Coyle

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

JAMES HENRY COYLE, Case No. 6:21-cv-00149-SB

Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATION

v.

COLETTE PETERS,

Defendant.

BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff James Henry Coyle (“Coyle”), a self-represented litigant and formerly an adult

in custody (“AIC”) at Santiam Correctional Institution (“Santiam”), filed this action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) in January 2021. Coyle’s only remaining claim is for negligence

against former Oregon Department of Corrections (“ODOC”) Director Colette Peters (“Peters”).

Now pending before the Court is Peters’ motion for summary judgment. (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.

(“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 68.)

The Court has jurisdiction over Coyle’s remaining claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that the district judge grant Peters’ motion for

summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

As relevant to his remaining claim, Coyle alleges that at the end of December 2020,

ODOC failed properly to test six AICs who transferred from Oregon State Penitentiary to

Santiam, which resulted in a COVID-19 (“COVID”) outbreak at Santiam. (Compl. at 3, ECF No.

2.)

Coyle tested positive for COVID antibodies on or about June 2020. (Compl. at 5; Jan. 9,

2026 Dep. James H. Coyle (“Coyle Dep.”) at 15:2-16:13, Decl. Jermaine Brown Supp. Mot.

Summ. J. (“Brown Decl.”), Ex. 1; see also Brown Decl., Ex. 3.) Coyle did not report COVID

symptoms to Santiam’s medical staff following the December 2020 transfer (see Coyle Dep. at

21:18-21) and he tested negative for COVID on January 20, 2021. (See Coyle Dep. at 22:6-

23:18; Brown Decl., Ex. 4.) Coyle declined a COVID test on February 1, 2021, because he “felt

totally healthy.” (Coyle Dep. at 24:14-25:15; Brown Decl., Ex. 4.) Coyle received the COVID

vaccine soon thereafter. (Id. at 25:24-28:2.) Coyle did not test positive for COVID at any time

after the six AICs arrived at Santiam. (Id. at 29:6-10.)

DISCUSSION

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). At the summary

judgment stage, the court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and

draws all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d

885, 891 (9th Cir. 2005). The court does not assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh evidence,

or determine the truth of matters in dispute. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

255 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for

the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391

U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).

II. ANALYSIS

Coyle’s only remaining claim is for negligence against Peters relating to ODOC’s

transfer of six AICs to Santiam in December 2020.

A. Negligence

1. Applicable Law

“Although . . . [Oregon courts] generally analyze a defendant’s liability for harm that the

defendant’s conduct causes another in terms of the concept of reasonable [foreseeability], rather

than the more traditional duty of care, if the plaintiff invokes a special status, relationship, or

standard of conduct, then that relationship may create, define, or limit the defendant’s duty to the

plaintiff[.]” Stewart v. Kids Inc. of Dall., Or., 261 P.3d 1272, 1277 (Or. Ct. App. 2011)

(simplified). “However, even when a plaintiff alleges a special relationship as the basis for the

defendant’s duty, the scope of that particular duty may be defined or limited by common-law

principles such as foreseeability.” Id. (simplified) (quoting Or. Steel Mills, Inc. v. Coopers &

Lybrand, LLP, 83 P.3d 322, 329 (Or. 2004)); see also Maney v. Oregon, 729 F. Supp. 3d 1087,

1156 (D. Or. 2024) (applying Oregon law to AICs’ negligence claims against ODOC resulting

from the COVID pandemic), aff’d, No. 24-2715, 2025 WL 1794110 (9th Cir. June 30, 2025),

petition for cert. filed, No. 25-960 (U.S. Feb. 13, 2026).

Actual harm is an essential element of any negligence claim. See Lowe v. Philip Morris

USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181, 184 (Or. 2008) (“Oregon law has long recognized that the fact that a

defendant’s negligence poses a threat of future physical harm is not sufficient, standing alone, to

constitute an actionable injury.”); see also id. at 189 (Walters, J., concurring) (“Damage, or

harm, is an essential element of a negligence claim.” (citing W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs,

Robert E. Keeton, & David G. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30, at 165 (5th

ed. 1984))).

2. Analysis

Coyle did not respond to Peters’ motion for summary judgment and has not presented any

evidence that he suffered harm resulting from ODOC’s transfer of six AICs to Santiam in

December 2020. The undisputed evidence in the summary judgment record reflects that Coyle

did not contract COVID as a result of the transfer, nor suffer any other cognizable injury.1

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Coyle and drawing all reasonable

inferences in his favor, Coyle has failed to establish that he suffered harm as a result of Peters’

alleged negligence, an essential element of his negligence claim. As a result, the Court

recommends that the district judge grant Peters’ motion for summary judgment. See Jackson v.

Surber, No. 2:22-cv-01832-SB, 2024 WL 4279428, at *6 (D. Or. Aug. 13, 2024) (dismissing

AIC’s negligence claim where he did “not allege that he contracted COVID” as the result of an

AIC transfer during the COVID pandemic and therefore failed to allege “that any defendant’s

actions caused him harm”); Williams v. Pollard, No. 21-cv-55-RSH-DTF, 2024 WL 6967307, at

*11 (S.D. Cal. May 15, 2024) (granting the defendant prison official’s motion for summary

judgment where “Plaintiff . . . did not contract Covid . . . . [and t]herefore, he has shown no

1 The Court previously dismissed Coyle’s claims for mental or emotional injury resulting

from the December 2020 transfer. See Coyle v. Brown, No. 6:21-cv-00149-SB, 2024 WL

4279424, at *8 (D. Or. Aug. 27, 2024) (“Coyle alleges that he was ‘in constant fear due to

knowing people were dying because of COVID-19’ and suffered ‘mental anguish[.]’ However,

Coyle does not allege that he suffered a physical injury following the events of December 2020.

He does not allege that he tested positive for COVID, suffered any physical symptoms, or

otherwise contracted COVID after December 2020. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the

district judge dismiss Coyle’s claims for mental or emotional injury.”) (simplified), findings and

recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4278127 (D. Or. Sept. 23, 2024).

injury as a result of [the defendant]’s actions”) (citation omitted), aff'd, No. 24-3582, 2025 WL

3706604 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court recommends that the district judge GRANT Peters’

motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 68).

SCHEDULING ORDER

The Court will refer its Findings and Recommendation to a district judge. Objections, if

any, are due within fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. If no

objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If

objections are filed, a response is due within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of

the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and

Recommendation will go under advisement.

DATED this 3rd day of April, 2026. ,

HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN

United States Magistrate Judge

PAGE 5 — FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION