Si Wireless, LLC v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 25–1067

(Filed: May 13, 2026)

*******************

SI WIRELESS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

*******************

Tony S. Lee, James U. Troup, Fletcher, Heald & Hildreth, Arlington,

VA. for plaintiff.

Anna Bondurant Eley, Senior Litigation Counsel, United States

Department of Justice, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,

Washington, DC for the defendant, with whom were Brett A. Shumate,

Assistant Attorney General, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, and Eric P.

Bruskin, Assistant Director.

OPINION

Bruggink, Judge

Pending in this Tucker Act suit seeking compensation pursuant to the

Secured Network Act (“SNA”) is defendant’s motion to dismiss. It is brought

under Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

The matter is fully briefed, and oral argument was heard on December 18,

2025. Because Tucker Act jurisdiction has been displaced, we grant

defendant’s motion.

BACKGROUND 1

1

These facts are drawn from the complaint and the attachments thereto unless

otherwise indicated, as well as from materials attached to the motion to

1

SI Wireless LLC (“SI”) provided advanced communication services

in Tennessee and Kentucky. Plaintiff alleges that it is entitled to

compensation pursuant to the Secured Network Act (“SNA”), 2 which

Congress enacted in 2020 to eliminate American reliance on communications

technology manufactured by Chinese companies such as Huawei. SI offers

two theories under which it is entitled to recover. First, SI alleges it

contracted with the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or

“Commission”) to replace cellular devices under the provisions of the SNA

and that the FCC breached that contract by not paying to replace plaintiff’s

equipment. Its second theory is that the SNA directly establishes the basis

for a statutory claim for compensation by mandating funds be paid to plaintiff

for that same destroyed equipment.

With the SNA, Congress created a reimbursement program,

administered by the FCC, to compensate cell phone carriers that replace

Huawei network hardware potentially compromised by the Chinese

Communist Party. See 47 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (defining “covered hardware” as

that described in FCC Report 34 FCC Rcd. 11423 (Nov. 26, 2019)). The

Commission was directed to “make reasonable efforts to ensure that

reimbursement funds are distributed equally among all applicants.” Id. at §

1603(d)(5)(A). Reimbursement was afforded only to companies that met

three criteria. The first was those applicants had to be companies that serve

“10,000,000 or fewer customers.” 47 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(1). Second,

applicants were required to submit “a plan for the permanent removal,

replacement, and disposal of” equipment from a pre-approved list. Id. at §

1603(d)(4). Third, they had to provide a “timeline for the permanent removal,

replacement, and disposal of” the identified equipment. Id.

The complaint alleges that in 2020 and 2021 FCC officials directed

telecommunications providers such as SI to remove high-risk equipment

from their networks and in turn that providers were promised reimbursement

under the SNA. Before those actions, 30,000 customers used SI’s network

and without the income from those customers, plaintiff alleges that it could

not finance the network rebuild. On May 25, 2022, SI signed and filed the

5640 form required to receive reimbursement under the SNA. The FCC

validated the form later that year and approved reimbursements to SI for the

completed work. By then, plaintiff had dismantled the bulk of its network–

dismiss. These facts are undisputed unless otherwise specified.

2

Pub. L. No. 116-124, § 2, 134 Stat. 158 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §1601 et.

seq.).

2

including 204 cell sites and two switches—removing Huawei devices.

In 2024, the Washington Post published an article quoting SI’s

President, Leslie Williams, that attracted the FCC’s attention. See App. to

Def. Mot. Dis. at 308–309. Williams stated that “his network had been down

since 2022.” Id. This statement prompted questions regarding SI’s eligibility

for reimbursement based on the commission’s reading of the statute that

applicants needed to be current providers of service. In July of 2024, the FCC

suspended payments until an investigation could establish SI’s eligibility.

Frustrated with the lack of resolution from the investigation, on April

17, 2025, SI filed a mandamus petition at the D.C. Circuit seeking to compel

the FCC to determine whether SI was eligible for reimbursement. Def. Mot.

To Dis. App. A1 (Pl. Pet., In re: SI Wireless, LLC., No. 25-CV-1112 (D.C.

Cir. April 17, 2025) (“Mand. Pet.”)). It brought its action under the All Writs

and Administrative Procedure Acts, alleging retaliation and unreasonable

delay. Id. at 29–30. On June 26, 2025, not having received a ruling from the

D.C. Circuit, SI filed suit here. On October 1, 2025, the D.C. Circuit denied

SI’s mandamus petition, finding that SI had not established the absence of

adequate relief available elsewhere. In re: SI Wireless, LLC, No. 25-1112,

slip op. at 1 (D.C. Cir. October 1, 2025) (per curiam). This lawsuit followed.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts that it is owed money either as a result of the FCC’s

promise to pay it in exchange for the removal of the covered equipment, a

contractual theory, or as directly mandated by the SNA itself. As to the latter,

SI contends the SNA requires payments because Congress directed that “the

Commission shall establish a reimbursement program.” 47 U.S.C. § 1603(a)

(emphasis added); see also id. § (d)(5)(A) (the Commission “shall make

reasonable efforts to ensure that reimbursement funds are distributed equally

among all applicants”). SI argues that it fulfilled the statute’s three

reimbursement requirements: (1) have 10,000,000 or fewer customers; (2)

submit a plan to remove pre-approved equipment; and (3) propose a timeline

for that removal. The first requirement was met because SI served

approximately 30,000 customers on May 25, 2022, when it signed the Form

5640. SI contends it met the plan and timeline requirements when it provided

the FCC with a detailed timeline and equipment replacement plan. At the

time SI filed suit, defendant had reimbursed less than $25 million of $181

million purportedly promised. This represents approximately 13.5% of the

promised reimbursement. SI alleges the FCC reimbursed most companies in

the program significantly more than 13.5%. Therefore, plaintiff contends

reasonable efforts were not made to distribute reimbursement funds equally.

3

Because it fulfilled all three SNA eligibility requirements and the statute is

money-mandating, SI argues the court has jurisdiction over the claim under

the Tucker Act. As to its contract theory, plaintiff contends that the statute

and implementing regulations constitute an offer which SI accepted by

removing Huawei hardware and completing Form 5640.

Defendant moves to dismiss because the court lacks jurisdiction over

either claim for four reasons: 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2341(1) the courts of

appeal have “exclusive jurisdiction” over actions to enforce the SNA; 2) SI’s

petition was pending in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals when the

complaint here was filed, and thus jurisdiction here is barred by operation of

28 U.S.C. § 1500; 3) the claims are not ripe because the FCC has not made

a final decision on plaintiff’s reimbursement eligibility; and 4) plaintiff failed

to exhaust its statutory administrative remedies.

Defendant also moves under 12(b)(6) to dismiss the contract claim

because it fails to state a cause of action due to the lack of assent by the

government. Because we conclude below that the court lacks jurisdiction

over either claim under both of the first two arguments above, it is

unnecessary to consider the alternative bases for dismissal.

I. Displacement of the Tucker Act Remedy

We begin by analyzing the proper forum for judicial review. The

Tucker Act grants this court jurisdiction “to render judgment upon any claim

against the United States founded either upon . . . any Act of Congress . . . or

upon any express or implied contract with the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

1491(a)(1). Plaintiff contends that it offers both a nonfrivolous allegation that

it is within the class of plaintiffs entitled to recover under a “money-

mandating” source of law (the SNA), Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. FAA,

525 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2008), and that it has sufficiently pled the

existence of a valid contract with the FCC. See Total Med. Mgmt. v. United

States, 104 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed.Cir.1997). Either would normally be

enough to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.

Defendant argues, however, that the court’s jurisdiction is displaced because

the SNA creates a specific alternative and exclusive review scheme in a

different court. A review of the statutory framework in which the SNA was

inserted is necessary.

The SNA’s program for compensating cellular providers for replacing

compromised equipment was incorporated into an existing multi-layered

statutory framework, anchored by the Communications Act of 1934, 47

U.S.C. § 151 et seq. The statute requires the FCC to enforce the SNA “with

4

the same jurisdiction . . . as though all applicable terms and provisions of the

Communications Act . . . were incorporated.” 47 U.S.C. § 1606. Section

402(a) of the Communications Act provides that “any proceeding to enjoin,

set aside, annul, or suspend any order of the Commission . . . shall be

brought” under section 2342 of the Hobbs Act. 47 U.S.C. § 402(a). 3 The

Hobbs Act, in turn, gives “the court of appeals . . . exclusive jurisdiction to

enjoin, set aside, suspend . . . or to determine the validity of . . . all final

orders of the Federal Communications Commission.” 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1).

In short, the SNA directs that the FCC’s actions pursuant to it are governed

by the Communications Act, and the Communications Act requires that the

FCC’s actions may only be challenged via the Hobbs Act. See 28 U.S.C. §

2342(1). Section 2342 provides for judicial review of final FCC actions only

in the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal. 4 Following that line of analysis

leads defendant to the conclusion that plaintiff’s suit is miscast as one for

damages under the Tucker Act; in reality, it is a collateral attempt to avoid

the D.C. Circuit’s jurisdiction, where it has already been told to abide the

outcome of the FCC’s investigation. In re: SI Wireless, LLC, No. 25-1112,

slip op. at 1 (D.C. Cir. October 1, 2025) (per curiam).

A. Interplay Between Communication and Tucker Acts

A determination of withdrawal or displacement of jurisdiction

requires “an unambiguous [Congressional] intention to withdraw the Tucker

Act remedy.” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1019 (1984). This

intent exists where Congress provides a “precisely drawn, detailed statute”

that “contains its own judicial remedies.” United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S.

6, 12–13 (2012) (internal citation omitted). That “specific remedial scheme

establishes the exclusive framework for the liability Congress created under

the statute . . . [because a] self-executing remedial scheme supersedes the

gap-filling role of the Tucker Act.” Id.

3

The Communications Act was amended in 1996 by the

Telecommunications Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.

Plaintiff cites section 601(c)(1) which states “this Act and the amendments

made by this Act shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede

Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so provided in such Act or

amendments.” Id. As we explain below, plaintiff misconstrues the

amendment.

4

Other provisions of the Communications Act provide for review in other

fora, such as enforcement actions in district court and certain appeals of

agency action under section 402(b) are exclusively within the purview of the

D.C. Circuit. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b).

5

Defendant believes the placement of the SNA within the

Communications Act review scheme operates as a clear and unambiguous

displacement of the Tucker Act. It cites four primary cases in support. They

are Sandwich Isles Commc'ns, Inc. v. United States, 992 F.3d 1355, 1364

(Fed. Cir. 2021) (holding the Communication Act “displaces Tucker Act

jurisdiction for FCC orders and decisions”); Alpine PCS, Inc. v. United

States, 878 F.3d 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Tucker Act jurisdiction over

“contract claims was displaced by the . . . Communications Act”); Biltmore

Forest Broad. FM, Inc. v. United States, 555 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

(holding the Communication Act displaces the Tucker Act and vests

“exclusive jurisdiction” in the D.C. Circuit under section 402(b)); and Folden

v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that this court’s

“Tucker Act Jurisdiction . . . is preempted” by the Communications Act).

Given these precedents, the government argues that the question is foreclosed

and plaintiff’s only remedy is before the FCC directly and then the D.C.

Circuit if necessary.

Plaintiff has an entirely different view. It argues that the SNA and

Communications Act are silent as to the Tucker Act and its monetary

remedies, and therefore there is no unambiguous expression of congressional

intent to divest this court of jurisdiction to hear cases involving the SNA.

Plaintiff also makes a textual argument based on the Communications Act

and a subsequent amendment to that act, the Telecommunications Act.

Plaintiff contends those provisions show that monetary relief is not displaced

by the Communications Act and this court has concurrent jurisdiction. In

other words, declaratory relief vis-à-vis the FCC’s orders can be sought in

the circuit courts while monetary relief remains available from this court. SI

relies primarily on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v.

FCC, 414 F.3d 61 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and the Supreme Court’s more recent

decision in McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606

U.S. 146 (2025).

We believe, as defendant does, that the issue has been resolved by the

Federal Circuit in a conclusive manner and that the Supreme Court has not

spoken otherwise. We begin with the first pronouncement from the Circuit

in the Folden case cited above: that “Tucker Act Jurisdiction . . . is

preempted” by the Communications Act. 379 F.3d at 1357. There, the

Federal Circuit dealt with an appeal from this court in which we found an

absence of jurisdiction to hear a suit for damages stemming from the

Commission’s failure to carry out a cellular provider license lottery. Id. Both

courts held that the review scheme outlined in the Communications Act

mandated that the FCC’s decision on a communications license, even if

6

nominally a suit for monetary relief, belonged only in the D.C. Circuit per 47

U.S.C. § 402(b). Id. at 1357–63.

Although the suit at bar is subject to section 402(a), which expands

the possible venues for review of other FCC orders to nearly all federal

circuit courts, the reasoning of Folden is equally applicable. The Federal

Circuit, like this court, viewed the gravamen of the complaint to be a

challenge to the actions taken by the FCC about an application for a particular

benefit. The benefit there was a license to provide cellular service. The

contractual breach alleged was a failure to hold a lottery for that benefit. The

statutory violation alleged was the same. The Commission’s decisions

regarding licensure, however, was, as the court held, reviewable only in the

D.C. Circuit per section 402(b).

This case mirrors Folden in that the contractual and statutory claims

cover the same agency action that is otherwise reviewable only in the circuit

courts, per the Communications Act’s mandate. Here, the breach/violation

alleged is the FCC’s failure to pay out a benefit under the SNA, which is

enforced by the FCC per the terms of the Communications Act. Section

402(a), applicable to “any proceeding to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend

any order of the Commission,” requires that such an action “be brought as

provided by and in the manner prescribed in chapter 158 of title 28.” 47

U.S.C. § 402(a). As noted above, that section directs that such suits be

brought in the federal circuit courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (listing the circuit

courts’ jurisdiction as including the review of “all final orders of the Federal

Communication Commission made reviewable by [42 U.S.C. § 402(a)]”). SI

asks us to decide whether money is owed it under the SNA under either the

terms of the statute itself or an implied contract. But that is precisely the

question that FCC is tasked with deciding and is actually deciding in the

current investigation of plaintiff. Review of such a decision is, as held in

Folden, expressly reserved for other courts under the Communications Act.

The interlocutory timing of plaintiff’s complaint here does not change

the analysis. The FCC’s action on SI’s application for compensation under

the act is not final. The D.C. Circuit retains sole jurisdiction over the FCC’s

action or inaction in SI’s matter. “By lodging review of agency action in the

Court of Appeals, Congress manifested an intent that the appellate court

exercise sole jurisdiction over the class of claims covered by the statutory

grant of review power.” Telecomm. Res. and Action Center v. F.C.C., 750

F.2d 70, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“TRAC”). In other words, when Congress gave

exclusive jurisdiction over the FCC’s final decisions to the federal circuit

courts, it also gave them sole authority over non-final decisions. This is

because “any suit seeking relief that might affect the Circuit Court's future

7

jurisdiction is subject to the exclusive review of the Court of Appeals.” Id. at

75. The Federal Circuit agreed with this analysis in the patent context, but it

is equally applicable here. See Hyatt v United States Patent & Trademark

Office, 904 F3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The TRAC “rule applies to cases

concerning interlocutory challenges to agency proceedings that will

culminate in final agency actions exclusively reviewable by certain courts.

In those cases, the court with jurisdiction over the final agency action also

has exclusive jurisdiction over the interlocutory challenges in order to

‘protect its future jurisdiction.’” Id. at 1369 (emphasis added) (quoting

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 75); see also Mylan Laboratories Ltd. v. Janssen

Pharmaceutica, N.V., 989 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (adopting the “TRAC

rubric” [ t]o protect our future jurisdiction”). Thus, although the FCC’s order

is not final, this does not create an avenue for Tucker Act jurisdiction to

attach.

The same result applies with respect to Biltmore Forest Broadcasting

FM, Inc. v. United States, where the Federal Circuit reiterated that any suit

challenging a licensing decision was subject to the review mandated by

Section 402(b), namely, in the D.C. Circuit. 555 F.3d at 1383–84. The only

wrinkle in that case was that the plaintiff there had gone first to the D.C.

Circuit and, having no success there, tried an implied contract theory in this

court, arguing that the Folden decision did not mandate the same result

because the merits of the contract theory were not reached by the Circuit and

because, unlike the Folden plaintiff, Biltmore had exhausted its remedies by

seeking review of the FCC’s order at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. Id.

at 1383–84. These distinctions were of no moment to the Federal Circuit,

however, because, as it explained in Folden, the D.C. Circuit’s jurisdiction

is exclusive. Id. at 1384. We find section 402(a) equally exclusive.

The next relevant case is Alpine PCS, Inc., in which the Federal

Circuit was again confronted with a question of whether section 402(b)

applied, and it again answered in the affirmative. 878 F.3d at 1094–95. In

Alpine, the plaintiff was again a communications license holder whose

license was cancelled by the FCC for nonpayment of fees. Id. at 1090.

Plaintiff viewed that cancellation as a breach of contract and a taking of its

property rights in the license. It thus brought suit in this court, which was

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and an appeal was taken to the Federal

Circuit. The circuit followed Folden and Biltmore, holding that this court’s

contract and takings jurisdiction was displaced by 47 U.S.C. § 402(b). Id. at

1094–98. The court dealt with Alpine’s argument that the relief for a

constitutional cause of action (a taking) was outside of the scope of the relief

provided for by the statute, meaning that Tucker Act jurisdiction could not

have been displaced for Takings Clause cases. It found no such exception

8

because the comprehensive review scheme did not foreclose an allegation of

a taking to either the FCC or the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 1097–98. It was also not

problematic that money damages, either in contract or for just compensation,

would not be the direct result of a suit under section 402(b). Id. at 1094–95

(contract); 1095–98 (taking). Because those theories could be valid bases for

relief under the Communications Act, the Tucker Act is no longer necessary

to fill the gap and provide a forum for monetary relief. Id. 5

Finally, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Sandwich Isles

Communications, Inc., deals with section 402(a), the relevant provision here.

The plaintiff in that case sought “just compensation” under the Fifth

Amendment’s Takings Clause after the FCC denied it further funding via two

programs it administered to support rural communications providers. The

Federal Circuit held that Folden, Biltmore, and Alpine PCS dictated the same

result—the comprehensive review scheme imposed by the Communications

Act obviated the need for and displaced the Tucker Act. 992 F.3d at 1363-

65. As the Circuit recognized, the Supreme Court had already had an

opportunity to speak to whether section 402(a)’s judicial remedy was

exclusive. Id. at 1362 (citing FCC v. ITT World Commc’ns, Inc., 466 U.S.

463 (1984)). As in Alpine PCS, the fact that plaintiff alleged a taking in this

court did not change the nature of the suit as one challenging the propriety of

an FCC order. Sandwich Isles Comm’cns, 992 F.3d at 1364–65. 6

5

Earlier in its opinion, citing United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6 (2012), the

Circuit noted the “gap-filling” nature of Tucker Act jurisdiction. Alpine PCS,

Inc., 878 F.3d at 1092. When government obligations can be enforced

elsewhere, and are in fact directed by statute to be enforced elsewhere, the

Tucker Act’s jurisdiction is displaced. Id.

6

Recently, the Federal Circuit clarified that not all takings claims regarding

FCC-granted licenses implicate the Communication’s Act. Ligado Networks

LLC v. United States, 2026 WL 653982 (Fed. Cir. 2026). The plaintiff in

Ligado, a wireless services provider, received a license from the FCC despite

concerns from other agencies, notably the Department of War (“DOW”). Id.

at *1. Because of those apprehensions, the provider’s license was conditional

on coordinating with the DOW to mitigate GPS interference. Id. Plaintiff

sued here alleging a taking because the DOW had not permitted plaintiff to

launch its services. Id. at *2. This court held, and the Federal Circuit

affirmed, that the Tucker Act was not displaced by the Communications

Act’s review scheme. Id. at *3. Displacement was unwarranted because

plaintiff was “not challenging any Commission action.” Id. It was broader

government action alleged to have taken the property right. Therefore, Alpine

PCS and Sandwich Isles were not implicated.

9

Sandwich Isles controls the outcome of this case. The Federal Circuit

made explicit that section 402(a) provides the exclusive path of judicial

review for all FCC actions not otherwise challengeable under section 402(b).

The SNA’s incorporation of the Communications Act is fatal to plaintiff’s

suit here. Just as in each of the four cases discussed above, the point of

plaintiff’s suit is to challenge FCC action or inaction. Here, it is the FCC’s

decision to stop payment of funds under the SNA. Like the cases discussed

above, the contractual theory pled here does not change the result. Congress

has control of the federal courts’ jurisdiction, other than in limited

circumstances prescribed by the Constitution, and it has done so here by

making exclusive the jurisdiction of the circuit courts to hear challenges to

FCC agency action taken pursuant to any aspect of the Communications

Act. 7

B. Plaintiff’s Statutory and Precedential Objections

SI cites two provisions of the Communications Act and one circuit

court case and a more recent Supreme Court case to the effect that Tucker

Act jurisdiction has been preserved or otherwise left undisturbed by the

Communications Act. We take the statutory arguments first and then the

case law objection.

1. Statutory Arguments

Plaintiff relies on the savings clause in the Communications Act to

argue that the Tucker Act has not been displaced. Section 414 of the

Communications Act states that “nothing in this chapter contained shall in

any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by

statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.”

47 U.S.C. § 414 (“Savings Clause”) (citation modified). The Tucker Act was

first enacted in 1887 – nearly five decades before the Communications Act

in 1934. § 3657 Statutory Exceptions to Sovereign Immunity—Actions

Under the Tucker Act, 14 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3657 (4th ed.). Because

the Communications Act explicitly saves existing statutory remedies and the

Tucker Act predated the Communications Act, SI argues the latter cannot

displace the former.

The Tucker Act, however, does not itself create a remedy in the sense

7

The exception being licensing decisions, as in Folden, review of which is

further limited to the D.C. Circuit alone.

10

used by the savings clause of section 414. Rather, it is a waiver of sovereign

immunity. Thus, the remedy, money, must be provided by a separate source

of law, such a statute or regulation mandating that it be paid to the plaintiff.

See Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. FAA, 525 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008)

(requiring “a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to

money damages” apart from the Tucker Act itself). The Tucker Act is

described as “remedial” in the sense that it provides a judicial forum where

none exists absent the waiver of sovereign immunity provided by the Tucker

Act. See, e.g., Baltimore Mail S.S. Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d 582, 584

(4th Cir. 1935) (ascribing to Justice Holmes the description of the Tucker

Act as “that great remedial statute” but finding no jurisdiction under the act

for an implied at law contractual theory). Moreover, no court has read the

Savings Clause in the broad fashion that plaintiff now propounds. 8 Because

the Tucker Act is a jurisdiction statute—a waiver of sovereign immunity—,

not a grant of any particular remedy, its jurisdiction is not saved by section

414.

Plaintiff’s final statutory construction argument relies on a 1996

amendment to the Communications Act, known as the “Telecommunications

Act of 1996,” which states, “[t]his Act shall not be construed to modify,

impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law unless expressly provided in

such Act or amendments.” Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(c)(1), 110 Stat. 56

(1996). The 1996 amendment cannot save jurisdiction in this court, however,

because that clause is only describing the scope of that particular amendment,

as grafted into a larger piece of legislation. It certainly does not purport to

fundamentally change the comprehensive remedial scheme of the

Communications Act described above or in any way broaden the savings

clause of section 414. It is inapposite to the question of displacement of the

Tucker Act.

8

Plaintiff’s argument appears to be novel: the Federal Circuit was not asked

to rule on the applicability of the Savings Clause in Alpine PCS, Biltmore,

Folden, or Sandwich Isles. Appellate courts besides Federal Circuit have

declined to read the Savings Clause broadly as SI requests. See Cahnmann v.

Sprint Corp., 133 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that state law contract

action on a promotional sale offered by Sprint Corporation was preempted

by the Communication Act’s administrative and judicial review scheme); see

also Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., 205 F.3d 983 (7th Cir. 2000)

(holding the Savings clause does not “abrogate the very federal regulation of

mobile telephone providers that the act intended to create” (citation

omitted)).

11

2. Case Law

Plaintiff relies primarily on two cases for its argument that we should

not read the Communications Act’s remedial scheme as comprehensive and

displacing. The first is from the D.C. Circuit and the second from the

Supreme Court. We begin with the circuit court decision. Plaintiff points to

the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Northpoint Technology, Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d

61 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In Northpoint, the circuit court was faced with an

Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) challenge to FCC rulemaking. Id.

The rule covered sharing of certain bandwidth channels between terrestrial

video distribution providers and satellite video providers. Id. at 64. The court

rejected the challenge to the rule and stated, that if Northpoint was alleging

a breach of an agreement between it and the FCC, that would implicate the

Tucker Act and not the APA. Id. at 185.

That statement, besides being unnecessary to the disposition of the

case is limited to the precise context in which it was stated. The APA’s

presumed remedy of setting aside agency action when a violation is found,

see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), is limited when other adequate remedies are present

at law, such as the Tucker Act. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“Agency action made

reviewable by statue and final agency action for which there is no other

adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review”). Because the

Tucker Act would provide adequate relief for a contract dispute with the

government, the APA would be inapplicable in such disputes. We thus

understand the D.C. Circuit’s statement to be an invocation of the APA’s

own limiting principle regarding judicial review and not a statement

regarding the Communications Act’s exclusive review scheme. Section 414

does not save jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. 9

Lastly, the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in McLaughlin

Chiropractic Associates is not to the contrary. Plaintiff argues that

McLaughlin created a distinction between enforcement actions and

9

Nor does it, as plaintiff urges, create an ambiguity through which the Tucker

Act might avoid displacement. Plaintiff argues that neither the

Communications nor Hobbs Acts address the question of sovereign

immunity. Therefore, plaintiff argues, they do not unequivocally waive

sovereign immunity and cannot displace the Tucker Act. Not so. Assuming

that the SNA creates a right of recovery enforceable in this court via the

Tucker Act, it is displaced if Congress unambiguously expressed an intent to

divest this court of jurisdiction. As we held above, Congress unequivocally

manifested such displacement through the passage of the Communication

Act’s comprehensive remedial scheme.

12

challenges to FCC action. The former are suits under the Communications

Act against parties other than the FCC. The latter are squarely within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the federal appeals courts as the Federal Circuit held

in Folden, Biltmore, Alpine PCS, and Sandwich Isles.

In McLaughlin, a chiropractic association brought a class action in

district court against McKesson Corporation for violations of the Telephone

Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, another statute grafted into the

Communications Act. 606 U.S. at 149. That act provides a private right of

action against marketers who send unsolicited advertisements by fax without

an opt-out notice attached. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C), 2(D). During the

pendency of that action, the FCC issued an order concerning the meaning of

the term “telephone facsimile machine” contained in the act, declaring that

online fax services did not fit within the meaning of the term. 606 U.S. at

150. After that order, the district court viewed itself as bound by the FCC’s

pronouncement and granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs. The

Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 151. The Supreme Court granted the writ of

certiorari to decide whether the Hobbs Act, incorporated by the

Communications Act and relevant here, mandated the result below. That is

to say, certiorari was granted on whether the district court was bound by the

final FCC action. Id.

The Court began with the Hobbs Act’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction

to the circuit courts to review FCC orders. The issue was thus whether the

district court, in an enforcement action of a provision of the Communications

Act, was bound by an FCC order interpreting that same provision. The Court

began with an exercise in taxonomy by categorizing three types of pre-

enforcement reviews of agency rules and orders. Id. at 153–54. The first

consists of any statutes that authorize pre-enforcement judicial review but

preclude subsequent judicial review during enforcement proceedings. Id. at

153. Two environmental statutes were given as examples. The second

category covers the opposite scenario, in which a statute expressly authorizes

both pre-enforcement judicial review and review of agency action during

enforcement proceedings. Id. at 153. The third category is in-between the

first two: the statute provides for pre-enforcement review of agency action

but is silent as to the courts’ ability to take up the validity of agency orders

during an enforcement proceeding. Id. at 154. That was the scenario in

McLaughlin.

Citing Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024),

the Court said that the default rule was to allow district courts to take up the

issue of an agency’s interpretation of a statute during an enforcement

proceeding. McLaughlin, 606 U.S. at 155–56. Thus, if a statute does not

13

expressly preclude judicial review during enforcement proceedings, a district

court may review the agency’s interpretation of a statute. Id. The Court went

on to hold that the Hobbs Act did not expressly limit a district court’s review

during enforcement proceedings. Id. at 159-62. The result then was that the

district court had erred in viewing itself as bound by the FCC’s interpretation

of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Id. at 168.

SI casts itself in the shoes of the chiropractic association in

McLaughlin. Its Tucker Act suit seeks to enforce the SNA against the party

subject to the statutory cause of action, here the government. The conclusion

for plaintiff is that this court, like the district court in McLaughlin, is not

bound by any pronouncements of the FCC regarding the SNA. By extension,

SI reasons our jurisdiction must not be precluded by section 402(a)’s

invocation of the Hobbs Act. We do not so read McLaughlin.

We do not think this suit is an “enforcement action” as the term is

used by the McLaughlin Court. It explained that it used the term as a

shorthand for the APA’s “civil or criminal proceedings for judicial

enforcement.” Id. at 153 n.1. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 703). The Court meant that

the term included “both (i) enforcement actions brought by the Government

and (ii) civil suits brought by private parties alleging a defendant’s violation

of a statute, regulation, or order. Id. This second type of enforcement action

is represented in Mclaughlin where the chiropractic association sought to

enforce the statutory prohibition against unsolicited fax advertisements

against the party sending them. The SNA’s provisions relied upon by SI are

not analogous. The SNA does not create private rights of action against non-

government entities. The SNA is an attempt to incentivize conduct by

creating a compensation program solely administered by the FCC.

Plaintiff is neither the government nor a private party aggrieved by

some third-party violation of statutory proscriptions. Unlike McLaughlin, SI

has no private cause of action created by the act against a true third-party

violator of the act. In such a case, the trial court would necessarily be called

upon to determine the parties’ standing under or rights vis-à-vis the statute in

question. The Supreme Court applied Loper Bright to mean that, unless

expressly prohibited, the courts’ purview in such a case would include the

interpretation of the statute alleged to have been violated by the third party.

Id. at 157–58. 10 This holding is inapplicable here because plaintiff is not an

10

On February 27, 2026, plaintiff filed supplemental authority expanding on

its interpretation of McLaughlin. Astro Companies, LLC v. WestFax Inc.,

2026 WL 346180 (D. Colo. 2026) (holding that the district court was not

bound by the agency decision and thus had jurisdiction); Alvarez v. Fiesta

14

enforcer of a private right of action against a third-party violator of the SNA.

It is the FCC that is tasked with taking agency action to distribute the

program’s funds to eligible providers. Plaintiff alleges that it is such a

provider. It is perturbed by the lack of payments received from the FCC. Per

the terms of the SNA, it will have to seek a determination by the agency, as

it has done. If SI is unsuccessful, then it may seek review in the exclusive

forum vested with jurisdiction to hear that challenge: the circuit courts. 11

In sum, this court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction because

the Communications Act is a comprehensive remedial framework that

displaces Tucker Act review. Sandwich Isles Comm’cns, 992 F.3d at 1363–

65. Plaintiff’s attempt to shoehorn itself into the position of an enforcement

action plaintiff like that in McLaughlin is an attempt to fit a square peg into

a round hole. Congress has spoken regarding any challenge to the FCC’s

orders and actions under the SNA, and it has spoken conclusively and

unambiguously. As in Alpine PCS and Sandwich Isles Communications,

plaintiff’s suit is a challenge to the agency’s determination of its eligibility

for compensation under the act, which is reserved for the FCC and the circuit

courts.

II. Section 1500 Precludes Jurisdiction

There is an independent and equally conclusive problem with

jurisdiction in this court: 28 U.S.C. § 1500. Section 1500 divests this court

of jurisdiction when there is an (1) “an earlier-filed suit” that is (2) “based on

Nissan, Inc., 2026 WL 202930 (S.D. Tex. 2026) (reading McLaughlin to

permit statutory interpretation instead of Chevron deference); Loudermilk v.

Maelys Cosmetics USA, Inc., 2025 WL 3625779 (N.D. Ga. 2025) (holding

the same); TowerNorth Development, LLC v. City of Geneva, Illinois, 2025

WL 2767029 (N.D. Ill. 2025) (holding the same). As discussed above, this is

not an enforcement action and thus McLaughlin and its progeny are

inapposite.

11

Our holding will not strip plaintiff of a monetary remedy. The result of a

favorable FCC determination or a successful challenge in the Circuit court

would be a declaration of plaintiff’s rights under the SNA, which, if

appropriate, will include its right to sums appropriated for compensation of

rural cell service providers who remove the affected equipment. C.f. Bowen

v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 907 (rejecting the argument that an APA

challenge was unavailable because monetary relief was available pursuant to

the Tucker Act, noting that the plaintiff could not receive prospective relief

under the Tucker Act for future payments).

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substantially the same operative facts as the Claims Court suit.” United States

v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307, 317 (2011)(quotation omitted).

The “relief sought in each suit” has no bearing on the second element. Acetris

Health, LLC v. United States, 949 F.3d 719, 728 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing

Tohono O’Odham).

Here, the first condition for dismissal was triggered when SI filed its

mandamus petition on April 17, 2025, over two months before it filed its

complaint here. Although, the mandamus petition is no longer pending, In

re: SI Wireless, LLC, No. 25-1112, slip op. at 1 (D.C. Cir. October 1, 2025),

the pertinent question is whether it was pending when plaintiff filed here. See

Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013). It was.

SI disagrees, however, by arguing that the D.C. Circuit does not have

jurisdiction over money-mandating or contract claims. See Climate United

Fund v. Citibank, N.A., 154 F.4th 809, 822 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (holding this

court has “exclusive jurisdiction because the remedy [sought] is

contractual”). 12 Plaintiff reasons that, if the other court lacks jurisdiction, a

claim cannot be considered pending. See Acetris, 949 F.3d at 729 (The Court

of International Trade lacked “colorable jurisdiction to review the merits” of

an agency decision and thus its decision did “not have preclusive effect under

section 1500”). While the D.C. Circuit may not have jurisdiction over the

case plaintiff brings here, that is not the proper question. The question is

whether the D.C. Circuit had jurisdiction to hear the “pending” case in front

of it—a mandamus petition. The D.C. Circuit possessed jurisdiction over that

matter. See, e.g., In re Tennant, 359 F.3d 523, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

(explaining that mandamus jurisdiction lies with the court that has the

ultimate decision to review a decision). Clearly the D.C. Circuit had

jurisdiction to consider the mandamus request although it dismissed the

petition because the matter was still pending at the FCC. In re: SI Wireless,

LLC, No. 25-1112, slip op. at 1 (D.C. Cir. October 1, 2025) (per curiam). The

first prong of section 1500 is met.

Next, SI contends section 1500 is also inapplicable because the

mandamus petition seeks different relief and alleges different facts than SI

does here. As stated above, however, the difference in potential relief is

irrelevant for section 1500 purposes. Plaintiff argues that the operative facts

are substantially different because the grounds for review are not the same.

Here, SI lodges its complaint under the SNA, Compl. ¶ 3, while in the D.C.

Circuit, it does so under the All Writs and Administrative Procedure Acts.

12

Reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 25-5122, 2025 WL 3663661

(D.C. Cir. Dec. 17, 2025).

16

See Mand. Pet. at 30. The mandamus petition alleges retaliation, id. at 29,

and unreasonable delay. Id. at 30. Here, SI contends the key operative fact is

the FCC’s non-payment—something not required for a favorable ruling for

plaintiff by the D.C. Circuit.

Although there are differences between the two suits, the operative

facts are the same. The FCC’s freeze on reimbursement precipitated both of

SI’s suits. The suspension is the proximate cause for both lawsuits. Necessary

facts are common to both suits. Whether or not SI met the SNA’s customer

requirements, submitted its equipment removal plan, and filed its timeline

are all relevant to both cases. Furthermore, whether the FCC personnel made

statements indicating a quid pro quo, confirmed SI’s successful application

or made initial payments are also relevant facts here and in the mandamus

petition. The conclusion is thus not in doubt. Because there was pending an

earlier-filed suit based on substantially the same operative facts when

plaintiff filed here, its complaint must be dismissed under section 1500.

CONCLUSION

The SNA incorporates the Communications Act—and by extension,

the Hobbs Act. The Hobbs act comes with an exclusive grant of jurisdiction

to the circuit courts to review agency action. Tucker Act jurisdiction has thus

been displaced. Even if it were not, another statute precludes our exercise of

review, namely 28 U.S.C. § 1500, because plaintiff’s mandamus petition was

pending at the time it filed suit here. For these reasons, we need not reach

any of the other issues presented by defendant’s motion. Accordingly, the

following is ordered:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (ECF No. 6)

is granted.

2. Plaintiff’s second motion for leave to file supplemental authority

(ECF No. 24) is denied as moot.

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to dismiss the Complaint and enter

judgment accordingly. No costs.

s/Eric G. Bruggink

ERIC G. BRUGGINK

Senior Judge

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