Opinion

State of Tennessee v. Oscar Romero

Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
May 13, 2026
Status
Published
Author
Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
On the bench
Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.6%

The opinion

05/14/2026

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs April 14, 2026

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. OSCAR ROMERO

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County

No. CC-2021-CR-1328 Robert T. Bateman, Judge

No. M2025-00777-CCA-R3-CD

The Defendant, Oscar Romero, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of rape, a

Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-503 (2018) (subsequently amended). On appeal, he

asserts that the proof is insufficient to sustain his conviction, that the trial court erred by

excluding rebuttal evidence to impeach the victim, and that the court erred in its

application of an enhancement factor during sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TOM

GREENHOLTZ and STEVEN W. SWORD, JJ., joined.

John T. Maher, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Oscar Romero.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy E. Wilber, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; Robert J. Nash, District Attorney General; and Christopher L. West,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The Defendant’s conviction relates to the rape of a nineteen-year-old victim that

occurred on December 26-27, 2020, after a party at the Defendant’s house for the

Defendant’s stepdaughter.

At the trial, the victim testified that on December 26, 2020, she was age nineteen,

lived with her parents, and attended a birthday party for her friend, Ms. Enriquez, who

was the Defendant’s stepdaughter. The victim said that Ms. Enriquez’s cousin drove her

from her house in Nashville to the party at the Defendant’s house in Clarksville and that

the victim was supposed to return home that same evening. The victim recalled that she

arrived at the Defendant’s house around 10:00 p.m. and that approximately twenty

members of Ms. Enriquez’s family were in attendance. The victim said that she had

previously met the Defendant and identified him at the trial. The victim stated that Ms.

Enriquez’s mother, Maribel Paredes, offered the victim an alcoholic drink and that the

victim did not eat any food during the party. The victim recalled that everybody

continued drinking throughout the evening and that, around 11:00 p.m., she contacted her

mother and asked if she could stay the night because Ms. Enriquez’s cousin, who was

supposed to drive the victim home, had been drinking alcohol. The victim said that her

mother contacted Ms. Paredes and gave permission for her to stay the night. The victim

said that over the course of the evening, guests left until only the victim, Ms. Enriquez,

Ms. Paredes, the Defendant, and two other guests remained at the house.

The victim testified that she and Ms. Enriquez would “go out” about three

weekends each month and would drink alcohol. The victim recalled that after drinking

the alcoholic drink she was given when she arrived, she began drinking whiskey in a shot

glass. The victim recalled that Ms. Paredes and other guests poured alcohol into shot

glasses. The victim believed that she had more than three shot glasses of alcohol.

The victim testified that, during the party and while she was sitting in a chair at the

kitchen counter, the Defendant “put his arm around [her] and grabbed [her] left breast”

with his hand. The victim said that she did not want the Defendant to do this, and she left

the kitchen and went to bed in Ms. Enriquez’s bedroom. The victim said this happened

while Ms. Enriquez, Ms. Paredes, and the other guests sang karaoke. The victim said that

she did not mention this incident to anyone at the party because she was “in shock.” The

victim acknowledged that she was “pretty drunk” at the time and that she wanted to

“sleep it off.” The victim explained that the long side of Ms. Enriquez’s bed was pushed

against a window, that she slept on the side of the bed away from the window, and that

she slept on her side with her face toward the window and her back toward the door. The

victim believed she went to bed around 2:00 a.m. and set an alarm for 10:00 a.m. The

victim recalled that she went to bed wearing a black, braless top, underwear, and white

jeans and that she lay on top of the covers. The victim said that she closed the bedroom

door after entering the bedroom, that it was dark, and that she was alone when she went

to bed. The victim stated that she did not recall Ms. Enriquez entering the bedroom.

The victim testified that she awoke “feeling [the Defendant] behind me.” The

victim explained that she felt a man “thrusting himself against [her]” and that he had his

“private part” in her vagina. The victim said that she tried but was unable to wake

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completely and fell unconscious. The victim said she “just had a feeling” that the man in

bed with her was the Defendant. The victim acknowledged that she did not know

whether the man ejaculated. The victim said that Ms. Enriquez was asleep on the bed to

the victim’s right and on the side of the bed that was closer to the window. The victim

recalled waking up again during the night and hearing an argument before falling asleep.

The victim said she could not determine who argued. The victim said that when she

awoke from her alarm, Ms. Enriquez was beside her in the bed on the victim’s left side

and that Ms. Enriquez’s mother and younger sister were sleeping on the bedroom floor.

The victim stated that Ms. Enriquez’s mother and sister had not been sleeping on the

floor when the victim awoke earlier and heard an argument.

The victim testified that when she awoke at 10:00 a.m., her underwear was

“rolled” and her pants were unzipped and “sort of down.” The victim recalled that her

pants had been zipped when she went to bed. The victim said that the state of her clothes

led her to believe that someone had “messed with them” and that feeling a man behind

her had not been a dream. The victim said that the Defendant entered the bedroom and

asked how she and Ms. Enriquez slept. The victim stated that she was scared to

acknowledge that she was aware something had happened and pretended everything was

“okay.” The victim said that Ms. Enriquez “just looked down the whole time.” The

victim acknowledged that she did not tell anyone about what happened because she felt

she could not trust Ms. Enriquez’s family. The victim said that Ms. Enriquez’s cousin

gave her a ride home and that during the ride, she felt like crying and remained silent.

The victim said that during the ride she sent a text message to her boss regarding what

had happened and told her boss that she would miss work. The victim recalled arriving at

her house around noon on December 27, 2020.

The victim testified that after arriving at her house, she told her sister what had

happened and that they went to the hospital, where a nurse performed a sexual assault

examination. The exam included swabs of the victim’s vagina. The victim said that she

did not report the assault to the police on the day she visited the hospital but that she

reported it to the police two days later, after telling her mother. The victim recalled

giving a statement to the police. The victim said that she did not want to have sexual

intercourse with the Defendant, that she did not flirt with the Defendant or indicate she

wanted to have sex with him, and that she never told anyone that she wanted to have sex

with him.

The victim testified that, after the incident, the Defendant attempted to send her

messages on Facebook which she did not open, and she later blocked his messages. The

victim stated that she had not been friends on Facebook with the Defendant and that she

“didn’t want anything to do with him.” The victim said that the messages sent by the

Defendant were later “unsent” by the Defendant. A screenshot of the Defendant’s

Facebook profile showing sent and unsent messages was received as an exhibit. The

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victim stated that she blocked Facebook messages from Ms. Enriquez and that she and

Ms. Enriquez “eventually” stopped staying in contact with each other.

On cross-examination, the victim testified that, initially, she planned to stay at Ms.

Enriquez’s party for about an hour, that she planned to drink alcohol, and that she

believed Ms. Enriquez’s cousin could drive her home. The victim recalled that the

dancing and karaoke lasted approximately three hours and that she recorded videos and

sent text messages. The victim, however, acknowledged that she did not have a copy of

the recordings or messages. The victim stated that after going to bed, she did not

remember Ms. Enriquez, Ms. Paredes, or Ms. Enriquez’s sister entering the bedroom.

The victim said she did not recall telling the nurse or the police officer that the Defendant

left Ms. Enriquez’s bedroom after Ms. Enriquez asked him to leave. The victim said that

she did not recall any time after going out and drinking alcohol when she took off her

clothes or sent a text message to her boss’s husband. The victim did not recall Ms.

Enriquez ever telling the victim that the victim had done those things.

The victim testified that she contacted the police by telephone. The victim said

that she did not recall telling the nurse that she lay on her stomach when she was raped,

nor did she recall a police officer asking her about whether she was lying on her stomach

or her side. The victim recalled one police interview and then later telephone calls. The

victim recalled that she was alone when she first went to sleep in the bedroom, that Ms.

Enriquez was asleep on the victim’s right when the victim woke during the incident, and

that when the victim woke from her alarm, Ms. Enriquez was asleep on the victim’s left,

where the Defendant had been. The victim acknowledged that she had no “issues” with

the Defendant during the previous three or four times she had been around the Defendant.

The victim’s sister testified that in December 2020, she was age fifteen and lived

in Nashville with her parents and siblings, including the victim. The victim’s sister

recalled receiving a telephone call from the victim on the morning of December 27 and

that the victim sounded upset. The victim’s sister said the victim went straight to the

victim’s bedroom upon arriving home. The victim’s sister recalled talking to the victim

but said that the victim did not talk to their parents. The victim’s sister said that, on

December 27, she accompanied the victim to the hospital and that the victim appeared

angry. The victim’s sister said that when she joined the victim in the hospital room, the

victim was crying, which was unusual. The victim’s sister stated that upon returning

home, the victim began sleeping in the victim’s sister’s bedroom instead of the victim’s

bedroom. On cross-examination, the victim’s sister acknowledged that she did not attend

Ms. Enriquez’s party or know the Defendant.

The victim’s mother testified that she had met Ms. Enriquez and Ms. Paredes prior

to Ms. Enriquez’s party and that the victim had asked permission to attend Ms.

Enriquez’s party. The victim’s mother recalled that she was hesitant to allow the victim

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to attend because the party was far from Nashville but that she agreed because the victim

was supposed to return home the same night. The victim’s mother said that she agreed to

allow the victim to spend the night at Ms. Enriquez’s house only after Ms. Paredes sent

her a text message asking if the victim could stay. The victim’s mother said that she was

not at home when the victim returned home and that when she saw the victim the next

day, December 28, the victim “looked strange” and “was shut up in her room.” The

victim’s mother said that on December 29, the victim told her what happened at Ms.

Enriquez’s house, that she told the victim to contact the police, and that the victim spoke

to a detective. The victim’s mother stated that she helped the victim begin counseling.

On cross-examination, the victim’s mother said that she has had no contact with the

Defendant.

Meredith Boggs, a nurse and expert in the area of sexual assault examination,

testified that on the afternoon of December 27, 2020, she performed an examination of

the victim at the Vanderbilt Medical Center. Ms. Boggs said that she began the

examination by obtaining the victim’s medical history and obtaining any other

information that could affect the collection of DNA evidence. Ms. Boggs stated that the

victim had not showered or changed her underwear. Ms. Boggs said that the victim

related that she had been at a friend’s party and had been drinking alcohol, that she went

to bed fully clothed, that she awoke feeling “someone was behind [her] going inside of

[her]” and touching her breast, and that her friend awoke and yelled at “this person” to

get out. Ms. Boggs recalled that the victim said she was unsure whether the person

ejaculated. Ms. Boggs said the victim did not disclose the name of her assailant.

Ms. Boggs testified that she examined the victim for any injuries and collected

swabs for DNA evidence, including swabs of the victim’s vaginal area, and the victim’s

underwear. Ms. Boggs said that the victim’s vaginal area was not injured and that such a

finding was not unusual in sexual assault cases. Ms. Boggs did not take photographs

because the victim declined to be photographed. Ms. Boggs explained that the swabs and

underwear were sent to a laboratory for DNA testing. The sexual assault kit containing

evidence collected from the victim was received as an exhibit.

Officer Brittney Honeycutt testified that she spoke to the victim by telephone and

that the victim reported being sexually assaulted by the Defendant at the Defendant’s

house.

Clarksville Police Department (CPD) Sergeant Sean Walden testified that, in

December 2020, he was a detective with the special victims unit and, on January 7, 2021,

he interviewed the victim at the CPD office. Sergeant Walden stated that on January 8,

he went to the Defendant’s house, that he was unable to locate the Defendant, and that he

left a contact card. Sergeant Walden said that he received a telephone call from Ms.

Enriquez and that he spoke to Ms. Enriquez and Ms. Paredes. Sergeant Walden recalled

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that the Defendant provided a DNA sample and that Sergeant Walden submitted the

Defendant’s sample and the victim’s sexual assault kit to the Tennessee Bureau of

Investigation (TBI) for testing.

On cross-examination, Sergeant Walden testified that during his interview of the

victim, she indicated that she “was not falling down drunk” at Ms. Enriquez’s party and

that she and Ms. Enriquez went together into the bedroom. Sergeant Walden recalled

that the victim described the Defendant as being on top of her and also behind her.

Sergeant Walden said that after talking to the victim a second time, he concluded the

victim believed that the Defendant was behind her during the incident and that Ms.

Enriquez knew that something had happened and that Ms. Enriquez had walked with the

Defendant out of the bedroom. Sergeant Walden stated that he never received Snapchat

video recordings from Ms. Enriquez, although she had mentioned that they existed.

Laura Boos, a former special agent forensic scientist with the TBI and a forensic

biology expert, testified that she analyzed evidence collected from the victim and the

Defendant. Ms. Boos stated that the victim’s vaginal swabs contained sperm cells, for

which she developed a DNA profile. Ms. Boos said that she also obtained DNA profiles

from the Defendant’s and the victim’s buccal swabs. Ms. Boos stated that the evidence

obtained from the victim’s vaginal swabs contained DNA from both the victim and the

Defendant. Ms. Boos explained that “no one other than [the Defendant] could be the

source of that DNA profile with the exception of an identical twin.” Ms. Boos said that

TBI policy dictated that if tests of a victim’s “most intimate items,” such as the victim’s

vaginal swabs, show a DNA match, then testing of additional items was unnecessary.

Ms. Boos’s forensic report was received as an exhibit.

The State concluded its proof.

Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court heard testimony from Ms. Enriquez

that rebutted the victim’s testimony regarding past instances when the victim forgot

events after becoming intoxicated. Ms. Enriquez testified that sometimes when she and

the victim went out and drank alcohol, the next morning the victim could not recall what

the victim did the prior evening. Ms. Enriquez said this happened two or three times.

Ms. Enriquez recalled a time when the victim texted her boss’s husband, another time

when the victim began “acting weird” and “touching herself,” and a third time when the

victim tried to kiss Ms. Enriquez. Ms. Enriquez stated that she told the victim about what

the victim did on those three occasions, but that the victim did not have any recollection

of doing those things.

The parties agreed that the incident involving the victim trying to kiss Ms.

Enriquez was excluded by Tennessee Evidence Rule 412. The defense argued that the

remaining rebuttal evidence was admissible to prove the victim was not truthful during

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her testimony. The State noted that the victim was never asked about touching herself

and that sending a text message was not relevant or unusual behavior. The State also

argued that this evidence was excluded by Tennessee Evidence Rule 608(b). The court

held that the rebuttal evidence regarding the victim’s touching herself and trying to kiss

Ms. Enriquez was sexual in nature and barred by Tennessee Evidence Rule 412. The

court noted that the Defendant had failed to provide any notice or to request a hearing

before using this evidence as required by Rule 412. The court determined that the

victim’s text message “could be an [a]llusion to sexual impropriety,” and, thus, also was

barred by Rule 412. Additionally, the court found the evidence regarding the text

message to be irrelevant and, even if relevant, the potential for undue prejudice

outweighed any relevance. The jury returned to the courtroom.

Ms. Enriquez testified for the defense that she lived in Clarksville with her mother,

sister, and the Defendant and that she and her family lived in Nashville before moving to

Clarksville. Ms. Enriquez said that she had a birthday party in December 2020, to which

she invited her family, extended family, and the victim, with whom she had been friends

for two years. Ms. Enriquez recalled that her cousin drove the victim to the party and

that it was the first time the victim had been to Ms. Enriquez’s house in Clarksville. Ms.

Enriquez believed the victim arrived at the party around 8 p.m. Ms. Enriquez said that

alcoholic beverages were served at the party and that people danced and sang karaoke.

Ms. Enriquez said that she went with the victim to the bedroom and that they recorded

videos for and looked at social media before going to sleep. Two Snapchat video

recordings, one showing a time of 4:23 a.m. and the other of 4:26 a.m. on December 27,

2020, showed Ms. Enriquez and the victim in Ms. Enriquez’s bedroom, and were

received as exhibits. Ms. Enriquez stated that she and the victim went to sleep after

recording the videos and that the only other people in the bedroom were Ms. Enriquez’s

mother and sister, who slept on the floor next to the bed. Ms. Enriquez said her bedroom

door opened into the room and that birthday presents were on the floor near the door,

which the door touched when it opened. Ms. Enriquez recalled that she was not disturbed

during the night by noise or movement, that her mother woke her the next morning

around 9:00 a.m. or 10:00 a.m., and that the victim and Ms. Enriquez’s sister were still

asleep when Ms. Enriquez awoke. Ms. Enriquez stated that when she awoke, she was in

the same position on the bed near the window as when she went to sleep. Ms. Enriquez

said that the victim asked to borrow clothes to wear to work and seemed “fine.” Ms.

Enriquez recalled that the victim slept under the bed covers. Ms. Enriquez stated that the

Defendant was in the kitchen with her cousin when she went to sleep and that he was in

the living room the next morning. Ms. Enriquez acknowledged that she did not have any

contact with the victim after the morning of December 27 except that Ms. Enriquez sent

the victim a text message after Ms. Enriquez was contacted by a police investigator, to

which the victim did not respond. Ms. Enriquez stated that she was certain that, on

December 27, the Defendant did not enter or need to be escorted out of her bedroom.

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On cross-examination, Ms. Enriquez testified that she told the investigator that she

and the victim went to bed between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. and acknowledged that video

recordings could be posted to social media at a time later than when they were recorded.

Ms. Enriquez said that she was age nineteen on December 26, 2020, that she began

drinking tequila that night around 8:00 p.m., and that she described herself to Detective

Walden as being “wasted” during the party. Ms. Enriquez explained that around

midnight she and other guests began dancing and singing karaoke. Ms. Enriquez

estimated that she consumed five or six shots of tequila. Ms. Enriquez acknowledged

that the Defendant was her stepfather and that she had lived with him for approximately

eight or nine years.

On redirect examination, Ms. Enriquez testified that the Defendant no longer lived

with her and her mother and that she did not want to have any contact with the Defendant

“because of how much he hurt my mom and sister,” which Ms. Enriquez attributed to

financial issues.

Maribel Paredes testified that the victim and her daughter, Ms. Enriquez, were

friends and drank tequila during the party. Ms. Paredes said that she did not notice any

interaction between the victim and the Defendant during the party, that she was the last to

go to bed, and that the victim and Ms. Enriquez went to bed around 3:45 a.m. Ms.

Paredes explained that she, the victim, Ms. Enriquez, and Ms. Enriquez’s sister slept in

Ms. Enriquez’s bedroom, that the Defendant and Ms. Enriquez’s cousin slept on the floor

in the living room, and that two other guests slept in Ms. Paredes’s bedroom. Ms.

Paredes said she and Ms. Enriquez’s sister slept on the floor. Ms. Paredes recalled that

her feet touched Ms. Enriquez’s bedroom door when she fell asleep and that she slept

through the night until the victim’s alarm woke her. Ms. Paredes explained that she then

woke Ms. Enriquez and that Ms. Enriquez woke the victim. Ms. Paredes recalled that the

victim slept on the side of the bed next to the window and that Ms. Enriquez slept on the

side of the bed closer to the door.

On cross-examination, Ms. Paredes testified that she, Ms. Enriquez, and the victim

drank alcohol but that she did not recall whether someone gave the victim a bottle of

whiskey. Ms. Paredes said that Ms. Enriquez’s cousin was age seventeen at the time of

the party. Ms. Paredes said that when party guests began to leave, she told Ms. Enriquez

and the victim to stop drinking alcohol and to go to bed. Ms. Paredes acknowledged that

she told Detective Walden that the victim and Ms. Enriquez went to bed between 2:30

a.m. and 3:00 a.m. and that she went to bed around 3:45 a.m. Ms. Paredes explained that

her house had three bedrooms and that no one slept in Ms. Enriquez’s sister’s bedroom.

Ms. Paredes said that she told Ms. Enriquez’s cousin to sleep there but that he slept on

the living room floor.

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Ms. Enriquez’s cousin testified that he drove the victim to Ms. Enriquez’s party

and that he and the Defendant were the last to go to sleep on the floor in the living room.

Ms. Enriquez’s cousin said that on December 27, 2020, Ms. Paredes woke him and that

he drove the victim home. He said the victim seemed normal. On cross-examination,

Ms. Enriquez’s cousin said that he and the Defendant were the last to go to sleep around

5:00 a.m. and that he “kn[e]w for sure [Ms. Enriquez’s sister] was sleeping in her room.”

The Defendant elected not to testify.

The jury found the Defendant guilty of one count of rape.

At the sentencing hearing, the presentence report was received as an exhibit. It

reflected that the Defendant was age forty-two at the time of the offense, that he attended

school in Mexico, and that he completed additional education through the eighth grade in

the United States. The Defendant had no prior criminal history. The Defendant reported

that his mental health was good, that his physical health was fair, and that he took sleep

medication. The Defendant acknowledged that he was intoxicated on the night of the

offense but denied that he was dependent on alcohol. The Defendant reported illegally

entering the United States when he was age sixteen or seventeen, that his father was

deceased, and that his mother had just obtained a visa to travel to the United States. The

Defendant reported that, as a child, he was sexually abused by a relative. The Defendant

said that he had been married to Ms. Paredes for ten years, that they had a daughter

together, and that he had a stepdaughter, Ms. Enriquez. The Defendant also reported a

son who lived in Mexico. The Defendant stated that he had a good relationship with his

wife and daughter but that he no longer had contact with Ms. Enriquez. The Defendant’s

prior employment included construction work. The Strong-R Risk and Needs

Assessment reflected that the Defendant had a low risk to reoffend and a high or

moderate need for education and residential assistance.

The trial court also received victim impact statements from the victim and the

victim’s sister. The victim wrote that she “will never be the same after this” and that her

sister and mother also “suffered greatly.” She wrote that she was diagnosed with post-

traumatic stress disorder and depression. She wrote that she engaged in destructive

behavior and that her grades fell. She described the rape as affecting her “relationships,

health, and enjoyment of life.” She wrote that she pushed away her friends and family

and sought therapy and that she had feelings of “guilt, despair, and disgust” and suicidal

ideations. She described living with trauma as a “day-to-day battle.” She requested that

the court order the Defendant to serve a maximum sentence. Likewise, the victim’s sister

described the torment she and the victim experienced as a result of the rape.

Ms. Paredes testified that she had known the Defendant for eleven years, and she

described him as a good man who never had engaged in criminal behavior. Ms. Paredes

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said that the Defendant had been a good provider and a loving father. Juana Romero, the

Defendant’s sister, testified that the Defendant was hardworking and responsible and that

he never had been in trouble during the fifteen years he had lived in Tennessee.

The State argued that enhancement factors applied because the victim was

particularly vulnerable at the time of the rape due to intoxication, that the Defendant

admitted he was unlawfully in the United States, and that the Defendant reported

frequently using alcohol and being intoxicated on the night of the offense. See T.C.A. §

40-35-114 (2019) (subsequently amended). The State requested an eleven-year sentence.

The Defendant argued that the victim’s incapacitation was an essential element of the

crime and should not be considered as an enhancement factor. The Defendant, requesting

that the court order the minimum sentence, also argued that his citizenship status had not

been adjudicated, that he had no criminal history, that he had strong ties to the

community, and that the presentence report found he had a low likelihood of recidivism.

The State further noted that the Defendant was charged with rape due to the victim’s lack

of consent, not that the victim was incapacitated.

The trial court found that the Defendant was a Range I offender1 and not a

favorable candidate for alternative sentencing pursuant to the relevant alternative

sentencing factors. The court applied three enhancement factors. See T.C.A. § 40-35-

114 (2019). The court applied enhancement factor (4), that the victim was particularly

vulnerable because of age or disability, because of the “vast difference” in age between

the victim and Defendant. Id. § 40-35-114(4). The court applied enhancement factor (7),

that the offense involved a victim and was committed to gratify the Defendant’s desire

for pleasure or excitement. Id. § 40-35-114(7). Additionally, the court applied

enhancement factor (28), that the Defendant was unlawfully in the United States when

the offense was committed, based upon the presentence report and the Defendant’s

admission to being in the United States unlawfully. Id. § 40-35-114(28). The court

determined that no mitigating factors were applicable. See id. § 40-35-113 (2019)

(subsequently amended). The court ordered the Defendant to serve a ten-year sentence in

confinement.

The Defendant filed a motion for new trial contending that the trial court erred by

excluding rebuttal evidence to impeach the victim’s credibility. The Defendant also filed

a renewed motion for judgment of acquittal and a motion to modify his sentence. The

court, after a hearing, denied the Defendant’s motions. This appeal followed.

1

The current rape statute requires that a defendant convicted of rape receive a sentence as, at least, a

Range II offender. Compare T.C.A. § 39-13-503(b)(2) (2025), with § 39-13-503(b) (2018) (subsequently

amended).

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The Defendant contends that the trial evidence is insufficient to support the

conviction, that the trial court erred by excluding rebuttal evidence to impeach the victim,

and that the court abused its discretion in sentencing by considering the age difference

between the victim and the Defendant as an enhancement factor. The State counters that

the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, that the court did not err by excluding

rebuttal evidence, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing.

I

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is “whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514,

521 (Tenn. 2007). The State is “afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence

and all reasonable inferences” from that evidence. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d at 521. The

appellate courts do not “reweigh or reevaluate the evidence,” and questions regarding

“the credibility of witnesses [and] the weight and value to be given the evidence . . . are

resolved by the trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997); see

State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984).

“A crime may be established by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a

combination of the two.” State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 140 (Tenn. 1998); see State v.

Sutton, 166 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tenn. 2005). “The standard of review ‘is the same whether

the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331

S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn.

2009)).

“It is well established that the identity of the perpetrator is an essential element of

any crime.” State v. Miller, 638 S.W.3d 136, 158 (Tenn. 2021). The identity of the

perpetrator is a question of fact for the jury to determine. State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d

361, 388 (Tenn. 2005). Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish the

perpetrator’s identity. State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 277 (Tenn. 2002). We apply the

same standard of review, whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. Dorantes, 331

S.W.3d at 379.

As relevant to the Defendant’s appeal, rape is the “unlawful sexual penetration of

a victim by the defendant or of the defendant by a victim . . . without the consent of the

victim and the defendant knows or has reason to know at the time of the penetration that

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the victim did not consent[.]” T.C.A. § 39-13-503(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended).

Sexual penetration is defined as

sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other

intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object

into the genital or anal openings of the victim’s, the defendant’s, or any

other person’s body, but emission of semen is not required[.]

Id. § 39-13-501(7) (2025).

Here, the victim testified that she went to bed and then woke to feel a man behind

her thrusting his penis into her vagina. Swabs of the victim’s vagina contained evidence

of semen and the Defendant’s DNA. The victim testified that she did not consent to have

sex with the Defendant. The victim’s conduct after the incident was consistent with the

behavior of a victim processing a sexual assault. The victim testified that she left Ms.

Enriquez’s house without confronting anyone, that she went to the hospital for an

examination shortly after arriving home, that she disclosed the assault to her mother and

sister, and that two days later she reported the assault to law enforcement. Although

witnesses at the trial provided conflicting testimony regarding whether the Defendant

entered the bedroom where the victim was sleeping, the jury resolved this conflict by

crediting the victim’s testimony. The Defendant’s conviction is further supported by the

DNA evidence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we

conclude that the jury could have found the essential elements of rape beyond a

reasonable doubt. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.

II

Exclusion of Evidence to Impeach the Victim

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by excluding evidence to

impeach the victim’s credibility. Specifically, the Defendant sought to introduce

evidence that on two occasions the victim forgot things she did when she was intoxicated.

The first instance regarded a time when the victim was alleged to have sent a text

message to her boss’s husband. The second instance regarded a time when the victim

was alleged to have acted “irrationally” and began touching herself. The Defendant

asked the victim about these alleged occurrences during cross-examination, and the

victim said she did not remember the incidents and generally denied that they occurred.

The Defendant sought to introduce Ms. Enriquez’s testimony to rebut the reliability of the

victim’s recollection. The Defendant relies on Tennessee Rule of Evidence 611(a) in this

regard. The State relies upon the Defendant’s failure to comply with the conditions of

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412 and the evidence’s failure to meet the relevance

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requirement of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 401.2 The following exchange occurred

during cross-examination of the victim:

[Defense Counsel]: Do you remember . . . going out and drinking

with [Ms. Enriquez] before, and waking up in the morning and

having them tell you you did something and you didn’t recall it?

....

[Victim]: No.

[Defense Counsel]: Do you remember an incident where you were

taking off your clothes in the house?

[Victim]: No.

[Defense Counsel]: And you don’t recall it?

[Victim]: No.

[Defense Counsel]: And [Ms. Enriquez] told you the next day?

[Victim]: No.

[Defense Counsel]: Do you recall texting your boss’s husband –

[Victim]: No.

[Defense Counsel]: -- when you guys were out drinking?

[Victim]: No.

[Defense Counsel]: And telling [Ms. Enriquez] about it the next

morning?

2

The State, in the trial court, relied on Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b), in addition to Tennessee Rule

of Evidence 412 to exclude the evidence. Rule 608(b) provides that “[s]pecific instances of conduct of a

witness for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’s character for truthfulness or

untruthfulness . . . may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.” The trial court did not rule on the

applicability of Rule 608(b) to the exclusion of the evidence of Ms. Enriquez’s proffered testimony, and

neither party addresses the rule on appeal.

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[Victim]: No.

[Defense Counsel]: Couldn’t believe you did it?

[Victim]: No.

[Defense Counsel]: You don’t think any of those things ever

happened?

[Victim]: No.

In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the trial court considered whether the

Defendant could offer Ms. Enriquez’s testimony to impeach. Ms. Enriquez testified that

the victim, when she was intoxicated, sent a text message to the victim’s boss’s husband.

Ms. Enriquez said she did not recall the contents of the victim’s text message. Ms.

Enriquez also testified that, on another occasion, the victim, who was intoxicated, began

“touching herself” but did not recall it the next morning. The court held that the

testimony regarding the victim’s touching herself was sexual in nature and was prohibited

by Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412. The court also found that the text message to the

victim’s boss’s husband was “an [a]llusion to [the victim’s] sexual impropriety” and,

likewise, was prohibited Rule 412. The court noted that the parties entered an agreed

order providing that evidence of the victim’s prior sexual behavior would not be allowed

at the trial. The court also noted that the Defendant provided no prior notice to the court

of his intent to use this evidence, as required by Rule 412. Additionally, the court found

the evidence regarding the text message to be irrelevant and, alternatively, that the

potential for undue prejudice substantially outweighed any relevance. See Tenn. R. Evid.

401, 403.

Evidence is relevant and generally admissible when it has “any tendency to make

the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401,

402. Questions regarding the admissibility and relevance of evidence generally lie within

the discretion of the trial court, and the appellate courts will not “interfere with the

exercise of that discretion unless a clear abuse appears on the face of the record.” State v.

Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799, 809 (Tenn. 2010) (citing State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 141

(Tenn. 2007)).

A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard or

reaches a conclusion that is “illogical or unreasonable and causes an injustice to the party

complaining.” State v. Ruiz, 204 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tenn. 2006). Relevant evidence,

however, “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by

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considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative

evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 403.

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412 provides that although evidence of reputation or

opinion evidence of a victim’s sexual behavior or evidence of sexual behavior with an

individual other than the defendant is generally inadmissible, it may be admissible in

limited circumstances. Tenn. R. Evid. 412(c)(4). In order for the evidence to be

admitted, a motion complying with certain requisites must be filed, and the trial court

must determine at a hearing that the evidence relates to reputation or opinion regarding

the victim’s sexual behavior or is evidence of sexual behavior with someone other than

the defendant and is offered to rebut scientific or medical evidence. Id. 412(d). The

court must also determine that the probative value of the evidence of the evidence

outweighs its unfair prejudice to the victim. Id. 412(d)(4).

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 611(a) provides that “[t]he court shall exercise

appropriate control over the presentation of evidence and conduct of the trial when

necessary to avoid abuse by counsel.” Whereas the court has the essential responsibility

to “control the flow of evidence to the jury by ruling on the admissibility of evidence[,]”

Rule 611(a) gives the court “discretion to prevent lawyer misconduct.” Overstreet v.

Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 702, 708 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). “[T]he propriety, scope,

manner and control of the examination of witnesses is a matter within the discretion of

the trial judge, subject to appellate review for abuse of discretion.” State v. Caughron,

855 S.W.2d 526, 540 (Tenn. 1993).

In the present case, the trial court concluded that the impeachment evidence that

the victim “touched” herself was sexual in nature and excluded pursuant to Rule 412.

Tenn. R. Evid. 412. The record reflects that the parties entered an agreed order that

evidence of the victim’s prior sexual behavior would not be allowed at the trial. It further

reflects that the Defendant provided no prior notice to the court of his intent to use this

evidence as required by Rule 412. The court did not abuse its discretion by excluding

this evidence pursuant to Rule 412.

The court also concluded that evidence regarding the victim’s text message to her

boss’s husband could be “an [a]llusion to [the victim’s] sexual impropriety” and should

be excluded pursuant to Rule 412. It is unclear whether this evidence is excludable

pursuant to Rule 412 because no record exists regarding whether the substance of the text

message was sexual in nature. However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

excluding this evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Evidence 401. The victim

testified that she was intoxicated during that evening. Although she did not recall much

of what happened to her after she went to bed, she recalled waking in the night to feel the

Defendant thrusting his penis into her vagina, an act to which she testified that she did

not consent. Because the victim testified that she remembered the incident, Ms.

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Enriquez’s proffered testimony that the victim allegedly had drinking-induced memory

loss on a different occasion had no tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the victim’s recollection in this case more probable

or less probable than it would have been without the evidence. See Tenn. R. Evid. 401.

We also note that the State’s evidence was strong, including both testimonial and DNA

evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this evidence. The

Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.

III

Sentencing

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by considering the age difference

between the victim and the Defendant as a sentencing enhancement factor.

This court reviews challenges to the length of a sentence within the appropriate

sentence range “under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of

reasonableness.’” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012). A trial court must

consider any evidence received at the trial and sentencing hearing, the presentence report,

the principles of sentencing, counsel’s arguments as to sentencing alternatives, the nature

and characteristics of the criminal conduct, any mitigating or statutory enhancement

factors, statistical information provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts as to

sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee, any statement that the defendant

made on his own behalf, the potential for rehabilitation or treatment, and the result of the

validated risk and needs assessment. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-103 (2025), -210 (2019); State v.

Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991); State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 236 (Tenn.

1986); State v. Taylor, 744 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987); see T.C.A. § 40-

35-102 (2025).

Likewise, a trial court’s application of enhancement and mitigating factors is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion with “a presumption of reasonableness to within-

range sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles

of our Sentencing Act.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 707. “[A] trial court’s misapplication of an

enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate the sentence imposed unless the trial

court wholly departed from the 1989 Act, as amended in 2005.” Id. at 706. “So long as

there are other reasons consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing, as

provided by statute, a sentence imposed . . . within the appropriate range” will be upheld

on appeal. Id.

The Defendant does not contest that he is a Range I offender who was found guilty

of a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 40-35-105; 39-13-502(b)(1)(A). Tennessee Code

Annotated section 40-35-112(a)(2) (2025) provided that the Defendant’s sentencing

-16-

range was “not less than eight (8) nor more than twelve (12) years.” The trial court

ordered the Defendant to serve a within-range, ten-year sentence. Because the court

considered the appropriate purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act and ordered the

Defendant to serve a within-range sentence, the court’s sentencing determination is

accorded a presumption of reasonableness.

The trial court applied enhancement factor (4), that the victim was particularly

vulnerable because of age or physical or mental disability. The court found this factor

applied because of the age difference between the victim, age nineteen, and the

Defendant, age forty-two. Id. § 40-35-114(4). The Defendant contends that the court

erred by applying this enhancement factor. The State noted that this factor was

applicable because the victim was vulnerable due to her intoxication. The court did not

address the victim’s intoxication as a basis for applying enhancement factor (4). We

agree with the Defendant that the court misapplied this enhancement factor if it was

based solely on an age difference. However, the misapplication of an enhancement factor

does not invalidate the sentence imposed unless the court wholly departed from the

Sentencing Act. Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706. The Defendant does not contest the

application of enhancement factors (7) and (28). See T.C.A. §§ 40-35-114 (7) (“The

offense involved a victim and was committed to gratify the defendant’s desire for

pleasure or excitement[.]”); 40-35-114 (28) (“At the time the instant offense was

committed, the defendant was illegally or unlawfully in the United States[.]”) The court

considered the appropriate purposes and principles of sentencing and ordered the

Defendant to serve a within-range, ten-year sentence, which is two years less than the

maximum sentence for a Range I offender convicted of a Class B felony. Accordingly,

the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the Defendant. Bise, 380 S.W.3d at

706. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

s/Robert H. Montgomery, Jr._ _

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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