reversing summary judgment where inmate did not receive treatment for painful broken nose for two days
How later courts described this case
- reversing summary judgment where inmate did not receive treatment for painful broken nose for two days
- an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”
- internal bleeding and pain caused by doctor-prescribed medication
- back pain and muscle spasms
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
GARRETT ROTTAU, MS16284, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-02124-MAB
)
PERCY MEYERS, )
CHRISTINE BROWN, and )
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Garrett Rottau, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (IDOC) and currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center
(Pinckneyville), brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional deprivations
arising from his allegedly inadequate medical care at Pinckneyville. (Doc. 1). He seeks
monetary and injunctive relief.1 Id.
The Complaint is now before the Court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.2
Any portion that is legally frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or
requests money damages from an immune defendant must be dismissed. Id.
1 The Court construes Plaintiff’s request for “injunctive relief” as a request for relief at the close of the case.
If he requires interim injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary
injunction, Plaintiff may file a separate “Motion for TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction Under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 65” at any time during the pending action.
2 The Court has jurisdiction to screen the Complaint in light of Plaintiff’s consent to the full jurisdiction of
a Magistrate Judge, and the limited consent by the Illinois Department of Corrections and Wexford to the
exercise of Magistrate Judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding between this
Court and the Illinois Department of Corrections and Wexford.
THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1, pp. 5-12):
Plaintiff has been submitting written requests for treatment of back, stomach, and bowel
problems since 2020. Id. at 5. Pinckneyville’s medical and nursing staff provided him with
“minimal pain medications,” which frequently ran out, and prescription laxatives, which
were ineffective. Id. at 6. He continued to seek treatment. Id.
While performing heavy lifting as a cellhouse porter on June 30, 2023, Plaintiff says
he heard a loud popping sound in his back and suffered a collapsed disc. The following
morning, he lost control of his right leg, suffered excruciating leg pain, and noticed
numbness in his right foot and toes. Plaintiff informed an officer that he needed medical
care, and he was taken by wheelchair to the health care unit (HCU). Id.
Plaintiff was placed in an isolation cell with a sleeping mat on July 1, 2023. Early
that day, a nurse administered an injection that did not help his pain. Id. at 7. Around
7:30 p.m., another nurse informed Plaintiff that he could only have naproxen, and she
provided it at 8:30 p.m. Then, two officers moved Plaintiff to A Ward, where he was given
a blanket and two sleeping mats around 10:30 p.m. Id.
At 9:00 a.m. on July 2, 2023, a nurse instructed Plaintiff to sign release paperwork.
When Plaintiff said he was still unable to walk, she injected him with medication. Plaintiff
was also allowed to call his family. An inmate porter then pushed him in a wheelchair
back to his cellhouse and let him hobble into his cell unassisted. Id. at 7-8.
For several months, Plaintiff remained in the same condition. Id. at 8. He suffered
from pain, stiffness, and immobility. At some point, Plaintiff saw Dr. Meyers in the
asthma clinic. Plaintiff confronted the doctor about his inadequate medical care. He asked
why the doctor refused to evaluate or treat him. Id. Dr. Meyers attempted to send Plaintiff
back to his cellhouse without acknowledging his concerns. When Plaintiff warned that
he would report his denial of care to a wing officer, Dr. Meyers gave him a prescription
for naproxen (500 mg). Id.
Plaintiff then suffered an injury to his right shin and foot that resulted from
constant hobbling after his back injury. Id. at 8-9. The hobbling forced his right foot into
a permanent outward-facing position. In late 2023 or early 2024, Plaintiff underwent a
right foot MRI, which revealed a stress fracture in his shin and foot. Id. at 9. Plaintiff was
sent to a pain management clinic in October 2024. Although a specialist recommended
injections with narcotic pain medication, he never received any. Id. Plaintiff suffered
permanent nerve damage, pain, numbness, deformities, and loss of mobility in his right
foot. Id. at 12.
In January or February 2025, Plaintiff met with an outside foot specialist, who
reviewed his medical charts and scans. Id. at 9. The specialist recommended an updated
MRI of his spine and further evaluation with an orthopedic specialist to determine
whether there was a connection between his back, stomach, and bowel issues. Plaintiff
was never sent for additional testing or treatment. He was instead placed on three
stomach medications and ibuprofen, which caused additional stomach issues, internal
bleeding, and bloody stools. Id. at 11-12.
HCU Administrator Christine Brown failed to schedule an appointment or
arrange a medical writ for further scans, tests, and/or treatment of Plaintiff. Id. at 9-10.
His family’s requests for medical records and other “institutional correspondence”
should have put Brown on notice of Plaintiff’s medical needs. Even so, Brown never
released his medical records or arranged treatment. Id. at 10-11.
At all times, Dr. Meyers served as the primary physician at Pinckneyville and,
according to Plaintiff, delayed or denied necessary testing and treatment for his back,
stomach, bowel, and foot problems. The doctor chose to treat him with only pain
relievers, and this medication complicated his condition by causing internal bleeding and
bloody stools. Id.
When making medical decisions, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Meyers acted pursuant
to policies and procedures of Wexford Health Sources, Inc. According to Plaintiff,
Wexford had a policy of delaying or denying treatment for non-life-threatening
conditions to reduce the cost of inmate medical care. Dr. Meyers acted pursuant to this
policy when choosing to treat Plaintiff’s symptoms with pain medication instead of
ordering diagnostic testing and treatment of his underlying medical condition(s). Id.
PRELIMINARY DISMISSALS
Plaintiff mentions the following individuals in the statement of his claim but does
not identify them as defendants in the Complaint: unidentified medical staff, nursing
staff, and officers. (Doc. 1). The Court will not treat these individuals as defendants, and
all claims against them are considered dismissed without prejudice. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a)
(caption of complaint “must name all the parties”).
DISCUSSION
Based on the allegations set forth above, the Court designates the following claims
in this pro se Complaint:
Count 1: HCU Administrator Brown exhibited deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff’s back, stomach, bowel, and foot injuries at Pinckneyville,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Count 2: Dr. Meyers exhibited deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s back,
stomach, bowel, and foot injuries at Pinckneyville, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
Count 3: Wexford Health Sources, Inc. had a policy of delaying or denying
non-life-threatening medical care for inmates to save on costs, and
this policy caused the delay or denial of necessary medical care for
Plaintiff’s back, stomach, bowel, and foot injuries at Pinckneyville,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed herein is
considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly.3
The Eighth Amendment guards against cruel and unusual punishment of
prisoners. U.S. CONST. amend VIII. A plaintiff bringing an Eighth Amendment claim
based on the denial of adequate medical care must make two showings. First, the plaintiff
must set forth allegations describing an objectively serious medical condition. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Second, he
must describe deliberate indifference to that condition by each defendant. Id.
3 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
1. Serious Medical Condition
An objectively serious medical condition is one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as requiring treatment or one where the need for treatment would be obvious
to a lay person. Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 412 (7th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff complains of
back, stomach, bowel, and foot conditions, and he alleges that medical providers,
including physicians, recommended further evaluation and treatment of each condition.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also recognized that back pain, stomach
bleeding, bowel issues, and bone fractures are each objectively serious. See, e.g., Diaz v.
Godinez, 693 Fed. App’x 440 (7th Cir. 2017) (chronic back pain); Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d
556 (7th Cir. 2017) (back pain and muscle spasms); Reck v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 27
F.4th 473 (7th Cir. 2022) (Crohn’s Disease); Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1999)
(internal bleeding and pain caused by doctor-prescribed medication); Zaya v. Sood, 836
F.3d 800 (7th Cir. 2016) (broken hand, dislocated finger, tissue damage, with open
wound); Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2 653 (7th Cir. 1981) (broken wrist). Plaintiff’s
medical conditions are each sufficiently serious to support this claim at screening.
2. Deliberate Indifference
Deliberate indifference occurs when a defendant knows of an excessive risk of
harm to an inmate’s health and either acts, or fails to act, in disregard of that risk. Roe v.
Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011). This standard is “more than negligence and
approaches intentional wrongdoing.” Collignon v. Milwaukee Cnty., 163 F.3d 982, 988 (7th
Cir. 1998). Even so, a plaintiff “need not prove that the prison official intended, hoped
for, or desired the harm that transpired.” Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir.
2002). Plaintiff is also not required to show that he was literally ignored. Greeno v. Daley,
414 F. 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005).
According to the allegations, HCU Administrator Brown failed to schedule
outside appointments or medical writ(s). However, Plaintiff does not allege that anyone
informed Brown that he required additional treatment or requested Brown’s assistance
in securing it. Plaintiff vaguely alleges that “institutional correspondence” and his
family’s requests for medical records should have put Brown on notice of his need for
additional treatment. This vague assertion of notice and knowledge falls short of
establishing deliberate indifference, even at this early stage. Count 1 shall be dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim against Brown.
According to the Complaint, Dr. Meyers disregarded Plaintiff’s need for
evaluation, testing, and treatment of each underlying condition and instead provided
him with over-the-counter pain relievers. However, Plaintiff contends the naproxen,
ibuprofen, and other pain relievers did not help his back, foot, or bowel problems. They
only complicated his condition by causing stomach issues, internal bleeding, and bloody
stools. A medical professional’s decision to use an “‘easier and less efficacious treatment’
without exercising professional judgment” may rise to the level of deliberate indifference.
McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2010). Persistence in a course of treatment
“known to be ineffective” violates the Eighth Amendment. Greeno, 414 F. at 655. And, a
delay in effective medical treatment may also support a claim, particularly where it
results in prolonged and unnecessary pain. Grievance v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 779 (7th
Cir. 2008) (reversing summary judgment where inmate did not receive treatment for
painful broken nose for two days). At this stage of the case, Plaintiff has stated a claim
against Dr. Meyers in Count 2.
The Complaint also articulates a claim of deliberate indifference against Wexford
Health Sources, Inc. A private medical corporation can be held liable for deliberate
indifference if an unconstitutional policy, custom, or widespread practice of the
corporation caused the constitutional deprivation at issue. Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corr.,
746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Iskander v. Village of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th
Cir. 1982)). The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply under § 1983, so Wexford
cannot be held liable for the misconduct of its employees absent this showing of a policy,
custom, or widespread practice. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the corporation had a policy of
denying or delaying non-life-threatening medical care to inmates to save on the cost of
inmate medical care, and Dr. Meyers relied on this policy when authorizing treatment
with excessive over-the-counter pain medication while denying testing and treatment of
Plaintiff’s underlying back, stomach, bowel, and foot conditions. At this stage of the case,
Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim against Wexford and Count 3 shall
proceed against Wexford.
DISPOSITION
IT IS ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 1) survives screening under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, and the following claims will proceed: COUNT 2 against PERCY MEYERS and
COUNT 3 against WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.
IT IS ORDERED that COUNT 1 against CHRISTINE BROWN is DISMISSED
without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
IT IS ORDERED that the WARDEN OF PINCKNEYVILLE CORRECTIONAL
CENTER (official capacity only) is ADDED as a defendant based on Plaintiff’s request
for injunctive relief.
With regard to COUNTS 2 and 3, the Clerk shall prepare for PERCY MEYERS,
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC. and WARDEN OF PINCKNEYVILLE
CORRECTIONAL CENTER (official capacity only): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and
Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this
Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by
Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form
6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take
appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require
the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not
known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for
sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation
of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court
file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to
the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this
Merit Review Order.
Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and the opposing parties informed of any change in his address; the Court
will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not
later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply
with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result
in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Christine Brown □□ a
defendant in CM/ECF; ADD the WARDEN OF PINCKNEYVILLE CORRECTIONAL
CENTER (official capacity only) as a defendant in CM/ECF; and ENTER the standard
qualified protective order_pursuant_to_ the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED. mM Q B
DATED: April 29, 2026 wh ly
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge
10
Notice to Plaintiff
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the Defendants of your lawsuit
and serve them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been achieved,
Defendants will enter an appearance and file Answers to your Complaint. It will likely
take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the Defendants’ Answers, but
it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When Defendants have filed
Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important information on
deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has
appeared for Defendants before filing any motions, to give the Defendants notice and an
opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has
filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any
evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.