Kornoski

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

TODD KORNOSKI, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-3314-CRL

)

JOSHUA MCDANNALD, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is Petitioner Todd Kornoski’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13). For

the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus without prejudice. The Court DECLINES

to issue a certificate of appealability.

I. BACKGROUND

In December 2014, Petitioner was convicted of possession of child pornography in

DuPage County and sentenced to three years in the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC) and three years to natural life of Mandatory Supervised Release (MSR). See Illinois

v. Kornoski, 14 CF 409 (DuPage Cnty. Cir. Ct. Ill.). In January 2015, Petitioner was also

convicted of Solicitation of Child Pornography in DeKalb County and sentenced to four

years in the Illinois Department of Corrections and two years of MSR to run concurrent

with his DuPage County sentence. See Illinois v. Kornoski, 13 CF 565 (DeKalb Cnty. Cir. Ct.

Ill.).

Petitioner reports that he was most recently released from IDOC and placed on

MSR on September 23, 2022. (Doc. 1 at 2). However, he was taken back into custody on

alleged violations of the terms of his MSR on February 15, 2025. Id. The Illinois Prisoner

Review Board (IPRB) revoked his parole on April 15, 2025. Id. The IPRB denied

Petitioner’s timely appeal on June 27, 2025. Id. Petitioner did not file any actions in state

court following these proceedings. Id.

Instead, Petitioner filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 on October 13, 2025. He argues that the IPRB failed to afford him his due

process rights as set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), when the IPRB relied

solely on hearsay, deprived Petitioner of an opportunity to confront the evidence against

him, failed to make any findings that there was good cause to deny Petitioner the

opportunity to confront and cross examine the evidence against him, and failed to make

a finding that the violation report was sufficiently reliable to form the basis of a decision

to revoke. (Doc. 1 at 3).

After being ordered to respond, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss (doc. 13),

arguing Petitioner must first exhaust his available state court remedy before seeking

habeas relief. Petitioner filed a response to the motion to dismiss (doc. 10), and

Respondent filed a reply (doc. 14).

II. DISCUSSION

“Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality of a state prisoner’s

conviction and sentence are guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court

judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of

legal proceedings within our system of federalism.” Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012).

One of these rules is that a state prisoner must exhaust adequate and available state

remedies before filing a petition for habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)

and (c).

While Illinois has an appellate process to contest a prisoner’s conviction and

sentence, Petitioner and Respondent contest whether there is an adequate state court

process to challenge alleged due process violations that occur during a supervised release

revocation proceeding. Respondent argues Illinois state prisoners may file a complaint

for an order of mandamus from an Illinois circuit court and invoke one complete round

of the normal appellate process, to contest the IPRB’s decision. (Doc. 13 at 3). However,

Plaintiff argues that a complaint for an order of mandamus is not required because it is

not an established state procedure for judicial review of revocation decisions. The

Seventh Circuit has found that this procedure is available to prisoners to bring

constitutional claims and a prisoner is required to exhaust it prior to bringing a federal

habeas proceeding. See McAtee v. Cowan, 250 F.3d 506, 508–09 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that

Illinois prisoners are required to exhaust claims regarding the constitutionality of

disciplinary hearings in a complaint for an order of mandamus) (citing U.S. ex rel. Johnson

v. McGinnis, 734 F.2d 1193, 1198 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Illinois courts have recognized that

petitions for writs of mandamus directed against corrections officials may be an

appropriate remedy for constitutional violations of parole procedures and prison

conditions.”);See also, Faheem-El v. Klincar, 600 F. Supp. 1029, 1033–34 (N.D. Ill. 1984)

(“Mandamus is a proper route to compel public officials to comply with statutory or

constitutional duties.” (citing Illinois state cases)).

Moreover, Illinois caselaw supports the Seventh Circuit’s precedent. Under Illinois

law, “[m]andamus is an extraordinary remedy to enforce, as a matter of right, ‘the

performance of official duties by a public officer where no exercise of discretion on his

part is involved.’” Holly v. Montes, 231 Ill. 2d 153, 159 (2008) (internal citations omitted).

Accordingly, a plaintiff seeking mandamus must show: “(1) an affirmative right to relief;

(2) defendant’s duty to act; and (3) defendant's authority to comply with the order.” Id.

As the Illinois Supreme Court explained, “[i]n the parole context, a writ of mandamus may

be used to compel the Board to exercise its discretion, but may not be used to compel the

Board to exercise its discretion in a certain manner.” Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268,

272 (1996). See also Crump v. Ill. Prisoner Review Bd., 181 Ill. App. 3d 58, 62 (1989) (finding

the plaintiff’s allegation of constitutional violation regarding the denial of his parole

could not be raised in mandamus action, but acknowledging that “certain cases

allegations of constitutional violations by an inmate can state a cause of action for

mandamus relief. For example, mandamus has been used to compel the Review Board to

grant an accused parole violator a reasonably prompt final revocation hearing.”). While

Illinois now has a mandatory supervised release system instead of parole, Illinois

Appellate Court decisions have applied this same framework to mandamus complaints

against the IPRB. See Walker v. Monreal, 76 N.E.3d 796, 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (considering

mandamus complaint against IPRB alleging denial of due process at MSR revocation

hearing but denying relief because the mandamus complaint was filed ten years after the

alleged due process violation); Lee v. Findley, 835 N.E.2d 985, 989 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)

(finding that a mandamus complaint that alleged the IPRB denied a prisoner due process

when it failed to comply with Morrissey stated a cause of action for mandamus and

remanding for further proceedings).

Petitioner argues that a more recent Illinois Supreme Court case, Cordrey v. Prisoner

Review Board, 2014 IL 117155, shows that “mandamus is not an available state remedy

because it cannot compel the [IPRB] to conduct revocation hearings in a particular

manner.” (Doc. 10 at 4). In Cordrey, a prisoner was challenging the practice of “violating

at the door,” whereby the IPRB would not release him on mandatory supervised release

because he did not have a suitable host site to be released to because he was indigent.

Cordrey, 2024 IL 117115, ¶ 1. However, the Illinois Supreme Court found that while the

IPRB “sets the conditions for an inmate's MSR, the entity directed with assisting an

inmate with finding a suitable host site for MSR placement is the Department of

Corrections.” Id. ¶ 24. Rather, the respondents in the case were “tasked with setting the

conditions of MSR and determining whether a violation of those conditions warrant

revocation of MSR.” Id. ¶ 26. Because there is no claim or allegation that respondents

failed to do those tasks, the court found that he had not established he was entitled to a

writ of mandamus. Id. However, Cordrey did not purport to overrule Hanrahan, nor does

Cordrey’s holding conflict with Hanrahan’s. Cordrey was seeking to compel the IPRB to

exercise its discretion in a certain manner—essentially to not find a lack of suitable

housing as a reason to find the prisoner would violate his MSR when the prisoner and

the Department of Corrections were unable to find suitable housing or otherwise provide

suitable housing. This result is in accordance with Hanrahan’s holding that “a writ of

mandamus may be used to compel the Board to exercise its discretion, but may not be used

to compel the Board to exercise its discretion in a certain manner.” Hanrahan, 174 Ill. 2d

at 272.

Compliance with the due process rights set forth in Morrissey is not discretionary

and does not require a court to substitute its discretion or judgment for that of the IPRB.

Morrissey held the minimum requirements of due process are:

(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the

parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and

to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront

and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically

finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and

detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of

which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement

by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking

parole.

408 U.S. at 489. Here, Petitioner alleges the IPRB failed to afford him his due process

rights when the IPRB relied solely on hearsay, deprived Petitioner of an opportunity to

confront the evidence against him without making any findings that there was good

cause to deny Petitioner the opportunity to confront and cross examine the evidence

against him, and failed to make a finding that the violation report was sufficiently reliable

to form the basis of a decision to revoke. (Doc. 1 at 3). It may be true that an order of

mandamus cannot compel the IPRB to reach a certain result when making these findings,

but neither does Morrissey. Morrissey merely requires the IPRB to follow certain

procedures but not reach a certain result.

Accordingly, the Court finds that a complaint for writ of mandamus remains an

available state court remedy that a prisoner must exhaust prior to bringing a federal

habeas challenge to his revocation proceedings in Illinois. Because Petitioner has not yet

done so, his Petition must be dismissed as unexhausted.

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Should Petitioner wish to appeal this decision, he must obtain a certificate of

appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). A certificate may issue “only if the applicant has

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

Where a claim is resolved on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability should

issue only if reasonable jurists could disagree about the merits of the underlying

constitutional claim and about whether the procedural ruling was correct. Flores-Ramirez

v. Foster, 811 F.3d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 2016). Here, the Court does not find that reasonable

jurists could disagree that Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted. Accordingly, the Court

declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13),

DISMISSES Petitioner Todd Kornoski’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) without prejudice, and DECLINES to issue a certificate of

appealability. The Clerk is DIRECTED to issue judgment in favor of Respondent and

CLOSE the case.

Signed on this 13th day of May 2026.

/s/ Colleen R. Lawless

Colleen R. Lawless

United States District Judge