -6, and the New Jersey Survivor's

Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-3. To support a wrongful death action, there must be a “death ...

caused by a wrongful act ... such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the person injured

to maintain an action for damages resulting from the injury.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:31–1; Aronberg

v. Tolbert, 25 A.3d 1121, 1128 (N.J. 2011). Likewise, under the Survivor's Act, a claim may be

pursued by the decedent's estate if there was a “wrongful act ... where death resulted from injuries

1 The Amended Complaint names both the City of Paterson and the City of Paterson Police Department as Defendants.

However, for purposes of § 1983 liability, municipalities and their police departments are treated as a single entity.

See Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417, 430 (D.N.J. 2011)

for which the deceased would have had a cause of action if he had lived.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15–

3; Tolbert, 25 A.3d at 1130. Here, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead a cause of action under

New Jersey’s Wrongful Death Act and Survivor’s Act. Critically, Plaintiff does not allege that

any of the Paterson Defendants committed a “wrongful act” that caused Mr. Yasin’s death.

Accordingly, Counts III and IV are dismissed.

C. The PCPO’s Motion to Dismiss

The PCPO contends that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars all federal claims brought

against them. (D.E. 28-1 at 14.) Plaintiff counters that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity

does not apply because the PCPO fails to satisfy the Fitchik factors.

The Eleventh Amendment may bar an action even where a state is not a named party; it

extends to state agencies and state officers, “as long as the state is the real party in interest.” Fitchik

v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989); Estate of Lagano

v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 769 F.3d 850, 857 (3d Cir. 2014). To determine whether a

state-affiliated entity is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, courts apply a three part test,

also referred to as the “Fitchik factors”: “(1) whether the money that would pay any judgment

would come from the state; (2) the status of the agency under state law; and (3) the degree of

autonomy possessed by the agency.” Allen v. New Jersey State Police, 974 F.3d 497, 505 (3d Cir.

2020); see also Lagano, 769 F.3d at 857-58 (“We therefore conclude that Fitchik provides the

proper framework for analyzing Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity as it applies to county

prosecutors....”).

First, Fitchik factor one asks whether the State of New Jersey would find itself responsible

for damages if Plaintiff prevailed in this case. The New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled

definitively that when county prosecutors act in their law enforcement or investigatory capacity,

“they act as ‘agents’ and ‘officers’ of the State, qualifying as State employees for the purpose of

determining vicarious liability. See Wright v. State, 778 A.2d 443, 462 (N.J. 2001). Here, Plaintiff

contends that the PCPO performed administrative tasks, which would mean the PCPO acted as

county officials rather than agents of the State. (D.E. 36 at 12.) However, Plaintiff’s allegations

are premised on the PCPO’s alleged inactions that clearly relate to the PCPO’s authority to

investigate and enforce the criminal laws of the State of New Jersey as delegated by the State

Legislature, thereby making the PCPO an “agent” or “officer” of the State. Therefore, the first

Fitchik factor is satisfied.

Next, the second factor concerns the status of the PCPO under state law. See Fitchik, 873

F.2d at 659. “The office of county prosecutor in the State of New Jersey is a constitutionally

established office.” Wright, 778 A.2d at 452 (internal quotation marks omitted); N.J. Const. art.

VII, § 2, ¶ 1 (“County prosecutors shall be nominated and appointed by the Governor with the

advice and consent of the Senate. Their term of office shall be five years, and they shall serve until

the appointment and qualification of their respective successors.”). Accordingly, the PCPO's

status as a “constitutionally established office” satisfies the second Fitchik factor.

Lastly, the third Fitchik factor considers the degree of the PCPO's autonomy from the State.

See Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659. That factor is satisfied where, as here, “a county prosecutor acting

with prosecutorial authority is not an autonomous entity separate from the State.” Est. of Bardzell

v. Gomperts, 515 F. Supp. 3d 256, 269 (D.N.J. 2021), aff'd, No. 21-1906, 2022 WL 843483 (3d

Cir. Mar. 22, 2022), and aff'd, No. 21-1906, 2022 WL 843483 (3d Cir. Mar. 22, 2022). In Wright,

the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that a prosecutor whose actions involve enforcing

criminal laws is not autonomous from the State as “the [State] Attorney General has the ultimate

responsibility in matters related to the enforcement of the State's criminal laws that have been

legislatively delegated to county prosecutors.” 778 A.2d at 464 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:17B–

98; N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:17B–103). Here, the third factor is satisfied as the PCPO lacks autonomy

when enforcing criminal laws.

Based on the Fitchik factors, this Court finds that the PCPO is entitled to sovereign

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. As such, as to the PCPO, Plaintiff’s federal and state

claims are dismissed. See Allen v. New Jersey State Police, 974 F.3d 497, 505 (3d Cir. 2020)

(stating that there is no exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity for plaintiffs who bring state

law claims against a state entity) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,

106 (1984) (recognizing that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to state law claims in

addition to federal claims)).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days to file an amended complaint. An appropriate

order follows.

/s/ Susan D. Wigenton x

SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk

cc: José R. Almonte, U.S.M.J.

Parties