Sanders

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

THERESA MARIE SANDERS, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, Counterclaim Defendants/ )

Third-Party Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 24-CV-258-MTS

)

GRAND RIVER DAM AUTHORITY, )

)

Defendant/Counterclaimant/ )

Third-Party Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

KAMO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., )

et. al., )

)

Third-Party Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Third-Party Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) Motion to Amend and Alter the

Court’s March 31, 2026, Opinion and Order and Brief in Support. (Docket No. 144). After

considering the parties’ briefing on the matter and the applicable caselaw, Third-Party Plaintiffs’

Motion to Amend and Alter is hereby DENIED.

Background and Procedural History

On June 4, 2024, Plaintiffs Theresa Marie Sanders, Adrian Kemohah Sanders, Mahada

Bernadette Sanders, James P. Boese, Monica Boese, and Alysha Boese (“Plaintiffs”) brought their

initial action against Defendant Grand River Dam Authority (“GRDA”). (Docket No. 1). Plaintiffs

filed their First Amended Complaint on May 27, 2025, which included claims against GRDA for

quiet title, trespass, unjust enrichment, fraud, slander of title, injury to real property, and nuisance.

(Docket No. 65 at 5-11). Plaintiffs also included allegations that prior to GRDA’s ownership of

certain electric lines that traverse their property, KAMO Electric Cooperative, Inc. (“KAMO”)

owned and maintained the electric lines and utilized certain unapproved right-of-way easements

from at least 1942 until KAMO assigned the easements to GRDA in 1998. Id. at 2-4.

On July 17, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Third-Party Complaint against KAMO, asserting claims

for quiet title, unjust enrichment, fraud, and slander of title arguing that KAMO unlawfully and

willfully maintained the electric lines “starting from the dates of construction and continuing until

on or about the date of the Assignment.” (Docket No. 95 at 5-9). In response, KAMO filed its

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third-Party Complaint on August 5, 2025. (Docket No. 105).

KAMO argued that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims because Plaintiffs neither owned

nor possessed any interest in the subject property before KAMO’s assignment of the electrical line

and right-of-way easements to GRDA on July 15, 1998. Id. at 5-9. It also asserted that Plaintiffs

could not rely on alleged harms to their ancestors to satisfy the “injury in fact” element for

standing. Id. at 8-10. Conversely, Plaintiffs responded that they had standing to bring their claims

against KAMO pursuant to certain federal regulations, congressional legislation, and Oklahoma

law. (Docket No. 108 at 3). They argued that KAMO’s liability did not cease in 1998 because the

assignment of the easements to GRDA was void for lack of federal approval and KAMO remained

bound under the easements until “released by Plaintiffs.” Id. at 5-6. Plaintiffs further asserted that

their claims were for “live ongoing injuries [] proximately attributable to KAMO” which “became

injurious to all Plaintiffs [] the moment each acquired an interest in the property . . . [and] will

continue to cause injury to Plaintiffs until they are compensated[.]” Id. at 2.

After considering the extensive briefing by the parties and applicable caselaw, the Court

entered its Opinion and Order granting KAMO’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third-Party

Complaint on March 31, 2026. (Docket No. 141). Ultimately, the Court determined that Plaintiffs

failed to establish possession or ownership of the property from 1942-1998, the period at issue in

Plaintiffs’ Third-Party Complaint. Id. at 6. The Court was also unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ reliance

on provisions of the Osage Allotment Act of 1906, Article I, § 3 of the Oklahoma Constitution,

federal statutes addressing Indian lands, and the alleged harms by KAMO to their ancestors as a

means to establish the injury in fact necessary for standing. Id. at 7-10. Accordingly, the Court

found that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims against KAMO and dismissed Plaintiff’s

Third-Party Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Id. at 9-10.

On April 6, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their Rule 59(e) Motion to Amend and Alter the Court’s

March 31, 2026, Opinion and Order and Brief in Support. (Docket No. 144). KAMO filed its

Response on April 14, 2026. (Docket No. 146). Plaintiffs filed their Reply on April 23, 2026.

(Docket No. 148). As such, the Motion is ripe for review.

Legal Standard

Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the Court’s Opinion and Order under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 59(e).1 Commonly referred to as a motion to reconsider, a Rule 59(e) motion “is

designed to permit relief in extraordinary circumstances and not to offer a second bite at the

proverbial apple.” Syntroleum Corp. v. Fletcher Int’l, Ltd., 2009 WL 761322, at *1 (N.D. Okla.

Mar. 19, 2009) (internal citation omitted). The grounds warranting the grant of a Rule 59(e) motion

“include (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable,

1 The Court notes that Rule 59(e) applies to a judgment, which has not been entered in this case.

However, the Tenth Circuit has recognized that “[d]istrict courts generally remain free to

reconsider their earlier interlocutory orders.” Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 647 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th

Cir. 2011). Such practice is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which provides

that “any order or other decision . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . may be revised

at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and

liabilities.” In fact, when considering a Rule 54(b) motion, a court may look to the standard used

to consider a Rule 59(e) motion. See Carbajal v. Lucio, 832 F. App’x. 557, 569 (10th Cir. 2020).

and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Servants of Paraclete v. Does,

204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). Thus, the motion is appropriate where the court has

“misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the controlling law.” Id. at 1012. However, it is

not “a second chance for the losing party to make its strongest case or to dress up arguments that

previously failed.” Sims v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Okla. Cnty., No. CIV-23-780-R, 2026 WL

915584, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 3, 2026), quoting Voelkel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1482,

1483 (D. Kan. 1994). Nor should it be used to revisit previously addressed issues or “advance

arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing.” Servants of Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012.

Discussion

In their Motion, Plaintiffs assert the Court’s Opinion and Order contains “manifest errors

of law and fact” creating “premature judicial involvement” that resulted “in a judgment on the

merits.” (Docket No. 144 at 2). Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the Opinion and Order “should

be altered to address: first, injuries to the Plaintiffs as Trust Beneficiaries under an existing Trust

that has persisted since 1906;[2] second, Plaintiffs’ assertion that KAMO has an ongoing physical

presence on the subject property until released by the Secretary of the Interior; and third, viable

claims such as fraud that did not accrue until the time of discovery.” Id. at 2; see id. at 4-9.

Plaintiffs also contend that the Assignment created “a continuing cloud of title upon the

unextinguished 1906 trust, which has held legal title since before the Assignment was filed.”3 Id.

at 9.

2 Plaintiffs later characterize this argument as the Court’s failure to address “the interest of the

Osage Allotment trust during the time period of 1942-1998.” Id. at 3.

3 In Plaintiffs’ Reply, they characterize their Rule 59(e) arguments as follows: “[1] Plaintiffs have

standing to bring claims as successor trust beneficiaries concerning injuries to unextinguished trust

lands; [2] KAMO disclaimed its right to be relieved of liability for transgressions against

unextinguished Indian trust land without first obtaining approval by the Secretary of the Interior;

In its Response, KAMO argues that Plaintiffs’ Motion is improper under Rule 59(e) as it

“does nothing more than (1) regurgitate arguments previously considered by this Court and (2)

provide additional case law and argument which it did not provide—despite no less than three

opportunities to do so.” (Docket No. 146 at 2). Specifically, KAMO contends that certain

arguments in Plaintiffs’ Motion are contrary to the allegations of the Third-Party Complaint and

made on behalf of a trust that has never been a party to the lawsuit. Id. at 6-7, 11. KAMO further

asserts that Plaintiffs mischaracterize the additional caselaw cited in their Motion and fail to show

“that this Court construed the applicable law incorrectly or made an egregious mistake of fact.”

Id. at 5, 9-10. According to KAMO, Plaintiffs appear to merely disagree with the Court’s

ruling(s).” Id. at 5.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet the requirements of Rule 59(e). In their

Motion, Plaintiffs argue that they have standing to bring their claims against KAMO because

federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over restricted Indian lands and that the Court failed to

address the interest of the Osage Allotment Trust for the 1942-1998 period or Plaintiffs’ interests

as “trust beneficiaries.” (Docket No. 144 at 4-7). They assert that KAMO’s alleged conduct during

the 1942-1998 period at issue in the Third-Party Complaint injured the trust and, as trust

beneficiaries, Plaintiffs have standing. (Docket No. 144 at 5- 6). However, the Court addressed

Plaintiffs’ argument of exclusive federal jurisdiction in its Opinion and Order, specifically

Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Osage Allotment Act of 1906, the Oklahoma Constitution, and other

[3] KAMO’s 1998 fraud is ongoing, and viable according to Oklahoma law because it was recently

discovered by the current trust beneficiaries; [and 4] KAMO has created an ongoing cloud of title

upon an unextinguished trust that has held continuous legal title since 1906.” (Docket No. 148 at

7).

federal statutes. (Docket No. 141 at 7-8). The Court determined that none of the cited authorities

support Plaintiffs’ arguments for standing. Id.

Moreover, Plaintiffs cannot utilize a Rule 59(e) Motion as a means to amend their Third-

Party Complaint. Plaintiffs brought claims against KAMO in their individual capacities, and as

KAMO aptly points out, the trust estate is not a party to this action, nor did Plaintiffs argue standing

based upon their status as trust beneficiaries. (See Docket Nos. 65; 95). Instead, as discussed in

the Court’s Opinion and Order, Plaintiffs alleged they were “the heirs of Thomas Kemohah” and

that KAMO’s conduct caused injuries to Plaintiffs’ ancestors or predecessors in interest and

therefore to Plaintiffs. (Docket No. 141 at 2, 8-9).

Further, it is improper for Plaintiffs to raise new issues or rely on additional authorities in

a Rule 59(e) motion when they could have easily been raised in Plaintiffs’ original briefing to

KAMO’s Motion to Dismiss. For example, Plaintiffs cite to Oklahoma trust statutes and new

caselaw in the Rule 59(e) Motion, which they allege support their standing to bring claims against

KAMO for the time period of 1942-1998. However, the Court provided Plaintiffs with ample

opportunity to raise such issues or support to establish standing in their initial briefing to KAMO’s

Motion to Dismiss. In fact, the Court allowed Plaintiff to address the standing issue on two

subsequent occasions after filing their initial response to KAMO’s Motion to Dismiss, wherein

Plaintiffs continued to raise the same issues and arguments as raised in their initial response. (See

Docket Nos. 108; 125; 129).

As to the additional caselaw cited by Plaintiffs, it does not establish Plaintiffs’ standing to

bring claims against KAMO. In continuation of their argument that they are now trust beneficiaries

and therefore have standing, Plaintiffs for the first time rely on Tanner-Brown v. Haaland, 105

F.4th 437 (D.C. Cir. 2024). (Docket No. 144 at 5-6). However, Tanner-Brown does not support

Plaintiffs’ standing argument in the context of this case. The theory of standing in Tanner-Brown

was “premised on the alleged creation of a trust relationship and attendant fiduciary duties between

the Interior Secretary and the minor allotees under . . . the 1908 Act.” Tanner-Brown, 105 F.4th at

443. Tanner-Brown, the granddaughter of one of the minor allottees, alleged an injury in fact based

upon “the Secretary’s failure to provide an accounting of the allotment,” claiming such injury “runs

to her as the representative of [the] estate.” Id. The Circuit Court agreed and reversed the lower

court’s decision, finding that Tanner-Brown’s alleged injury was the lack of an accounting and that

she “ha[d] standing to assert her claim for an accounting.” Id. at 445-46. Thus, Tanner-Brown

does not apply in this case, as it does not involve a claim against the government for an accounting,

and as discussed herein, Plaintiffs did not bring their third-party claims on behalf of the trust.

Finally, Plaintiffs’ contention that KAMO has an ongoing physical presence on the subject

property until released by the Secretary of the Interior is nothing more than an improper rehashing

of arguments previously considered by this Court. (Docket No. 144 at 8; see also Docket Nos.

108 at 5-7; 125 at 3-6; 129 at 3-4). Moreover, Plaintiffs arguments that they have standing to bring

their fraud and slander of title claims against KAMO because the alleged fraud was only recently

discovered and the assignment by KAMO created a continuing cloud upon the trust are new

arguments that Plaintiffs could have raised in their initial briefing. (Docket No. 144 at 8-9). In

any event, the Court views these new arguments as addressing the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims,

which do not bear on whether Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims against KAMO. Such

claims need not be addressed when a complaint is dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See Docket No. 141 at 10 n.7).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have in no way demonstrated that this Court’s decision

“misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the controlling law.” Barber ex. rel. Barber v.

Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2009). Nor have they shown that an

amendment is necessary to “prevent manifest injustice.” Servants of Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012.

In fact, all of Plaintiffs’ arguments demonstrate their attempt to rehash issues already addressed

and/or to raise new issues or facts that were wholly available to Plaintiffs at the time of their

original arguments. See id. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Motion must be denied.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, Third-Party Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) Motion to Amend and

Alter the Court’s March 31, 2026, Opinion and Order and Brief in Support (Docket No. 144) is

hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 14th day of May, 2026.

MARK T. STEELE, MAGISTRATE JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT