Bertalan v. Bertalan

[Cite as Bertalan v. Bertalan, 2026-Ohio-1773.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CHRISTINE M. BERTALAN, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 115533

v. :

GEORGE ANTHONY BERTALAN, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 14, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Domestic Relations Division

Case No. DR-21-384906

Appearances:

Christine M. Tuneberg, a.k.a., Christine M. Bertalan,

pro se.

George Anthony Bertalan, pro se.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

Defendant-appellant George A. Bertalan (“George”) appeals from the

trial court’s order denying his motion to vacate the final divorce decree pursuant

to Civ.R. 60(B). Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Plaintiff-appellee Christine M. Bertalan (“Christine”) filed a

complaint for divorce from George on April 15, 2021.1 During the pendency of the

action, George filed two affidavits of disqualification and an amended affidavit of

disqualification seeking to disqualify the trial court judge from presiding over the

divorce case. Those affidavits were denied by the Supreme Court of Ohio on or

about September 18, 2023, and November 22, 2023. Thereafter, the trial court

issued a judgment entry of divorce on December 28, 2023, and the court issued a

nunc pro tunc judgment entry of divorce on January 8, 2024. The trial court

denied George’s motion for a new trial on January 9, 2024.

A direct appeal was filed, and on April 24, 2025, this court affirmed

the trial court’s judgment entry of divorce and the denial of the motion for new

trial in Bertalan v. Bertalan, 2025-Ohio-1443 (8th Dist.). In that appeal, among

other determinations, this court found no abuse of discretion or error in the trial

court’s denial of George’s motions to continue the trial proceedings and no error

by the trial court proceeding with the trial ex parte when George failed to appear

on the final day of trial. Id. at ¶ 42-60. This court also found nothing in the record

to suggest a due-process violation and recognized George’s two affidavits of

disqualification were both rejected by the Supreme Court of Ohio, which we are not

permitted to second-guess. Id. at ¶ 64-65. Additionally, this court found no error

regarding the property division in the divorce. Id. at ¶ 67-86.

1 It appears from the appellate briefing that Christine M. Bertalan is now known

as Christine M. Tuneberg.

On August 8, 2025, George filed a motion to vacate the final divorce

decree pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). In that motion, George asserted “newly

substantiated evidence of judicial misconduct and denial of due process” and

referenced findings by the Ohio Board of Professional Conduct (“the Board”)

relating to the trial court judge, not related to this action, to suggest issues of

judicial impartiality, due process, and fundamental fairness were involved in this

case. George asserted grounds for relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) and (3), raising

issues with the denial of his requests for a continuance of trial and with the

conditions under which the parenting terms were executed. George also sought

relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5), generally asserting the Board’s findings “undermine

the integrity of the judgment,” “corroborate [his] prior Affidavits of

Disqualification,” and “demonstrate a retaliatory motive” in the issuance of the

trial court’s judgment in his case. He further sought relief under the inherent

authority of the court, referencing due process and fundamental fairness, and he

made other assertions.

On September 3, 2025, the trial court denied George’s Civ.R. 60(B)

motion. The trial court found the law-of-the-case doctrine is applicable, and the

court also found the claims for relief pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(1) and (3), which

were made more than a year after judgment was entered, were untimely. The trial

court further determined that the alleged grounds for the claim for relief under

Civ.R. 60(B)(5) were not relevant to the instant case, and the court also noted that

the prior affidavits of disqualification filed by George were denied by the Supreme

Court of Ohio. Additionally, the trial court rejected other arguments and found

that George’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion “appears essentially as an attempt to relitigate

the prior appeal of this matter.”

George filed an appeal from the trial court’s ruling on his Civ.R.

60(B) motion. Under his three assignments of error, George argues that the trial

court erred in denying his Civ.R. 60(B) motion because he claims (1) due process

prohibits a judge from ruling on a motion challenging her own impartiality and

conduct, (2) the failure to provide an independent review constitutes structural

error, and (3) subsequent disciplinary findings of judicial misconduct rendered the

underlying judgment constitutionally infirm.

As an initial matter, we are mindful that George is a pro se litigant.

Nevertheless, pro se litigants are “held to the same standard as litigants who are

represented by counsel” and “the failure of an unrepresented party to properly

present their case for review can lead to arguments not being reviewed at all.”

(Cleaned up.) In re M.C., 2026-Ohio-1051, ¶ 20.

Insofar as George claims the trial court judge should not have ruled

on his Civ.R. 60(B) motion in light of the Board’s findings, he failed to demonstrate

that any recusal or disqualification was warranted in this case. George’s challenges

stem from findings of judicial misconduct that were not related to this action, but

which George nevertheless seeks to impute herein. As this court determined in the

prior appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected George’s prior affidavits of

disqualification in this case, and the record did not show any due-process violation

occurred. Bertalan, 2025-Ohio-1443, at ¶ 64-65 (8th Dist.). Further, this court

observed that “[t]he record instead suggests the trial court, tasked with handling a

demonstrably recalcitrant party, met that challenge with restraint.” Id. at ¶ 64.

George fails to show that the Board’s findings, or any subsequent repercussions

involving the trial court judge, have any relevance to his individual divorce case.

We also find that the cases upon which George relies to support his argument are

distinguishable. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884-887

(2009) (an “exceptional case” dealing with “extreme facts” where “the probability

of actual bias [rose] to an unconstitutional level”); Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510

(1927) (a criminal case in which the mayor who tried the case had a direct,

personal, and pecuniary interest in the decision). There are no extreme facts

involved in his case, and George’s assertions of judicial bias and impartiality in this

matter did not rise to a constitutional level. See Bertalan at ¶ 63-64. Simply put,

George fails to demonstrate that any due-process violation or structural error

occurred. We overrule his first and second assignments of error.

Additionally, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in

denying the motion under Civ.R. 60(B). The trial court properly determined that

the Civ.R. 60(B)(1) and (3) portions of George’s motion were barred by the one-

year time limit and that the issues raised were addressed in the prior appeal.

Although a motion made under Civ.R. 60(B)(5) must be made within a reasonable

time, as the trial court observed, it appears that George was merely using the Civ.R.

60(B) motion as an attempt to relitigate matters previously determined. To the

extent George is claiming newly discovered evidence supports his Civ.R. 60(B)(5)

ground for relief, Civ.R. 60(B)(5) ordinarily cannot be used in this manner. State

ex rel. Richard v. Cuyahoga Cty. Commrs., 89 Ohio St.3d 205, 206 (2000), citing

Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 174 (1994). Even if it were proper with regard

to the assertion of judicial misconduct, Civ.R. 60(B)(5) “is only to be used in an

extraordinary and unusual case when the interests of justice warrant[] it.” State ex

rel. Hatfield v. Miller, 2023-Ohio-429, ¶ 12, quoting Adomeit v. Baltimore, 39 Ohio

App.2d 97, 105 (8th Dist. 1974). This is not such a case. Upon our review, we find

no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Accordingly, we overrule the third

assignment of error.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into

execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR