Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.

262 May 14, 2026 No. 25

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

Kristina SHEPPARD,

Petitioner on Review,

v.

PROGRESSIVE CLASSIC INSURANCE COMPANY,

a foreign corporation,

Respondent on Review,

and

Eric McHENRY

and State of Oregon,

Defendants.

(CC 20CV28039) (CA A178724) (SC S071187)

En Banc

On review from the Court of Appeals.*

Argued and submitted April 17, 2025.

Derek Larwick, Larwick Law Firm, PC, Eugene, argued

the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.

Jonathan Henderson, Davis Rothwell Earle & Xochihua,

P.C., Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for

respondent on review. Also on the briefs was Christopher J.

Drotzmann.

David E. Smith, Spooner Staggs Trial Lawyers, Salem,

filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers

Association.

Brian C. Hickman, Gordon & Polscer, L.L.C., Tigard,

filed the brief for amicus curiae American Property Casualty

Insurance Association.

DeHOOG, J.

______________

* Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, James C. Edmonds, Judge. 333

Or App 39, 551 P3d 967 (2024).

Cite as 375 Or 262 (2026) 263

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The

judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is

remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

264 Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.

DeHOOG, J.

Under Oregon law, automobile liability policies

must provide insured motorists with coverage for, among

other things, bodily injury or death resulting from acci-

dents caused by uninsured or underinsured motorists. See

ORS 742.504 (uninsured motorist coverage); ORS 742.502

(underinsured motorist coverage). However, coverage is not

required for bodily injuries an insured suffers while “occu-

pying a vehicle * * * furnished for the regular use of[ ] the

named insured[.]” ORS 742.504(4)(b). Plaintiff was injured

by another motorist while plaintiff was driving a vehicle

that her employer had provided for her work-related use.

Plaintiff’s damages exceeded the combined limits of the

other motorist’s and her employer’s insurance policies, so

she sought underinsured motorist coverage from her own

insurer, defendant in this case. Defendant denied plain-

tiff’s claim. It asserted that plaintiff was not entitled to

coverage, because, in its view, the vehicle she was driv-

ing at the time of the accident had been “furnished for

[her] regular use.” Plaintiff sued to recover those bene-

fits, but, on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judg-

ment, the trial court agreed with defendant. The court

therefore granted defendant’s motion, denied plaintiff’s

cross-motion, and dismissed plaintiff’s claim. The Court

of Appeals affirmed. Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins.

Co., 333 Or App 39, 551 P3d 967 (2024) (holding that

defendant was entitled to summary judgment because

plaintiff’s employer had furnished work vehicle for her

regular use). On review, we conclude that disputed issues

of fact in this case preclude the determination that, as a

matter of law, the vehicle that plaintiff was driving had

been “furnished for [her] regular use” within the mean-

ing of ORS 742.504(4)(b); the trial court therefore erred

in granting summary judgment to defendant. We further

conclude, however, that plaintiff also has not shown that

she, instead, was entitled to summary judgment on that

issue. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision,

reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand to

that court for further proceedings.

Cite as 375 Or 262 (2026) 265

I. BACKGROUND

A. Legal and Procedural Posture

This case involves two aspects of a typical automo-

bile liability policy: uninsured motorist coverage and under-

insured motorist coverage. In general, those components

of an automobile policy cover loss to an insured who suf-

fers bodily injury or death due to a motor vehicle accident

caused by another person, if the person at fault either has

no liability insurance (an uninsured motorist), or has liabil-

ity insurance insufficient to cover the damages the insured

has incurred (an underinsured motorist). See ORS 742.504

(uninsured motorist coverage); ORS 742.502 (underinsured

motorist coverage); see also Batten v. State Farm Mutual

Automobile Ins. Co., 368 Or 538, 542, 495 P3d 1222 (2021)

(summarizing framework).

Plaintiff, a state employee, brought this civil action

against defendant insurer to obtain underinsured motorist

coverage through her personal automobile insurance policy.

She alleged that she had been in an accident while driving

a work vehicle owned by the State of Oregon; that she had

suffered damages as a result of the accident; and that those

damages exceeded the policy limits of the other driver and

of the state. She asserted that defendant, who had issued

the insurance policy on her personal vehicle, was required

to cover the excess damages up to her policy limits.

Defendant moved for summary judgment, contend-

ing that, due to an exclusion in plaintiff’s policy, she was not

entitled to underinsured motorist benefits. Specifically, Part

III of the policy, which governs accidents involving unin-

sured or underinsured motorists, provides:

“Coverage under this Part III will not apply:

“1. to bodily injury sustained by any person while occupy-

ing or being struck by a motor vehicle that is owned by or

furnished for the regular use of you, a relative, or a rated

resident.

“This exclusion does not apply to a covered auto that is

insured under this Part III[.]”

266 Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.

(Emphases omitted.) That exclusion is authorized by stat-

ute. ORS 742.504(4)(b).1 Defendant argued that the work

vehicle in which plaintiff sustained her injuries had been

“furnished for [her] regular use” within the meaning of the

exclusion, making the policy’s underinsured motorist cover-

age inapplicable to plaintiff’s accident. In a cross-motion for

partial summary judgment, plaintiff raised the same issue,

arguing that the restrictions that were placed on her use of

the work vehicle meant it had not been “furnished for [her]

regular use.” The parties supported their respective motions

with exhibits and deposition testimony.

After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s

motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff’s cross-

motion. Plaintiff appealed both aspects of the trial court’s

rulings, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.2 We allowed

review to consider the meaning of “furnished for the regular

use” when used in an automobile insurance policy.

B. Facts Regarding Plaintiff’s Use of a Work Vehicle

The relevant facts are those submitted by the par-

ties in their respective summary judgment filings. When

reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we typically set

out the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. See ORCP 47 C; Moore-Reed v. Griffin, 374 Or 596,

598, 581 P3d 949 (2025). Because we begin our analysis by

considering whether the trial court erred in granting sum-

mary judgment to defendant, we first set out the facts in

the light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party.

However, when we turn to plaintiff’s cross-motion, we will

discuss whether any additional facts, when viewed in defen-

dant’s favor, precluded summary judgment on behalf of

plaintiff.

1

Although this case involves underinsured motorist coverage, the require-

ments of ORS 742.504 regarding uninsured motorist coverage equally apply. See

ORS 742.502(4) (“Underinsurance coverage is subject to ORS 742.504[.]”).

2

Because the Court of Appeals had concluded, as a matter of law, that plain-

tiff’s work vehicle had been furnished for her regular use, it affirmed the grant

of summary judgment to defendant (Sheppard, 333 Or App at 45); it therefore

necessarily rejected plaintiff’s argument that she was entitled to partial sum-

mary judgment on that issue. As we will explain, we conclude that the summary

judgment record discloses disputed issues of fact that preclude an award of sum-

mary judgment to either party, and we remand this case to the trial court for it

to resolve those remaining factual disputes.

Cite as 375 Or 262 (2026) 267

As noted, plaintiff was injured driving a vehicle that

her employer had authorized her to use for work purposes,

and the question on review is whether plaintiff’s employer

had “furnished [it] for [her] regular use” within the mean-

ing of the exclusion for such vehicles. We therefore begin by

examining plaintiff’s work duties and her related authoriza-

tion to use the work vehicle that her employer provided.

Plaintiff worked in the Roseburg office of the

Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF), holding the position

of Executive Support Specialist 2. She had held that position

since December 2011. The position summary for plaintiff’s

job described it as largely an office position that involved

administrative, management, and secretarial functions.

The position could require “infrequent” travel for adminis-

trative work related to active wildfire operations.

The Roseburg office had a total of 8 or 9 state-owned

vehicles. Most of the employees at the Roseburg office had

field duties, so they had work vehicles specifically assigned

to them. Employees with assigned vehicles would keep a key

to their vehicle.

Plaintiff was not one of those employees. From ODF’s

perspective, plaintiff used a work vehicle so infrequently that

it was unnecessary for ODF to assign her a vehicle. Instead,

plaintiff’s usual only option was to use the one shared, or

“floating,” vehicle available at the Roseburg office: a specific

Chevy Silverado pickup truck, which was the vehicle that she

was driving at the time of her accident.3 The Silverado was a

marked state vehicle that was equipped for off-road travel.

Plaintiff was not required to specifically obtain

her supervisor’s permission each time that she used the

Silverado. It was “okay” with plaintiff’s supervisor for plain-

tiff to use the Silverado “as needed without having to ask

permission.” (Emphasis added.) But, because the Silverado

was not assigned to plaintiff, she did not have her own key

and had to get it from her supervisor whenever she checked

the truck out.

3

Plaintiff occasionally borrowed another employee’s assigned work vehicle if

her work required her to drive and the assigned employee did not need the vehicle

that day. The record does not indicate how frequently that might occur or what

those work assignments might be.

268 Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.

The record contains very little evidence of how

frequently plaintiff used any work vehicle, and almost all

the available evidence relates to the Silverado. There is no

evidence that plaintiff used any work vehicle between her

start date in 2011 and her first recorded use of the Silverado

in June 2017. There are 61 months of records showing the

Silverado’s use prior to the accident; they indicate that plain-

tiff used it during only six of those 61 months: June, August,

and September 2017, and May, July, and August 2018.

The only evidence of plaintiff’s work travel involved

fire assignments.4 Because fire assignments were not an offi-

cial aspect of plaintiff’s work position, those assignments

were not simply infrequent; they also were contingent and,

it seems, optional. According to plaintiff’s supervisor, if the

team handling a particular wildfire concluded that they

needed additional personnel having certain qualifications,

that team would contact ODF’s coordination center. The coor-

dination center would identify employees with the appropri-

ate qualifications, then contact each employee’s supervisor to

“ask if that [employee] may be available for an assignment.”

“[T]he supervisor would usually talk to the employee and ask

if they’re available, interested, and if they are, work it out.”

Plaintiff’s supervisor followed that practice with plaintiff.

The mileage records maintained by the state do not

indicate how many days plaintiff used the Silverado during

each of the months in which she used it, but her own testi-

mony was that the average length of time that she spent at

a fire assignment was 14 days. The records show that plain-

tiff drove the Silverado a total of 4,532 miles during those

months.

Plaintiff was permitted to use a work vehicle only for

work purposes, not for any personal reason. When plaintiff

was assigned to a fire, however, the permitted uses expanded

somewhat because she was on “travel status.” At those times,

in addition to driving from her home duty station to the fire

and back, plaintiff was allowed to drive the truck to take

4

Plaintiff’s job summary indicated that she could be required to travel to

and from meetings in other offices, and it is possible that some of plaintiff’s use

of the Silverado related to those duties. We note again, however, that the record

lacks evidence as to when or how often plaintiff might have used any work vehicle

for any reason other than her recorded use in 2017 and 2018.

Cite as 375 Or 262 (2026) 269

care of basic necessities such as refueling the truck, buying

food for herself, and getting to and from her nightly lodging.

Plaintiff’s accident occurred while she was using the

Silverado in an authorized manner. She had been assigned to

a fire and had been using the truck for at least two days. The

accident itself occurred while she was driving to her lodging

for the night. As a result of the accident, plaintiff incurred

damages exceeding the policy limits for both the other driver

and ODF, and it is not disputed that their insurers have paid

plaintiff those full policy limits.5 The facts and nature of the

accident are otherwise not relevant to this case.

C. The Court of Appeals’ Decision

After the trial court granted summary judgment

to defendant, plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals

affirmed. Sheppard, 333 Or App 39. The Court of Appeals

had previously held that, in determining whether a vehi-

cle was “furnished for regular use,” the key inquiry was

whether an insured enjoyed the right to the regular use of

a vehicle, and not the manner in which they were permitted

to use it. See id. at 44-45 (discussing North Pacific Ins. Co.

v. Anderson, 110 Or App 269, 821 P2d 444 (1991)). Thus,

although plaintiff emphasized the limits on how she could

use the truck, the Court of Appeals regarded those limits as

immaterial. Id. at 44. Instead, the court explained:

“[P]laintiff’s supervisor testified that plaintiff could use

the truck whenever she needed, without having to ask for

permission. The evidence establishes that she did in fact

regularly use the truck, logging nearly 5,000 miles on the

truck in just over a year. The truck was furnished to plain-

tiff for her regular use because she had a right to use it for

work purposes whenever she wanted.”

Id. at 45 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff sought review, which this court allowed.

5

Plaintiff alleges total damages of up to $150,000. The other driver’s insurer

paid the full amount of its liability policy limit, $25,000. The state also paid the

full amount of its underinsured motorist policy limits, $25,000. Plaintiff’s action

against defendant sought the full amount of her remaining alleged damages, up

to the $100,000 policy limit for underinsured motorist coverage. Although the

actual amount of damages remains in dispute, we assume for purposes of defen-

dant’s summary judgment motion that they at least exceeded the combined cov-

erage available under the other policies.

270 Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because the trial court granted summary judg-

ment for defendant, we must determine whether defendant

has shown “that there is no genuine issue as to any mate-

rial fact” and that defendant “is entitled to prevail as a

matter of law.” ORCP 47 C; see, e.g., Twigg v. Admiral Ins.

Co., 373 Or 445, 473-74, 568 P3d 156 (2025). We will affirm

the grant of summary judgment only if “no objectively rea-

sonable juror could return a verdict for” plaintiff. ORCP

47 C. Here, if an objectively reasonable juror could find

that the work vehicle that plaintiff was driving at the time

of her accident was not “furnished for [her] regular use”

within the meaning of defendant’s insurance policy, then

summary judgment for defendant was not appropriate. We

turn to that inquiry.

B. “Furnished for the Regular Use”

To determine whether there is a genuine question of

fact regarding the “furnished for the regular use” exclusion,

we must first determine what that phrase means. As we

discuss below, although that phrase appears in defendant’s

automobile insurance policy, it tracks the statutory mini-

mum coverage provisions that govern Oregon insurers, as

well as the uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits

that their policies must provide. Thus, even though we dis-

cuss that phrase both as it appears in defendant’s insurance

policy and in the underlying statute, because it is undis-

puted that the phrase as used in the policy has the same

meaning as it does in the statute, our decision here ulti-

mately turns on what we conclude the legislature intended

by that phrase.

1. History of “furnished for the regular use” exclusion

As historical context, we note that the “furnished

for the regular use” exclusion did not originate under

Oregon law, nor was it limited to uninsured motorist or

underinsured motorist coverage. Automobile insurance poli-

cies nationwide have included the phrase for the better part

Cite as 375 Or 262 (2026) 271

of a century; the earliest reported opinion that we are aware

of is a Maine decision from 1941.6

Automobile insurance policies commonly use the

phrase in two different contexts. The first is as an exclu-

sion from coverage for liability: A policy will state that the

policy does not cover liability as to any vehicle that is not

expressly covered and that is either owned by the insured

or “[f]urnished or available for [the insured’s] regular use.”

William J. Schermer and Irvin E. Schermer, 1 Automobile

Liability Insurance § 6:10 (4th ed Westlaw, updated Nov

2025) (describing that text as “typical”). The second use is

as an exclusion from underinsured motorist coverage sim-

ilar to the exclusion here—such policies will often exclude

from the definition of “underinsured motor vehicle” any

vehicle “owned by [the insured] or a relative or furnished

for the regular use of [the insured] or a [resident] relative.”

Schermer and Schermer, 3 Automobile Liability Insurance

§ 39:6.

Dozens of reported decisions have been decided

since the insurance industry first began using the phrase in

policies. See Schermer and Schermer, 1 Automobile Liability

Insurance § 6:10 (collecting cases as to exclusion for liability

coverage); id. at 3 Automobile Liability Insurance § 39:6 (col-

lecting cases regarding exclusion as to uninsured motorist

and underinsured motorist coverage); David B. Harrison,

When is automobile furnished or available for regular use

within “drive other car” coverage of automobile liability pol-

icy, 8 ALR 4th 387 (Westlaw, originally published 1981) (col-

lecting cases generally); Curtis M. Elliott, The Insurance

Definition of Automobile, 1967 Ins LJ 596, 603-06 (1967)

(discussing major decisions to date); Fred D. Cunningham,

Use of Other Automobiles, 21 Ins Counsel J 137, 139-40

(1954) (discussing major decisions to date).

Despite the extensive case law, those opinions pro-

vide limited guidance. If there is a consensus about the case

law, it appears to be that “furnished for the regular use” has

no single, clearly defined meaning. Harrison, 8 ALR 4th 387,

6

Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pulsifer, 41 F Supp 249 (D Me 1941). That

court noted, “The clause in question seems to be one only recently in vogue and I

find no decisions precisely in point.” Id. at 251.

272 Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.

§ 2 (“a specific and universally applicable definition of the

phrase ‘furnished or available for regular use’ is lacking”);7

Elliott, 1967 Ins LJ at 603-04 (“What constitutes ‘furnished

for regular use’ or ‘furnished or available for regular use’

has long been a source of dispute.”); Cunningham, 21 Ins

Counsel J at 139 (noting the “inconsistent interpretations

of this phrase of the exclusion” by courts, and stating that

“[t]hese conflicting decisions appear to be irreconcilable and

may perhaps be only distinguished by the particular facts

of each case”); see, e.g., Brouillette v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.,

163 So 2d 389, 391 (La Ct App 3d Cir), cert den, 246 La 594,

165 So 2d 485 (1964) (“the application of the exclusion is a

question of fact, with no hard and fast rule established to

determine such question, which depends upon an examina-

tion of the facts in each case according to the general crite-

ria of the terms used”); Home Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 52 Del 42,

47, 152 A2d 115, 118 (1959) (“No absolute definition can be

established for the term ‘furnished for regular use.’ Each

case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances.”);

Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marr, 128 F Supp 67, 68

(DNJ 1955) (“a reading of the cases discloses that no hard

and fast rule has been nor in the opinion of this Court can

be established for determining this question but that each

case must stand or fall upon examination of the facts in

the particular case before the Court”); Pac. Auto. Ins. Co. v.

Lewis, 56 Cal App 2d 597, 600, 132 P2d 846, 848 (1943) (not-

ing “the rather broad and not very explicit language used

in these policies to set forth the exception to the coverage

otherwise provided”).

2. Interpretation of ORS 742.504(4)(b)

Another factor potentially limits the guidance that

those other cases can provide here. In the typical insurance

coverage case, the primary goal is to determine the intent

of the parties to an insurance contract. See, e.g., Twigg, 373

Or at 456 (“In interpreting the terms of an insurance policy,

our primary goal is to ascertain the intention of the parties,

as reflected in the terms and conditions of the policy.”). In

7

The Harrison annotation adds that the other terms often used by courts

to interpret “furnished for regular use”—”casual” and “infrequent,” as distin-

guished from “steady,” “constant,” and “ordinary”—”are as difficult to define with

specificity as the latter phrase itself.” 8 ALR 4th 387, § 2.

Cite as 375 Or 262 (2026) 273

this case, however, we are not called upon to interpret the

text of an insurance policy. Instead, we must interpret the

statute that governs the policy term at issue, ORS 742.504.

That conclusion is due to the nature of ORS 742.504,

which mandates the inclusion of uninsured and underin-

sured motorist coverage in automobile insurance policies.

ORS 742.504 prescribes “a comprehensive model” policy for

uninsured motorist coverage. Vega v. Farmers Ins. Co., 323

Or 291, 302, 918 P2d 95 (1996) (so describing ORS 742.504).

The model policy set forth under that statute represents the

minimum coverage; that is, an actual policy must provide

coverage at least as favorable to the insured as the model,

though it may be more favorable by providing more than

the minimum coverage. See id. (stating that terms “that

disfavor insureds may be excluded or softened and extra-

neous terms that are neutral or that favor insureds may be

added”). If any policy term is less favorable to the insured

than the model policy, then that term is unenforceable. See

id. at 303 (noting as much); Erickson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 331

Or 681, 685, 21 P3d 90 (2001) (same).

Plaintiff here acknowledges that the relevant policy

provisions provide coverage that, in substance, meets all the

requirements of ORS 742.504. Further, plaintiff does not

contend that the relevant policy provisions provide broader

coverage. Accordingly, the parties (like the Court of Appeals)

agree that the appropriate focus is on ORS 742.504, rather

than on the text of this particular insurance policy. We like-

wise agree that, because it is undisputed that the coverage

that the policy provides is the coverage that ORS 742.504

requires, the proper focus of our inquiry is on the intended

meaning of the statute. See Perez v. State Farm Mutual

Ins. Co., 289 Or 295, 299, 613 P2d 32 (1980) (so concluding

regarding the personal injury protection coverage required

by statute for motor vehicle insurance policies).8

8

In Perez, this court addressed the personal injury protection (PIP) coverage

given by an automobile insurance policy. 289 Or at 297. By statute, an insurer

was (and is) required to give a certain minimum coverage. Id. at 297-99 (constru-

ing predecessor to ORS 743.520). Because the particular policy at issue had been

intended to provide the statutory minimum, this court held that the scope of that

coverage was determined by the meaning of the statute, not by the particular

words of the policy:

274 Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.

With that understanding in mind, we turn to the

meaning of ORS 742.504. To inform that inquiry, we apply

our familiar method of statutory interpretation, seeking to

determine the legislature’s intent, of which the statutory

text and context are the best evidence. E.g., State v. Gaines,

346 Or 160, 171, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). To the extent that we

find it helpful, we also will consider the available legisla-

tive history, giving it the weight we deem appropriate. Id. at

171-72.

The dispute between the parties turns on whether

the work vehicle that plaintiff was driving had been “fur-

nished for [her] regular use,” such that the policy exclusion

applied. As noted, defendant’s policy denies uninsured and

underinsured motorist coverage for “bodily injury sustained

by any person while occupying or being struck by a motor

vehicle that is owned by or furnished for the regular use

of[,]” in relevant part, the insured person.9 That provision

tracks—both textually and in intended meaning—the fol-

lowing statutorily authorized exclusion:

“This coverage does not apply to bodily injury to an

insured while occupying a vehicle, other than an insured

vehicle, owned by, or furnished for the regular use of,

the named insured or any relative resident in the same

household[.]”

ORS 742.504(4)(b) (emphasis added). Plaintiff did not own

the Silverado, and it was not owned by or furnished for the

use of any relative residing in plaintiff’s household. Thus,

the relevant statutory text, like the relevant policy lan-

guage, is that emphasized above: “furnished for the regular

use[.]”

“Although plaintiff relies on the terms of the policy, she does not point to

anything in its language suggesting that the coverage provided was different

from the minimum required by statute. Although the arrangement of the

policy provisions varies slightly from that of the statute, the dispositive lan-

guage is virtually identical. We find no indication of an intention to provide

broader coverage than the statute requires. As did the Court of Appeals, we

therefore approach the issue as a problem of statutory construction.”

Id. at 299. As a consequence, the interpretive maxim ordinarily used for insur-

ance policies—that ambiguities would be resolved in favor of coverage—did not

apply. Id. at 299 n 2.

9

The exclusion does not, of course, apply to any vehicles expressly covered

under the policy, such as plaintiff’s personal vehicle.

Cite as 375 Or 262 (2026) 275

In interpreting statutory text, we typically pre-

sume, at least initially, that the legislature intended to give

words of common usage their ordinary meanings. E.g., PGE

v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d

1143 (1993).10 Here, there are three such words: “furnish,”

“regular,” and “use.”

We begin with “use.” The relevant definition of

“use,” when, as here, it is used as a noun, would appear to be

the following:

“3 a : the privilege or benefit of using something <offered

him the ~ of his pen for signing> <had the ~ of the usual

class time for study> <nor shall private property be taken

for public ~ without just compensation—U.S. Constitution>

<the Lord bless this food to our ~, and us to His service—

Bk. of Com. Worship>”

Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2523 (unabridged ed

2002).11

10

Plaintiff contends that the term “regular use” has a well-defined legal

meaning that we should use here. Plaintiff relies on the definition of “regular use”

found in the 2009 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary. See Black’s Law Dictionary

1682 (9th ed 2009) (under entry for “use,” defining “regular use” as “[a] use that

is usual, normal, or customary, as opposed to an occasional, special, or incidental

use”).

Plaintiff’s general proposition is correct: When there is evidence that the

legislature intended to use a term of art, we typically apply that definition. See

State v. Williams, 374 Or 648, 657, 582 P3d 637 (2025) (noting proposition and

citing cases); Jack L. Landau, Oregon Statutory Construction, 97 Or L Rev 583,

661-65 (2019) (discussing cases). But “we attempt to determine what the legis-

lature actually intended at the time of enactment,” so we consider “dictionaries

that are contemporaneous with the time of enactment when determining the

ordinary meaning of a statutory word or phrase.” OR-OSHA v. CBI Services,

Inc., 356 Or 577, 592-93, 341 P3d 701 (2014) (emphasis in original). We are not

persuaded that the legislature that enacted ORS 742.504(4)(b) had that mean-

ing of “regular use” in mind. The definition that plaintiff offers dates to 2009—

long after the legislature had enacted what is now ORS 742.504(4)(b). The edi-

tion of Black’s that existed in 1967—the fourth edition, 1951—did not define the

term. The term does not appear in Black’s until the seventh edition, published in

1999.

11

Unlike defendant’s reliance on the 2009 edition of Black’s, our reliance

on the 2002 edition of Webster’s should raise no concerns. The main text of

Webster’s is essentially unchanged since 1961; thus, “any version of Webster’s

Third—regardless of its copyright date—provides a relevant source of ordinary

meaning for statutes enacted any time after 1961, if not earlier.” State v. Eastep,

361 Or 746, 751 n 2, 399 P3d 979 (2017) (explaining that “[a]ny new definitional

material since 1961 appears in an addendum section at the beginning of each

republication”).

276 Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.

For the exclusion to apply, the furnished “use” of a

vehicle must be “regular.” The most relevant definition of

the adjectival form of “regular” appears to be

“3 a : steady or uniform in course, practice, or occurrence :

not subject to unexplained or irrational variation : steadily

pursued : orderly, methodical <~ habits> b (1) : returning,

recurring, or received at stated, fixed, or uniform intervals

<a ~ income> <in the ~ course of events>”

Webster’s at 1913. Thus, the term “regular use” can have

different connotations, as the court observed in Hartford

Acci. & Indem. Co. v. Hiland, 349 F2d 376 (7th Cir 1965):

It “may be used in the sense of time, for example, steady as

opposed to occasional[,] or in the sense of type of use, usual

as against unusual.” Id. at 377-78 (rejecting district court’s

interpretation of “regular use” as focusing on an insured’s

“own use * * * on a normal or usual basis” (internal quota-

tion marks omitted)).

Finally, the vehicle must have been “furnished” for

that regular use. The relevant definition of the verb “fur-

nish” seems to be

“1 a : to provide or supply with what is needed, useful, or

desirable : equip <’tis now but four o’clock. We have two

hours to ~ us—Shak.>”

Webster’s at 923.

Thus, applying the plain meaning of those three

words here suggests that a vehicle is one that has been “fur-

nished for [one’s] regular use” if someone has provided or sup-

plied another person with the privilege or benefit of using it,

either as a “steady” or “uniform” practice or at “stated, fixed,

or uniform” intervals. And although the plain meaning of

“regular” does not require absolute rigidity—see Webster’s

at 1913 (recognizing that “regular” matters may be subject

to some variation, just not “unexplained or irrational varia-

tion”)—it would, at a minimum, appear to exclude vehicles

furnished merely on an incidental or ad hoc basis.

Looking to context for further indications of what

the legislature intended by ORS 742.504(4)(b), we first note

that, before the legislature enacted that paragraph’s statu-

tory predecessor, this court had issued an opinion in which

Cite as 375 Or 262 (2026) 277

it interpreted the phrase “furnished for regular use.” See

Wallace Co. v. State F. M. Auto. Ins. Co., 220 Or 520, 349

P2d 789 (1960) (seeking to determine the meaning of “fur-

nished for regular use” as used in automobile insurance pol-

icy; focusing on intent of insurer and insured). This court’s

preexisting decisions can provide evidence of what the leg-

islature intended its enactments to mean. OR-OSHA v. CBI

Services, Inc., 356 Or 577, 593, 341 P3d 701 (2014) (“Court

decisions that existed at the time that the legislature

enacted a statute—and that, as a result, it could have been

aware of—may be consulted in determining what the legis-

lature intended in enacting the law as part of the context for

the legislature’s decision.”). Because Wallace represents the

only relevant decision issued by this court prior to the adop-

tion of what is now ORS 742.504—and because the parties

disagree on what lessons we should draw from it—we now

consider that opinion in some detail.12

Wallace involved an exclusion from the liability

provisions of an automobile insurance policy rather than

underinsured motorist coverage. There, the insured’s wife

had been in an accident while driving a “loaner” vehicle

that an auto dealer had given the insured to use while the

insured’s own vehicle was being repaired. 220 Or at 522.

The evidence was unclear as to how long the insured was

permitted to use the loaner, “but whether it was to be four

days or two weeks [was], in our opinion, entirely immaterial

to the issue presented.” Id.

In subsequent insurance-coverage litigation regard-

ing the insured’s personal automobile policy, the issue was

whether that policy provided coverage for the accident that

the insured’s wife had been in while driving the loaner

12

Both the briefing of the parties and the Court of Appeals’ opinion refer-

ence this court’s decision in Shadbolt v. Farmers Insur. Exch., 275 Or 407, 551

P2d 478 (1976), but that opinion is not helpful here. The court in Shadbolt was

not interpreting ORS 742.504(4)(b), nor would that opinion have been available

to the legislature that enacted the first version of that statute in 1967 (Or Laws

1967, ch 482, § 3(4)(b)). Instead, Shadbolt interpreted a provision of an insurance

policy involving vehicles that the insured had “ ‘regularly or frequently used.’ ”

275 Or at 409. The Shadbolt opinion expressly distinguished that policy clause

from the clause interpreted in Wallace. See id. at 410 (“in Wallace, the issue was

not whether the automobile was, in fact, ‘regularly or frequently used’ by the

insured, as in this case, but whether the automobile was furnished for regular

use” (emphasis in original)).

278 Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.

vehicle. The policy covered some replacement vehicles, but

it excluded “ ‘any automobile owned by * * * or furnished for

regular use to’ ” the insured or a member of the same house-

hold. See id. at 522-23 (quoting policy). At trial, the jury was

instructed at some length regarding the meaning of the

phrase “[f]urnished for regular use,” including as follows:

“ ‘Furnished for regular use as used in the policy of

insurance in question means a vehicle furnished for prin-

cipal use as distinguished from a casual use. That is, fur-

nished for regular use, used in the same or similar manner

and for the same and similar purposes and at the usual

time as the car that is actually owned by the party using

the same.’ ”

Id. at 524 (quoting jury instruction).

In determining whether the trial court had correctly

instructed the jury regarding the meaning of “furnished for

regular use,” this court did not focus on the specific text of

that phrase. Instead, the court explained that “furnished

for regular use” was to be interpreted in light of its underly-

ing purpose. Id. at 525. The court gleaned that purpose from

the policy’s benefits and premiums and the relationship of

the exclusion to both. Id. at 525-26. The court evidently rea-

soned that it would make no sense for the policy to identify

which vehicles it covered and assess a corresponding pre-

mium, only to provide additional coverage for other vehicles

that the insured might own or use at will, but for which no

premium had been paid. As the court explained, the policy’s

design

“ ‘would seem to indicate the intention of the [insurer] to

protect itself from a situation where an insured could pay

for one policy and be covered by the insurance in driving

any car that he decided to use, whether owned by him or

members of his family or rented. In other words, cars under

his control that he could use at will and might use often.

Without some such exclusion it is obvious that the [insurer]

might lose premiums and also that the hazard under the

insurance would be increased.’ ”

Id. at 525-26 (quoting Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pulsifer,

41 F Supp 249, 251 (D Me 1941)). Thus, the purpose of the

exclusion was to protect the insurer against a combination

Cite as 375 Or 262 (2026) 279

of lost premiums and increased insurance risk, which would

occur if an insured were able to pay for insurance on one

vehicle, but effectively receive coverage for another that the

insured “could use at will and might use often.” Id. at 526.

The court went on to explain, however, that the “fur-

nished for regular use” exclusion did not pursue that goal at

all costs. The policy as a whole was intended to cover vehi-

cles that “the insured or his wife might perhaps on infre-

quent occasions obtain permission of various owners to use.”

Id. at 526. The exclusion was intended only “to eliminate

the risk to the insurer of the use of automobiles usually at

hand instead of [the insured’s] own [vehicle].” Id. Therefore,

“it seem[ed] obvious that the clause implie[d] a restriction

upon the use of automobiles over which the insured ha[d] a

rather permanent right of control.” Id.

Based on that understanding, the court explained

that the phrase “furnished for regular use” focused on the

right that the insured had to use a vehicle, not the particu-

lar manner in which the insured actually used it:

“We are of the opinion, therefore, that the phrase ‘fur-

nished for regular use’ as used in context does not imply the

manner of use, that is, putting the automobile to the same

uses to which an insured would use his own automobile, but

implies a right to the regular use of the automobile in the

sense that there is an expressed or implied understanding

with the owner of an automobile that the insured could have

the use of the particular automobile or perhaps any automo-

bile of the other at such times as he desired, if available.”

Id.

The court also explained that “furnished for reg-

ular use” would not apply to some situations in which the

right to use the vehicle was too limited by purpose or by

time:

“The term ‘furnished for regular use’ does not embody

the term ‘for temporary use,’ but describes the antithesis

thereof. It, therefore, expresses no thought of excluding

protection in those situations where the use is but for a sin-

gle occasion or single purpose.”

Id.

280 Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.

The court then returned to the challenged jury

instruction. Again, the trial court had instructed the jury

that “furnished for regular use” meant “furnished to be

‘used in the same or similar manner and for the same and

similar purposes and at the usual time as the car that is

actually owned by the party using the same.’ ” Id. at 527

(quoting jury instructions). Given the court’s interpretation

of the insurance policy, it held that the instruction misstated

the law:

“This wording gives emphasis to the manner of use and

not to the understanding of the [insured] as to the tempo-

rary or more or less permanent use of the automobile when

available[.]”

Id.

Our interpretation of “furnished for regular use” in

Wallace provides additional depth to the ordinary meaning

of that phrase, and it informs our understanding of how the

legislature that enacted ORS 742.504(4)(b) likely understood

it. The phrase should be understood in light of its purpose,

which is to protect insurance companies against both loss

of premiums (due to motorists obtaining double coverage

under their private policies) and increased insurance risk.

The primary effect is to exclude coverage when an insured

“pay[s] for one policy” but drives other vehicles “under [the

insured’s] control that he could use at will and might use

often.” 220 Or at 525-26 (internal quotation marks omitted);

see id. at 526 (exclusion was intended only “to eliminate the

risk to the insurer of the use of automobiles usually at [the

insured’s] hand” in place of the insured’s own). That provi-

sion should not, however, be understood to exclude coverage

when an insured is driving a vehicle that the insured might,

“on infrequent occasions,” receive permission to use. Id. at

526.

Thus, when determining whether a vehicle has been

furnished for regular use, the central focus of that inquiry

must be on the insured’s right to use the vehicle; the manner

or extent to which the insured actually exercised that right

is not dispositive. Id. at 526-27 (focus is properly on insured’s

“right to the regular use of the automobile”; exclusion is not

narrowly limited to those circumstances in which vehicle

Cite as 375 Or 262 (2026) 281

was “ ‘used in the same or similar manner and for the same

and similar purposes and at the usual time’ ” as insured’s

covered vehicle, as that improperly emphasizes “manner of

use”); see also Elliott, 1967 Ins LJ at 604 (“the right of use is

apparently more important to the courts than the number of

times the insured actually used the furnished automobile”

(footnote omitted)).

We further note that Wallace specifically informs

the meaning of “regular” as it appears in the statutory exclu-

sion. Wallace explained that a vehicle made available only

on an “infrequent” basis would fall outside the exclusion,

whereas one that an insured has the right to use “often”

would fall within it. Id. at 526. By making such a distinc-

tion, Wallace signaled that the right to “regular use” means

more than merely the right to use on any uniform basis,

such as, for example, once every quarter to pick up the CEO

at the airport. Instead, the insured’s right to use the vehi-

cle—even if not actually exercised—must arise with some

degree of frequency or even “often.”

Although that understanding of Wallace and its

implications for the meaning of ORS 742.504(4)(b) lends

some support to plaintiff, it does not go as far as she con-

tends. Plaintiff’s proposed interpretation of “furnished for

the regular use,” which is based on her reading of Wallace, is

that the exclusion applies only when an insured has “unre-

stricted rights to use the vehicle, i.e., de facto ownership.”

Plaintiff reads Wallace “to require insureds to add all the

vehicles that they own or have regular use of to their pol-

icy and to prevent the insured from getting the benefit of

coverage on two vehicles while paying premiums for just

one.” In support of that view, plaintiff notes that Wallace

twice used the word “permanent” in describing vehicles

that would be subject to the exclusion because they were

“furnished for regular use.” See 220 Or at 526 (“the clause

implies a restriction upon the use of automobiles over which

the insured has a rather permanent right of control”); id. at

527 (question turns on “the understanding of the [insured]

as to the temporary or more or less permanent use of the

automobile when available”). Although plaintiff recognizes

that “furnished for the regular use” denotes something less

282 Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.

than actual ownership, she reads Wallace as requiring the

insured to have such complete control over the vehicle that

they could obtain their own insurance for it.

Plaintiff identifies nothing in the text of the statute

to suggest that “furnished for the regular use” means “unre-

stricted rights to use the vehicle” or “de facto ownership,”

and we do not read Wallace as suggesting that interpretation

to the legislature. Although that opinion did mention “per-

manent” when discussing what would trigger the exclusion,

it summarized its understanding of “furnished for regular

use” more broadly, without referring to permanent control,

much less to an insured’s ability to add another vehicle to

their insurance policy. As noted, the court stated:

“We are of the opinion, therefore, that the phrase ‘fur-

nished for regular use’ as used in context * * * implies a

right to the regular use of the automobile in the sense that

there is an expressed or implied understanding with the

owner of an automobile that the insured could have the use

of the particular automobile or perhaps any automobile of

the other at such times as he desired, if available.”

Id. at 526. Wallace thus suggested that the exclusion would

reach situations in which the vehicle’s owner retained

actual control, including the right to place certain limits

on the insured’s use of the vehicle. See id. (vehicle subject

to exclusion could be one that the insured could only use

“if available[,]” a matter presumably within the control of

the actual owner, not the insured). Further, by recognizing

that the exclusion might apply if an insured had the right to

use “any automobile of another,” id., not just an automobile

specifically assigned to the insured, the Wallace court does

not appear to have been concerned about any rights—such

as de facto ownership rights—other than the right that the

insured had to use a vehicle that belonged to someone else.

Moreover, plaintiff’s emphasis on the word “perma-

nent” fails to acknowledge the qualifiers that Wallace placed

before that term: “rather permanent” and “more or less per-

manent.” Id. at 526, 527 (emphases added). And even when

using the word “permanent” in those qualified ways, the

court did not seem to suggest that only vehicles made avail-

able to that extent would be subject to the exclusion. Rather,

Cite as 375 Or 262 (2026) 283

the court sought to distinguish situations that clearly fell

within the “furnished for regular use” exclusion from truly

temporary or incidental uses, which would not. As Wallace

explained, the policy in that case did not exclude vehicles

that “the insured or his wife might perhaps on infrequent

occasions obtain permission of various owners to use.” Id. at

526 (“The term ‘furnished for regular use’ does not embody

the term ‘for temporary use[.]’ ”); see also id. (exclusion does

not apply to “situations where the use is but for a single

occasion or single purpose”). Thus, the court was describing

polar opposites, with the exclusion clearly encompassing one

pole and just as clearly not encompassing the other. Id. at

527 (explaining that exclusion would apply to situations in

which an insured had “more or less permanent use of the

automobile when available[,]” but not to those merely involv-

ing “temporary * * * use”).

As to whether Wallace at least contemplated situ-

ations in which the insured had sufficient control over the

other vehicle to add it to their own policy, we are hesitant to

read that into the court’s rationale. It is true that Wallace

held that the insurer should not be the one to bear the risk

of an accident occurring while an insured was driving a vehi-

cle someone else had furnished for the insured’s regular use;

that could be read as suggesting that, if an insured wanted

insurance coverage for a vehicle that another had furnished

for their use, then the insured should be required to pay

for that coverage. See id. at 526 (noting one purpose of the

exclusion is “to eliminate the risk to the insurer of the use of

automobiles usually at hand” for the insured, rather than the

insured’s own vehicle). Further, the policy at issue there, simi-

lar to ORS 742.504(4)(b), extended the “regular use” exclusion

to vehicles that had been “ ‘furnished for [the] regular use’ ” of

“ ‘member[s] of the same household,’ ” which could be read as

intending to reach vehicles that an insured did not own but

as to which they might exercise or share significant authority,

including with regard to obtaining coverage. See id. at 523

(quoting policy). But Wallace also appears to have viewed “fur-

nished for regular use” as encompassing the right to use any

of a number of vehicles owned by someone else—such as an

automobile dealership—and it is unlikely that the court rea-

soned that insureds would have a quasi-ownership interest in

284 Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.

each such vehicle. See id. at 526 (referring to “an expressed or

implied understanding with the owner of an automobile that

the insured could have the use of the particular automobile

or perhaps any automobile of the other” (emphasis added)).13

Thus, even though Wallace clearly contemplated that vehicles

subject to the exclusion would be ones that it would not be

fair to expect insurance companies to insure without receiv-

ing corresponding premiums, it did not suggest that those cir-

cumstances included only ones in which the insureds them-

selves were in a position to acquire the desired coverage.14

3. Legislative history

Defendant and amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers

Association (OTLA) have both discussed legislative history,

and we have independently reviewed it. The legislation was

introduced in two different legislative sessions and reviewed

by an interim committee before being finally adopted in 1967.

See Or Laws 1967, ch 482, § 3 (enacting what is now ORS

742.504).15 Neither the parties nor we have identified any

13

Wallace may have made that statement in contemplation of a very early

decision regarding “furnished for regular use,” which involved a car salesman

injured while driving one of his employer’s cars: Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

v. Boecher, 48 NE2d 895 (Ohio Ct App 1942) (cited to the Wallace court in briefing

but not cited in the opinion). The salesman was entitled to use any car on the

employer’s lot for demonstration purposes, and he very often took such cars home;

he had never however, previously driven the particular car in which the accident

occurred. 48 NE2d at 895-96. The Ohio Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded

that that car had been “furnished for regular use” within the meaning of an insur-

ance policy issued to the salesman’s wife, as would, in that court’s view, be true as

to any of the employer’s cars, given their availability for the salesman’s use both

as part of the business day and at his discretion when driving home at night:

“We believe this would [also] be true as to any automobile in the group of

used cars, whether or not it was the first time that he was driving it, because,

although he might not customarily or frequently drive any specific car in the

group, each and all of these cars were furnished to him for his regular use,

either in the business during the day or if he desired to drive home at night.”

Id. at 896.

14

The Wallace court may have contemplated that, in the case of an auto deal-

ership or other employer that owned a fleet of vehicles, the employer would pro-

vide the desired coverage. Indeed, those were the circumstances here: Plaintiff’s

employer, the State of Oregon, insured the Silverado, and plaintiff was paid the

limits of the policy’s underinsured motorist benefits. Thus, to the extent that the

legislature sought to place the burden on someone other than insurers to bear

that risk (or pay for coverage so as to insure against it), the circumstances here

arguably satisfied that objective.

15

This court summarized that history in Vega, explaining that what became

ORS 742.504:

Cite as 375 Or 262 (2026) 285

part of that legislative history that further illuminates the

intended scope of the phrase “furnished for the regular use[.]”

The legislative history that has been cited to us is either

too general16 or too indirect17 to give any material aid to the

definition.

4. Establishing “for Regular Use”

In summary, we conclude the following regarding

the statutorily authorized exclusion for vehicles “furnished

for the regular use” of an insured.

“was first considered as part of a 1963 insurance bill, HB 1809 (1963), that

was tabled by the Senate Judiciary Committee. That bill was substantially

incorporated into HB 1041 (1965), that was under consideration in the next

(1965) legislative session. The latter bill passed both houses of the legislature

but ultimately was defeated by a governor’s veto. The vetoed bill was, in turn,

substantially incorporated into an insurance bill under consideration in the

1967 legislative session, HB 1506. The text of ORS 742.504[ ] finally became

law when that bill was enacted by that legislature and signed by the governor

in 1967.”

323 Or at 305 n 12.

16

OTLA’s most relevant quote appears to be the following from the 1964

Interim Committee on Insurance:

“The first proposed exclusion is to carry out the rating intent discussed

by industry representatives and subcommittee members at an earlier date;

to charge a premium for UMC [(uninsured motorist coverage)] on each owned

auto for which the company has issued a liability policy and to exclude cover-

age on such autos which the insured has not seen fit to insure. This exclusion

is necessary to effect that rating intent since the Insuring Agreements on

pages 2 and 3 of the rough draft of the bill don’t require the insured to be

in an ‘insured’ auto to be protected by this coverage. Thus, in the absence of

this conclusion the [ insured could] insure one of his cars and automatically

receive free UMC coverage on his other automobiles. This would serve to

greatly increase the UMC rate and be very inequitable to persons who own

only one car.”

Minutes, Interim Committee on Insurance, Subcommittee #4, Sept 18, 1964

(statement regarding amendments proposed by Nationwide Insurance Co.). The

statement (which appears to actually discuss the “regular or frequent use of

the insured” provision now in ORS 742.504(2)(d)(B)) addresses vehicles that the

insured owns—something that was already in the text of the statute. It does not

shed any light on what the legislature meant when it expanded the definition to

also include vehicles “furnished for the regular use[.]”

17

Defendant summarizes its excerpts from legislative history as showing

that the legislature was balancing uninsured motorist coverage for Oregonians

“with the resentment from the public at being forced to purchase insurance,

which is one of the main considerations regarding the minimum limits, because

the higher the minimum limits, the higher the cost for purchasing the required

insurance.” Defendant does not explain how that is helpful to determining when

a vehicle has been “furnished for the regular use” of an insured.

286 Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.

First, the plain text, as viewed through the lens of

Wallace, indicates that the insured must have been granted

the privilege or benefit of using the vehicle on a steady or

uniform basis; further, whether or not the insured actually

exercises that right, the opportunity to do so must at least

arise with some degree of frequency.

Second, the determination whether a vehicle has

been “furnished for the regular use” of an insured will

ultimately depend on the breadth of the privilege or ben-

efit granted to the insured. See Wallace, 220 Or at 526-27

(distinguishing manner of actual use from insured’s right

to use vehicle). In some cases, the parties involved will have

a written or oral agreement that precisely dictates when

and under what circumstances a person is permitted to use

another owner’s vehicle. In other cases, however, the evi-

dence regarding the scope of an insured’s right may be less

direct. Although in this case there was some direct evidence

regarding the scope of plaintiff’s authorized use, the indirect

evidence sheds further light on whether her employer autho-

rized “regular use” within the meaning of ORS 742.504(4)

(b). Because it will likely aid future inquiries, we pause to

describe some forms of indirect evidence that can inform

whether a vehicle has been “furnished for * * * regular use.”

One such form of indirect evidence would be how

frequently, and for what reason, the insured had previously

used the vehicle. Although nothing in the text, context or

legislative history of ORS 742.504(2)(b) requires a showing

of prior use, the extent to which an insured actually used

another’s vehicle is at least circumstantial evidence of what

use was permitted. That is, even though we have noted that

the insured’s actual use of a vehicle is not dispositive, fre-

quent prior use of a vehicle would be some indication that an

insured has been granted a broad privilege to use it.

Another form of indirect evidence is whether, as in

this case, the vehicle in question was owned by the insured’s

employer, though the significance of that fact will likely

vary from case to case. In some cases, that fact might war-

rant considerable weight. For example, a “company car” that

an employee is permitted to use as a fringe benefit of their

employment—whether in the form of an assigned vehicle or

Cite as 375 Or 262 (2026) 287

a comparable right to choose from any number of cars in an

employer’s fleet—might be considered a prototypical exam-

ple of a vehicle that has been “furnished for the regular use”

of an insured. See Wallace, 220 Or at 526 (describing “an

expressed or implied understanding with the owner of an

automobile that the insured could have the use of the par-

ticular automobile or perhaps any automobile of the other at

such times as he desired”). That is, such arrangements often

contemplate both a rather broad scope of use and a use that

occurs quite frequently.

Notably, even before Oregon adopted ORS 742.504(4)

(b) in 1967, other jurisdictions had concluded that a “com-

pany car” or equivalent had been “furnished for regular

use.” See, e.g., O’Brien v. Halifax Ins. Co., 141 So 2d 307, 308

(Fla Dist Ct App 1962) (insured was police officer driving

one of four city-owned police vehicles); Moore v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 239 Miss 130, 133, 135, 121 So 2d 125,

126-27 (1960) (insured used one of employer’s 10 trucks

two-to-three times a week); Kennedy, 52 Del at 47-48, 152

A2d at 118-19 (single employer-owned vehicle that insured

used every weekday); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Addy, 132 Colo

202, 204, 206, 286 P2d 622, 623-24 (1955) (company car);

Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marr, 128 F Supp 67,

70-71 (DNJ 1955) (one of four motor pool cars had been “fur-

nished for regular use” to insured when insured was the

agent in charge of government office with four other agents;

insured had driven a motor pool car roughly 50 times in the

10 months before the accident, and accident occurred while

insured was taking car home on government business);18

18

In Marr, the United States District Court identified several “signposts” rel-

evant to determine whether a vehicle had been furnished for regular use,” based

on cases from numerous jurisdictions. Id. at 70. Those were:

“1. Was the use of the car in question made available most of the time to

the insured?

“2. Did the insured make more than mere occasional use of the car?

“3. Did the insured need to obtain permission to use the car or had that

been granted by blanket authority?

“4. Was there a purpose for the use of the car in the permission granted

or by the blanket authority and was it being used for such purpose?

“5. Was it being used in the area where such car would be expected to be

used?”

Id.

288 Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.

Davy v. Merchs. Mut. Cas. Co., 97 NH 236, 238-39, 85 A2d

388, 389-90 (1952) (insured was taxi driver and one of three

drivers using employer’s two taxis). Although some contem-

porary cases had held that a “company car” or equivalent

had not been “furnished for regular use,” they often did so

only because the accident had happened on a trip outside the

scope of the employer’s permission. See, e.g., Schoenknecht v.

Prairie State Farmers Ins. Asso., 27 Ill App 2d 83, 97-98, 169

NE2d 148, 155-56 (1960) (employer-assigned vehicle was

not “furnished for regular use” when insured was using it

outside business hours and for personal reasons); Lewis, 56

Cal App 2d at 599-600, 132 P2d at 848 (salesman who reg-

ularly used one of several cars provided for demonstration

purposes; demonstration car was not “furnished for regu-

lar use” when salesman had obtained special permission to

take the car on a personal trip outside town).

Other forms of indirect evidence may also inform

whether a vehicle has been furnished for the regular use of

an insured. By specifically identifying certain forms of evi-

dence, we do not purport to establish a required or exclusive

list of relevant factors. We emphasize the two that we have

because they are at least somewhat relevant to our disposi-

tion, given the summary judgment record and the factual

context in which this case arises, and because the rationale

underlying our reliance on them may assist others under-

taking the same inquiry.

C. Application

The remaining question, then, is whether the trial

court correctly granted defendant’s motion for summary

judgment and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion. In answering

the first part of that question, the ultimate inquiry is whether

all reasonable factfinders would find that the Silverado had

been “furnished for [plaintiff’s] regular use,” that is, that

plaintiff had had the right to use the Silverado in a steady

or uniform manner and her right to do so arose with at

least some degree of frequency. Construing the summary

judgment record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the

nonmoving party for this part of our analysis, and applying

our interpretation of “furnished for the regular use,” we con-

clude that there remain genuine issues of material fact and

Cite as 375 Or 262 (2026) 289

that the trial court therefore erred in granting summary

judgment to defendant.

We begin with the fact that ODF, plaintiff’s

employer, had a fleet of available vehicles for its employees

in the Roseburg office and assigned most of those vehicles

to individual employees. If plaintiff had been one of those

employees, it would have been strong evidence (though not

conclusive) that the Silverado had been “furnished for [her]

regular use.” But plaintiff was not one of those employees.

The fact that ODF had vehicles available for assignment

and yet concluded that plaintiff’s job duties involved insuf-

ficient travel—or that her corresponding opportunity to use

an ODF vehicle arose on an insufficiently steady or uniform

basis—to warrant assigning one of them to her, is affirma-

tive (though not necessarily conclusive) evidence that the

Silverado was not “furnished for [her] regular use.”

Turing to the evidence of plaintiff’s prior use, we

conclude that it also falls short of the sort of frequency

that would compel the finding that the Silverado had been

“furnished for [her] regular use.” Plaintiff’s authorization

to use the Silverado—or any vehicle within ODF’s fleet—

existed only when her work duties required it. And her work

duties (as far as the record shows) required it relatively

infrequently. There is no evidence that plaintiff used the

Silverado (or any other work vehicle) for the first five years

that she worked for ODF. Even disregarding those earlier

years, the evidence shows only that plaintiff used a work

vehicle during three months in 2017 and another three

months in 2018. Furthermore, those uses apparently all

involved fire assignments, which means that plaintiff’s use

of the Silverado was largely contingent on (1) there being

a wildfire; (2) ODF requiring resources for that fire that

included plaintiff’s specific work skills; and (3) plaintiff’s

ability and willingness to accept an assignment to the fire.

Given the summary judgment record, we conclude

that the evidence—viewed in the light most favorable to

plaintiff—was not sufficient to compel, as a matter of law,

a finding that the Silverado had been “furnished for [plain-

tiff’s] regular use.” That is, we are not convinced that, on

the basis of that record, all reasonable factfinders would

290 Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.

find that ODF had given plaintiff the privilege of using the

Silverado on such a steady or uniform basis and with suf-

ficient frequency for that use to be “regular,” much less “at

such times as [plaintiff] desired[.]” Wallace, 220 Or at 526.

Resisting that conclusion, defendant argues—as

the Court of Appeals concluded—that the fact that plaintiff

could use the vehicle for work purposes “as needed,” with-

out the need to request permission, established that the

Silverado was “furnished for [her] regular use.” Sheppard,

333 Or App at 45. We disagree. Plaintiff’s right to use the

vehicle without asking permission was only “as needed,”

which, as noted, was dictated solely by her work duties. The

evidence as to when plaintiff’s “need[ ]” to use a vehicle arose

was specific to ad hoc fire assignments and dependent upon

her supervisor’s authorization. Plaintiff’s purported autho-

rization to take the vehicle “as needed,” then, is somewhat

illusory, as that need was substantially dependent upon

her supervisor’s underlying authorization to accept a fire

assignment. Moreover, defendant’s understanding would

effectively equate “regular use” with “regular work use.”

While we do not foreclose the possibility that regular work

use could constitute “regular use,” we disagree that plain-

tiff’s right to use the Silverado “as needed” for fire assign-

ments constituted “regular use” as a matter of law.

That, in part, is because even an authorization

that arose every time that defendant was assigned to a fire

would not indisputably be “regular,” given the necessary

confluence of a wildfire, a need for someone with plaintiff’s

skills, and an agreement to have plaintiff take the assign-

ment. That is, even if such authorized use could be deemed

“steady” or “uniform” in the sense that it arose every time

that those elements aligned, the record does not compel the

finding that, over the course of plaintiff’s employment, it

arose with any degree of “frequency.”

Thus, when viewed in the proper light, the sum-

mary judgment record does not compel, as a matter of law,

the finding that the Silverado (or any ODF vehicle) was “fur-

nished for [plaintiff’s] regular use.” The trial court therefore

erred in granting defendant’s summary judgment motion.

Cite as 375 Or 262 (2026) 291

Turning, finally, to plaintiff’s cross-motion for par-

tial summary judgment, the foregoing discussion and our

disposition of defendant’s motion largely foreshadows our

conclusion as to plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff’s contention is

primarily a legal one: She asserts that an employer-provided

vehicle, the use of which is strictly limited to work purposes,

can never be considered “furnished for the regular use” of

an insured within the meaning of ORS 742.504(4)(b). As our

analysis above suggests, we disagree with that contention

and, consequently, plaintiff’s position that she was entitled

to summary judgment on the issue of “regular use.” As we

have explained, the exclusion does not require “de facto own-

ership” or an unrestricted right to use the vehicle. Further,

whether an insured has the right to use a vehicle on a steady

or uniform basis that arises with some degree of frequency

is a factual inquiry, one that depends upon a variety of mat-

ters and that can be established through both direct and

indirect evidence of the scope of the authorized use. Here, as

noted, that evidence includes that the Silverado was owned

by plaintiff’s employer, ODF; that she repeatedly received

and accepted fire assignments over the two summers that

preceded her accident; that she drove the vehicle over sub-

stantial distances and for extended periods during those

assignments; and that, even though her use corresponded to

only a few months out of each year, that use appears to have

regularly tracked the fire season, making it arguably steady

or uniform in relation to that aspect of plaintiff’s employ-

ment. Thus, although we disagree with defendant’s conten-

tion that those circumstances compel the finding that ODF

furnished the Silverado for plaintiff’s regular use, we also

disagree with plaintiff’s argument that, when viewed in the

light most favorable to defendant (the nonmoving party for

purposes of plaintiff’s motion), those same circumstances

compel the opposite finding: that the Silverado was not fur-

nished for plaintiff’s regular use. As a result, we conclude

that the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff’s partial

motion for summary judgment.

III. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment for defendant and that the Court of

292 Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co.

Appeals therefore erred in affirming on that basis. We also

conclude, however, that the trial court did not err in denying

plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case

is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.