The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
FARANAK SOLEYMANI,
Plaintiff,
No. 25-cv-4284 (TSC)
v.
MARCO A. RUBIO, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Faranak Soleymani seeks to compel Defendants Marco Rubio and Kenneth Platek,
in their official capacities as Secretary of State and Acting Director of the National Vetting Center,
respectively, to adjudicate her F-1 nonimmigrant visa application. See Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff seeks relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), and the
Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, for allegedly unreasonable delay in processing her application.
See Compl. ¶¶ 72–73, 111. Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim. See generally Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 5. For the reasons set forth below, the court
will GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a German citizen who studied in the United States from 2022 to 2024 under an
F-1 visa. Compl. ¶¶ 43–45, 51. Seeking to renew her visa to continue her Ph.D. at the University
of Oregon, she submitted a new application in April 2024. Id. ¶¶ 44, 55. In July 2024, after an
interview at the U.S. Embassy in Frankfurt, Germany, a consular officer refused her application
and informed her that her case would require “further administrative processing.” Id. ¶¶ 45, 47.
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The officer requested additional documents, which Plaintiff submitted in August 2024. Id. ¶¶ 45–
46. The State Department’s Consular Electronic Application Center website indicates that
Plaintiff’s case was “[r]efused” and remains so while undergoing additional processing. Id. ¶ 47;
ECF No. 1-2. In December 2025, Plaintiff sued under the APA and Mandamus Act to compel
adjudication of her application, alleging that the delay has caused her significant harm, including
loss of funding, financial hardship, and emotional distress. See Compl. ¶¶ 52–56, 59.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In opposing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff “bears the burden of
demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction.” Shuler v. United States, 531 F.3d 930, 932 (D.C. Cir.
2008). The court must accept any “well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable
inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor.” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C.
Cir. 2015).
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning v.
Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court
construes the complaint “liberally,” but “need not accept inferences . . . unsupported by facts
alleged in the complaint” or “legal conclusions.” Speelman v. United States, 461 F. Supp. 2d 71,
73 (D.D.C. 2006).
Under section 221(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), a consular officer
shall refuse a visa application if it appears from the application or supporting papers that the
applicant is ineligible or if the officer knows or has reason to believe the applicant is ineligible.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). The consular officer must either “issue,” “refuse,” or “discontinue
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granting” a visa application that has been “properly completed and executed” in accordance with
the INA and its implementing regulations. 22 C.F.R. § 41.121(a). When refusing a visa under
section 221(g), the consular officer may afford the applicant additional administrative process
culminating either in issuance of the visa or confirmation of the prior refusal. See Administrative
Processing Information, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://perma.cc/J6WR-HXLS. “There is no such
thing as an informal refusal or a pending case once a formal application has been made.” 9 FAM
§ 504.1-3(i); id. § 504.11-2(A)(b). 1
III. ANALYSIS
Both the APA and the Mandamus Act require Plaintiff to “identify a legally required,
discrete act that the agency has failed to perform.” Karimova v. Abate, 2024 WL 3517852, at *3
(D.C. Cir. July 24, 2024) (cleaned up); see Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64
(2004). Because Plaintiff fails to identify any further duty related to her already-refused visa
application, dismissal is appropriate.
Although a consular officer must “issue” or “refuse” a visa once an application is executed,
22 C.F.R. § 41.121(a), Plaintiff has “already received” the “official refusal[s]” to which she is
entitled, Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *4. Plaintiff argues that a section 221(g) refusal
followed by administrative processing is not “final,” so the agency has not discharged its duty to
timely adjudicate under section 555(b) of the APA. See Opp’n at 10–17, ECF No. 7; 5 U.S.C.
§ 555(b). But in Karimova, a unanimous D.C. Circuit panel squarely rejected that theory, holding
1
Because the court concludes that an administrative record is unnecessary to decide the threshold
legal questions presented by Defendants’ motion to dismiss, it will waive compliance with Local
Civil Rule 7(n), which applies only to cases “involving the judicial review of administrative agency
actions.” LCvR 7(n). Plaintiff alleges agency inaction; “if an agency fails to act, there is no
‘administrative record’ for a federal court to review.” Nat’l Law Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty
v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 842 F. Supp. 2d 127, 130 (D.D.C. 2012).
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that a refused application placed into administrative processing “remains officially refused,” with
no further duty to “conclude [the] matter” under section 555(b). Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at
*2–3.
Plaintiff argues that the INA and its implementing regulations contain a “mandatory duty”
to “timely adjudicate” her application, notwithstanding the refusal already entered. Opp’n at 21–
30. The court disagrees. The agency satisfied any duties under the INA and its implementing
regulations to process and adjudicate completed applications when “[a] consular officer reviewed
her application, interviewed her, and ruled that no visa would be granted.” Karimova, 2024 WL
3517852, at *4; see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201(g), 1202(e); 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.106, 41.121(a); 9 FAM §
403.10-2(A). The same is true as to any duty to timely dispose of visa applications implied by the
State Department’s collection of fees under 22 C.F.R. § 41.107. Plaintiff’s reliance on 8 U.S.C.
§ 1571(b)’s “sense of Congress” regarding timely processing of visa applications fares no better.
See Opp’n at 7, 41. That language is precatory, not binding, see Palakuru v. Renaud, 521 F. Supp.
3d 46, 51 (D.D.C. 2021), and in any event, the consular officer already processed Plaintiff’s
application by refusing it under section 221(g). Finally, while 22 C.F.R. § 41.121(c) provides for
reconsideration on a showing of new evidence overcoming ineligibility, “the possibility of
reconsideration of a refusal does not mean that the refusal was not a refusal.” Alnaddaf v. Rubio,
No. 25-cv-2491, 2026 WL 555314, at *8 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2026) (quoting Ramizi v. Blinken, 745
F. Supp. 3d 244, 261 (E.D.N.C. 2024)). “[T]he visa application remains officially refused” until
the consular officer “re-open[s] and re-adjudicate[s] the applicant’s case.” Karimova, 2024 WL
3517852, at *2.
Plaintiff counters that Karimova is unpublished and therefore non-binding. See Opp’n at
17–20. Although “courts in this district are split on whether unpublished circuit decisions like
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Karimova are binding,” Seifan v. Sweeney, No. 25-cv-261, 2025 WL 2171093, at *3 (D.D.C. July
31, 2025) (collecting cases), this court has already concluded that it “must follow” Karimova.
Ariani v. Rubio, No. 25-cv-349, 2025 WL 3653503, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2025) (quoting Deylami
v. Kvien, No. 23-cv-1393, 2025 WL 219064, at *5 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2025)). Unpublished D.C.
Circuit decisions are not binding on future Circuit panels, see In re Grant, 635 F.3d 1227, 1232
(D.C. Cir. 2011), but are nonetheless “precedential” if entered on or after January 1, 2002, Davis
v. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 716 F.3d 660, 666 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see D.C. Cir. R. 32.1(b)(1)(B).
Given “our hierarchical system of absolute vertical stare decisis,” Klayman v. Obama, 805 F.3d
1148, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc), the
court will not depart from a reasoned, unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals on a squarely
presented question.
In any event, “[r]egardless of whether Karimova is actually binding, it is still a case decided
by the Circuit that contains reasoning the Court finds persuasive.” Pour v. Rubio, No. 25-cv-573,
2025 WL 2374559, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2025) (cleaned up). The fact that the State Department
may “re-open and re-adjudicate” a refused application based on new information does not undo
the refusal already entered or reset any statutory or regulatory duty to timely adjudicate. See
Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *2, *4–5. And critically, “[n]othing in federal law” restricts the
“ability of a consul, after making that decision, to hold onto the application in case circumstances
later change in the applicant’s favor, thereby saving the applicant the time and cost of filing a
whole new visa application.” Id. at *4. Holding otherwise would only incentivize consular officers
to withhold administrative processing, to the detriment of visa applicants.
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In sum, because Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants violated a clear, non-
discretionary duty to act, her mandamus and APA claims must be dismissed. 2
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. ECF
No. 5. A separate order will follow.
Date: May 14, 2026
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
2
Because the court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims on this ground, it need not address Defendants’
arguments that (1) Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to bring claims against Platek; (2) the doctrine
of consular nonreviewability bars Plaintiff’s claims; and (3) that any delay is not unreasonable
under the factors set out in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
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