Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 97000 v. Sex Offender Registry Board

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23-P-1024 Appeals Court

JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 97000 vs. SEX

OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD.

No. 23-P-1024.

Worcester. January 13, 2025. – May 15, 2026.

Present: Rubin, Henry, & Walsh, JJ.

Sex Offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community

Notification Act. Evidence, Expert opinion, Sex offender.

Witness, Expert. Administrative Law, Hearing, Judicial

review, Regulations, Substantial evidence.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on

July 28, 2022.

The case was heard by Valerie A. Yarashus, J.

Colin Caffrey for the plaintiff.

Jessica M. Blackman for the defendant.

HENRY, J. The plaintiff, John Doe, appeals from a Superior

Court judgment affirming his reclassification by the Sex

Offender Registry Board (SORB) as a level two sex offender. On

appeal, Doe argues that the hearing examiner (examiner), who

reduced his classification from a level three to a level two sex

offender, (1) abused her discretion in denying expert witness

2

funds where Doe was an emerging adult at the time he committed

the sex offenses of which he was convicted, (2) abused her

discretion in applying SORB's factor 2 (repetitive and

compulsive behavior), see 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(2) (2016),1

and (3) erred in classifying him as a level two sex offender.

We affirm.

Background. 1. The offenses. In 1997, when Doe was

thirteen years old, he sexually assaulted a nine year old boy

(victim one). The incident involved Doe repeatedly pulling the

boy's pants down and touching his penis. Victim one's family

reported Doe to the police, and Doe was interviewed by an

officer. After victim one's parents and Doe's parents agreed

that Doe would engage in counseling, no criminal charges were

filed.

About four years later, from July 2001 through January

2003, when Doe was almost eighteen,2 and continuing until after

he turned nineteen years old, he sexually assaulted five

additional child victims (victims two through six), all known to

1 We refer to SORB's classification factors by number, or

name and number, it being understood that each of them appears

in the corresponding subpart of 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33

(2016). SORB's regulations were updated in 2025, but the 2016

version of the regulations were in effect at the time of the

examiner's decision in this case and therefore govern our

analysis.

2 Doe turned eighteen on August 30, 2001.

3

him. The victims included four boys, aged twelve to fourteen,

and one fifteen year old girl. Doe had a business where he

employed one of the victims and invited others to visit and use

the business's Internet service. Doe was trusted by the victims

as a babysitter and friend, and by victim four as a boyfriend.

Doe, however, used his business and access to the victims' homes

to commit sexual offenses. Doe's sexual offenses against the

victims included taking pictures of victim two while he was

using the bathroom, placing his mouth on the genitals of victims

two and five, penetrating victim four with his penis, offering

to buy things or pay the victims if they engaged in a variety of

sexual acts, groping the victims, asking the male victims to

show their penises to him, and showing them pornography.

2. Procedural history. In November 2004, Doe pleaded

guilty to numerous sexual offenses committed against victims two

through five.3 Doe was sentenced to from eight to twenty years

in prison followed by fifteen years of probation from and after

his release. Doe was finally classified as a level three sex

offender in May 2011.

Although Doe was never criminally charged with sexually

3

assaulting victim one or convicted of his sexual offenses

against victim six, the examiner found victim one's and victim

six's allegations to be detailed, credible, and reliable, and

considered them as fact.

4

In December 2020, Doe filed a motion for reclassification.

He also filed a motion for funds to hire an expert "to consult

and explore" his risk of recidivism given his "age and maturity

at the time of his sexual offenses," which Doe asserted were

"conditions and circumstances special to [him]."

In May 2022, the examiner held a de novo hearing on the

basis of documentary evidence submitted by both parties. At the

hearing, the examiner took the motion for expert funds under

advisement. The hearing examiner denied the motion, concluding:

"I give consideration in my analysis of the Petitioner's

current risk of re-offense and degree of dangerousness to

the fact that the Petitioner's deviant sexual behaviors

began when he was a juvenile and continued into late

adolescence, a time where he lacked the same level of

maturity as that of a fully developed adult. I therefore

do not believe an expert to be necessary . . . ."

(Emphasis added.)

At the time of the reclassification decision, Doe was nearly

thirty-nine years old. After taking into account Doe's youth at

the time of his offenses, the examiner reduced Doe's

classification from level three to level two. Pursuant to G. L.

c. 30A, § 14, and G. L. c. 6, § 178M, Doe sought review of his

classification, which was upheld by a judge of the Superior

Court.

Discussion. 1. Expert witness funds. Doe argues that the

examiner abused her discretion in denying expert witness funds

for testimony on brain development because he was an "emerging

5

adult" when he committed his later offenses. On this record, we

do not discern that the hearing examiner abused her discretion

in denying Doe expert funds on his emerging adult status.

Doe was eighteen and nineteen years old when he committed

most of the sexual offenses against victims two through six,

making him an adult offender as defined by SORB's regulations.

See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.03 (2016) (defining "juvenile" sex

offender as "[a]n individual younger than [eighteen] years old

at the time of committing a sex offense"). "A properly

promulgated regulation 'has the force of law . . . and must be

accorded all the deference due to a statute'" (citation

omitted). Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex

Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 629 (2011) (Doe

No. 10800).

While we acknowledge the holding by the Supreme Judicial

Court that "emerging adults," eighteen to twenty year olds,

should not be sentenced to life in prison without parole because

their brains "are not fully developed and are more similar to

those of juveniles than older adults," Commonwealth v. Mattis,

493 Mass. 216, 217-218, 234 (2024), Mattis did not specifically

address what effect, if any, the brain development of emerging

adults has on recidivism for sexual offenses in their later

years, see id. at 227. In fact, in Doe, Sex Offender Registry

Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 113

6

(2014) (Doe No. 68549), the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the

argument of a man who had committed sex offenses only as a

juvenile and was significantly older at the time of the

classification. The Supreme Judicial Court noted that "the

[SORB] guidelines specify whether each of the factors enumerated

in them applies in whole, in part, or not at all to a

'[j]uvenile [o]ffender.'" Id.4

Importantly, in the context of classification of sex

offenders, each factor states whether it applies differently to

juvenile offenders, and many factors apply in the same way to

adult and juvenile offenders.5 Of the high-risk and risk-

elevating factors that the examiner applied to Doe, factors 19

(level of physical contact), 20 (diverse sexual behavior), 21

4 At the time the Supreme Judicial Court decided Doe

No. 68549 in 2014, SORB regulations defined "juvenile" as "any

sex offender who was younger than [seventeen] years old at the

time he [or she] committed all of his or her sex offenses." Doe

No. 68549, 470 Mass. at 113, quoting 803 Code Mass. Regs.

§ 1.39(4) (2013). In 2016, SORB changed the definition of

"juvenile" and the placement of that definition in the

regulations. See Code Mass. Regs. § 1.03 (2016) (defining

"juvenile" as "[a]n individual younger than [eighteen] years old

at the time of committing a sex offense").

5 The court recognizes that SORB's regulations provide

juvenile offenders certain additional procedural protections

during the classification process, including, for example,

preparation of a recommended classification level by "a licensed

psychologist or psychiatrist with special expertise in the

assessment and evaluation of juvenile sex offenders." 803 Code

Mass. Regs. § 1.06(5) (2016).

7

(diverse victim type), and 22 (number of victims) apply the same

to adults and juveniles.6 See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(19)-

(22). The examiner properly applied the adult male standard to

Doe for factor 2 (repetitive and compulsive behavior) because

the juvenile standard may only be applied to adults "whose only

sex offense(s) were committed as a juvenile." See 803 Code

Mass. Regs. § 1.33(2)(c). Factor 3 (adult offender with a child

victim) does not apply to juvenile offenders. See 803 Code

Mass. Regs. § 1.33(3)(c). Because Doe committed most of his

offenses as an adult, factor 3 was properly applied to him.

Even if he were considered a juvenile, the age disparity between

Doe and his victims would instead be taken into account by

factor 27 (age of victim), which applies only to juvenile

offenders. See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(27)(c). Finally,

factor 17 (male offender against male victim) applies to adult

males and only to juvenile offenders who "were 13 years of age

or older at the time of the sexual misconduct," and whose male

6 In determining the weight of factor 19 with respect to a

juvenile offender, the regulations additionally require SORB

examiners to consider the "age difference between offender and

victim; whether there is evidence of an ongoing dating type

relationship; whether the victim consented; and whether there

was force or coercion." See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(19)(c).

Regardless of whether those circumstances were considered here,

even if the examiner had allowed Doe's request for funds for an

expert to address his risk of reoffense, any consideration of

factor 19 pertains solely to the determination of an offender's

dangerousness and not the offender's risk of recidivism.

8

victim was under thirteen and at least five years younger than

the offender. See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(17)(c). In other

words, factor 17 differentiates among juvenile offenders based

on age. Here, factor 17 would apply regardless of whether Doe

was considered an adult or juvenile because he was over thirteen

at the time of the offenses and offended against two males who

met both the age and five-year difference requirements.

Contrast Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex

Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 604, 610 (2013) (Doe No.

205614) (holding that where "guidelines do not take into account

the gender of the sex offender," examiner erred in denying

expert funds where offender was female).7

7 This case was decided under SORB's 2016 regulations. See

note 1, supra. We note that the 2025 regulations expressly

acknowledge the emerging adult issue.

"[SORB] recognizes there is current scientific research

regarding young adults at age 18, 19, 20 years old referred

to as 'emerging adults' and that this population

demonstrates issues with impulse control similar to

individuals in late adolescence. For most individuals who

engage in criminal behavior as emerging adults, they have a

greater capacity to change than older adults (Steinberg &

Scott, 2003)."

803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (2025). SORB also states, "However,

there is no current sex offender recidivism research specific to

emerging adults." Id.

Doe's motion might have been stronger had it articulated

some specific reason to believe an expert might opine that one

who commits a sex offense as an emerging adult has a lower risk

of recidivism than one who offends as a mature adult. See,

e.g., Doe No. 205614, 466 Mass. at 610 (abuse of discretion to

9

Additionally, "the decision whether to grant an individual

sex offender funds for an expert is a discretionary one, to be

based on the facts presented in an individual case." Doe, Sex

Offender Registry Bd. No. 89230 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,

452 Mass. 764, 775 (2008) (Doe No. 89230). After Doe No. 89230,

SORB developed a standard for expert funds: In moving for

expert witness funds, the burden is on the sex offender to

"identify a condition or circumstance special to the sex

offender and explain how that condition is connected to [the sex

offender's] risk of reoffense or level of dangerousness." 803

Code Mass. Regs. § 1.16(4)(a)(1) (2016). "Motions for funds for

the purpose of an expert to provide a general opinion on the sex

offender's risk to reoffend and degree of dangerousness will be

deemed insufficient" and denied. 803 Code Mass. Regs.

§ 1.16(4)(b) (2016).8

deny expert funds where female petitioner supported motion "with

significant evidence that the research undergirding SORB's

guidelines was limited almost exclusively to male sexual

recidivism, in addition to evidence indicating that females have

lower over-all rates of sexual recidivism," thus identifying "a

particular characteristic or condition peculiar to her that the

guidelines do not appear to contemplate, and that an available

expert is qualified to address").

8 To the extent that SORB argued on appeal that, because Doe

failed to establish a circumstance or condition special to him,

the denial of the motion was proper, we decline to consider the

argument, as that was not a ground on which the examiner denied

Doe's motion. See, e.g., Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd.

No. 58574 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 98 Mass. App. Ct. 307,

10

Here, Doe failed to establish the need for expert testimony

on brain development. See Doe No. 89230, 452 Mass. at 775. In

denying Doe's motion for expert funds, the hearing examiner

explained that she did not believe an expert on Doe's emerging

adult status at the time of the offenses was necessary because

she considered Doe's age at the time of his sexual offenses in

her classification decision. This conclusion is bolstered by

the hearing examiner's analysis of factor 37 (other information

related to the nature of the sexual behavior), where she stated

that she considered in her deliberations the "various scholarly

articles" on the adolescent brain submitted by Doe, given his

"youthfulness at the time that he committed the governing

offenses and sexual misconduct." See Doe No. 68549, 470 Mass.

at 112-114 (holding that examiner did not ignore Doe's

adolescence, "a scientifically relevant factor," where studies

comparing adolescent and adult brains not in record and examiner

"took into consideration Doe's young age at the time of his

offenses"). We discern no error.9

312-313 (2020) (declining to uphold hearing examiner's denial of

expert funds on ground not relied on by examiner).

9 Any argument that the regulations are invalid for failure

to account for "emerging adults" must be brought as an original

action for declaratory judgment. See Doe No. 10800, 459 Mass.

at 630 ("A challenge to the constitutionality of a general

regulation cannot be resolved by requesting declaratory relief

in an appeal from an administrative agency decision because

judicial review is confined to the administrative record, see

11

2. Factor 2. Doe argues, for the first time on appeal,

that the examiner abused her discretion in applying factor 2.

Because Doe did not raise this argument below, it is waived.

See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 203108 v. Sex Offender

Registry Bd., 87 Mass. App. Ct. 313, 320-321 (2015) (argument

that examiner arbitrarily and capriciously applied certain

factors waived where raised for first time on appeal).

Even if Doe had preserved the argument, we are not

persuaded. Doe claims that the examiner applied full weight to

factor 2. An examiner may give full weight to factor two "only

when the sex offender reoffends after being 'charged with or

convicted of a sex offense.'" Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd.

No. 22188 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 96 Mass. App. Ct. 738,

741 (2019), quoting 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(2)(a). However,

under factor 2 an examiner "may give increased weight to

offenders who have been discovered and confronted (by someone

other than the victim) or investigated by an authority for

sexual misconduct and, nonetheless, commit a subsequent act of

sexual misconduct."10 See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(2)(a).

G. L. c. 30A, § 14 [5], which has been made based on the

presumption that the classification scheme is constitutional").

10On April 16, 2021, a Superior Court judge issued a

judgment declaring invalid the second and third sentences of

factor 2 pertaining to its threshold weight. See Doe, Sex

Offender Registry Bd. No. 22188 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,

101 Mass. App. Ct. 797, 800 (2022). The portion of factor 2

12

Here, the examiner explained that factor 2 applied because

Doe reoffended after being investigated by police for his sexual

offense against victim one, noting that Doe was not criminally

charged for that offense. In reciting various provisions of

factor 2, the examiner incorrectly stated that "[i]ncreased

weight shall be given to an offender who engages in sexual

misconduct after having been charged with or convicted of a sex

offense." That is the standard for full weight. But the

examiner did not state that she gave factor 2 full weight; she

said only that factor 2 "applie[d]." In other words, although

the hearing examiner made a misstatement, she applied factor 2

in a manner consistent with the regulation's requirements for

increased weight. See NSTAR Elec. Co. v. Department of Pub.

Utils., 462 Mass. 381, 387 (2012) ("[W]e can conduct a

meaningful review of a decision of less than ideal clarity if

the agency's path may reasonably be discerned" [quotation and

citation omitted]).

quoted supra is for adult offenders, but the relevant juvenile

language is substantively similar. For adult males, increased

weight applies "to offenders who have been discovered and

confronted." 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(2)(a). For juveniles,

increased weight applies to juveniles who are "detected," which

includes "being cautioned, warned, disciplined, criminally

charged, or otherwise sanctioned by an adult authority (e.g.

police, parent, or teacher)." 803 Code Mass. Regs.

§ 1.33(2)(c).

13

In any event, the examiner's application of factor 2 was

supported by the evidence. Doe was confronted by the police

when he was interviewed at age thirteen about a sexual assault

he committed. Undeterred by this confrontation, as a seventeen

year old and as an adult, Doe sexually assaulted five more young

victims. See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(2)(a) (factor 2 may be

applied with increased weight "to offenders who have been

discovered and confronted [by someone other than the victim]

. . . and, nonetheless, commit a subsequent act of sexual

misconduct"). We discern no error.11

11 Doe's reliance on Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd.

No. 136652 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 81 Mass. App. Ct. 639

(2012) (Doe No. 136652), is misplaced. In Doe No. 136652, a

hearing examiner applied SORB's regulatory factors to a

petitioner who was ten years old when he sexually offended

against other prepubescent children, in a "bare-bones recitation

of regulatory text." Id. at 652. We were concerned that the

regulatory factors applied were not written with a ten year old

offender in mind, as many of the factors indicated that

offenders who choose victims who are prepubescent or cannot

defend themselves present a greater risk to the public. Id. We

opined that it was not "intuitively obvious," why "a ten year

old who offends with a seven year old inherently presents a

greater social risk than a seventeen year old who offends with a

thirteen year old," holding that it was error for the examiner

to apply, without explanation, regulatory factors "that do not

on their face take account of sexual activity between

prepubescent children." Id. at 652, 656.

Doe argues that the application of factor 2 gives rise to a

similar concern here because he was an emerging adult when he

committed his later offenses. But the circumstances of this

case are readily distinguishable from those in Doe No. 136652.

Doe first offended at age thirteen and was confronted by police;

he then committed multiple subsequent sexual offenses as an

adult. Factor 2 expressly accounts for such situations,

14

3. Substantial evidence. Doe argues that the examiner's

decision to classify him as a level two sex offender was not

based on a reasoned analysis or substantial evidence. To

classify Doe as a level two sex offender, the examiner had to

"find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) [Doe]'s risk of

reoffense is moderate; (2) [Doe]'s dangerousness is moderate;

and (3) a public safety interest is served by Internet

publication of [Doe]'s registry information." Doe, Sex Offender

Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass.

643, 656 (2019).

"We review the examiner's finding that clear and convincing

evidence supported the classification to determine whether it

was supported by substantial evidence." Doe, Sex Offender

Registry Bd. No. 523391, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 94 (2019) (Doe

No. 523391). Substantial evidence is "such evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion." G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6).

including cases where a juvenile is "detected for prior sexual

misconduct" and subsequently offends. See 803 Code Mass. Regs.

§ 1.33(2)(c) (detection includes "being cautioned, warned,

disciplined, criminally charged, or otherwise sanctioned by an

adult authority [e.g. police, parent, or teacher]"). In other

words, factor 2 considers whether an offender was a juvenile

when he was confronted, the extent of the confrontation, and

whether he reoffended.

15

Here, at ages seventeen, eighteen, and nineteen, Doe

sexually assaulted five child victims, a girl and four boys,

while he was an emerging adult and despite having been

confronted by the police for a prior sexual assault that he

committed at thirteen years old. These facts supported the two

high-risk factors found by the examiner, that Doe's behavior was

repetitive and compulsive (factor 2) and that he was an adult

offender with child victims (factor 3). The facts also

supported the risk-elevating factors found by the examiner, that

Doe assaulted extrafamilial victims (factor 7), was a male

offender against five male victims (factor 17), committed

offenses involving a high level of physical contact (factor 19),

engaged in diverse sexual behavior (factor 20), had a diverse

victim type (factor 21), and offended against two or more

victims (factor 22).

The examiner considered mitigating factors, including Doe's

probation supervision (factor 28), his engagement in sex

offender treatment (factor 32), his support system (factor 33),

and his residential and employment stability in the community

(factor 34). As a result, the examiner reduced Doe's

classification from level three to level two. "We can discern

no error in the examiner's weighing of these . . .

factors . . . ." See Doe, No. 523391, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 94,

citing Adoption of Jacques, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 608 (2012).

16

Because the examiner's decision was factually supported and

weighed various high-risk, risk-elevating, and risk-mitigating

factors, we conclude that her decision was supported by

substantial evidence and a reasoned analysis.

Judgment affirmed.

1

RUBIN, J. (dissenting). Because the petitioner should have

been granted funds for the consultation with and possible

testimony of an expert on the issues surrounding the

petitioner's risk of sexual recidivism given that he was an

"emerging adult" –- aged eighteen and nineteen – when he

committed the final sex offenses at issue here, I must

respectfully dissent. The fact articulated by the Supreme

Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Mattis, where the Court held

that "emerging adults" aged eighteen, nineteen, and twenty,

could not be sentenced to life without the possibility of

parole, is "that the brains of emerging adults are not fully

developed and are more similar to those of juveniles than older

adults." Commonwealth v. Mattis, 493 Mass. 216, 234-235 (2024).

Although, as the majority notes, status as a juvenile is

taken account of in the regulations applicable to the

petitioner's case, they do not address the circumstances of

emerging adults. Consequently, the petitioner has met his

"burden . . . to identify and articulate the reason or reasons,

connected to a condition or circumstance special to him, that he

needs to retain a particular type of expert." Doe, Sex Offender

Registry Bd. No. 89230 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 452 Mass.

2

764, 775 (2008) (Doe No. 89230). The hearing examiner thus

erred in denying the request for funds.1

The Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) argues that the

motion for funds could have been denied independently on the

ground that status as an "emerging adult" is not a circumstance

"special to" the petitioner because it is a category that could

include all offenders aged eighteen to twenty years old. But

this case is very much like Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd.

No. 205614 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594 (2013)

(Doe No. 205614). That was the case in which the Supreme

Judicial Court held that it was error to deny a female

petitioner funds for an expert to explore whether and how the

regulations' failure to take gender into account –- which, like

1 The majority suggests that nothing in the analysis would

have changed before the hearing examiner had Doe been a

juvenile, and not an emerging adult when the offenses were

committed. To begin with, without an expert opinion there is no

reason to believe that one would opine that the proper approach

to emerging adults is to treat them as though they were

juveniles. Beyond that, to give just one example of a

regulation relevant here that applies to juvenile offenders, but

not emerging adults, juvenile offenders are entitled to have

their classification level recommended by "a licensed

psychologist or psychiatrist with special expertise in the

assessment and evaluation of juvenile sex offenders." 803 Code

Mass. Regs. § 1.06(5) (2016). Emerging adults are not.

Likewise, where child victims are involved, "high-risk" factor

3, which "is indicative of a high risk of reoffense and degree

of dangerousness," does not apply to juveniles, who instead are

subject to "risk-elevating" factor 27. See 803 Code Mass. Regs.

§ 1.33(3), (27) (2016). Factor 3, though, does apply to

emerging adults. 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(3).

3

"emerging adulthood" in this case, was not then yet considered

by the regulations –-affected her risk of reoffense. Id. at

595. Her status as a female of course would have been shared by

all female offenders. Yet it was found "special to her" within

the meaning of the case law. Id. at 609-610, quoting Doe No.

89230, 452 Mass. at 775. See Doe No. 205614, supra at 610

(petitioner's status as female is "a particular characteristic

or condition peculiar to her that the guidelines do not appear

to contemplate"). And, like the petitioner in Doe No. 205614,

the petitioner may have his claim addressed in this case, his

appeal, and need not bring it in a declaratory judgment action.

Cf. ante at note 9.

The majority suggests that an expert was unnecessary

because the hearing examiner explicitly took account of articles

submitted by the petitioner. Ante at . But, as the hearing

examiner explained in detail, those articles are actually not

relevant to the risk-of-reoffense question at issue here, and

they do not address anything the expert might have.

I note that whether expert funds should be allowed in this

circumstance is a recurring issue, and at least one Superior

Court decision has concluded that a board hearing examiner erred

4

in denying funds for an expert witness regarding brain

development in emerging adults as a factor in risk assessment.2

2 See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 527714 vs. Sex

Offender Registry Bd., Mass. Super. Ct., No. 2481CV01218

(Middlesex County Apr. 18, 2025).

I express no opinion on the 2025 revisions to the

regulations, which are not applicable to this case, and which

the majority describes as "expressly acknowledg[ing] the

emerging adult issue." Ante at note 7. A preface to 803 Code

Mass. Regs. § 1.33 of the 2025 regulations, which sets forth the

risk factors, says,

"[SORB] recognizes there is current scientific research

regarding young adults at age 18, 19, 20 years old

referred to as 'emerging adults' and that this population

demonstrates issues with impulse control similar to

individuals in late adolescence. For most individuals who

engage in criminal behavior as emerging adults, they have a

greater capacity to change than older adults (Steinberg &

Scott, 2003)."

But there appears to be no change to the actual regulations in

the 2025 version that address the issue of emerging adulthood.