Flynn

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

CHARLES FLYNN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 3:26-cv-03103-MMM

)

JB PRITZKER, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional

Center, alleges Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process in

their handling of his petition for executive clemency.

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and identify and dismiss any

legally insufficient claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.

The Court accepts factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the

plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory

statements and labels are insufficient – facts alleged must “state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013).

Allegations

Plaintiff names as Defendants Illinois Governor JB Pritzker and the Illinois

Prisoner Review Board.

Plaintiff was convicted of burglary by a jury. He is in prison on that conviction.

He petitioned for executive clemency. He asserts he was denied due process in the

handling of his petition for executive clemency. He seeks money damages for the

purported violation.

Analysis

Although Illinois law establishes mandatory procedures for clemency petitions,

the Governor retains complete discretion in deciding when to consider the clemency

petition and whether to grant the petition. Bowens v. Quinn, 561 F.3d 671, 675–76 (7th

Cir. 2009). “There is no Fourteenth Amendment property or liberty interest in obtaining

a pardon in Illinois—no substantive entitlement, in other words—and so no ground for

a claim of denial of due process.” Bowens, 561 F.3d at 673; see also Dist. Attorney’s Office

v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 67–68 (2009) (“[N]oncapital defendants do not have a liberty

interest in traditional state executive clemency, to which no particular claimant is

entitled as a matter of state law.”); Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 283

(1998) (holding that state’s clemency procedures did not violate due process because the

ultimate decision maker, the Governor, retained broad discretion in granting clemency,

so there was “no substantive expectation of clemency”).

In Woodard, the Court found that “the availability of clemency, or the manner in

which the State conduct[ed] clemency proceedings, [did] not impose ‘atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’”

523 U.S. at 283 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); see also Connecticut Bd.

of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (“[P]ardon and commutation decisions

have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever,

appropriate subjects for judicial review.”).

In other words, a plaintiff has no federal right to have Illinois follow its

procedures on considering clemency petition. Antia-Perea v. Holder, 768 F.3d 647, 660

(7th Cir. 2014) (“A gubernatorial pardon is a quintessential form of discretionary

relief.”); Guarjardo-Palma v. Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 806 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] violation of

state law is not a ground for a federal civil rights suit.”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's complaint, and this action, are dismissed with prejudice for

failure to state a claim. Judgment to enter for Defendants and against

Plaintiff, who takes nothing.

2. Leave to replead is denied. Amendment would be futile. There is no

plausible basis for Plaintiff's claim because it is flatly foreclosed by

binding precedent. This dismissal may be found by a future court to count

against Plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Entered this 14th day of May, 2026.

s/Michael M. Mihm

MICHAEL M. MIHM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE