Alexander

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DAVID ALEXANDER, )

R66783, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 25-cv-2091-RJD

)

MADISON EILERS, )

AUSTIN E. DEAL, )

L. TOLIVER, )

SHANE N. CLARK, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DALY, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff David Alexander, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)

currently detained at Lawrence Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights at Graham and Lawrence

Correctional Centers (Doc. 6). He seeks monetary relief and expulsion of a disciplinary action

from his prison record.

Alexander’s second amended complaint (Doc. 12) is now before the Court1 for preliminary

review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any

portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such

1 The Court has jurisdiction to screen the Complaint considering Plaintiff’s consent to the full jurisdiction

of a Magistrate Judge, and the limited consent by the Illinois Department of Corrections to the exercise of

Magistrate Judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding between this Court and the

Illinois Department of Corrections.

relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro

se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816,

821 (7th Cir. 2009).

Alexander’s second amended complaint provides significantly less detail than his original

complaint, and it omits the exhibits he attached to the original, including copies of his final

disciplinary documents. In the second amended complaint, Alexander again alleges that Defendant

Eilers fabricated allegations against him about a sexual advance he made on Eilers, Defendant

Deal did not thoroughly investigate the allegations, and Defendants Toliver and Clark conducted

a faulty disciplinary hearing (Doc. 12 at 5-7). He claims that he is hearing impaired, and Clark and

Toliver conducted the hearing at his cell front in restrictive housing. (Id. at 6-7). Due to the noisy

environment, Alexander alleges he could not clearly hear what Toliver or Clark said and he did

not know a hearing was taking place, what the charges were, or if he could present evidence. (Id.

at 7). He alleges the forum for the hearing was inappropriate and violated Departmental Rules. He

also alleges that when he was transferred some of his personal property was lost, and the

disciplinary punishment “infringed upon [his] normal prison life.” (Id. at 6).

Alexander seeks expungement of the disciplinary charges and monetary compensation

(Doc. 12 at 9). The materials submitted in support of the First Amended Complaint include a copy

of the disciplinary ticket, which indicated that on February 25, 2025, Alexander refused to sign

when a copy of the ticket was delivered to him (Doc. 6 at 17). The materials also included the

March 7, 2025, Adjustment Committee Final Summary, wherein the committee recorded excerpts

of statements Alexander made about the allegations and indicated he pled not guilty (Doc. 6 at 19).

As punishment, Alexander received 28 days in segregation. (Id.).

Alexander’s complaint is inadequate, as pleaded for all the same reasons initially stated in

relation to his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10). First, he faults Eilers for fabricating

disciplinary information, but an inmate cannot maintain a false discipline claim where he

ultimately received due process via the prison’s disciplinary proceedings. See Hanrahan v. Lane,

747 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing allegations of false discipline by guards planting alleged

false evidence, and finding there cannot be a claim if inmate got due process in the subsequent

disciplinary proceedings). As the Court explains, Alexander received all the process he was due

based on the punishment he received, thus he cannot maintain a fabricated discipline claim against

Eilers.

Second, Alexander challenges Deal’s investigation of Eilers’ credibility, but there is no

freestanding right in the prison disciplinary process associated with a hearing investigator’s

potential role in the process. Alexander does not contend that Deal prevented him from gathering

or providing his own evidence, he merely complains Deal did not exercise diligence in his own

investigation. Alexander also faults Deal for subjecting him to an emergency prison transfer, but

inmates generally have no protected liberty interest in the prison transfer process. Meachum v.

Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (“[t]hat life in one prison is much more disagreeable than in

another does not in itself signify that a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest is implicated”).

Alexander may only have a claim related to the transfer if the conditions at the new institution

were significant and atypical compared to Graham, but he has said nothing of the sort. At most,

Alexander alleges in his second amended complaint that his life at Lawrence was different because

some of his personal property was lost during the transfer, but this does not create a new basis for

liability.2 As such, the Court finds no basis for Alexander to proceed against Deal.

2 An inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections may only challenge the loss of personal property in the Illinois

Court of Claims. See Cunningham v. Washington, 16 Fed. App’x 502, 506 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that a district court

Third, Alexander still has not alleged that the time he spent in segregation amounted to a

deprivation of a liberty interest. “Prisoners generally do not have a liberty interest in avoiding brief

periods of segregation, whether administrative or disciplinary. Smith v. Akpore, 689 Fed. App’x

458, 460 (7th Cir. 2017) citing Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 524-25 (7th Cir. 2017). In Smith, the

Seventh Circuit concluded that 30 days in investigative segregation and 3 months of disciplinary

segregation were not long enough to raise a Due Process concern. Even 6 months in segregation

and 6 months’ loss or restriction of privileges—do not, without more, implicate a protected liberty

interest. See Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 2013) (six-month disciplinary

segregation alone); Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 605, 613 (7th Cir. 2005) (temporary loss of

contact visitation and restricted commissary); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 533 n.7 (7th Cir.

1995) (six-month disciplinary segregation and demotion to C grade). Some short terms of

segregation may invoke a liberty interest if the conditions are deplorable. See e.g., Jackson v.

Anastasio, 2025 WL 2437947 at * 5-8 (7th Cir. Aug. 25, 2025) (finding that 3 months of

disciplinary segregation with deplorable conditions such as a cell coated with feces and urine,

constant noise, water contaminated by Legionnaire’s, and mice and roaches and mice were

sufficient conditions to invoke a protected liberty interest). Alexander says nothing about his 28-

day term of segregation that suggests an atypical and significant hardship sufficient to invoke due

process protections.

Additionally, inmates who do not lose good time credit are only entitled to informal due

process. Informal due process requires only that an inmate is provided (1) notice of the reasons for

his placement in segregation, and (2) an opportunity to present his views in a written statement or

hearing. Ealy v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 965 (7th Cir. 2024). Alexander is intent on suggesting he

properly dismissed a claim about an inmate’s lost personal property because the Illinois Court of Claims provides an

adequate post-deprivation remedy for lost inmate property).

lacked notice of the reason for the discipline because he could not physically hear well at his

hearing but, he does not contest that he got advance notice of the ticket on February 25, 2025. He

also claims he could not make adequate statements on his own behalf at the hearing because he

did not understand what was happening, but the Adjustment Committee Summary contains

excerpts of his statements that appear directly relevant to the discipline at issue, so it is implausible

that Alexander was clueless or had no meaningful chance to participate.

Finally, Alexander argues again the prison did not follow its own procedures, but a failure

to follow departmental policies or even state laws does not give rise to a § 1983 claim. Scott v.

Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (Section 1983 protects against constitutional

violations, not violations of state law or departmental policies). Overall, Alexander’s assertions

about his disciplinary experience do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and his

complaint will now be dismissed in full. See e.g. Zimmerman v. Bornick, 25 F.4th 491, 494 (7th

Cir. 2022) (amendment would be futile if plaintiff already had multiple chances to cure

deficiencies); Always Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2 F.4th 695, 707 (7th Cir.

2021) (courts may deny leave to amend if an amendment would be futile); McCree v. Grissom,

657 F.3d 623, 624 (7th Cir. 2011) (leave to amend shall be granted where justice so requires, but

leave to amend need not be given if an amendment to the complaint would be futile). This dismissal

shall count as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Disposition

Alexander’s Motion for an Extension of Time to File his Second Amended Complaint

(Doc. 11) is GRANTED instanter. Alexander’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 12) is

DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Clerk of

Court shall enter judgment and CLOSE this case.

If Alexander wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court

within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Alexander chooses to

appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See

Fed. R. App. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-56 (7th

Cir. 2008). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be non-meritorious, Alexander may incur another

“strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A proper and timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e)

motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline

cannot be extended.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 27, 2026

s/ Reona J. Daly

Reona J. Daly

United States Magistrate Judge