Lawrence

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CORDARIUS LAWRENCE, M22043, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) Case No. 25-cv-1006-DWD

JOHN/JANE DOES 1-3, )

KIMBERLY WEITL, )

MISS BUETHER, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Cordarius Lawrence, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC) currently detained at Dixon Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights at

Menard Correctional Center (Menard). Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) and Amended

Complaint (Doc. 12) were dismissed for failure to state a claim, and his Second Amended

Complaint (Doc. 15) is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to

filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion of a

complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from

such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual

allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth

Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff initially filed a second amended complaint on November 24, 2025, but

upon a cursory review the Court found that it still lacked necessary details about the

individual actions of the alleged John/Jane Doe 1-3 defendants, so Plaintiff was directed

to show cause about the ambiguity. The Court specifically stated:

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE: On November 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed his

second amended complaint wherein he focuses on the conditions of

confinement he faced in segregation at Menard Correctional Center from

June-December of 2023. In the case caption, Plaintiff names John/Jane Does

1-3, officers who worked the 7a.m.-3p.m. shift, the 3p.m.-11p.m. shift, and

the 11p.m.-7a.m. shift. It is not clear from his allegations in the complaint if

he means only three officers, Officers A, B, and C, one who worked each

shift, or if he is actually attempting to refer to every single officer who

worked in his cellhouse for every single shift for six months. While a litigant

can use a John or Jane Doe designation to refer to a singular person whose

name they do not know, it is not appropriate to use this label to refer to

mass groups because the complaint then lacks the level of detail necessary

to establish the personal responsibility of each individual within the group.

See e.g. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (the vague assertion

that "one or more of the Defendants" in a group caused harm is not

sufficient to plead personal involvement for a Section 1983 claim).

Therefore, Plaintiff is directed to provide further detail about John/Jane

Does 1-3 within 21 days. He should focus on describing each defendant

with details such as their appearance, the shift such defendant worked at

the time, the number of times Plaintiff interacted with them, and which

conditions of confinement they knew of and refused to fix. If Plaintiff fails

to provide supplemental information, the conditions of confinement

allegations in his Second Amended Complaint will be dismissed for failure

to state a claim. Plaintiff must file his response to this Order by February 6,

2026.

(Docket entry 16). On February 6, 2026, the Court received Plaintiff’s response, which

turned out to be an entirely new amended pleading, with the second amended complaint

appended and edited by handwritten interlineation. (Doc. 18). The Court will refer to

document 18 as the Third Amended Complaint for ease of comprehension.

Plaintiff has dropped all allegations about disciplinary proceedings that resulted

in his placement in segregation for six months, and he now focuses only on the conditions

of confinement in segregation from June 26, 2023, through December 22, 2023. (Docs. 15,

18). Plaintiff alleges that upon being moved to segregation, he immediately observed

that his cell was covered in food, dirt, hair, fingernails, toenails, urine stains, and fecal

stains. (Doc. 15 at 2; Doc. 18 at 6). The toilet and sink appeared as though they had never

been cleaned, and the sink often produced brown, black, or cloudy water. (Id.). His cell

and the shower area both contained trash. (Doc. 15 at 2). The cleanliness issue worsened

in October of 2023 when other inmates threw feces about the gallery. (Id.).

He alleged in the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 15) that he asked John Does

1-3 for cleaning supplies to no avail. In the Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 18) he

narrows his focus to John Doe and Jane Doe—the five day officers that worked the 7am-

3pm shift. (Doc. 18 at 6). He alleges he asked them for cleaning supplies and they refused.

(Id.). Plaintiff alleges in the third amended complaint that within a month of confinement

in segregation, he began to lose weight and hair, and he felt sick all the time. (Doc. 18 at

6-7). He claims he asked John and Jane Doe for relief, to no avail. (Doc. 18 at 7).

In addition to the filth, Plaintiff alleges there was excessive screaming, singing,

rapping, banging, and loud noises from the pipes at all hours. (Doc. 15 at 3-4). He claims

the noise was so excessive that he could barely speak to the officers. (Id.). He claims he

asked John Does 1 and 2 about it but they refused to do anything despite having the

authority to write excessive noise tickets to quell the cacophony. (Doc. 15 at 3-4). Plaintiff

repeats comparable allegations in the Third Amended Complaint, and alleges it caused

him sleep deprivation and anxiety. (Doc. 18 at 7). In response to his pleas for assistance,

he alleges John Doe said there was nothing he could do, and Jane Doe said the noise

comes with restrictive housing. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges without assistance his mental

health deteriorated and he experienced sleep deprivation, lack of focus and concentration

and mental anguish. (Id. at 7-8).

Plaintiff alleges that from June to October of 2023 he experienced persistent

anxiety, sleeplessness, a reduced appetite, depression, PTSD and auditory hallucinations.

He attributes the decline in his mental health to segregation. (Doc. 15 at 5). He reported

the symptoms to Defendant Buether, a mental health professional, but she merely gave

him a mental health packet to read and refused any other sort of care or services. He filed

a grievance which eventually reached Defendant Weitl in late October of 2023, but she

offered no assistance. (Doc. 15 at 6). Plaintiff repeats the same allegations against Buether

and Weitl in his Third Amended Complaint.

Based on the allegations in the Third Amended Complaint, the Court will

designate the following claims:

Claim 1: Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim

against John Doe and Jane Doe 5-day officers from 7am-

3pm for the totality of the conditions Plaintiff faced from

June 2023-December 2023;

Claim 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendants Miss Buether and Weitl for their handling of

Plaintiff’s mental health needs from June-October of 2023.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

Analysis

To establish a conditions of confinement claim, an inmate must establish (1) a

deprivation that is, from an objective standpoint, sufficiently serious that it results in the

denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities, and (2) where prison officials

are deliberately indifferent to this state of affairs. Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th

Cir. 2016), citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 824 (1994). Conditions may be

considered collectively when analyzing a conditions of confinement claim, and the

duration of the allegedly harmful conditions is relevant to the existence of an Eighth

Amendment violation. Id. Many of these conditions standing alone are not sufficient to

give rise to an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, but they must also

be considered collectively. Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006). Although

“the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337, 349 (1981), inmates are entitled to adequate food, clothing, shelter, bedding, hygiene

materials, and sanitation. Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009). Ultimately,

a plaintiff must establish a discrete physical harm to qualify for compensatory damages.

See e.g., Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 2016) (discussing the PLRA’s

physical injury requirement for compensatory damages, as well as the availability of

punitive and nominal damages if an inmate can only establish psychological harm).

Here, Plaintiff describes filth in his cell with no ability to clean it, exposure to

human waste with no reprieve, murky water, showers polluted with mold and fungi, and

prolonged periods of disturbing noise. He alleges that as a result of these conditions, he

lost weight, hair, and sleep, he became physically ill, and he suffered a decline in his

mental health that required medication. The Court has pressed him for more information

or specificity about the individual John or Jane Doe employees. Earlier in this suit, it

seemed that Plaintiff was referring to all staff who worked his cellhouse on all shifts. See

(Doc. 1 at 3 (describing John Doe officers from the 7am-3pm shift, the 3pm-11pm shift,

and the 11pm-7am shift)). Plaintiff then moved to naming John/Jane Does 1, 2 & 3 who

worked five days a month by his cell—but he still did not make it clear when he interacted

with these individuals. (Doc. 15 at 2). Plaintiff has now narrowed his description to John

Doe and Jane Doe—correctional officers that were the 5-day officer on the 7am-3pm shift.

The Court is unaware if a “5-day officer” is a designated role that a single staff member

fills, or if Plaintiff is still describing a larger group of employees. In the text of the Third

Amended Complaint, Plaintiff attributes a spoken conversation to a John Doe, and a

spoken conversation to a Jane Doe. This suggests that Plaintiff has discrete people in

mind, and it is just enough to allow him to proceed at this preliminary juncture.

Before Claim 1 is solidified, Plaintiff must still complete the task of identifying the

names of Jane Doe and John Doe. The Warden of Menard will be added to this case to

assist. Plaintiff shall have 21 days to file a notice with a physical description of John

Doe and Jane Doe. He should include things like hair color, height, gender,

nicknames, race, and any other information he knows about John Doe and Jane Doe

that would help in finding their names. If Plaintiff does not file a timely notice, or if his

notice makes it apparent that he is trying to identify more than two individuals—then

Claim 1 may still be subject to dismissal. The Court has advised a few times that Plaintiff

needed to be specific and needed to focus on the actions of individual employees. Until

he has found the names of two prison employees, Claim 1 is still subject to dismissal.

Claim 2 is adequate to proceed against Defendants Buether and Weitl. Plaintiff

alleges he interacted directly with Buether, presented numerous concerns about his

deteriorating mental health, and received essentially no assistance. He raised the issue

to Weitl in detailed written correspondence but alleges she rendered no aid. At this early

juncture, these allegations are sufficient to proceed under the Eighth Amendment.

Disposition

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claim 1 of the Complaint (Doc. 1) survives

against Defendants Jane Doe (7am-3pm 5-day officer) and John Doe (7am-3pm 5-day

officer), and Claim 2 survives against Kimberly Weitl and Miss Buether.

The Clerk shall ADD the Warden of Menard in official capacity to help identify

Jane Doe (7am-3pm 5-day officer) and John Doe (7am-3pm 5-day officer). Plaintiff shall

have 21 days to file a notice with descriptive information about Jane Doe (7am-3pm 5-

day officer) and John Doe (7am-3pm 5-day officer). He shall include physical

appearance, dates when he interacted with these defendants, nicknames, and any other

information he possesses. Failure to file a notice may result in the dismissal of the

unnamed parties. Once Plaintiff has filed his Notice, the Court shall set a deadline for

the Warden to respond.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants Kimberly Weitl, Miss

Buether, and the Warden of Menard (official capacity): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit

and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of

Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Third Amended

Complaint (Doc. 18), and this Memorandum and Order to Defendants’ place of

employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver

of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were

sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the

Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent

authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this

Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 14 days after a change of address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will

cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this

action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the standard HIPAA Order in this case

because it will involve the exchange of medical records.

Plaintiff’s Motion for an Extension of Time (Doc. 17) is GRANTED instanter and

his Third Amended Complaint was reviewed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 27, 2026

David W. Dugan

/s/

________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,

the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will

likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,

but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants

have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important

information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles

that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but

it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening

only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some

relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged

actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is

the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.