EPPICH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

FREDERICK EPPICH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 2:25-cv-00522-SDN

)

FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE )

SYSTEM INC., )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

Plaintiff Frederick Eppich sued Defendant FedEx Ground Package System Inc.

(“FedEx”) for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29

U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), and Maine state law. ECF No. 1-3 at 10. This matter now comes before

the Court on FedEx’s motion for partial summary judgment. ECF Nos. 2–5. On February

26, 2026, the parties appeared before the Court for a hearing in part on the motion for

summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART and

DENIES IN PART FedEx’s motion for partial summary judgment as explained herein.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant FedEx is a registered motor carrier with the U.S. Department of

Transportation (“DOT”) and operates as a motor carrier of property for compensation

engaged in interstate and foreign commerce throughout the United States. ECF No. 3 at

¶ 1; ECF No. 13 at ¶ 1. By means of providing their services, FedEx contracts with third-

party businesses (“Service Providers” or “ISPs”) to provide pickup and delivery services

between customers and FedEx’s sorting stations. ECF No. 3 at ¶ 3.1 As required by DOT

regulatory requirements on motor carriers, FedEx maintains records pertaining to

activity of drivers employed by ISPs, referred to as “scanner data.” ECF No. 3 at ¶ 4; ECF

No. 13 at ¶ 4. Scanner data reflects, among other things, the time a driver is “on duty,”

information identifying the vehicle used each day, and the time the driver logs off. ECF

No. 3 at ¶ 5; ECF No. 13 at ¶ 5. Critically, the scanner data does not capture the weight of

the vehicle operated by the driver; instead, this information may be recovered by cross-

referencing the vehicle number against FedEx’s internal system. ECF No. 3 at ¶ 6; ECF

No. 13 at ¶ 6. If an ISP does not provide information regarding the vehicle number driven

by employees, FedEx does not have access to information regarding the vehicle’s gross

vehicle weight rating (“GVWR”). ECF No. 3 at ¶ 7; ECF No. 13 at ¶ 7.

As part of their relationship with FedEx, individual ISPs enter into an Independent

Service Provider Agreement (“Agreement”) with FedEx, which states that ISPs have “sole

and complete discretion in the staffing, selection, hiring, training, supervision,

assignment, hours and days worked, discipline, termination, compensation, benefits, and

all other terms and conditions of employment.” ECF No. 3 at ¶ 10; ECF No. 13 at ¶ 10.

Under the Agreement, ISPs are required to maintain their own employment records of

drivers. Id. Further, ISPs agree to treat all personnel as their employees for legal purposes

and to provide FedEx annual certification of their compliance with any legal obligations,

of which FedEx may request proof of at any time. ECF No. 3 at ¶ 11; ECF No. 13 at ¶ 11.

1 Parties dispute whether ISPs are truly “independent businesses,” as Mr. Eppich argues the ISPs

are instead “intermediary employees operating with FedEx’s system and under FedEx’s rules.”

ECF No. 13 at ¶ 3.

Plaintiff Frederick Eppich worked as a delivery driver in Maine for two different

ISPs during the claimed damages period: RF Delivery Service, Inc. (“RF”) and UML Inc.

(“UML”). ECF No. 3 at ¶ 12; ECF No. 13 at ¶ 12. Mr. Eppich also drove for Central Perk,

Inc. from July 28, 2021, through August 10, 2023, but raises no overtime damages claim

for time worked for Central Perk. ECF No. 3 at ¶ 14; ECF No. 13 at ¶ 14. According to

available scanner data, for the relevant time periods, Mr. Eppich drove vehicles with a

GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less on 736 days and drove vehicles with an unknown or

“heavy” GVWR (larger than 10,000 pounds) on 682 days. ECF No. 3 at ¶ 15; ECF No. 13

at ¶ 15. The 682 “unknown” or “heavy” vehicle days occurred within the following work

weeks: January 5, 2016, through July 23, 2016; July 17, 2018, through May 18, 2019; and

May 29, 2019, through August 24, 2019. Id. Mr. Eppich testified that all ISPs he worked

for paid him a “day rate” and that he never spoke to anyone at RF, UML, or Central Perk

about overtime pay. ECF No. 3 at ¶¶ 17–18; ECF No. 13 at ¶¶ 17–18.2 During the relevant

period, UML submitted annual compliance certifications to FedEx, pursuant to the

Agreement, which confirmed its “compliance with applicable wage-and-hour laws

governing ‘wage payment [and] overtime.’” ECF No. 3 at ¶ 21; ECF No. 13 at ¶ 21.3

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 21, 2018, a number of plaintiff-employees filed a FLSA class-action

lawsuit for overtime wage damages against Defendant FedEx in the Western District of

2 Although Mr. Eppich testified to these facts in his response to FedEx’s statement of facts, see

ECF No. 13 at ¶¶ 17–18, during the hearing, plaintiff’s counsel disputed whether Mr. Eppich’s

testimony accurately reflected his understanding of his pay with respect to overtime wages, see

ECF No. 55 at 57:13–58:18.

3 Although Mr. Eppich does not dispute that UML submitted these certifications, he contests their

evidentiary value, noting that such attestations “cannot be relied upon as credible proof” that ISPs

actually paid him or other Plaintiffs the overtime wages to which they were legally entitled. ECF

No. 13 at ¶ 21.

Pennsylvania. ECF No. 1-1 (W.D. Pa. docket sheet). On July 10, 2020, Mr. Eppich filed an

opt-in consent form to join the class action against FedEx. Id. at 35–36. On July 24, 2024,

Mr. Eppich filed his second amended complaint against FedEx, along with eleven other

class member plaintiffs, seeking unpaid overtime wages under both the FLSA and Maine

state law. See ECF No. 1-3. Regarding Mr. Eppich’s employment as a delivery driver under

FedEx via ISPs, he alleges that “based on the economic realities of the relationship

between FedEx and these drivers, it is clear that the delivery drivers working under the

intermediary ISPs are also FedEx employees under the FLSA.” Id. at ¶ 21. Mr. Eppich

alleges a variety of other ways in which delivery driver employees like himself are

connected to or “controlled” by FedEx, including driving vehicles bearing FedEx’s logo

and color scheme, working out of FedEx-owned and -managed terminals throughout the

country, delivering packages for FedEx customers on FedEx’s behalf, and complying with

various other FedEx-imposed requirements. See id. at ¶¶ 23–29.

On September 29, 2025, the Western District of Pennsylvania granted FedEx’s

“Motion on Misjoinder, Change of Venue, and Separate Trials,” thereby severing each

individual plaintiff’s claims and transferring them to the district courts located in the

plaintiffs’ respective places of employment. See Claiborne v. FedEx Ground Package Sys.,

Inc., No. 18-CV-1698, 2025 WL 2772339 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2025). Mr. Eppich’s case was

formally transferred to the District of Maine on October 14, 2025. ECF No. 1.

Mr. Eppich now seeks overtime damages, under both the FLSA and Maine law, for

work completed with different ISPs during the following time periods: November 27,

2015, through July 23, 2016 (RF Delivery Service, Inc.) and July 17, 2018, through August

24, 2019 (UML, Inc.).4 FedEx has moved for partial summary judgment on any overtime

damages accruing beyond the FLSA’s two-year statute of limitations period, arguing Mr.

Eppich cannot establish either entitlement to equitable tolling of his individual claims, or

a willful FLSA violation, both of which would extend the statutory limitations period. ECF

No. 4 at 9–14. FedEx additionally seeks partial summary judgment for any workweeks in

which Mr. Eppich cannot prove he drove “small vehicles” weighing 10,000 pounds or less,

which would make him exempt from overtime pay under the “Motor Carrier exemption”

(“MCA exemption”) of the FLSA. Id. at 4–8; see 29 C.F.R. § 782.2. FedEx similarly seeks

summary judgment on Mr. Eppich’s claims for overtime wages under Maine law under

the MCA exemption. ECF No. 4 at 15. Finally, FedEx seeks summary judgment on whether

Mr. Eppich’s compensation constitutes a “flat day” rate and, if so, how to calculate any

overtime damages under the applicable federal regulations. Id. at 15–19. In response, Mr.

Eppich argues there is a genuine dispute of material fact precluding summary judgment

on the issues of willfulness of FedEx’s purported FLSA violations, whether he drove “light

vehicles,” and whether he was paid a “flat day” rate. ECF No. 14 at 1–2.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the

parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment;

the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty

4 Although Mr. Eppich originally sought overtime damages for work completed for Central Perk,

Inc. between July 28, 2021, and August 10, 2023, he no longer seeks any overtime damages for

weeks during which he was paid through Central Perk, Inc. ECF No. 14 at 1 n.1; ECF No. 4 at 1.

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (quotation modified). A material fact is one that

has the potential to determine the outcome of the litigation. See Oahn Nguyen Chung v.

StudentCity.com, Inc., 854 F.3d 97, 101 (1st Cir. 2017). A dispute of material fact is

genuine if a rational factfinder could resolve it in favor of either party. See Rando v.

Leonard, 826 F.3d 553, 556 (1st Cir. 2016). The moving party “bears the initial burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists.” Feliciano-Muñoz v. Rebarber-

Ocasio, 970 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2020). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party

to show “specific facts sufficient to deflect the swing of the summary judgment

scythe.” Xiaoyan Tang v. Citizens Bank, N.A., 821 F.3d 206, 215 (1st Cir. 2016)

(quoting Mulvihill v. Top-Flite Golf Co., 335 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2003)).

I. Applicable Statute of Limitations

A plaintiff’s claim for unpaid overtime wages under the FLSA is subject to a two-

year statute of limitations. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). However, the limitations period for an

FLSA overtime claim may be extended to three years for any “cause of action arising out

of a[n employer’s] willful violation of the FLSA.” Id. Mr. Eppich opted into the then-

pending class action on July 10, 2020. Accordingly, FedEx moves for partial summary

judgment on any overtime damages that accrued prior to July 10, 2018— two years prior

to that date. Mr. Eppich argues (1) whether an alleged FLSA violation is willful presents a

question of fact reserved for trial, and (2) regardless of willfulness, the Court should apply

equitable tolling to preserve the entirety of his FLSA claim. See ECF No. 14 at 8, 12–15.

A. Willfulness

An FLSA violation is considered willful when “the employer either knew or showed

reckless disregard for . . . whether its conduct was prohibited.” Walsh v. N. Providence

Primary Care Assocs., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 3d 195, 202 (D.R.I. 2021) (quoting McLaughlin

v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988)). Whether an FLSA violation is willful is a

mixed question of law and fact. Reich v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 44 F.3d 1060,

1080 (1st Cir. 1995); Pineda v. Skinner Servs., Inc., No. 16-cv-12217, 2020 WL 5775160,

at *11 (D. Mass. Sept. 28, 2020); see also Acosta Colon v. Wyeth Pharms. Co., 363 F.

Supp. 2d 24, 29 (D.P.R. 2005) (“Plaintiffs[] are correct in asserting that the determination

of their employer’s willfulness, or lack thereof, in order to apply the exception to the two[-

]year statute of limitation is a question for the trier of fact to decide.”). When a party

presents “some evidence that, particularly when viewed in the light most favorable to

them and resolving all doubts and reasonable inferences in their favor . . . at least

supports an inference [of] willfulness . . . it should be left to the trier of fact to make that

determination.” Walsh, 537 F. Supp. 3d at 203; but see McGrath v. City of Somerville,

419 F. Supp. 3d 233, 259 (D. Mass. 2019) (rejecting the notion that “failure to investigate

compliance with the FLSA can, without more, constitute willfulness”).

At this juncture, there is sufficient evidence to support at least an inference that

FedEx knew or showed reckless disregard for whether its pay practices complied with the

FLSA’s overtime requirements, particularly in light of material factual disputes regarding

FedEx’s control over the function and operation of ISPs and FedEx’s status as a “joint

employer” of Mr. Eppich. The parties dispute, for example, the extent to which FedEx

retains control over ISPs through maintaining and reviewing the employment records of

drivers employed by ISPs, conducting regular “wage and hour assessments,” and by

issuing reports detailing its findings regarding FLSA compliance—including whether ISPs

pay overtime wages to drivers and properly record all hours worked by drivers. See ECF

No. 13 at 11–13; ECF No. 18 at 15–20. The issue of whether FedEx is considered a joint

employer of Mr. Eppich likewise remains pending and disputed as FedEx has not moved

for summary judgment on the issue. ECF No. 4 at 1 n.3. Mr. Eppich accordingly argues

the evidence presented at this stage demonstrates a factfinder could reasonably find that

“FedEx knew or showed reckless disregard for whether Plaintiffs were properly paid

overtime compensation for all overtime hours worked.” ECF No. 14 at 11.

FedEx disagrees and argues the undisputed facts cannot support even an inference

of willfulness, “as there is no basis for finding that FedEx knew or disregarded the fact

that [Mr.] Eppich allegedly did not receive overtime pay he was owed or that FedEx was

his joint employer.” ECF No. 4 at 10. FedEx contends it had a “reasonable basis” to

conclude it was not Mr. Eppich’s joint employer and thus cannot have shown “reckless

disregard” for any alleged FLSA violations. See id. at 11–12. However, the question of the

reasonableness of that determination or of FedEx’s knowledge of any alleged FLSA

violation rests on weighing of the evidence and credibility determinations, which pose a

roadblock for any party seeking summary judgment. See Velez-Gomez v. SMA Life

Assurance Co., 8 F.3d 873, 877 (1st Cir. 1993) (“At the summary judgment stage, however,

there is no room for credibility determinations, no room for the measured weighing of

conflicting evidence, no room for the judge to superimpose h[er] own ideas of probability

and likelihood.” (quotation modified)). Because the record supports at least an inference

of willfulness, the Court concludes the issue of willfulness and applicable statute of

limitations are factual questions reserved for trial. Accordingly, FedEx’s motion for partial

summary judgment is DENIED with respect to any alleged unpaid overtime wages

accruing after July 10, 2017—three years prior to the date Mr. Eppich joined this suit.

B. Equitable Tolling

The remainder of Mr. Eppich’s FLSA claim seeking unpaid overtime wages from

prior to July 10, 2017, falls outside the FLSA’s statute of limitations regardless of

willfulness. He argues the Court should apply equitable tolling of the statute of limitations

to preserve the entirety of his FLSA claim, based primarily on a previous ruling in this

matter from the Western District of Pennsylvania in this matter which held that “in light

of the unique procedural history” of the case, “sound legal principles as well as the

interests of justice warrant[ed] equitably tolling the notice period to preserve the claims

of potential op-ins.” Sullivan-Blake v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. CV 18-1698,

2019 WL 4750141, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2019) (quotation modified). In response,

FedEx argues the order tolling the notice period was designed only to provide notice to

any future plaintiffs of their potential claims and does not extend to equitable tolling of a

plaintiff’s underlying FLSA claim, which it argues is a “merits-based determination that

depends on each opt-in [plaintiff’]s individual circumstances.” ECF No. 4 at 13. FedEx

further contends Mr. Eppich’s individual circumstances do not warrant equitable tolling

of his claims beyond the statutory period, as he cannot demonstrate either unfair

prejudice or the requisite due diligence in pursuing his claim. See ECF No. 17 at 10–12.

The Court first addresses Mr. Eppich’s argument that the equitable tolling of the

notice period ordered by the Western District of Pennsylvania should be extended to the

tolling of his individual FLSA claim. Mr. Eppich specifically contends the Court “need not

conduct a new tolling analysis” of his FLSA claim as it was “already determined” by the

Pennsylvania district court’s prior order. ECF No. 47 at 3. The First Circuit has made clear

that the applicability of equitable tolling to a plaintiff’s civil claim is determined at an

individual level. Bah v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. of Bos., 699 F. Supp. 3d 133, 142 (D. Mass.

2025), aff’d sub nom., Kwoka v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. of Bos., 141 F.4th 10, 12 (1st Cir.

2025) (collecting district court cases declining to adopt a categorical, non-individualized

approach to equitable tolling); see also Gardner v. Fallon Health & Life Ins. Co., Inc., No.

CV 19-40148, 2021 WL 4459525, at *6 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2021) (“The issue of equitable

tolling often arises in FLSA cases because the filing of a collective action does not toll the

limitations period for opt-in plaintiffs until the opt-in plaintiffs actually opt-in.”)

(emphasis added). Mr. Eppich has not cited any authority to support the concept that a

prior court’s ruling tolling the notice period for opt-in plaintiffs should be categorically

adopted to now toll the statute of limitations for his individual FLSA and Maine state law

claims. Indeed, in tolling the notice period of any potential opt-in plaintiffs, the Western

District of Pennsylvania specifically declined to decide whether the named plaintiff’s

individual claim was subject to equitable tolling “at this juncture.” Sullivan-Blake, 2019

WL 4750141, at *6 n.5. Accordingly, the Court rejects Mr. Eppich’s argument that the

prior district court ruling entitles him to equitable tolling of his individual claims.5

It then follows that to preserve the remainder of his claims for overtime damages

accruing prior to July 10, 2017, Mr. Eppich must demonstrate that he is entitled to

equitable tolling based on the circumstances of his individual claims. Because the FLSA

itself does not reference tolling whatsoever, it is presumed that the FLSA allows for tolling

in accord with “background equitable tolling principles,” Kwoka, 141 F.4th at 20.

(quotation modified), meaning that Mr. Eppich must demonstrate “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way,” Pineda v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 2018) (quotation modified).

Essentially, the “equitable tolling doctrine extends statutory deadlines in extraordinary

circumstances for parties who were prevented from complying with them through no fault

5 Indeed, to hold otherwise would mean similar FLSA plaintiffs no longer have to prove the issue

of “willfulness” to establish the extended three-year statute of limitations; instead, plaintiffs could

rely on a prior ruling tolling the notice or certification period to ensure tolling of their individual

claims without regard to the issue of willfulness.

or lack of diligence of their own.” Neves v. Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2010). In

analyzing a plaintiff’s due diligence, the First Circuit has recognized five factors to guide

the analysis: “(1) lack of actual notice of the filing requirement; (2) lack of constructive

knowledge of the filing requirement; (3) diligence in pursuing one’s rights; (4) absence of

prejudice to the defendant; and (5) a plaintiff’s reasonableness in remaining ignorant of

the filing requirement.” Farris v. Shinseki, 660 F.3d 557, 564 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting

Mercado v. Ritz-Carlton San Juan Hotel, Spa & Casino, 410 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 2005)).

Mr. Eppich’s primary argument for equitable tolling, aside from pointing to the

prior order tolling the notice period, is that tolling would prevent any “unfair prejudice”

against him and that the Court should impute the due diligence of the original named

plaintiff, Mr. Horace Claiborne, to Mr. Eppich’s individual claims. See ECF No. 14 at

14–15. In response, FedEx contends that the due diligence of Mr. Claiborne may not be

imputed and that Mr. Eppich has produced no evidence demonstrating his own due

diligence or otherwise “exceptional circumstances” warranting tolling. ECF No. 17 at 9–11

(“Plaintiff[] do[es] not even argue [he] exercised due diligence.”).

“Where questions of fact are presented, statute of limitations defenses are

ordinarily submitted to the jury.” Meléndez-Arroyo v. Cutler-Hammer de P.R. Co., 273

F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2001). However, the “mere fact that a party asserts such equitable

claims does not foreclose granting a motion for summary judgment.” Benitez-Pons v.

Com. of P.R., 136 F.3d 54, 64 (1st Cir. 1998). At this juncture, Mr. Eppich has not

presented any evidence regarding his due diligence or any “exceptional circumstance”

often recognized by courts to warrant the need for equitable tolling.6 In his supplemental

6 Examples of “exceptional circumstances” that have prompted courts to invoke equitable tolling

include: an employer materially misleading an employee about his right to bring suit for denied

briefing, Mr. Eppich appears to argue the Court should exercise tolling to prevent unfair

prejudice to him based on his reliance on the prior Western District of Pennsylvania

ruling tolling the notice period. See ECF No. 47 at 4 (citing Pineda v. Skinner Services,

Inc., 2020 WL 5775160, at **10–11).

Pineda involved FLSA plaintiffs seeking equitable tolling based upon their reliance

on a prior ambiguous, oral order by the same court granting plaintiffs’ motion with

multiple requests for relief, including the application of equitable tolling of their

individual claims. See Pineda, 2020 WL 5775160, at *10. The Pineda court found that

because the court’s oral order was unclear as to whether it had granted every aspect of the

plaintiff’s motion,7 “it was reasonable for plaintiffs to believe that the motion was granted

in its entirety, and to rely on that interpretation in determining when the limitations

period expired,” and thus applied equitable tolling of plaintiffs’ individual FLSA claims.

Id. Unlike in Pineda, the prior order tolling the notice period in this matter is not

ambiguous. Even further, it does not follow that Mr. Eppich could have reasonably relied

on an order entered in a case of which he was not party to, and thus not subject to the

court’s jurisdiction, to determine the accurate limitations period for his FLSA claims.

Because Mr. Eppich has not presented a genuine question or dispute of material fact

regarding equitable tolling, the Court concludes he has not satisfied the requisite standard

retirement benefits against employer, see Ortega Candelaria v. Orthobiologics LLC, 661 F.3d 675,

681 (1st Cir. 2011), an employer’s failure to post the required FLSA notices regarding employees’

overtime rights, see Perez v. Shuck’s Me. Lobster LLC, No. 14-cv-00348, 2016 WL 6304674, at

*11 (D. Me. Oct. 27, 2016), and litigation delays from the conditional certification process of a

class action, Pineda v. Skinner Services, Inc., 2020 WL 5775160, at *11. Mr. Eppich has not alleged

anything similar occurred in the instant case to justify the application of equitable tolling.

7 “The question here is whether the Court granted all aspects of plaintiffs’ motion (including the

portion that requested tolling) when it orally granted the motion . . . unfortunately, it did not make

clear exactly what it was doing and why.” Pineda, 2020 WL 5775160, at *10.

to permit equitable tolling of his individual FLSA claims beyond the statutory period.8

Accordingly, FedEx’s motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART

with respect to overtime damages accruing prior to July 10, 2017.

II. TCA or “Small Vehicle” Exception

FedEx next contends the Court should grant summary judgment for all overtime

damages claimed for weeks in which Mr. Eppich did not drive “small” vehicles (weighing

under 10,000 pounds) in pursuit of his delivery duties, or in which the weight of the

vehicle driven by Mr. Eppich was unknown.

The FLSA generally requires all employers to pay salaried employees overtime for

any hours worked over forty in a single workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Federal law,

however, allows for an exemption to this general rule for certain transportation workers

whose hours and safety are regulated by the Department of Transportation. 29 U.S.C.

§ 213(b)(1) (the “MCA exemption”). Under the MCA exemption, an employee does not

receive overtime pay if (1) the employee works for a “motor carrier” (a company that

provides motor vehicle transportation for pay);9 and (2) the employee’s job duties directly

affect the safety of operating motor vehicles in interstate and foreign commerce (i.e.,

delivery drivers). See Noll v. Flowers Foods Inc., 442 F. Supp. 3d 345, 358–59 (D. Me.

8 The Court likewise rejects Mr. Eppich’s argument that the due diligence of named-plaintiff Mr.

Claiborne may be imputed to establish Mr. Eppich’s diligence because governing precedent

requires each plaintiff seeking equitable tolling to make an individualized showing of his own due

diligence or exceptional circumstances to warrant equitable tolling. Kwoka, 141 F.4th at 20, 25;

see also Bah v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. of Bos., LLC, C.A. No. 17-12542, 2022 WL 2333697, at *2

(D. Mass. June 28, 2022) (“After putative opt-in [FLSA] plaintiffs are identified, the court will

decide individually whether the doctrine of equitable tolling operates to permit each to maintain

his or her claim despite the usual two-year or three-year statute of limitations.”).

9 The MCA defines a “motor carrier” as “a person providing motor vehicle transportation for

compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14). The parties do not dispute that FedEx and the ISPs for

which Mr. Eppich drove qualify as “motor carriers” for purposes of the MCA exemption.

2020) (“Noll I”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a). Here, both FedEx and the ISPs for which

Mr. Eppich provided services are “motor carriers” for the purposes of the MCA

exemption, and Mr. Eppich performed duties affecting both interstate and foreign

commerce through his duties as a delivery driver. Thus, Mr. Eppich fits within the MCA

exemption and, without more, is not entitled to FLSA overtime wages.

The Technical Corrections Act (“TCA”) carves out an exception to the MCA

exemption, where certain employees otherwise exempt from overtime pay may still

qualify for overtime pursuant to the “small vehicle” exception. Under the TCA, a “covered

employee” is an employee who: (1) works for a qualified motor carrier; (2) does work, in

whole or in part, affecting the safety of operating motor vehicles weighing 10,000 pounds

or less in interstate or foreign commerce; and (3) performs duties on motor vehicles

weighing 10,000 pounds or less. See SAFETEA-LU Technical Corrections Act, Pub. L. No.

110-244, § 306(c), 122 Stat. 1620 (2008); see also Noll I, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 362–64

(discussing the “TCA” or “small vehicle exception”). If a worker is a “covered employee”

under the TCA exception, the MCA exemption does not apply, and the worker is subject

to the general FLSA overtime rule providing for overtime pay for all hours worked over

forty in a single workweek. Thus, a plaintiff may still succeed on a claim for overtime

wages by establishing the applicability of the TCA exception to the MCA exemption.

FedEx seeks summary judgment on damages for all weeks in which Mr. Eppich

drove vehicles weighing over 10,000 pounds (i.e., not subject to the small vehicle

exception) or where the weight of the vehicle is unknown. As part of its relationship with

ISPs, FedEx maintains records pertaining to activity of drivers employed by ISPs, referred

to as “scanner data.” ECF No. 3 at ¶ 4; ECF No. 13 at ¶ 4. Scanner data reflects information

identifying the vehicle driven by an employee each day but critically does not capture the

weight of the vehicle operated by the driver. ECF No. 3 at ¶ 5; ECF No. 13 at ¶ 5. A vehicle’s

weight is sometimes recoverable by cross-referencing the vehicle number against FedEx’s

internal database. ECF No. 3 at ¶ 6; ECF No. 13 at ¶ 6. If an ISP does not provide

information about the vehicle’s weight, however, FedEx does not have access to that

information. ECF No. 3 at ¶ 7; ECF No. 13 at ¶ 7. Here, the available scanner data

demonstrates that Mr. Eppich drove “small vehicles” (weighing under 10,000 pounds) for

736 out of 1,364 days in which he delivered packages for ISPs. For the remaining 682

days, Mr. Eppich either drove a heavy vehicle (weighing over 10,000 pounds) or a vehicle

with an unknown GVWR.10 FedEx thus argues that because Mr. Eppich is unable to

proffer sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he

drove small vehicles during each of the weeks in which he seeks overtime damages, it is

entitled to partial summary judgment on those portions of his claims.

Within the summary judgment context, the First Circuit has not yet “addressed

which party has the burden of proving application of the TCA exception to the MCA

exemption.” Noll I, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 363 (concluding “it is most reasonable” to place

burden on plaintiffs to show duties they performed in vehicles affected interstate

commerce). During the hearing in the instant case, FedEx relied on both Noll and a

District of Massachusetts case, Roy v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc., No. 17-cv-

30116, 2024 WL 1346999 (D. Mass. Mar. 29, 2024), to argue the burden of proving

eligibility under the TCA exception is most appropriately placed on the plaintiff-

employee. ECF No. 55 at 16:7–25. However, Noll is inapposite because both the initial

10 The specific weeks in which the GVWR of the vehicle driven by Mr. Eppich is unknown are

January 5, 2016, through July 23, 2016; July 17, 2018, through May 18, 2019; or May 29, 2019,

through August 24, 2019. ECF No. 4 at 6.

decision in Noll I and the subsequent decision in the same case addressed the question of

whose burden it is to establish that vehicles driven by the employee affected interstate

commerce—an issue of which the instant parties do not dispute. See Noll I, 442 F. Supp.

3d at 363; Noll v. Flowers Foods, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 3d 59, 63 (D. Me. 2020) (“Noll II”).

The Roy decision did involve a similar issue of unknown vehicle weight but extended

Noll’s allocation of the burden to a materially different question: which party must prove

the weight of the vehicles in an employer-controlled fleet for purposes of the TCA

exception. See Roy, 2024 WL 1346999, at *9–10. This Court declines to follow Roy on

this point. Neither Noll I nor Noll II articulated a rationale for placing on an individual

employee the burden of producing information about vehicle weight that is generated,

stored, and controlled by the employer and its contractors.

Where the issue of applicability of the TCA exception hinges on the availability of

information regarding the weight of vehicles driven by an employee, it seems at odds with

the purpose and spirit of the FLSA to preclude the recovery of overtime wages based on

an employer’s missing or incomplete records. The record in this case demonstrates that

FedEx maintains a database of “scanner data” pertaining to drivers employed by ISPs,

including information identifying the vehicle driven by employees each day. ECF No. 3 at

¶¶ 4–6; ECF No. 13 at ¶¶ 4–6. While the scanner data do not capture the weight of

vehicles, FedEx may recover this information by cross-referencing the vehicle number

provided by ISPs within their internal system. ECF No. 3 at ¶ 6; ECF No. 13 at ¶ 6. During

the hearing, both parties argued the opposing party could have requested information

from the ISPs regarding the weight of vehicles used by Mr. Eppich during weeks in which

the weight remains unknown. See ECF No. 55 at 12:2–9; 19:1–11; 41:18–42:3. It is not

entirely clear from the record why the ISPs employing Mr. Eppich supplied information

regarding the vehicle number to FedEx for some weeks but declined to on other weeks.11

Nevertheless, the Court finds it dubious—particularly in the context of an overtime wage

dispute—to suggest the plaintiff-employee would be in a better position to retain and

acquire such information rather than his employer, a large and well-resourced

corporation that already maintains a database for this precise type of information. To hold

otherwise and place the burden on the plaintiff to produce such information would create

a clear incentive for employers to not retain any records regarding vehicle weight, thereby

insulating themselves against any future overtime claims. Such a result cannot be

reconciled with “the FLSA’s purpose of protecting workers from substandard wages.”

Wilkinson v. High Plains, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 988, 994 (D.N.D. 2018).

Federal FLSA regulations already require employers to maintain records

reflecting, inter alia, the total hours worked each week by the employee, the total wages

paid each week, and extra (overtime) pay for any hours worked in excess of forty. See 29

C.F.R. § 552.110(a). In other FLSA wage cases, courts have employed a burden-shifting

scheme regarding proof of unpaid wages where an employer’s records are inaccurate or

incomplete “to prevent an employer from capitalizing on its failure to maintain records.”

See, e.g., O’Brien v. Town of Agawam, 482 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (D. Mass. 2007). Similar

reasoning applies here to avoid incentivizing employers to maintain incomplete or

inaccurate records concerning vehicle weights as relevant to the TCA exception.

11 During the hearing, FedEx’s counsel appeared to suggest the missing weeks of information

regarding a vehicle’s GVWR were due, at least in part, to the ISPs’ use of rental vehicles which

were not subject to the “same information reporting requirements.” See ECF No. 55 at 10:5–16.

The precise nature of these “reporting requirements” is unclear, but it remains clear at least that

the ISPs were subject to some form of information-sharing and reporting requirement regarding

the vehicles driven by employees.

The Court likewise rejects FedEx’s estoppel argument. FedEx contends Mr. Eppich

cannot now argue that the vehicles he drove during the “unknown” weeks may have

weighed under 10,000 pounds because the prior plaintiff-class took the position that opt-

in plaintiffs who could not show they drove a “small vehicle” for at least one percent of

their employment should be dismissed from the class action. ECF No. 4 at 7. That earlier

position, however, addressed only whether potential opt-in plaintiffs could demonstrate

that they operated small vehicles for more than a de minimis (i.e. one percent) portion of

their employment. See Oddo v. Bimbo Bakeries U.S.A., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 3d 466, 474

(E.D. Pa. 2019) (concluding, for the purposes of the TCA exception, that plaintiffs satisfied

the de minimis threshold by demonstrating they drove small vehicles for more than one

percent of the relevant period). Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Eppich drove small

vehicles for over half of his employment. ECF No. 3 at ¶ 15; ECF No. 13 at ¶ 15. Given that

record, his current argument—that he may have driven small vehicles during some of the

remaining “unknown” weeks—is not inconsistent with the position previously advanced

on behalf of the class.

Accordingly, for the reasons described herein, and when drawing all reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to Mr. Eppich as the nonmoving party, the Court

concludes that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the weight of the vehicles

driven by Mr. Eppich for the weeks in which the vehicle’s GVWR is either missing or

unknown. FedEx’s motion for partial summary judgment as to overtime damages for

those weeks is DENIED.

III. Maine State Law Claims

Mr. Eppich seeks overtime damages pursuant to Maine state law in addition to his

FLSA claims. ECF No. 1-3 at 10; see 26 M.R.S.A § 664(3) (“An employer may not require

an employee to work more than 40 hours in any one week unless 1 1/2 times the regular

hourly rate is paid for all hours actually worked in excess of 40 hours in that week.”). For

purposes of the instant case, the parties do not identify any material difference between

the substantive overtime protections afforded by Maine law and those provided by the

FLSA. FedEx thus seeks summary judgment on Mr. Eppich’s state law claims on the same

grounds it advances with respect to his FLSA claims. ECF No. 4 at 15. Because the parties’

arguments regarding Mr. Eppich’s federal and state overtime claims do not meaningfully

differ, see id.; ECF No. 14 at 16; ECF No. 17 at 12, the Court applies the same analysis here.

The only difference in analysis is with respect to the applicable statute of limitations.

Unlike the FLSA, all Maine civil actions, unless otherwise specified, are subject to

a six-year statute of limitations after the cause of action accrues. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 752.

All of Mr. Eppich’s alleged overtime damages accrued within six years of July 10, 2020,

the date he opted in to the federal lawsuit. Accordingly, none of Mr. Eppich’s state law

claims for overtime wages are barred by the statute of limitations and FedEx’s motion for

partial summary judgement with respect to these state law claims is DENIED.

IV. Damages Calculation Method

FedEx additionally seeks summary judgment on the legal determination of the

proper method used to calculate Mr. Eppich’s alleged overtime damages. ECF No. 4 at 15;

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (allowing a party to move for summary judgment on “part of [a]

claim or defense”). Specifically, FedEx contends that Mr. Eppich has previously admitted

he was paid a flat “day rate,”12 meaning his “regular rate” of pay should be calculated

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 778.112. ECF No. 17 at 13; see 29 CFR § 778.112 (a day rate

12 FedEx points to Mr. Eppich’s prior deposition and his admission that all ISPs he worked for

paid him a “day rate.” ECF No. 3 at ¶ 17; ECF No. 13 at ¶ 17.

employee “is paid a flat sum for a day's work or for doing a particular job, without regard

to the number of hours worked in the day or at the job”). Under this method, a day rate

employee’s “regular rate is determined by totaling all the sums received at such day rates

or job rates in the workweek and dividing by the total hours actually worked.” Id.

According to FedEx, Mr. Eppich would then be entitled to extra half-time pay for all hours

worked in excess of forty hours per week. Id.

Mr. Eppich disagrees and instead argues that, because there was no explicit

agreement between himself and any ISP (or FedEx) which “clearly stated his flat pay

covered all hours worked in a week,” see ECF No. 14 at 18, his regular rate of pay should

be calculated pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 778.109–which divides an employee’s total

compensation in a workweek “by the total number of hours actually worked by him in that

workweek for which such compensation was paid,” 29 C.F.R. § 778.109. Following this

calculation of his “regular rate” of pay, Mr. Eppich’s overtime compensation would then

be calculated “at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he

is employed,” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (emphasis added), rather than the one-half rate

proposed by FedEx.

Within the context of FLSA overtime cases, courts have declined to grant summary

judgment on the appropriate damages calculation method and an employee’s regular rate,

concluding such questions are “premature” at the summary judgment stage when factual

disputes remain regarding the employer’s underlying liability. See, e.g., Clark v. Cap.

Vision Servs., LLC, No. 22-CV-10236, 2024 WL 3458525, at *22 (D. Mass. July 18, 2024);

see also Newman v. Advanced Tech. Innovation Corp., 749 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 2014)

(concluding an employee’s regular rate of pay “is a fact question”). Accordingly, the Court

declines to reach a legal determination on the appropriate damages calculation method

under the FLSA pending the outstanding questions of material fact relating to FedEx’s

liability to Mr. Eppich, if any. FedEx’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect

to the proper method of damages calculations is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, FedEx’s motion for partial summary judgment, ECF No.

2, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Regarding the applicable statute of

limitations, FedEx’s motion is GRANTED with respect to any FLSA claim for overtime

wages accruing prior to July 10, 2017. FedEx’s motion is DENIED with respect to any

weeks in which the weight of the vehicle driven by Mr. Eppich in the course of his

employment is currently unknown. FedEx’s motion for partial summary judgment is

DENIED with respect to Mr. Eppich’s claims for overtime wages under Maine state law

and with respect to the proper calculation method of any potential damages. Finally,

FedEx’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to any claims for

overtime damages from Mr. Eppich’s employment with Central Perk, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

Dated this 15th day of May, 2026.

/s/ Stacey D. Neumann

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE