Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

DELTA DIVISION

TYISHA NELSON PLAINTIFF

v. CASE NO. 2:24-CV-00180-BSM

MARIO BROWN DEFENDANT

Individually and in his Official Capacity

ORDER

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 13] is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

When Forrest City police officers were dispatched to a fight, one of the suspects fled

in a black or gray Ford Fusion with temporary tags in the direction of the St. Francis County

Detention Center (“jail”). Pl.’s Resp. Def. Statement Undisputed Material Facts (SUMF)

¶¶ 1–3 & 6, Doc. No. 23. At approximately the same time, Tyisha Nelson was driving her

black Honda Civic with paper tags in the direction of the jail. Id. ¶ 4. Officer Mario Brown

was driving near the jail and saw Nelson’s vehicle. Id. ¶ 7. When Brown radioed dispatch

about the number of occupants in the suspect’s vehicle, he was told it was “a lady and her

kids.” Id. ¶ 8. Brown informed dispatch that he was initiating a stop on a black Honda with

kids in the back seat. Id. ¶ 11. Brown stopped Nelson and she denied any involvement in

the fight. Id. ¶ 12.

Sergeant Billy Spencer, Brown’s supervisor, instructed the officers to detain Nelson

until he got there. SUMF ¶ 14. Nelson was handcuffed and placed in the back of Brown’s

patrol car. Id. ¶ 16. Brown then transported Nelson to the jail. Id. ¶ 23. As Brown escorted

Nelson into the jail, a deputy told Brown that Nelson was not the right person, and within

one minute, she was released. Id. ¶¶ 24–25.

Nelson is suing Brown in his individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. section

1983, under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, and for false imprisonment. Brown is moving

for summary judgment on all claims.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986). Once the moving party

demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the non-moving party may not

rest upon the mere allegations or denials in her pleadings. Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336,

340 (8th Cir. 2011). Instead, the non-moving party must produce admissible evidence

demonstrating a genuine factual dispute requiring a trial. Id. All reasonable inferences must

be drawn in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Holland v. Sam’s Club, 487

F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 2007). The evidence is not weighed, and no credibility

determinations are made. Jenkins v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2008).

III. DISCUSSION

Brown’s motion for summary judgment is granted and Nelson’s claims are dismissed

with prejudice. As an initial matter, Nelson failed to respond to the motion for summary

judgment on her First Amendment claim, its state law counterpart, and on her failure to train

claim. Those claims are therefore dismissed because they have been waived. Satcher v.

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Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2009) (failure to oppose

summary judgment constitutes a waiver of that argument). Nelson’s purported malicious

prosecution and battery claims are also dismissed because she did not plead them in her

complaint. See N. States Power Co. v. Fed. Transit Admin., 358 F.3d 1050, 1057 (8th Cir.

2004).

A. Fourth Amendment

Summary judgment is granted on Nelson’s claim that Brown lacked probable cause

to arrest her because Brown is immune from that claim.

Police officers are immune from civil suits unless they violate a plaintiff’s clearly

established rights. Kelsay v. Ernst, 933 F.3d 975, 979 (8th Cir. 2019); Morgan v. Robinson,

920 F.3d 521, 523 (8th Cir. 2019). Although Nelson has a clearly established right to be free

from a warrantless arrest, this standard is overcome because Brown had probable cause to

believe that she was engaged in criminal activity. See Rose v. City of Mulberry, 533 F.3d

678, 680 (8th Cir. 2008) (arrests made with probable cause do not violate the Fourth

Amendment); Kelsay v. Ernst, 933 F.3d 975, 979 (8th Cir. 2019); Morgan, 920 F.3d at 523

(in determining whether an officer has qualified immunity, courts must answer whether the

officer violated a clearly established right). Based on all of the circumstances and facts

available to Brown at the time he arrested Nelson, a reasonable officer would have believed

that Nelson was one of the people who fled from the fight.

In fact, in making this decision, the question is not whether Brown actually had

probable cause, but only whether he arguably had probable cause. Galanakis v. City of

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Newton, Iowa, 134 F.4th 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2025); Joseph v. Allen, 712 F.3d 1222, 1226

(8th Cir. 2013) (arguable probable cause exists even if officer mistakenly arrests a suspect,

so long as the mistake is objectively reasonable). It is undisputed that a dispatcher told

Brown that a black or gray Ford Fusion with temporary tags fled the scene of the fight and

was heading towards the jail. SUMF ¶ 3. Nelson was driving a black Honda Civic with

temporary tags heading towards the jail. Id. ¶ 4. Brown asked dispatch about the occupants

of the fleeing car and was told that it was a lady and her kids. Id. ¶ 8. Nelson was in the car

with her two children. Id. ¶ 9. It was objectively reasonable for Brown to believe that

Nelson was the suspect driving away from the fight. Although unpleasant for Nelson,

objectively reasonable mistakes of fact do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Heien v.

North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014).

For all of these reasons, Brown did not violate Nelson’s clearly established rights.

Nelson’s discussion about whether Brown was dispatched to a misdemeanor or felony is also

unpersuasive because it is immaterial to the Fourth Amendment analysis. Smithson v.

Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is granted on Nelson’s

state law counterpart claims for the same reasons. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-105;

Whitworth v. Kling, 90 F.4th 1215, 1218, n. 2 (8th Cir. 2024).

B. False Imprisonment

Summary judgment is granted on Nelson’s false imprisonment claim because Brown

had lawful authority to arrest Nelson. False imprisonment is the unlawful deprivation of

personal liberty without legal authority. See Trammell v. Wright, 489 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Ark.

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2016). As discussed above, Brown had legal authority to arrest Nelson.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Brown’s motion for summary judgment is granted and Nelson’s

claims are dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 2nd day of March, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE