Com. v. Hernandez, V.

J-S08007-26

2026 PA Super 100

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

VICTOR M. HERNANDEZ :

:

Appellant : No. 1052 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 21, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-23-CR-0002797-2022

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 14, 2026

Victor M. Hernandez appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in

the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County after he was convicted of

various sexual offenses at a jury trial. On appeal, Hernandez challenges the

denial of his motion for a preliminary hearing, the weight and sufficiency of

the evidence, and the admission of recorded statements at trial. After careful

consideration, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of the

matter as follows:

The Commonwealth presented testimony at trial [establishing

that] on or about January 1, 2007, until on or about December

31, 2013, [Hernandez] raped and otherwise sexually assaulted his

stepdaughter, S.M. [(“Victim”)], when she was between the ages

of 12 and 19. [Victim] became pregnant with [Hernandez’s] child

at 16 years-old, gave birth at 17-years-old[,] and left the family

home at 19 years-old. Ten years later, [Victim] reported

[Hernandez’s] crimes to the police. Police confirmed through DNA

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analysis as well as an official birth certificate and [Hernandez’s]

own admission that [he] had fathered [Victim’s] child.

The Commonwealth presented the testimony of four witnesses.

First, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Jacqueline

Block-Goldstein, [] a private child welfare consultant and forensic

interviewer. [See N.T. Trial, 11/20/24, at 46.] Ms. Block-Goldstein

was qualified to express an expert opinion regarding victim

dynamics in childhood sexual assault cases. [See id. at 50.] Ms.

Block-Goldstein testified without reference to the facts of this

case. [See id.] Ms. Block-Goldstein testified to delayed responses

in victims of sexual abuse and recantation of reports. [See id. at

52-56.] ...

Second, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of [Victim],

who at the time of trial was 31 years of age and married with three

children. [See id. at 66. Victim] testified that [Hernandez] was

the father of her 13-year-old son. [See id. at 66-67, 70.

Hernandez] signed an acknowledgement of paternity and his

name was placed on the birth certificate of the child shortly after

his birth. [See id. at 73-75.]

[Victim] testified that in March 2022, she gave a recorded

statement to Detective Nicole Young [] at the Delaware County

Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”). [See id. at 93. Victim]

was not under oath when she gave the statement to Detective

Young and never signed a sworn statement. [See id. at 144.] The

Commonwealth played [Victim’s] recorded statement for the jury.

[See id. at 98-143].

In her recorded statement to Detective Young, [Victim] described

how [Hernandez’s] sexual assaults of her[, which began when she

was approximately 12 years old, escalated from kissing, to

touching her body, and, ultimately,] to rape. [See id. at 101-04.

Victim] described multiple incidents of rape that took place in her

house and in [Hernandez’s] car. [See id. at 109-12. Victim

indicated that Hernandez] penetrated her vagina with his hands,

his fingers[, and his penis and stated that Hernandez] forced her

to perform oral sex on him. [See id. at 112, 115. Victim also

indicated that Hernandez] would put his fingers inside her vagina

like he was trying to put his whole hand and arm inside of her and

that when she told [Hernandez] to stop doing it[,] he would do it

harder. [See id. Victim] said she could not report the abuse to

her mother. [See id. at 115-16.]

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[Victim stated that Hernandez] impregnated her when she was 16

years old. [See id. at 116. She also indicated that] before she got

pregnant, [Hernandez] would keep track of her menstrual cycle

and make her consume a boiled drink with aspirin to try to

[terminate any] possible pregnancy. [See id. at 119.] When

[Hernandez] believed [Victim] was pregnant, he [obtained] a

pregnancy test and said she had to have the baby. [See id. at

119-20.]

[Victim] testified that after she gave a recorded statement to

Detective Young, she made two recorded phone calls to

[Hernandez, which] were recorded by CID with [Victim’s]

permission. [See id. at 93-94.] During the phone calls between

[Victim] and [Hernandez, he] denied any wrongdoing.

On cross-examination, [Victim] testified that she felt attacked

when the Commonwealth played her recorded statement for the

jury. [See id. at 144. Victim] testified that she was forced to come

to court and that she wanted to recant the allegations she made

against [Hernandez. See id. at 145.]

The Commonwealth’s third witness was Detective Young[, who]

has been in law enforcement since 2001 and is assigned to the

CID Special Victims Unit and Child Abuse Task Force. [See id. at

158-59.] Detective Young took [Victim’s] recorded statement in

March, 2022. Before taking [Victim’s] recorded statement,

Detective Young had been involved with “several hundred” sexual

assault cases in her 23 years in law enforcement. [Id. at 160.]

Detective Young testified that [Victim’s] report to her was

genuine[ and that she did not doubt Victim] was telling her the

truth about [Hernandez] sexually assaulting her. [See id.]

Detective Young said that on two different occasions

[Hernandez’s] attorney told Detective Young that [Victim] wanted

to recant her statement. [See N.T. Trial, 11/21/24 at 13.]

Detective Young said that despite [this, Victim] never recanted

her statement and never told Detective Young that anything she

reported was false. [See id. at 12-14.]

Detective Young arrested [Hernandez] on April 6, 2022, at his

home. ... [Following his arrest, Hernandez] agreed to speak with

Detective Young[ and] admitted [to] having a sexual relationship

with [Victim] but [maintained that] it was consensual.

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The Commonwealth played [Hernandez’s] recorded statement for

the jury. [See id. at 10.] Detective Young obtained a search

warrant and collected DNA swabs from [Hernandez], [Victim], and

[Victim’s] son which she sent to the DNA diagnostic center for

testing. [See id.] ...

The Commonwealth’s fourth witness was Dr. John Peterson[, who]

was qualified as an expert in the field of DNA profiling and

analysis. [See id. at 47.] Dr. Peterson testified that he reviewed

the DNA profiles of the samples taken by Detective Young from

[Hernandez], [Victim], and [Victim’s] son and generated a report.

[See id. at 48.] Dr. Peterson concluded that it was 9 billion times

more likely that [Hernandez], as opposed to “a random person

from the standing population,” was the father of [Victim’s son. Id.

at 56.] ...

[Hernandez] called two witnesses. [Hernandez’s] first witness was

[his] best friend, Manuel Polanco []. Mr. Polanco testified that

[Hernandez] had a reputation as a peaceful and law-abiding

citizen. [See id. at 70. Hernandez’s] second witness was

[Victim’s] brother, Marcos Rojas []. Mr. Rojas testified that there

was always someone [aside from Hernandez] in the house with

Mr. Rojas and [Victim, and] that he did not remember a time that

he found [Victim] and [Hernandez] alone in the house with each

other. [See id. at 79, 84.]

On April 5, 2022, a criminal complaint was filed charging

[Hernandez] with the following [52] crimes: counts 1-5: rape—

forcible compulsion []; count 6: endangering the welfare of

children [(“EWOC”)]; counts 7-11: unlawful contact with a

minor—sexual abuse of children []; counts 12-16: statutory

sexual assault—11 years older []; counts 17-21: sexual assault

[]; counts 22-26: indecent assault without consent of other [];

counts 27-31: indecent assault—person less than 16 []; count 32:

corruption of minors—defendant age 18 or above []; counts 33-

37: aggravated indecent assault without consent []; counts 38-

42: aggravated indecent assault—forcible compulsion []; counts

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43-47: indecent assault—complainant less than 16 []; and counts

48-52: indecent assault—forcible compulsion[. 1]

On June 20, 2022, [Hernandez] waived his right to a preliminary

hearing and agreed to proceed to the Court of Common Pleas on

1 count each of [rape, unlawful contact with a minor, sexual

assault, and EWOC]. The remaining counts and charges originally

filed were withdrawn.

On May 15, 2023, an amended information was filed which listed

the following charges: count 1: rape[]; count 2: unlawful contact

with a minor[]; count 3: sexual assault []; and count 4: [EWOC].

[Hernandez] entered an open guilty plea to counts 1 through 4 as

set forth above. The amended information was filed July 20, 2023.

On September 6, 2023, [Hernandez] filed a motion to withdraw

his guilty plea[, to which the Commonwealth filed a response on

September 15, 2023]. On September 19, 2023, [the trial court]

conducted a hearing on [the] motion. On December 7, 2023,

[Hernandez’s] motion [] was granted. On December 19, 2023, the

Commonwealth filed a motion to amend the information. On

January 12, 2024, [Hernandez filed a response to [the]

Commonwealth’s motion to amend [] and [a] motion for [a]

preliminary hearing. On February 20, 2024, [the] court conducted

a hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion to amend. On February

23, 2024, the Commonwealth’s motion was granted.

On March 11, 2024 [the] court conducted a hearing on

[Hernandez’s] motion for [a] preliminary hearing[, which it

ultimately denied on March 14, 2024.] On March 18, 2024, the

Commonwealth filed an amended information [which included the

offenses set forth in the original criminal complaint but replaced 5

counts of indecent assault—complainant less than 16 with 5

counts of aggravated indecent assault—person less than 16. 2]

A jury trial [was held from November 19, 2024 to November 22,

2024. Hernandez] was found guilty of [] rape[], sexual assault,

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(1), 4304(a)(1), 6318(a)(5), 3122.1(b), 3124.1,

3126(a)(1), 3126(a)(8), 6301(a)(1)(ii), 3125(a)(1), 3125(a)(2), 3126(a)(8),

and 3126(a)(2), respectively.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(8).

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aggravated indecent assault without consent [], aggravated

indecent assault—forcible compulsion, [EWOC], corruption of

minors, indecent assault—forcible compulsion, and indecent

assault—complainant less than 16. [Hernandez] was found not

guilty of aggravated indecent assault—person less than 16. [The

charge of statutory sexual assault was not submitted to the jury

for consideration.]

On March 14, 2025, [Hernandez] filed a motion for a new trial[, in

which he] argued that the verdict was against the weight of the

evidence. Prior to sentencing on March 21, 2025, [Hernandez]

made an oral motion for extraordinary relief. [The] court

sentenced [Hernandez] to an aggregate [term of 10 to 20] years

of confinement with an aggregate [3 years of] consecutive

probation.[3 The] court’s orders of March 21, 2025, denying

[Hernandez’s] motion for a new trial and motion for extraordinary

relief were memorialized in writing on March 31, 2025 and entered

on the docket April 1, 2025.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/25, at 1-9 (headings, footnotes, some citations to

record, and unnecessary capitalization omitted). On April 16, 2025, Hernandez

filed a notice of appeal. Both Hernandez and the trial court have complied with

Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), (b).

On appeal, Hernandez raises the following questions for our review:

1. After his plea was withdrawn and all charges reinstated as a

result of the non-completion of the waiver and plea agreement,

under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 541(A)(2), did the

trial court err in denying [Hernandez’s] motion for a preliminary

hearing[?]

2. Was the verdict against the weight of the evidence [where] the

Commonwealth’s evidence, the March 8, 2023 recorded statement

of [Victim], along with allegations in the consensual intercept calls

on March 17, 2023, and March 29, 2023, was recanted by [Victim]

on the witness stand[?]

____________________________________________

3 On June 26, 2025, the court entered an amended sentencing order to reflect

Hernandez’s credit for time served at the time of sentencing.

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3. Was the Commonwealth’s evidence sufficient to convict when

the Commonwealth’s evidence, the March 8, 2023 recorded

statement of [Victim], along with allegations in the consensual

intercept calls on March 17, 2023, and March 29, 2023, was

recanted by [Victim] on the witness stand[?]

4. Did the numerous rape shield violations [committed] by the

Commonwealth when it played [Victim’s] recorded statement and

read the March 17, 2022, and March 29, 2022 intercept calls into

the [record] result in a violation of [Victim’s] rights and create an

unfair basis in that [Hernandez] was blamed for the behavior of

other individuals?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5 (formatting altered; numbering provided;

unnecessary capitalization omitted).

In his first issue, Hernandez challenges the trial court’s denial of his

motion for a preliminary hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 541(A)(2). “The

interpretation [] and the application of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal

Procedure present questions of law for which our standard of review is de novo

and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Castaneira, 322

A.3d 223, 232 (Pa. Super. 2024) (brackets and citation omitted).

Our Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he primary reason for the

preliminary hearing is to protect an individual’s right against unlawful arrest

and detention. The preliminary hearing seeks to prevent a person from being

imprisoned or required to enter bail for a crime which was never committed,

or for a crime with which there is no evidence of his connection.”

Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717, 736 (Pa. 2020) (quotation

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marks and citations omitted). Rule 541, which governs waiver of preliminary

hearings, provides, in pertinent part:

(A) The defendant who is represented by counsel may waive the

preliminary hearing at the preliminary arraignment or at any time

thereafter.

(1) The defendant thereafter is precluded from raising the

sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s prima facie case unless

the parties have agreed at the time of the waiver that the

defendant later may challenge the sufficiency.

(2) If the defendant waives the preliminary hearing by way

of an agreement, made in writing or on the record, and the

agreement is not accomplished, the defendant may

challenge the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s prima facie

case.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 541(A).

Hernandez avers that a waiver agreement was not accomplished for

purposes of Rule 541(A)(2) because the court permitted him “to withdraw his

guilty plea and pursue a trial disposition,” and therefore, his request for a

preliminary hearing to challenge the Commonwealth’s prima facie case should

have been granted. Appellant’s Brief, at 15.

Hernandez is not entitled to relief. “[O]nce a defendant is found guilty

after trial, any alleged defects or errors at the preliminary hearing stage are

rendered moot.” Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 333 A.3d 417, 440 (Pa.

Super. 2025) (citations omitted); see Commonwealth v. Dixon, 276 A.3d

794, 799 (Pa. Super. 2022) (holding that any error in the trial court’s denial

of the appellant’s prima facie challenge at the preliminary hearing was

harmless where the appellant was convicted of the offenses beyond a

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reasonable doubt). Because Hernandez was subsequently convicted of eight

offenses by a jury at trial, any contended error by the trial court in denying

him the opportunity to present a prima facie challenge to those offenses is

moot. See McIntyre, 333 A.3d at 440. Accordingly, Hernandez’s first issue

does not merit relief.

In his second issue, Hernandez challenges the weight of the evidence.

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of

the trial court’s discretion, not of the underlying question of

whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because

the trial court had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence

presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration

to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial court when

reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is, or is not,

against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable

reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the trial court’s

conviction that the verdict was, or was not, against the weight of

the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest

of justice.

A trial court abuses its discretion where the course pursued

represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the

judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not

applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. By comparison, the role of the

trial court is to determine whether, notwithstanding all the

evidence, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to

ignore them, or to give them equal weight with all the facts, is to

deny justice. For an appellant to prevail on a weight of the

evidence claim, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague, and

uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the trial court.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 351 A.3d 1245, 1252-53 (Pa. Super. 2026)

(brackets, citations, and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, a weight

challenge “predicated on the credibility of trial testimony” is generally “not

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cognizable on appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238 A.3d 482,

498 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).

Hernandez avers that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied

his motion for a new trial challenging the weight of the evidence because, at

trial, Victim recanted the prior allegations she made against him. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 17-19. Hernandez contends that Victim’s recantation at

trial was “much more reliable than her original statements which concerned

events alleged to have happened between 14 [and] 20 years earlier.” Id. at

19.

The trial court addressed Hernandez’s challenge to the weight of the

evidence as follows:

In the current case, the Commonwealth presented testimony from

[Victim], the Commonwealth’s blind expert, [Ms.] Block-

Goldstein, Detective Young[,] and Dr. Peters. The defense

presented testimony from [Hernandez’s] best friend and [Victim’s]

brother.

The jury observed the demeanor of each of the witnesses and

assessed the credibility of the witnesses during both direct and

cross examination. During its deliberations, the jury was free to

consider all evidence presented during the trial. Based on the

evidence and testimony presented at trial, the jury found

[Hernandez] guilty. ...

For a challenge to the weight of the evidence to be successful, the

evidence must be so vague, tenuous, and uncertain that the

verdict shocks the court’s sense of justice. The jury in this case

was free to believe all, part or none of the testimony and evidence

presented. ... The guilty verdict in this case indicates that the jury

rejected all or part of [Hernandez’s] recorded statements and that

of his witnesses. The verdict does not shock one’s sense of justice.

The verdict regarding sexual assault crimes was not against the

weight of the evidence.

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Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/25, at 19-20 (unnecessary capitalization and citation

omitted).

Contrary to Hernandez’s bald assertion that Victim’s recantation

testimony was more credible than her prior allegations against him, it is well-

settled that “[r]ecantation testimony is one of the least reliable forms of

proof[.]” Commonwealth v. Franklin, 346 A.3d 812, 824 (Pa. Super. 2025)

(citation omitted). Thus, where a witness, who is subject to cross-examination

in front of the jury at trial, recants prior statements or allegations, “the jury

is free to credit the [witness’s] prior inconsistent statements over [the

witness’s] recantations.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 134 A.3d 1097, 1104

(Pa. Super. 2016). Although Hernandez seems to suggest the mere fact that

Victim recanted at trial automatically renders her prior allegations incredible,

it was within the province of the jury, as factfinder, to weigh the evidence

presented and determine which of Victim’s statements to believe, if any. See

Brown, 134 A.3d at 1104. Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court in determining that the jury’s verdict was not against the weight

of the evidence. See Smith, 351 A.3d at 1252. Accordingly, Hernandez’s

second issue does not merit relief.

In his third issue, Hernandez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of

law. [Accordingly,] our standard of review is de novo, and our

scope of review is plenary. In reviewing a sufficiency challenge,

we determine whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable

inferences derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most

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favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, [is] sufficient

to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable

doubt. Further, a conviction may be sustained wholly on

circumstantial evidence, and the trier of fact—while passing on the

credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence—is free

to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. In conducting this

review, the appellate court may not weigh the evidence and

substitute its judgment for the factfinder.

Commonwealth v. Wellmon, 345 A.3d 370, 373 (Pa. Super. 2025)

(quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).

Hernandez avers that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it

denied his motion for extraordinary relief because the Commonwealth

presented insufficient evidence to sustain his sexual assault convictions. 4 A

person commits the offense of sexual assault “when that person engages in

sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant without

the complainant’s consent.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.1. Hernandez does not

dispute that the Commonwealth established he engaged in sexual intercourse

____________________________________________

4 Based upon the question presented and the argument advanced in his brief,

it is unclear which specific convictions Hernandez purports to challenge. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 5, 20-21. However, in his 1925(b) statement, sexual

assault is the only offense Hernandez specifically identified in relation to a

sufficiency challenge. See 1925(b) Statement, at ¶¶ 7, 9. To the extent

Hernandez attempts to challenge the evidentiary sufficiency to sustain his

convictions of the remaining seven offenses, any such challenge is waived.

Commonwealth v. Boyer, 347 A.3d 689, 699 (Pa. Super. 2025) (“When an

appellant fails to identify in his Rule 1925(b) statement the specific elements

of the specific crimes he is challenging, his [sufficiency] claim is waived.”)

(citations omitted); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Accordingly, our

sufficiency review is limited to Hernandez’s convictions of sexual assault under

section 3124.1.

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with Victim. Rather, Hernandez contends the Commonwealth failed to prove

that his sexual encounters with Victim were nonconsensual, where Victim

recanted her prior allegations against him at trial and there was no

corroborating evidence of lack of consent. See Appellant’s Brief, at 20-21.

Hernandez’s arguments are unavailing. At trial, the Commonwealth

played Victim’s recorded interview with Detective Young during which Victim

stated that Hernandez raped her hundreds of times between the ages of 12

to 19. See N.T. Trial, 11/20/24, at 134. The Commonwealth also read the

transcript of the recorded phone calls between Victim and Hernandez, during

which Victim confronted Hernandez numerous times about raping and

impregnating her, into the record at trial. See id. at 169-212; 214-231.

Viewing this evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the

Commonwealth’s favor, we find that the Commonwealth established Victim’s

lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt. See Wellmon, 345 A.3d at 373.

The mere fact that Victim recanted her prior allegations against

Hernandez at trial does not preclude the statements Victim made relating to

her lack of consent from being considered as substantive evidence. See

Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1171 (Pa. 2012) (“Prior

inconsistent statements, which meet the requirements for admissibility under

Pennsylvania law, must[] be considered by a reviewing court in the same

manner as any other type of validly admitted evidence when determining if

sufficient evidence exists to sustain a criminal conviction.”) (footnote

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admitted). Moreover, to the extent Hernandez contends that the

Commonwealth’s evidence was legally insufficient to prove nonconsent

because Victim’s prior statements were uncorroborated, his argument likewise

fails, as “the uncorroborated testimony of a sexual assault victim, if believed

by the trier of fact, is sufficient to convict a defendant.” Commonwealth v.

Andrulewicz, 911 A.2d 162, 166 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted); see

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3106. Thus, it was within the province of the jury, as factfinder,

to believe or disbelieve Victim’s uncorroborated allegations against

Hernandez, and his sufficiency challenge fails. Accordingly, Hernandez’s third

issue does not merit relief.

In his final issue, Hernandez challenges the trial court’s evidentiary

rulings, specifically alleging that the court impermissibly permitted the

Commonwealth to enter evidence protected by Pennsylvania’s Rape Shield

Law5 into the record at trial. See Appellant’s Brief, at 22. It is well-settled that

“[t]he admission of evidence is solely within the discretion of the trial court,

and a trial court’s evidentiary rulings will be reversed on appeal only upon an

abuse of that discretion.” Commonwealth v. Warren, 350 A.3d 1018, 1033

(Pa. Super. 2025) (brackets and citation omitted).

The Rape Shield Law is designed to protect alleged victims of

sexual assault in criminal trials and, subject to limited exceptions,

it excludes evidence of an alleged victim’s past sexual history. Its

purpose is to prevent the trial from shifting its focus from the

defendant’s guilt or innocence to the victim’s reputation or moral

____________________________________________

5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104.

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virtue. Importantly, this protective measure is salient where

defendants attempt to utilize evidence of the complainant’s

alleged promiscuity to bolster their claim of consent.

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 336 A.3d 1038, 1044 (Pa. Super. 2025)

(quotation marks, brackets, citations, and emphasis omitted).

Hernandez avers that the trial court erred as a matter of law by

permitting the Commonwealth to play Victim’s recorded interview with

Detective Young and to read the intercept call transcripts into the record at

trial, where statements contained therein indicated “that [Victim] had sexual

relations and/or was raped while she was underage by three other individuals”

and resulted in “numerous rape shield violations[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 22.

Hernandez contends that these violations “prejudiced [him] because this

information generated more sympathy for [Victim] and as a result, created an

unfair basis for the jury’s verdict” and held Hernandez “accountable for the

criminal behavior of others.” Id.

The Commonwealth posits that Hernandez waived any challenge to the

admission of Victim’s recorded statement or the intercept calls into evidence

by failing to object at trial. See Appellee’s Brief, at 11. We agree.

“It is settled that an appellant's failure to raise a contemporaneous

objection to evidence at trial waives that claim on appeal.” Commonwealth

v. Rudolf, 262 A.3d 574, 581 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted); see

Pa.R.E. 103(a). “The judge hearing the case must be given an opportunity to

correct the error at the time it is made and potentially avoid an unnecessary

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appeal.” Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 527 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(citation omitted).

Our review of the record confirms that, prior to the Commonwealth

introducing the audio recording of Victim’s interview with Detective Young at

trial, counsel for Victim raised an objection asserting Victim’s Fifth Amendment

privilege against self-incrimination but did not object based on the Rape Shield

statute. See N.T. Trial, 11/20/24, at 81. However, Hernandez did not object

to the admission of either Victim’s recorded interview or the transcripts and

audio recordings of the consensual intercept calls on any basis, much less

based upon a purported Rape Shield violation. See id. at 98, 164, 166.

Therefore, Hernandez’s failure to launch a contemporaneous objection to the

recorded interview and intercept calls generally, or to assert specific

objections to the statements referencing Victim’s other alleged sexual

partners at trial, results in waiver of his claim on appeal. See Rudolph, 262

A.3d at 581. Moreover, even if Hernandez had properly preserved an objection

to this evidence before the trial court, he has failed to explain or cite to any

authority to support his contention that he, a perpetrator, would have standing

to recover for a Rape Shield violation committed against Victim, where the

purpose of the statute is to protect sexual assault complainants. See Thomas,

336 A.3d at 1044; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring the argument section of an

appellant’s brief to contain discussion of and citation to pertinent authorities).

Accordingly, Hernandez’s final issue does not merit relief.

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J-S08007-26

Based on the foregoing, Hernandez is not entitled to relief, and we affirm

his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 5/14/2026

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