Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC.,

CCAP AUTO LEASE, LTD.,

Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

23-cv-05308 (NCM) (ST)

– against –

THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, MARC

LINDEMAN, LELAND SOLAN,

Defendants.

NATASHA C. MERLE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiffs Santander Consumer USA, Inc. (“Santander”) and CCAP Auto Lease, Ltd.

(“CCAP”) are automobile lending and leasing companies. Plaintiffs’ Rule 56.1 Statement

¶¶ 1–2; Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Counterstatement ¶¶ 1–2.1 They bring suit against

defendants The County of Suffolk (“Suffolk” or “the County”), Assistant County Attorney

Leland Solon, and Deputy County Attorney Marc Lindemann concerning defendants’

conduct regarding two automobiles seized from intoxicated drivers in which plaintiffs have

an ownership or financial interest. See generally Compl.; see also Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 46; Defs’ 56.1

1 The Court hereinafter refers to plaintiffs’ Complaint, ECF No. 1, as the “Complaint”;

defendants’ Answer to Complaint with Counterclaims, ECF No. 35, as the “Answer”;

plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF

No. 67, as “Plaintiffs’ Motion”; defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment, ECF No. 69, as “Defendants’ Motion”; plaintiffs’ Combined Reply in

Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-

Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 70, as “Plaintiffs’ Reply”; defendants’ Reply

Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 71 as “Defendants’ Reply”; plaintiffs’ Rule 56.1 Statement,

ECF No. 67-1, as “Plaintiffs’ 56.1”; defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement, ECF No. 69-8, as

“Defendants’ 56.1”; plaintiff’s Rule 56.1 Counterstatement, ECF No. 70-1, as “Plaintiffs’

56.1 Counter”; and defendants’ Rule 56.1 Counterstatement, ECF No. 69-1, as “Defendants’

56.1 Counter.”

Counter ¶ 46. Suffolk brings counterclaims against plaintiffs, alleging that plaintiffs owe

Suffolk towing and storage fees for the automobiles. See Answer ¶¶ 102–16. Before the

Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. See Pls’ Mot.; Defs’ Mot. For

the reasons stated below, with respect to plaintiff’s claims, plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment is DENIED and defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. With respect to Suffolk’s counterclaims, the parties’ motions are held in

abeyance pending resolution of the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

When an individual is arrested for driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) in Suffolk

County, the Suffolk County Code (“S.C. Code” or “the Code”) authorizes the County to seize

the driver’s vehicle as an instrumentality of a crime and subsequently seek civil forfeiture

of the seized automobile. See S.C. Code §§ 420-5 to -10, 818-13 to -20. The Code specifies

that upon such a seizure, the “seizing agency shall send notification of the seizure to all

titled owners [and] registrants . . . within five business days of the seizure.” S.C. Code

§ 420-6(B)(1).2 The notification must “inform the recipient that there will be a hearing

promptly scheduled before a neutral magistrate to determine,” among other things,

“whether the County is likely to succeed on the merits of [a] forfeiture action,” “whether

retention is necessary to preserve the vehicle from destruction or sale during the pendency

of the forfeiture proceeding,” and “whether any other measures would better protect the

County’s interest during the proceedings” such as issuing a restraining order prohibiting

sale or transfer, taking a bond, or using an ignition interlock device. Id. The Code also

specifies that “[w]hen a hearing is held, the neutral magistrate shall review . . . relevant

2 Throughout this Order, the Court omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes, and

citations, and adopts all alterations, unless otherwise indicated.

documents and take any testimony to determine whether the seizing agency has sustained

its burden of proof.” Id. § 420-6(B)(2). If so, “the neutral magistrate shall authorize the

continued retention of the property by the seizing agency pending a judicial determination

of any civil forfeiture action.” Id. These hearings are commonly referred to as Krimstock

hearings, named after a Second Circuit case regarding due process rights in seized

automobiles, Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2002). See Pls’ Mot. 12; Defs’

Mot. 8.3 The Code specifies that Suffolk cannot retain a seized vehicle indefinitely in a pre-

forfeiture posture. Rather, “[a]ny action for forfeiture . . . shall be commenced, in the

manner prescribed by New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 304, within 180 days after

the seizure. Failure to commence such an action with[in] 180 days after the seizure shall

result in the immediate return of the property to its lawful owner.” S.C. Code § 420-6(C).

Furthermore, the Code specifies that “[a]ll property seized pursuant to this article is

subject to reasonable and customary towing, maintenance and daily storage fees” which

“shall be payable to the seizing agent prior to the release of said property.” Id. § 420-7(L).

Currently, the “towing and storage fees assessed by the County” encompass “a flat $250

towing fee and a storage fee of $30 per business day.” Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 44; Pls’ 56.1 Counter

¶ 44.

The present dispute centers on two automobiles—a RAM truck (the “RAM”) and a

Dodge SUV (the “Dodge”)—that were seized in 2022 and 2023 under this statutory

scheme. Pls’ 56.1 ¶¶ 6, 25, 43; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶¶ 6, 25, 43. The facts related to each

vehicle are discussed below.

3 Throughout this Order, page numbers for docket filings refer to the page numbers

assigned in ECF filing headers.

I. Plaintiff CCAP and the Dodge SUV

Plaintiff CCAP is an automotive finance company that takes assignment of

automobile lease contracts and holds title in the leased vehicles. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 2; Defs’ 56.1

Counter ¶ 2. In 2020, a non-party (the “Dodge Customer”) leased the Dodge from a

dealership under a three-year lease agreement. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 15; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 15. The

dealership assigned the lease agreement to CCAP, which “obtained a perfected security

interest and lien in the [Dodge].” Pls’ 56.1 ¶¶ 16–17; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶¶ 16–17. A few

weeks later, “CCAP perfected its lien when the New York State Department of Motor

Vehicles issued a Certificate of Title listing CCAP as the owner of the [Dodge].” Pls’ 56.1

¶ 18; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 18.

On August 20, 2022, the Dodge was seized and towed by the Police Department of

the Village of Quogue incidental to the arrest of the driver for DWI. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 25; Defs’

56.1 Counter ¶ 25. The Dodge was then put into Suffolk’s DWI forfeiture program. Pls’ 56.1

¶ 27; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 27. A Krimstock hearing regarding the Dodge was scheduled for

September 1, 2022. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 28; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 28. Suffolk assigned Assistant

County Attorney Dylan Vincent Reid to represent Suffolk’s interest at the hearing. Pls’ 56.1

¶ 28; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 28. The Village of Quogue sent notice to all interested parties,

including CCAP, that the vehicle had been seized and that a Krimstock hearing was

scheduled for September 1, 2022. Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 28; Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 28. Plaintiffs allege

that CCAP did not receive this notice until September 2, 2022, the day after the scheduled

hearing. Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 28. Receiving this letter was the first time CCAP learned of the

seizure and impoundment. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 33; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 33.4

On September 1, 2022, prior to the scheduled hearing, Suffolk agreed to accept the

Dodge Customer’s relinquishment of her interest in the Dodge in lieu of pursuing judicial

forfeiture. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 29; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 29. The parties dispute (or differently

characterize) what happened next. Complicating matters further, defendants’ two

Rule 56.1 filings assert seemingly contradictory statements regarding what happened.

The Court begins with the plaintiffs’ version. According to plaintiffs, after the

customer signed the relinquishment stipulation prior to the hearing, Suffolk consequently

“canceled the Krimstock hearing.” Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 30 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs “[d]eny . . .

that the Krimstock hearing was held.” Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 29. Plaintiffs also deny the

assertion that “CCAP did not appear at the Krimstock hearing,” because, plaintiffs insist,

“the Krimstock hearing never happened, and so there was no hearing at which CCAP could

appear.” Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 30.

Defendants offer a different description (or descriptions) of what transpired. In

defendants’ 56.1 statement, defendants allege that “[o]n September 1, 2022, the Krimstock

hearing on the [Dodge] was held.” Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 29. But in defendants’ 56.1

counterstatement, defendants “admit that a hearing was not held.” Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 30

(emphasis added). Defendants’ counterstatement goes on to explain that the absence of a

hearing was not “because the Krimstock hearing was cancelled.” Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 30.

4 Defendants state that they “deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a

belief as to when CCAP initially learned of the seizure.” Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 33. The Court

deems plaintiffs’ statement of this fact to accordingly be admitted. See Scarpinato v. 1770

Inn, LLC, No. 13-cv-00955, 2015 WL 4751656, at *2 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2015) (“[A]ny

. . . Rule 56.1 statements that are not specifically controverted are deemed admitted.”).

Rather, defendants assert, the absence of a hearing was because “the County reached an

agreement with the lessee and CCAP defaulted by failing to appear.” Defs’ 56.1 Counter

¶ 30.

The parties also differently characterize what would have happened had a

Krimstock hearing occurred and CCAP been present. Defendants suggest that CCAP could

have “challenge[d] the validity of the seizure or the Village of Quogue’s continued retention

of the vehicle.” Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 30. Plaintiffs assert that “the validity of the . . . continued

retention of the [Dodge] from CCAP . . . is not an issue that is addressed at a Krimstock

hearing.” Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 30. Plaintiffs cite deposition testimony given by Solon, which

they characterize as “explaining that, since lessors ‘never appear at the Krimstock

Hearing,’ none of the conditions imposed on a lessor for release of the vehicle are

presented at the Krimstock hearing.” Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 30 (emphasis added).5

On September 2, 2022, the County sent a letter to the Quogue Police Department

stating that the Dodge was awaiting release to the lessee or their authorized agent. Defs’

56.1 ¶ 31; Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 31. Defendants allege that the County sent the letter

“erroneously.” Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 31. Plaintiffs object to this characterization, arguing that

defendants have cited no evidence for the proposition that the letter was sent in error. Pls’

56.1 Counter ¶ 31.

On September 19, 2022, the Dodge was transferred from the Quogue impound to

the Suffolk County Police Department impound. Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 32; Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 32.

5 Plaintiffs cite pages 42 and 43 of Solon’s deposition transcript. Pls’ 56.1 Counter

¶ 30. Although some excerpts of the transcript have been filed with the Court, see ECF

Nos. 67-22, 69-3, 69-14, neither party has seemingly filed these particular pages.

Suffolk took no action to contact CCAP regarding the Dodge between September

2022 and April 2023, when Suffolk contacted CCAP’s attorney. Pls’ 56.1 ¶¶ 34–35; Defs’

56.1 Counter ¶¶ 34–35. Suffolk provided CCAP’s attorney with a proposed agreement for

return of the vehicle. Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 34; Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 34. Its contents included: (1) that

CCAP cannot return the Dodge to the Dodge Customer; (2) that CCAP must indemnify,

release, and hold Suffolk harmless; and (3) that CCAP must ensure payment of towing and

storage fees. Pls’ 56.1 ¶¶ 36–37; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶¶ 36–37.

The parties differently characterize the proposed agreement. Plaintiffs characterize

it as “provid[ing] a list of conditions for CCAP to satisfy in exchange for Suffolk’s release

of the [Dodge] to CCAP.” Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 35. Plaintiffs also characterize these items as

“demands.” Pls’ 56.1 ¶¶ 35–36. Defendants deny that the items were either “conditions for

CCAP to satisfy” or “demands.” Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶¶ 35–36. Defendants assert, rather,

that the items were instead “negotiable terms of a proposed settlement agreement.” Defs’

56.1 Counter ¶¶ 35–36. Defendants also state that the “terms were common” and that

“terms” like these were “negotiated on a case-by-case basis.” Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶¶ 35–36.

On June 21, 2023, CCAP’s attorney informed the County that CCAP had rejected

the County’s proposal and demanded the unconditional release of the Dodge. Defs’ 56.1

¶ 37; Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 37; Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 38; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 38. The instant litigation

ensued. See Compl.

The parties agree that, to date, Suffolk has not commenced a forfeiture proceeding

against the Dodge. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 31; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 31. However, the parties characterize

the absence of the commencement of a forfeiture proceeding differently. Plaintiffs assert

that “[b]ased upon the [Dodge] Customer’s relinquishment of her interest in the [Dodge],

Suffolk discontinued its effort to obtain judicial forfeiture.” Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 31. Meanwhile,

defendants assert that they merely “sought to negotiate an agreement with [plaintiff CCAP]

before seeking to commence a forfeiture proceeding.” Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 31.

The parties agree that Suffolk at no point obtained a warrant or other Court order

regarding the Dodge. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 39; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 39. According to plaintiffs,

“Suffolk did not arrange for a hearing before a neutral decision maker relating to the

propriety of Suffolk’s continued impoundment of the [Dodge] or the propriety of the

conditions Suffolk placed on release of the [Dodge] to CCAP.” Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 41. Defendants

“[d]eny that there was no hearing as to the continued impoundment of the [Dodge] where

the County was present at the Krimstock hearing and CCAP defaulted by failing to appear,”

but “[a]dmit that the County did not arrange for a separate hearing before a neutral

decision maker on the proposed terms of the . . . agreement [with CCAP] for the [Dodge].”

Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 41.

Finally, the parties agree that Dodge Customer is in default on the customer’s lease

agreement, Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 20; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 20, but the parties disagree about the

ramifications of that fact. The text of the lease agreement states that “[i]f you are in default

Lessor may . . . [t]ake the Vehicle from you without demand.” Lease Agreement § 26(B),

ECF No. 67-6; see also Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 21. Plaintiffs assert that “CCAP was thus entitled to

possession of the [Dodge],” Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 21, while defendants deny this assertion on the basis

that Suffolk “is not a party to the lease agreement” and that the assertion is “a legal

conclusion.” Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 21.6

6 The Court notes that the Dodge Customer brought a separate lawsuit against

defendants, asserting “(1) violation of her Fourth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 based on the County’s retention of the [Dodge] post-seizure without a warrant; (2)

violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the

County's post-seizure retention of the [Dodge] without a hearing; and (3) breach of

II. Plaintiff Santander and the RAM Truck

Plaintiff Santander is an automotive finance company that takes assignment of

automobile installment contracts and holds liens in vehicles to secure payment under

those contracts. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 1; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 1. In 2021, a non-party (the “RAM

Customer”) purchased the RAM from a dealership under a six-year retail installment

contract. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 7; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 7. The dealership assigned the contract to

Santander, which “obtained a perfected security interest and lien in the RAM.” Pls’ 56.1

¶¶ 8–9; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶¶ 8–9. A few days later, “Santander perfected its lien by virtue

of the issuance of a title to the RAM Customer reflecting Santander’s lien.” Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 10;

Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 10.

On March 18, 2023, the RAM was seized, towed, and impounded by Suffolk

incidental to the arrest of the RAM Customer for DWI. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 43; Defs’ 56.1 Counter

¶ 43. Suffolk then subjected the RAM to the County’s DWI forfeiture program. Pls’ 56.1

¶ 45; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 45. A Krimstock hearing regarding the RAM was scheduled for

April 6, 2023. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 46; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 46. The County served notice to all

interested parties, including Santander, that a Krimstock hearing before a neutral

magistrate was scheduled for that date. Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 17; Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 17. Santander

initially learned of the impoundment of the RAM on April 5, 2023, when it received a letter

from Suffolk. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 50; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 50.7

contract based on the County's failure to return the [Dodge] to CCAP in violation of a

release agreement into which she entered with the County.” Burnett v. County of Suffolk,

No. 23-cv-07521, 2025 WL 2783281, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2025). The Court

“dismiss[ed] plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for failure to state a claim and declin[ed] to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.” Id.

7 Paragraph 50 of defendants’ Rule 56.1 counterstatement refers to “CCAP” rather

than “Santander,” but the Court assumes that this is a typographical error. Defs’ 56.1

Counter ¶ 50.

Suffolk assigned defendant Solon to represent Suffolk’s interest at the hearing. Pls’

56.1 ¶ 46; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 46. At the request of the RAM Customer’s attorney, the

Krimstock hearing was adjourned to April 20, 2023 to allow the RAM Customer to turn

over title to the RAM to Suffolk. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 47; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 47. Plaintiffs assert that

Suffolk “took no action to inform Santander regarding the date of the rescheduled

Krimstock hearing.” Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 17. The customer turned over title to the RAM to

the County on April 19, 2023. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 47; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 47; Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 19; Pls’

56.1 Counter ¶ 19.

The parties differently characterize what happened next. According to plaintiffs,

once the RAM Customer surrendered title to the RAM to the County, Suffolk “canceled the

Krimstock hearing.” Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 48 (emphasis added); see also Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 20.

Defendants deny this and instead assert that “[t]he County was present at the Krimstock

hearing on the noticed date, and Santander defaulted by failing to appear.” Defs’ 56.1

Counter ¶ 48. Plaintiffs “[a]dmit that Santander did not appear at the Krimstock hearing,

but deny that there was any hearing at which Santander could appear at all, because,” in

the plaintiffs’ view, “the County . . . canceled the Krimstock hearing as soon as [the RAM

Customer] surrendered title to the RAM to the County.” Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 20.

The parties also differently characterize what would have happened had a

Krimstock hearing occurred and Santander been present. Defendants suggest that

Santander could have “challenge[d] the validity of the seizure [or] the County’s continued

retention of the vehicle.” Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 20. Plaintiffs assert that “the validity of the County’s

continued retention of the RAM . . . is not an issue that is addressed at a Krimstock

hearing.” Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 20. Plaintiffs again cite deposition testimony given by Solon,

which they characterize as “explaining that, since lessors ‘never appear at the Krimstock

Hearing,’ none of the conditions imposed on a lessor for release of the vehicle are

presented at the Krimstock hearing.” Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 20.

Between April 6, 2023 and May 3, 2023, Suffolk took no action to communicate

with Santander regarding the RAM. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 51; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 51. On May 3, 2023,

Santander’s attorney sent a fax to Suffolk asserting Santander’s right to possess the RAM

and requesting release of the vehicle and cessation of storage fees. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 52; Defs’ 56.1

Counter ¶ 52; Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 21; Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 21. In response, Suffolk sent a proposed

agreement to Santander’s attorney. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 53; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 53; Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 22;

Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 22. Its contents included: (1) that Santander cannot return the RAM to

the RAM Customer; (2) that Santander must indemnify, release, and hold Suffolk

harmless; and (3) that Santander must ensure payment of towing and storage fees. Pls’

56.1 ¶¶ 54–55; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶¶ 54–55.

The parties differently characterize the proposed agreement. Plaintiffs characterize

it as “provid[ing] a list of conditions for Santander to satisfy in exchange for Suffolk’s

release of the RAM Vehicle to Santander.” Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 53. Plaintiffs also characterize these

items as “demands.” Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 54. Defendants deny that the items were either “conditions

for Santander to satisfy” or “demands” and assert that they were instead “negotiable

terms.” Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶¶ 53–54. Defendants also state that the “terms were common”

and that “terms” like these were “negotiated on a case-by-case basis.” Defs’ 56.1 Counter

¶¶ 53–54.

On June 21, 2023, Santander’s attorney informed the County that Santander had

rejected the County’s proposal and demanded the unconditional release of the RAM. Defs’

56.1 ¶ 24; Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 24; Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 56; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 56. The instant

litigation ensued. See Compl.

The parties agree that to date, Suffolk has not commenced a forfeiture proceeding

against the RAM. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 49; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 49. However, the parties characterize

the absence of the commencement of a forfeiture proceeding differently. Plaintiffs assert

that “[b]ased upon the RAM Customer’s relinquishment of his interest in the RAM Vehicle,

Suffolk discontinued its effort to obtain judicial forfeiture of the [RAM].” Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 49.8

Meanwhile, defendants assert that they merely “sought to negotiate an agreement with

[Santander] before seeking to commence a forfeiture proceeding.” Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 49.

The parties agree that Suffolk at no point obtained a warrant or other Court order

regarding the RAM. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 57; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 57. According to plaintiffs, “Suffolk

did not arrange for a hearing before a neutral decision maker relating to the propriety of

Suffolk’s continued impoundment of the RAM Vehicle or the propriety of the conditions

Suffolk placed on release of the RAM Vehicle to Santander.” Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 59. Defendants

“[d]eny that there was no hearing as to the continued impoundment of the RAM where the

County was present at the Krimstock hearing and Santander defaulted by failing to

appear,” but “[a]dmit that the County did not arrange for a separate hearing before a

neutral decision maker on the proposed terms of the . . . agreement [with Santander] for

the RAM.” Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 59.

Finally, the parties agree that the RAM customer is in default on his auto loan

contract, Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 12; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 12, but disagree about the ramifications of that

fact. The text of the installment contract states that “[i]f you default, [Santander] may take

(repossess) the vehicle from you.” Retail Installment Contract 4, ECF No. 67-3. Plaintiffs

assert that “Santander was thus entitled to possession of the RAM Vehicle.” Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 13.

8 Paragraph 49 of plaintiff’s Rule 56.1 statement refers to “the [Dodge]” rather than

“the RAM,” but the Court assumes that this is a typographical error. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 49.

Defendants deny this assertion, stating that “Santander did not have a right to immediate

possession of the RAM, as the retail installment contract, to which the County is not a

party, only allows it to retake possession from the customer under certain circumstances.

This statement is also a legal conclusion.” Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 13.

III. Suffolk’s Policies with Respect to Vehicle Seizure and Impoundment

The parties agree that Suffolk “followed its standard policies, customs and practices

when it . . . impounded the RAM.” Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 60; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 60. Plaintiffs allege

that Suffolk did the same with respect to the Dodge, and defendants mostly agree except

with respect to the fact that Suffolk did not communicate with CCAP between September

2022 and March 2023. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 42; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 42. Defendants assert that “this

six-month gap in communication” was due to “an administrative error” where the Dodge

was incorrectly marked in defendants’ records as “awaiting release to the lessee or their

authorized agent” even though in fact there had “been no contact from CCAP or agreement

executed regarding the [Dodge]’s return.” Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 42.

The parties agree that, in general, when “the lessee of a leased vehicle or the owner

of a vehicle subject to a lien surrenders their interest in a seized vehicle to the County, the

County will contact the lessor or lienholder to determine whether they wish to retrieve the

vehicle and, if so, negotiate the terms of release.” Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 11; Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 11. The

County will also “[d]iscontinue all efforts to seek judicial forfeiture of the vehicle.” Pls’ 56.1

¶ 63; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 63. When negotiating the details of the vehicle’s release, “the

County typically prepares a form agreement with proposed terms for the vehicle’s release,

which is then modified during negotiations between the parties.” Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 12; Pls’ 56.1

Counter ¶ 12.

Plaintiffs allege that the County will then “[d]etain the vehicle from the lienholder

or leasing company until the lienholder or lessor agrees to conditions for release of the

vehicle demanded by Suffolk” and “[i]f the lienholder or leasing company will not agree to

Suffolk’s conditions . . . , Suffolk continues to detain the vehicle . . . with no form of hearing

afforded at any time.” Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 63. Defendants deny that Suffolk does either of these

things. Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 63.

The parties also have further disagreement about Suffolk’s approach when a

lending company and the County reach an impasse about the disposition of a seized vehicle

that the driver has relinquished their interest in. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 64; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 64.

Plaintiffs assert that Suffolk “has no policy for affording a lienholder or leasing company

any opportunity for a hearing when its relinquishment of interest detention results in an

impasse with a lienholder or lessor.” Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 64. Defendants disagree, stating that

Suffolk’s “policy is to negotiate with the lessor or lienholder until an agreement on a

vehicle’s return can be reached.” Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 64.

IV. The Instant Lawsuit

On July 12, 2023, still unable to repossess the vehicles, plaintiffs filed the instant

lawsuit. See Compl.; Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 75; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 75. The complaint raises three

counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) deprivation of property by unreasonable seizure in

violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) deprivation of property without due process of

law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) taking of property without just

compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Compl. ¶¶ 51–80. Defendant Suffolk

filed counterclaims against plaintiffs, alleging that plaintiffs owe Suffolk approximately

$8,070 in storage fees for the Dodge and $5,100 in towing and storage fees for the RAM.

Answer ¶ 102.

About three months after plaintiffs filed suit, Suffolk agreed to permit CCAP to

retrieve the Dodge pending the instant litigation. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 77; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 77. On

October 23, 2023, CCAP retrieved the vehicle. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 77; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 77. To

date, Santander is unable to retrieve the RAM from the County. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 81; Defs’ 56.1

Counter ¶ 81.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law.” Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC,

13 F.4th 247, 259 (2d Cir. 2021). Facts are in genuine dispute when “the jury could

reasonably find for” the non-moving party based on the evidence in the record. Borley v.

United States, 22 F.4th 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2021).

The movant “bears the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as

to a material fact.” Jaffer v. Hirji, 887 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2018). Where the moving party

meets their burden, the nonmoving party must provide sufficient evidence establishing a

genuine issue of material fact beyond “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of

evidence.” Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 205 (2d Cir. 2012). The court need only

consider admissible evidence and is not obligated to conduct an independent review of the

record to identify a factual dispute. Looney v. Macy’s Inc., 588 F. Supp. 3d 328, 340

(E.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Amnesty Am. v. Town of West Hartford, 288 F.3d 467, 470 (2d

Cir. 2002)).

When both parties submit a motion for summary judgment, “the court evaluates

each party’s motion on its own merits, and all reasonable inferences are drawn against the

party whose motion is under consideration.” Roberts v. Genting N.Y. LLC, 68 F.4th 81, 88

(2d Cir. 2023). A district court’s role is “not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess

whether there are any factual issues to be tried.” McKinney v. City of Middletown, 49 F.4th

730, 738 (2d Cir. 2022). Furthermore, “a district court may not make credibility

determinations, or weigh evidence” on summary judgment. Reynolds v. Quiros, 990 F.3d

286, 294 (2d Cir. 2021). Thus, a district court denies summary judgment where there are

disputed facts “that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Davis-Garett v. Urb. Outfitters, Inc.,

921 F.3d 30, 45 (2d Cir. 2019).

DISCUSSION

Section 1983 states that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects . . . any person within the [United

States] to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to

the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim against a municipality under Section 1983, a plaintiff

must satisfy the “well-settled requirements of Monell.” Martin v. County of Nassau, 692

F. Supp. 2d 282, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658 (1978)). Under Monell, a plaintiff must plausibly allege three elements: “(1) a

municipal policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) the

deprivation of a constitutional right.” Agosto v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 97 (2d

Cir. 2020). “[A]n underlying constitutional violation is a prerequisite to municipal liability

under Monell.” Walker v. City of New York, No. 24-cv-00330, 2024 WL 1679331, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2024).

With respect to defendants Solon and Lindeman, a “plaintiff may sue a municipal

officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in both his official and individual capacities.” Cass v. County

of Suffolk, No. 01-cv-03348, 2005 WL 1115472, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 11, 2005). To establish

Section 1983 liability of an officer in their individual capacity, “it is enough to show that

the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.”

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Section 1983 claims against municipal

employees sued in their official capacity, by contrast, are treated as claims against the

municipality itself. Ortiz v. Wagstaff, 523 F. Supp. 3d 347, 361 (W.D.N.Y. 2021).

“Therefore, in order to assert a viable claim against a municipal employee in his official

capacity, the plaintiff must have a viable Monell claim against the municipality.” Id.

(quoting Seri v. Town of Newtown, 573 F. Supp. 2d 661, 671 (D. Conn. 2008)).

Plaintiffs’ complaint does not specify whether the individual defendants are sued in

their individual or official capacities, see Compl., but the Court presumes so that plaintiff

intended to sue defendants in both. See Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d 1317, 1326 (2d Cir. 1993)

(“[A] plaintiff who has not clearly identified in her complaint the capacity in which the

defendant is sued should not have the complaint automatically construed as focusing on

one capacity to the exclusion of the other.”); Mobayed v. Pastina, No. 94-cv-06386,

1996 WL 741744, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 1996) (“While plaintiff's papers are silent as to

whether he sues defendants in their personal or official capacities, the Court assumes that

he does both.”).

Plaintiffs’ complaint raises three counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County

and individual defendants, alleging: (1) deprivation of property by unreasonable seizure in

violation of the Fourth Amendment, Compl. ¶¶ 51–60; (2) deprivation of property without

due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Compl. ¶¶ 61–71; and (3)

taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment, Compl.

¶¶ 72–80. The Court addresses each in turn.

I. Fourth Amendment

Count I of plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that defendants have seized and

unreasonably detained the RAM and Dodge in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Compl. ¶¶ 51–60. The Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the people to be secure

in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Plaintiffs allege that defendants “seize[d] the

RAM and [Dodge] within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment” and that when Suffolk

“decided not to seek judicial forfeiture, its continued ex parte detention of the RAM and

[Dodge] became unreasonable” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Compl. ¶¶ 54–57.

The Court finds that plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law

because plaintiffs challenge only Suffolk’s post-seizure retention of the vehicles but

concede that the initial seizures were constitutional. See Pls’ Reply 25 (conceding that

“Suffolk’s acts in seizing and detaining the vehicles pending Suffolk filing an action for

judicial forfeiture did not violate the Fourth Amendment”). The Second Circuit Court of

Appeals has explicitly held that if “an initial seizure of property was reasonable,

defendants’ failure to return the items does not, by itself, state a separate Fourth

Amendment claim of unreasonable seizure.” Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch.

Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 187 (2d Cir. 2004). Rather, “a seizure claim based on . . . unlawful

retention [is] too novel a theory to warrant Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. (citing

United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 802 (2d Cir. 1992)). In a summary order, the

Second Circuit further stated that the Fourth Amendment is not a viable basis for

challenging the prolonged detention of property that was initially seized under lawful

circumstances, and “to the extent the Constitution affords any right with respect to a

government agency’s retention of lawfully seized property, it would appear to be

procedural due process.” Bennett v. Dutchess County, 832 F. App’x 58, 60 (2d Cir. 2020)

(summary order) (quoting Shaul, 363 F.3d at 187).

Several district courts within the Second Circuit have recently cited Shaul to reject

similar Fourth Amendment claims regarding retention of vehicles initially seized under

lawful circumstances. See Mercedes-Benz Fin. Servs. USA, LLC v. City of New York, 770

F. Supp. 3d 643, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 2025); Santander v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2023 WL

12028907, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2023); Santander v. City of Yonkers, 2024 WL

4817649, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2024); The Court reaches a similar conclusion in the

instant case.

Accordingly, with respect to plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, plaintiffs’ motion

for summary judgment is denied and defendants cross-motion for summary judgment is

granted.

II. Fourteenth Amendment

Count II of plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that defendants have deprived plaintiffs of

their property interests in the RAM and Dodge without due process of law in violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Compl. ¶¶ 61–71. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment specifies that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. When a court evaluates a claim

that a state’s procedures for the deprivation of property violate the Due Process Clause, the

court must “consider two distinct issues: 1) whether plaintiffs possess a . . . property

interest protected by the Due Process Clause; and, if so, 2) whether existing state

procedures are constitutionally adequate.” Ford Motor Credit Co. v. NYPD, 503 F.3d 186,

190 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2005)).

For procedures to be constitutionally adequate, generally “individuals must receive

notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Government deprives them of

property.” United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993); see also

TD Auto Fin. LLC v. County of Putnam, No. 21-cv-09080, 2023 WL 6295116, at *7

(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 27, 2023). “Due process does not, in all cases, require a hearing before the

state interferes with a protected interest, so long as some form of hearing is provided

before an individual is finally deprived of the property interest.” Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d

147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Brody v. Village of Port Chester, 434 F.3d 121, 134 (2d Cir.

2005)). “In other words, due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections

as the particular situation demands.” Id. (quoting Brody, 434 F.3d at 134).

The government’s seizure and retention of automobiles under civil forfeiture

statutes has been the subject of extensive Due Process Clause litigation. The Supreme

Court has held that when a property owner will receive a forfeiture proceeding that is

suitably timely, that “satisfies any due process right with respect to the car.”

United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 251 (1986). Two decades ago, in

Krimstock v. Kelly, the Second Circuit held that—in addition to the forfeiture proceeding

itself—when a local government seizes a vehicle without a warrant and retains possession

of the vehicle prior to the conclusion of a forfeiture action, due process requires that the

government provide a prompt, post-seizure, pre-judgment hearing to test the probable

validity of continued deprivation of the vehicle and determine whether the government is

likely to succeed on merits of a forfeiture action. 306 F.3d at 67–68. In 2024, in Culley v.

Marshall, the U.S. Supreme Court abrogated Krimstock, clarifying that with respect to

seized automobiles, due process requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require

separate preliminary hearing. Culley v. Marshall, 601 U.S. 377, 380 (2024); see also

Innamorato v. County of Suffolk, No. 23-cv-06573, 2025 WL 2605604, at *4 n.5 (E.D.N.Y.

Sept. 9, 2025) (noting Culley’s abrogation of Krimstock). Whether a forfeiture hearing

occurs quickly enough to pass constitutional muster is a question to be determined based

on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred &

Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555 (1983). Culley, 601 U.S. at 387.

The Supreme Court’s opinion in $8,850 lays out the appropriate method for

appraising the constitutionality of a delay between a seizure and a forfeiture hearing. The

purpose of the inquiry is to permit appropriate delays but prohibit the circumstance where

“a post-seizure delay may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has

been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time.” $8,850, 461 U.S. at 562–63.

When courts conduct this inquiry, timeliness is to be “assessed by analogizing to a

defendant’s right to a speedy trial and considering four factors: the length of the delay, the

reason for the delay, whether the property owner asserted his rights, and whether the delay

was prejudicial.” Culley, 601 U.S. at 386 (citing $8,850, 461 U.S. at 564). In $8,850, the

Supreme Court found that an “18-month delay in filing a civil proceeding for forfeiture” of

seized property did not, under the circumstances, constitute an “unreasonable delay.”

$8,850, 461 U.S. at 556. Moreover, “Second Circuit cases subsequent to [$8,850] have

allowed significant delays based on these [four] factors.” United States v. David, 131 F.3d

55, 59 (2d Cir. 1997).

In the instant case, plaintiffs allege that Suffolk provides no “opportunity for neutral

review” of continued detention of a seized vehicle “in situations where [Suffolk] decides

not to seek judicial forfeiture.” Compl. ¶ 64. Plaintiffs allege that they had no “opportunity

to be heard in relation to any of [d]efendants’ actions in relation to the RAM and [Dodge]

in any venue at any time.” Compl. ¶ 65. They further allege that Suffolk “did not provide

[p]laintiffs with constitutionally adequate notice of that nonexistent hearing procedure.”

Compl. ¶ 66. Plaintiffs argue that this conduct amounts to a deprivation of plaintiffs’ rights

without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause. See Compl. ¶ 68.

The Court begins its analysis by noting that there are two distinct notice and hearing

procedures contemplated by the civil forfeiture regime at issue in this case. First, the

Suffolk County Code specifies that upon the seizure of an automobile, the “seizing agency

shall send notification . . . to all titled owners [and] registrants . . . within five business days

of the seizure.” S.C. Code § 420-6(B)(1). The notice must inform the recipient that the

County will promptly hold a Krimstock hearing before a neutral magistrate. Id. Although

Culley ruled that such hearings are not constitutionally required, Suffolk is permitted to

offer more process than the constitutional minimum.

The second notice and hearing procedure contemplated by the Suffolk County Code

is the forfeiture proceeding. The Code specifies that the County must either commence an

“action for forfeiture . . . in the manner prescribed by New York Civil Practice Law and

Rules § 304[] within 180 days after the seizure” or “return . . . the property to its lawful

owner.” Id. § 420-6(C). Section 304 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules specifies

the procedures for commencing a civil action in New York State Court. See N.Y. C.P.L.R.

§ 304. Such a civil action entails both notice (via service of process), see generally id.

§§ 306–316, and an inherent opportunity to be heard by the state court where the action

proceeds.

The instant case concerns the seizure and impoundment of two vehicles: the RAM

and the Dodge. The Court considers each in turn.

A. Due Process with Respect to the Dodge

To evaluate plaintiffs’ due process claim with respect to the Dodge, the Court must

consider “whether plaintiffs possess a . . . property interest protected by the Due Process

Clause” and, if so, whether the “procedures [were] constitutionally adequate.” Ford Motor

Credit, 503 F.3d at 190. Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff CCAP has a property

interest in the Dodge protected by the Due Process Clause, so the principal inquiry is

whether the procedures employed pass constitutional muster.

Under $8,850, the Court must consider four factors to evaluate the constitutionality

of the period of time during which CCAP was deprived of its property and had not received

a forfeiture hearing. The first factor is “the length of the delay.” Culley, 601 U.S. at 386

(citing $8,850, 461 U.S. at 564). The Dodge was seized on August 20, 2022 incident to the

arrest of the driver for DWI. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 25; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 25. The Dodge was

physically turned over to CCAP on October 23, 2023. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 77; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 77.

In total, a period of fourteen months and three days elapsed between the seizure of the

vehicle and Suffolk complying with the requirement to either hold a forfeiture hearing as

contemplated by Culley or cease the deprivation of property. In $8,850, the Supreme

Court found a period of eighteen months to be “quite significant” and “a substantial period

of time” (though ultimately permissible under the circumstances). 461 U.S. at 565, 569.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the “length of the delay” here of fourteen months weighs

in plaintiffs’ favor.

The second factor is the “reason for the delay.” Culley, 601 U.S. at 386 (citing

$8,850, 461 U.S. at 564). The fourteen-month period consists of four phases: (1) the time

between when the vehicle was seized in August 2022 and the date of the scheduled

Krimstock hearing in September 2022; (2) the time between September 2022 and April

2023 when neither CCAP nor the County contacted each other; (3) the time between April

2023 and July 2023 when the County was attempting to have CCAP enter into an

agreement; (4) the time between July 2023 and October 2023 when this litigation was

ongoing and before the County had returned the vehicle.

With respect to the first phase, the Court finds this brief delay in advance of holding

a Krimstock hearing to be an appropriate reason for delay. The reason for this portion of

the overall delay thus weighs in favor of the County.

The second phase encompasses a period where neither CCAP nor the County

attempted to contact each other about the vehicle and no material events transpired.

Defendants allege that this portion of the delay stemmed from “an administrative error”

where the vehicle was mistakenly marked in the County’s records as awaiting release to

the lessee even though in fact no arrangement had been set for the vehicle’s disposition.

Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶¶ 42, 61. Plaintiffs do not posit any alternative explanation for this

period. See generally Pls’ 56.1; Pls’ 56.1 Counter. The Court finds that the County waiting

to initiate a forfeiture proceeding due solely to an administrative error is a poor basis for

the delay. Accordingly, the reason for this portion of the overall delay weighs in favor of

plaintiffs. However, mitigating this somewhat is the fact that CCAP admits that it knew of

the seizure since September 2, 2022, Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 33; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 33, yet made no

effort to contact the County to attempt to retrieve its property during this entire period

lasting approximately six months, Pls’ 56.1 ¶¶ 34–35; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶¶ 34–35.

With respect to the third phase, the parties do not dispute that Suffolk was

attempting to have CCAP sign an agreement that would have resulted in the return of the

vehicle. See Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 34 (“Solon . . . sent a proposed lessor agreement to facilitate the

return of the [Dodge] to CCAP”); Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 34 (“Plaintiffs admit Solon provided

[CCAP’s attorney] with a proposed lessor agreement that would have led to CCAP’s

retrieval of the [Dodge], so long as CCAP agreed to certain conditions in that proposed

lessor agreement.”). The parties also agree that CCAP and the County engaged in

communication about the terms of the proposed agreement (despite disagreement about

whether the provisions were “demands” or “negotiable terms”). See Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 36

(“[T]there were multiple emails exchanged negotiating the terms of the proposed lessor

agreement.”); Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 36 (“Plaintiffs admit [CCAP’s attorney], on behalf of

CCAP, was communicating with Solon and the County regarding the terms of the proposed

lessor agreement . . . [though] object . . . to the extent [d]efendants attempt to characterize

the communications . . . as negotiating.”); see also Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 36 (characterizing provisions

as “demands”); Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 35 (characterizing provisions as “negotiable terms”).

The Court accordingly finds it undisputed that one reason for the delay was the County’s

attempt to resolve the vehicle’s status via an agreement with CCAP.

The Court finds that the County’s attempt to resolve the vehicle’s status via an

agreement with CCAP is a reason for this phase of delay that weighs in favor of the County.

As a starting point, judicial policy strongly favors the resolution of disputes through

voluntary, consensual agreements. See Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120, 129

(2d Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the law encourages settlement of disputes.”); ABKCO

Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[C]ourts favor

the policy of encouraging voluntary settlement of disputes.”). More specifically, the

Supreme Court has instructed that the $8,850 test should be analyzed “by analogizing to

a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.” Culley, 601 U.S. at 386 (citing $8,850, 461 U.S. at

564). In the speedy trial context, delays resulting from plea negotiations—or even time

during which a defendant is merely considering a unilateral plea offer—are routinely

considered appropriate reasons for delay. See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, No. 20-cr-

00379, 2021 WL 1614837, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2021) (“Courts have long recognized

that plea negotiations are a legitimate basis for an ends-of-justice continuance.”);

Brown v. Conway, No. 06-cv-05041, 2009 WL 7809913, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2009)

(finding delay “to give [defendant] time to consider a plea bargain” did not count in favor

of Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment speedy trial claims), report and recommendation

adopted, 2011 WL 1362125 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2011); United States v. Rizzuto,

458 F. Supp. 3d 373, 377 (E.D.N.C. 2020) (noting that court granted ends-of-justice

continuance because defendant would need “time to consider a plea offer”).

Finally, with respect to the fourth phase of delay—between the commencement of

the instant litigation in July 2023 and the return of the vehicle to CCAP in October 2023—

the Court finds this three-month period of delay weighs in favor of the County. After being

sued in federal court, it was reasonable for the County to maintain the status quo for a

period in order to take stock of the situation and develop its legal strategy before engaging

in further action with respect to the vehicle, such as returning the vehicle to CCAP or

attempting to initiate a forfeiture proceeding in state court.

Overall, taking stock of the reason for each phase of the overall delay, the Court

finds that the second factor of the $8,850 test weighs in aggregate in favor of the County.

The third factor of the $8,850 test is “whether the property owner asserted [their]

rights.” Culley, 601 U.S. at 386 (citing $8,850, 461 U.S. at 564). The Court notes that only

six months elapsed between when CCAP first communicated with the County in any

respect regarding the Dodge and the time when the Dodge was returned to CCAP.

Moreover, only four months elapsed between when CCAP clearly announced that it would

not agree to the County’s proposal and demanded unconditional release of the vehicle and

when the vehicle was returned. Specifically, the Dodge was seized on August 20, 2022. Pls’

56.1 ¶ 25; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 25. The first time CCAP sent a communication to Suffolk

regarding the Dodge was April 17, 2023. See Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 35; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 35;

Declaration of Matthew DeLuca, Ex. O at 7, ECF No. 69-24. It was not until June 21, 2023

that CCAP “rejected the [County’s] proposal and demanded the unconditional release of

the [Dodge],” Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 37; Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 37. The County returned the Dodge to

CCAP on October 23, 2023. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 77; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 77. Looking at these

circumstances, the Court concludes that CCAP did in fact assert their rights, which weighs

in CCAP’s favor, but CCAP did not do so until a significant length of time had elapsed since

the seizure. Moreover, CCAP had the vehicle returned to them between four and six

months after asserting their rights. Overall, the Court concludes that the third factor

weighs in CCAP’s favor only modestly.

The fourth factor is “whether the delay was prejudicial.” Culley, 601 U.S. at 386

(citing $8,850, 461 U.S. at 564). The prejudice that this factor is primarily concerned with

is “whether the delay has hampered the claimant in presenting a defense on the merits.”

$8,850, 461 U.S. at 569; see also David, 131 F.3d at 60 (finding no prejudice where

claimant “points to no witnesses or evidence that have been lost as a result of the delay”).

Plaintiffs have not identified any reason to believe that the passage of time made them less

able to present a defense on the merits than they would have been on the day the Dodge

was seized. Accordingly, the Court concludes that this factor does not weigh in favor of the

plaintiffs.

Weighing the factors as a whole, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have not alleged

a meritorious claim that the 14-month detention of the Dodge violated plaintiffs’ due

process rights.

Plaintiffs argue strenuously that defendants’ actions should not be evaluated in

terms of the length of a delay, but rather should be deemed an inherent due process

violation because following a driver or customer’s relinquishment, defendants will never

seek forfeiture against the vehicle. See, e.g., Pls’ Reply 7–8. The Court does not agree with

this analysis. Plaintiffs note that both parties agree that “[w]hen a person who is facing

DWI prosecution and/or forfeiture due to a DWI event relinquishes their interest in a

seized vehicle, Suffolk’s policy is to . . . [d]iscontinue all efforts to seek judicial forfeiture of

the vehicle.” Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 63; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 63. However, one of defendants’ other

Rule 56.1 responses contextualizes what defendants mean by “discontinue.” Specifically,

in response to the assertion that, following the relinquishment, “Suffolk discontinued its

effort to obtain judicial forfeiture,” Suffolk admitted this assertion “to the extent that the

County sought to negotiate an agreement with the lessor before seeking to commence a

forfeiture proceeding.” Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 31; see also Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 49. Following

a relinquishment, Suffolk discontinues all efforts to seek judicial forfeiture while they

attempt to resolve outstanding issues with the automobile lending company by consent,

but should circumstances change, the County could, if it wished, resume its efforts to seek

forfeiture. To be sure, if the County waits long enough without either returning the

property or commencing a forfeiture action, the delay at some point could contravene the

Due Process Clause, but the Court has already concluded that the delay was not

impermissibly long here. Separately, a lengthy delay may cause statutory problems with

forfeiture—such as the 180-day limit reflected in S.C. Code § 420-6(C)—but plaintiffs never

raise the 180-day limit as relevant to the due process analysis and the Court does not

consider this issue given that it was not raised. See generally Pls’ Mot.; see also Pls’

Reply 25, 30 (discussing the 180-day limit only in the context of plaintiffs’ Fourth

Amendment claim and Suffolk’s state law counterclaims for towing and storage fees).

Finally, the Court briefly notes that it does not agree that defendants have

committed a due process violation by failing to “publicize” procedures that are used to

deprive persons of vehicles. See Pls’ Mot. 18. While it is true that the government must

publicize the procedures that it and property owners are obliged to follow in the context of

vehicle forfeiture, see Butler v. Castro, 896 F.2d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1990), these procedures

are described in detail in the Suffolk County Code and on the Suffolk County’s public

website. See S.C. Code §§ 420-5 to -10, 818-13 to -20; Cuthbertson Decl. Ex. 2, ECF No.

69-4. These policies are not so incomplete as to violate the Due Process Clause simply

because they do not state that the County may or will attempt to negotiate a voluntary

agreement in certain circumstances.

Accordingly, with respect to plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim concerning

the Dodge, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is denied and defendants’ cross-

motion for summary judgment is granted.

B. Due Process with Respect to the RAM

To evaluate plaintiffs’ due process claim with respect to the RAM, the Court again

must consider “whether plaintiffs possess a . . . property interest protected by the Due

Process Clause” and, if so, whether the “procedures are constitutionally adequate.” Ford

Motor Credit, 503 F.3d at 190.

To start, Santander has a protected property interest in the RAM even though it

holds only a lien in the vehicle, not title. “[A] lienholder like [Santander] has a property

interest in the present value of a seized vehicle subject to a lien, and the same rights as a

vehicle claimant-owner to expect that a civil forfeiture action be promptly instituted and

then be afforded due process and an opportunity to be heard.” Santander v. Suffolk, No.

20-cv-02656, 2021 WL 4480574, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2021) (quoting Prop. Clerk v.

Leon, 960 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)); see also Mercedes-Benz, 770 F. Supp. 3d at

657 (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects a lienholder’s property interest in a seized

vehicle.” (citing Ford Motor Credit, 503 F.3d at 191)). The County asserts that “there would

be nothing to accomplish through a forfeiture proceeding” because it does “not seek to

extinguish Santander’s interest.” See Defs’ Mot. 23. Nevertheless, each day that the County

holds the RAM and thereby deprives Santander of its property interest in the present value

of the vehicle, the clock is ticking for the County to either: (a) commence a forfeiture

proceeding and have Santander receive the associated notice and hearing, or (b) return the

property interest to Santander.

Next, with regard to the constitutionality of the procedures, the Court must again

consider the four factors under $8,850 to evaluate the constitutionality of the period of

time during which Santander has been deprived of its property interest. The first factor is

“the length of the delay.” Culley, 601 U.S. at 386 (citing $8,850, 461 U.S. at 564). The RAM

was seized by Suffolk incidental to a DWI arrest on March 18, 2023. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 43; Defs’

56.1 Counter ¶ 43. The RAM Customer turned over title to the vehicle to Suffolk on April

19, 2023. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 47; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 47. On July 12, 2023, plaintiffs filed the instant

lawsuit. Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 75; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 75. To date, Suffolk has neither returned the

vehicle to Santander nor commenced a forfeiture proceeding against the RAM. Pls’ 56.1

¶ 49; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 49. Thus the period of delay currently totals around 2 years and

11 months.

The Court notes that although the instant litigation commenced less than four

months after the seizure and has been pending since, that fact does not alter the calculation

of the period of delay. Even if the instant litigation were equivalent to a forfeiture

proceeding for due process purposes, the delay’s endpoint is not merely when a forfeiture

proceeding is commenced, but rather when a forfeiture trial is actually held. United States

v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1163 (2d Cir. 1986) (“To require prompt filing

of a forfeiture action but allow indefinite postponement of the trial would reduce the filing

requirement to a nullity.”); see also United States v. All Assets Held in Raymond James &

Assocs., Inc. Acct. No. XXXXXXXX in the Name of Deltora Enters. Grp. Co. Ltd.

(“Deltora”), No. 19-cv-00377, 2025 WL 3683271, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2025) (“[T]he

Government’s obligation to proceed expeditiously extends beyond the filing of the

forfeiture action to the commencement of trial.”).

The Court finds that the length of the delay—approaching three years—weighs in

plaintiffs’ favor. See $8,850, 461 U.S. at 565, 569 (finding a period of eighteen months to

be “quite significant” and “a substantial period of time”).

The second factor is the reason for the delay. Culley, 601 U.S. at 386 (citing $8,850,

461 U.S. at 564). Defendants allege that since this litigation commenced, Suffolk has

“delayed selling the RAM until the parties’ respective rights to the proceeds from its sale

had been determined.” Defs’ Mot. 24. Although the government’s obligation to proceed

expeditiously is continuous until the commencement of trial in a forfeiture action, courts

may find some periods of delay more understandable than others. For example, courts

may treat time attributable to the government’s delay in initiating a forfeiture action

differently from time attributable to the pace of litigating the action once commenced. See

Deltora, 2025 WL 3683271, at *6 (“[T]he Court recognizes the difference—both

conceptually and mathematically—between the pre-litigation delay (approximately

eighteen months) and the post-commencement-of-litigation delay (approximately forty-

one months). The Court considers the reasons for these delays when evaluating the second

factor in the due process analysis.”).

In the present case, the Court concludes that the second factor weighs in the

County’s favor. Of the two years and eleven months of delay, the overwhelming majority

has occurred during the pendency of the instant litigation. The County’s choice to maintain

the status quo during this time—neither returning the vehicle to Santander, nor selling the

vehicle at auction and returning proceeds to Santander, nor commencing a forfeiture

proceeding—is a reasonable course of action while Suffolk waits for the Court to adjudicate

the rights of the parties. Moreover, there is no allegation that Suffolk dragged its feet or

otherwise took an improperly long time to litigate this case. The duration of the instant

litigation is primarily attributable to discovery and summary judgment motion practice,

and otherwise “attributable to the Court’s schedule.” Id. at *7 (citing United States v.

$307,970.00, in U.S. Currency, 156 F. Supp. 3d 708, 716 (E.D.N.C. 2016)).

The third factor is “whether the property owner asserted [their] rights.” Culley, 601

U.S. at 386 (citing $8,850, 461 U.S. at 564). The Court finds that this factor weighs in favor

of the plaintiffs. After the RAM was seized on March 18, 2023, Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 43; Defs’ 56.1

Counter ¶ 43, Santander informed the County on June 21, 2023 that it rejected the

County’s proposed terms and demanded the unconditional release of the RAM, Defs’ 56.1

¶ 24; Pls’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 24; Pls’ 56.1 ¶ 56; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶ 56. Plaintiffs also filed the

instant lawsuit, which could reasonably be understood as an assertion of rights. See Compl.

The fourth factor is “whether the delay was prejudicial.” Culley, 601 U.S. at 386

(citing $8,850, 461 U.S. at 564). The Court concludes that this factor does not weigh in

favor of the plaintiffs with respect to the RAM for the same reasons as for the Dodge—

plaintiffs have not identified any reason to believe that the passage of time made them less

able to present a defense on the merits.

Weighing the factors as a whole, the Court finds the impoundment of the RAM to

be a closer question than the impoundment of the Dodge. However, the Court holds that

plaintiffs have not alleged a meritorious claim that the detention of the RAM under the

circumstances violated plaintiffs’ due process rights. The Court arrives at this conclusion

chiefly because of the reason for the delay—awaiting resolution of the instant case—and

also because plaintiffs have not articulated why the delay has prejudiced them in terms of

their ability to assert their rights. Accordingly, with respect to plaintiffs’ Fourteenth

Amendment claim concerning the RAM, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is

denied and defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment is granted.

III. Fifth Amendment

Count III of plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that defendants “took [p]laintiffs’ interests

in the RAM and [Dodge]—their right to possession of such vehicles—for a public use,

namely, [Suffolk]’s enforcement of traffic safety obligations.” Compl. ¶ 74. Plaintiff asserts

that “[i]n depriving [p]laintiffs of [their] property in order to force disposal of vehicles

according to [Suffolk’s] unilateral demands, [Suffolk] has exceeded the reasonable scope

of its police power authority.” Compl. ¶ 75. Because Suffolk has not compensated plaintiffs,

plaintiffs allege that Suffolk “therefore took [p]laintiffs’ property for public use without

just compensation in violation of the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Compl.

¶¶ 76–77.

The Court finds that plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim unmeritorious. The Takings

Clause states that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just

compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. However, civil forfeiture against property involved

in criminal activity is not a taking for which just compensation is required. Bennis v.

Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452–53 (1996) (holding that a civil forfeiture proceeding against

a car used in criminal act was not a taking); see also United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 97

(2d Cir. 2011) (“[I]f the government acts pursuant to a forfeiture statute, it may seize

personal property without compensating the owner.”). Indeed, plaintiffs concede that

“[t]here is an exception to Takings Clause liability that applies when property rights are

taken incident to forfeiture actions.” Pls’ Reply 22.

Plaintiffs attempt to get around the exception to Takings Clause liability by arguing

that the “exception applied until . . . Suffolk decided not to seek judicial forfeiture.” Pls’

Reply 22. Even assuming that Suffolk, in fact, “decided not to seek judicial forfeiture,” the

Court does not agree that Suffolk’s continued impoundment of the vehicle at that point

became a taking. A principal reason that the County retained possession of each vehicle

was to collect accrued storage fees prior to relinquishing the vehicle. These fees accrued

because the vehicles had been seized as a law enforcement matter. See S.C. Code § 420-7(L)

(“All property seized pursuant to this article is subject to reasonable and customary towing,

maintenance and daily storage fees as may be established by the Suffolk County Police

Commissioner. Such fees shall be payable to the seizing agent prior to the release of said

property.”). Courts to have considered the question widely agree that the impoundment of

a vehicle due to unpaid fees does not constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. See,

e.g., Tate v. District of Columbia, 627 F.3d 904, 906, 909–10 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding

that where plaintiff had “unpaid traffic fines and related fees,” the “impoundment . . . of

[plaintiff]’s . . . vehicle [did not] constitute a taking for a public use for which she was

entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause”); Oko v. City of

Cleveland, No. 21-cv-02222, 2023 WL 4405270, at *13–15 (N.D. Ohio July 7, 2023); Brite

Fin. Servs., LLC v. Bobby’s Towing Serv., LLC, 461 F. Supp. 3d 549, 558 (E.D. Mich.

2020). To be sure, collecting fees may or may not have been the County’s sole rationale for

continued impoundment, see Pls’ 56.1 ¶¶ 36–37, 54–55; Defs’ 56.1 Counter ¶¶ 36–37, 54–

55 (noting that the County also sought plaintiffs’ agreement to holding the County

harmless, among other provisions), but the parties agree that collecting the towing and

storage fees was one of Suffolk’s motivations, see Pls’ 56.1 ¶¶ 36–37, 54–55; Defs’ 56.1

Counter ¶¶ 36–37, 54–55. Moreover, though the parties dispute whether Suffolk could

lawfully charge towing and storage fees here, see Defs’ Mot. 40–41 Pls’ Reply 29–35; Defs’

Reply 13, the Court finds that it is reasonable for the County, under the circumstances, to

hold the vehicles until the fees are either paid or actually found by a neutral decisionmaker

to be invalid—continuing to impound the vehicles during this time does not constitute a

taking. For these reasons, even assuming that Suffolk “decided not to seek judicial

forfeiture,” the County did not commit a taking by continuing to detain the vehicles until

the accrued fees were resolved.

Accordingly, with respect to plaintiffs’ claim that defendants’ impoundment of the

vehicles violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment is denied and defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment is

granted.

IV. Suffolk’s Counterclaims for Towing and Storage Fees

Because the Court dismisses the only claims over which it has federal question

jurisdiction, it is inclined to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the County’s

state law counterclaims against plaintiffs for towing and storage fees. “[I]n the usual case

in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be

considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee,

316 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,

350 n.7 (1988)). Nonetheless, the parties will be provided with notice and an opportunity

to be heard on the issue. See Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp., 899 F. 3d 77, 82 (2d

Cir. 2018).

Accordingly, the parties shall submit a joint letter on or before March 5, 2026

setting out their respective positions regarding whether the Court should, in its discretion,

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Suffolk’s counterclaims for towing and storage

fees. Plaintiffs collectively and defendants collectively are each allotted 750 words to state

their position. Failure to comply with the Court’s order will result in the Court sua sponte

declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, with respect to plaintiff’s claims, plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment is DENIED and defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. With respect to Suffolk’s counterclaims, the parties’ motions are held in

abeyance pending resolution of the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The parties

are ORDERED to file a joint letter regarding Suffolk’s counterclaims as directed on or

before March 5, 2026.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Natasha C. Merle

NATASHA C. MERLE

United States District Judge

Dated: February 19, 2026

Brooklyn, New York