EARLEY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STEPHEN B.E., )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) 1:25CV591

)

FRANK BISIGNANO, )

Commissioner of Social )

Security, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The plaintiff, Stephen B.E. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

(“Stephen”), brought this action to

obtain review of a final decision of the Stephen filed an application for

Commissioner of Social Security disability insurance benefits and a

denying his claim for social security period of disability in February of

disability insurance benefits and a 2014, alleging a disability onset date

period of disability.1 The Court has of November 1, 2006. (Tr. 145-46.)

considered the certified The applications were denied initially

administrative record, Stephen’s and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 78-81,

motion for summary judgment, and 84-87.) After a hearing, ALJ Bowling

the briefing from both parties. determined on May 3, 2017 that

Because substantial evidence Stephen was not disabled under the

supports the determination of the Act. (Tr. 13-61.) The Appeals Council

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), denied a request for review. (Tr. 1-6.)

the Court will deny Stephen’s request This Court then remanded the action

for remand or the award of benefits, for further proceedings. (Tr. 896-97.)

as set forth below.

A new hearing was held with a

different ALJ (“ALJ Stefanelli”) who

also concluded that Stephen was not

disabled under the Act, and the

1 Transcript citations refer to the Reference, this matter was referred to the

Administrative Transcript of Record filed Undersigned to conduct all proceedings

manually with the Commissioner’s in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

Answer. See Docket Entry 4. By Order of 636(c). Docket Entry 14.

Appeals Council again denied a conflicting evidence, make credibility

request for review. (Tr. 821-73.) determinations, or substitute its

Stepehen challenged the new decision judgment for that of the

in this Court, which granted the Commissioner. Craig v. Chater, 76

Commissioner’s uncontested motion F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Put

to remand on April 27, 2022. (Tr. simply: the issue before the Court is

1264-65.) ALJ Stefanelli held a new not whether Stephen is disabled but

hearing on December 5, 2023 (Tr. whether the finding that he is not

1204-35) and issued a new decision disabled is supported by substantial

on January 17, 2024 (Tr. 1187-95), evidence and based upon a correct

again concluding that Stephen was application of the relevant law. Id.

not disabled under the Act. The

Appeals Council denied a request for III. THE ALJ’S DECISION

review on May 7, 2025, making ALJ

Stefanelli’s 2024 decision the final The ALJ followed the correct process,

decision for purposes of review. (Tr. set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, to

1168-74.) Therefore, unless otherwise determine disability. See Albright v.

noted, the Court at all times is Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d

addressing ALJ Stefanelli’s 2024 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999).

decision.

“The Commissioner uses a five-step

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW process to evaluate disability claims.”

Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470,

While Section 405(g) of Title 42 of the 472-73 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing 20

United States Code “authorizes C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4),

judicial review of the Social Security 404.1520(a)(4)).

Commissioner’s denial of social

security benefits,” see Hines v. Under this process, the

Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. Commissioner asks, in

2006), the scope of that review is sequence, whether the

specific and narrow, see Smith v. claimant: (1) worked during the

Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th alleged period of disability; (2)

Cir. 1986). Specifically, review is had a severe impairment; (3)

limited to determining if there is had an impairment that met or

substantial evidence in the record to equaled the requirements of a

support the Commissioner’s decision. listed impairment; (4) could

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hunter v. return to her [or his] past

Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. relevant work; and (5) if not,

1992); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d could perform any other work

1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). In in the national economy.

reviewing for substantial evidence,

the Court does not re-weigh

2

Id. at 472. A finding adverse to the onset date of November 1, 2006

claimant at any of several points in through his date last insured of

this five-step sequence forecloses a September 30, 2010. (Tr. 1189.) The

disability designation and ends the ALJ next found the following severe2

inquiry. Id. at 473. “Through the impairments at step two: intercostal

fourth step, the burden of production neuralgia and thoracic radiculitis; and

and proof is on the claimant. If the post-cholecystectomy pain

claimant reaches step five, the burden syndrome.3 (Tr. 1190.) At step three,

shifts to the Secretary to produce the ALJ found that Stephen did not

evidence that other jobs exist in the have an impairment or combination

national economy that the claimant of impairments listed in, or medically

can perform considering his age, equal to one listed in, Appendix 1. (Tr.

education, and work experience.” 1191.)

Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal

citations omitted). The ALJ next set forth Stephen’s

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”)

The ALJ determined at step one that and determined that he could perform

Stephen had not engaged in a reduced range of light work except

substantial gainful activity during the he should “never [be] required to

relevant period, from his alleged climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds

2 ALJ Stefanelli noted that ALJ Bowling’s symptom. (Tr. 1190, 294.) He has had no

2017 decision found Stephen had severe sedation from medications. (Tr. 1190,

migraines with resulting concentration 304.) He has also indicated that his pain

limitations. (Tr. 1190; see Tr. 15-16.) But is much improved with medications. (Tr.

ALJ Stefanelli found Stephen’s migraines 1190, 303.)

did not meet the durational requirement

of at least 12 months and that he did not 3 “‘Intercostal Neuralgia’ is ‘pain in the

have concentration, persistence, or pace chest wall due to neuralgia of one or more

problems. (Tr. 1190.) Stephen does not of the intercostal nerves.’ ‘Neuralgia’ is

challenge that specific finding. See ‘[p]ain of a severe, throbbing, or stabbing

Grayson v. Co. v. Agadir Int’ l LLC, 856 character in the course or distribution of

F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (a party a nerve.’ ‘Intercostal’ is defined as

waives an argument by failing to present ‘[b]etween the ribs.’” Ramon M. v.

it in his opening brief). However, even if Berryhill, No. CV CBD-18-2025, 2019

Stephen did challenge this finding, it WL 2436938, at *6 n.4 (D. Md. June 10,

would fail. As ALJ Stefanelli pointed out 2019) (citing and quoting Stedmans

in her 2024 decision, Stephen has not Medical Dictionary, available on

reported concentration symptoms to Westlaw at §§ 599340, 599220, and

medical providers and he is generally 450160.). A “cholecystectomy” involves

noted as alert, oriented, and as having the surgical removal of the gall bladder.

normal concentration. (Tr. 1190, 313, See Stedmans, § 169870. “Radiculitis” is

325, 270, 263, 251.) In April 2009, he did a disorder of the spinal nerve roots. Id., §

not indicated inability to concentrate as a 748650.

3

necessary to perform work duties; limitation” that assesses the

should have no concentrated claimant’s “ability to do sedentary,

exposure to hazards, such as heights light, medium, heavy, or very heavy

or dangerous equipment; and would work,” as well as “nonexertional

be able to change position every 2 limitations (mental, sensory, or skin

hours.” (Tr. 1191.) At the fourth step, impairments).” Hall v. Harris, 658

the ALJ determined that Stephen was F.2d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 1981).

unable to perform his past relevant

work. (Tr. 1193.) Last, at step five, the “Social Security Ruling 96-8p

ALJ concluded that there were other explains that the RFC assessment

jobs in the national economy that must include a narrative discussion

Stephen could perform. (Tr. 1194.) describing how the evidence supports

each conclusion, citing specific

IV. DISCUSSION medical facts (e.g., laboratory

findings) and nonmedical evidence

In his appeal, Stephen asserts only (e.g., daily activities, observations).”

that “[t]he ALJ failed to properly Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189

evaluate [his] complaints of pain.” (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations

Docket Entry 12 at 11. The record omitted). An ALJ need not discuss

demonstrates otherwise, as set forth every piece of evidence in making an

below. RFC determination. See Reid v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861,

A. The RFC Determination. 865 (4th Cir. 2014). Yet, the ALJ

“must build an accurate and logical

The RFC measures the most a bridge from the evidence to [the]

claimant can do in a work setting conclusion.” Brown v. Commissioner,

despite the physical and mental 873 F.3d 251, 269 (4th Cir. 2017).

limitations of his or her impairments “The RFC assessment must first

and any related symptoms (e.g., pain). identify the individual’s functional

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); see limitations or restrictions and assess

also Dunn v. Colvin, 607 F. App’x his or her work-related abilities on a

264, 272 (4th Cir. 2015) function-by-function basis . . . . Only

(unpublished) (claimant’s RFC is “[a] [then] may RFC be expressed in terms

medical assessment of what an of the exertional levels of work,

individual can do in a work setting in sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and

spite of the functional limitations and very heavy.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL

environmental restrictions imposed 374184, at *1.

by all of his or her medically

determinable impairment(s)”) The Fourth Circuit has held that

(internal citation omitted); Hines, “meaningful review is frustrated when

453 F.3d at 562. The RFC includes an ALJ goes straight from listing

both a “physical exertional or strength evidence to stating a conclusion.”

4

Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, statements about pain, to determine

311 (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “a whether the claimant is disabled. Id.

proper RFC analysis has three at 595-96. In so doing, the ALJ need

components: (1) evidence, (2) logical not credit them if they conflict with

explanation, and (3) conclusion”). As the objective medical evidence or if

noted earlier, the ALJ “must both the underlying impairment could not

identify evidence that supports his reasonably be expected to cause the

conclusion and ‘build an accurate and symptoms alleged. Id. Where the ALJ

logical bridge from [that] evidence to has considered the relevant factors,

his conclusion.’” Woods v. Berryhill, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3), and

888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) heard the claimant’s testimony and

(alteration in original) (quoting observed his or her demeanor, the

Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189). Failure to Court will defer to the ALJ’s

do so constitutes reversible error. See determination regarding those

Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 868 subjective complaints. Shively v.

(4th Cir. 2017). Where an ALJ’s Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir.

“analysis is incomplete and precludes 1984).

meaningful review,” remand is

appropriate. Monroe, 826 F.3d at 191. Those relevant factors include:

Moreover, “[a]n ALJ assesses the (i) [Plaintiff’s] daily

credibility of a claimant’s subjective activities;

statements about his condition as part

of the RFC assessment,” Ladda v. (ii) The location, duration,

Berryhill, 749 F. App’x 166, 170 (4th frequency, and intensity

Cir. 2018) (unpublished), using a two- of [Plaintiff’s] pain or

part test: “First, there must be other symptoms;

objective medical evidence showing

‘the existence of a medical (iii) Precipitating and

impairment(s) which results from aggravating factors;

anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities and (iv) The type, dosage,

which could reasonably be expected to effectiveness, and side

produce the pain or other symptoms effects of any medication

alleged,’” Craig, 76 F.3d at 594 (citing [Plaintiff] take[s] or

20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b), [has] taken to alleviate

404.1529(b)). his pain or other

symptoms;

If such an impairment exists, the ALJ

must then consider, as the second (v) Treatment, other than

prong of the test, all available medication, [Plaintiff]

evidence, including the claimant’s receive[s] or [has]

5

received for relief of his symptoms . . . .” (Tr. 1192.) Next, the

pain or other symptoms; ALJ performed step two of the

analysis, concluding that Stephen’s

(vi) Any measures [Plaintiff] “statements concerning the intensity,

use[s] or [has] used to persistence and limiting effects of

relieve his pain or other these symptoms are not entirely

symptoms (e.g., lying flat consistent with the medical evidence

on [his] back, standing and other evidence in the record for

for 15 to 20 minutes the reasons explained in this

every hour, sleeping on a decision.” (Tr. 1192.)

board, etc.); and

The ALJ then gave good reasons for

(vii) Other factors concerning partially discounting Stephen’s

[Plaintiff’s] functional subjective allegations. First, the ALJ

limitations and pointed out that though Stephen at

restrictions due to pain times reported pain at medical

or other symptoms. appointments and also demonstrated

tenderness over his ribs (Tr. 1192,

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). 248-49, 270), see 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529(c)(3)(ii) (ALJ considers

Here, the ALJ completed the two- location, duration, frequency, and

step Craig analysis. As a preliminary intensity of claimant’s pain in

matter, the ALJ summarized evaluating subjective allegations), he

Stephen’s subjective complaints. (Tr. otherwise demonstrated mostly

1192.) Specifically, Stephen alleged normal findings of no edema; no

that he was disabled because of erythema; no allodynia; no

“difficulties sitting, standing, and hyperalgesia; normal strength;

walking for long periods during the normal tone; a healthy, well-

relevant period. He indicated that he nourished, well developed

could lift up to 20 pounds at one time, appearance; intact sensation; normal

sit for up to 2 hours, and stand for 2 movement of all extremities; no acute

hours at a time. The claimant asserted distress; normal reflexes; and normal

that he did not begin going to a pain gait, (Tr. 1192, 1193, 249, 270, 299-

clinic until 2008. The claimant 300, 365, 368, 812), see 20 C.F.R. §

testified that he had difficulty 404.1529(c)(4) (ALJ considers

concentrating.” (Tr. 1192, citation inconsistencies in evidence and the

omitted.) extent to which there are conflicts

between claimant’s statements and

The ALJ then concluded that rest of the evidence in evaluating

Stephen’s “medically determinable subjective complaints). Beyond this,

impairments could reasonably be repeated examinations during the

expected to cause the alleged relevant period showed normal

6

movement of extremities, motor Stephen said steroid injections had

strength, muscle bulk and tone, helped his pain “to a certain degree”

and/or normal gait. (Tr. 363, 365, with his most recent one giving him

367- 68, 370, 372-73.) three weeks of relief. (Tr. 812.)

Stephen also said that Lyrica had been

Stephen asserts that this evidence and “very helpful,” Tramadol gave him

claims of normal findings have adequate pain relief, and “pain

“nothing to do with intercostal medication allows him to function.”

neuralgia.” Docket Entry 12 at 16. (Tr. 812.) See 20 C.F.R. §

However, normal movement and 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v) (ALJ considers

walking are inconsistent with alleged kind of treatment and its effectiveness

debilitating pain. Notably, Stephen in assessing allegations).

reported that movement, positioning,

walking, bending, sitting, and Stephen takes issue with the ALJ

standing aggravated his intercostal describing this treatment as

neuralgia pain. (Tr. 299, 345, 348, conservative, Docket Entry 12 at 16-

352, 354.) Therefore, contrary to his 17, but in Scharbrough v. Comm’r,

argument, Stephen’s ability to move Soc. Sec., No. 23-1830, 2024 WL

normally was relevant evidence. 4371618, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 2, 2024),

Moreover, the ALJ was required to the Fourth Circuit rejected the very

consider objective evidence in same argument. Id. (“[T]he ALJ did

evaluating his alleged symptoms. 20 not err by labelling his treatment as

C.F.R § 404.1529(c)(2); Craig, 76 conservative.”). See also 20 C.F.R §

F.3d at 594. 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v) (ALJ considers

medication and other treatment used

Second, the ALJ considered Stephen’s to relieve pain/other symptoms in

conservative treatment history of evaluating subjective symptoms).

steroid injections and pain Accordingly, the ALJ acted

medication. (Tr. 1192, 249, 256, 270, reasonably in considering Stephen’s

273, 286, 300, 377.) The ALJ also conservative treatment in finding that

pointed out that in 2008, 2009, and the degree of his alleged symptoms

2010, Stephen reported that was not entirely consistent with the

medication helped his pain. (Tr. 1192, evidence. (Tr. 1192.)

249, 267, 286, 303, 812.) In February

2009, Stephen said that Lyrica and It was also reasonable for the ALJ to

Tramadol had been “very helpful,” consider Stephen’s reported

and he was able to partake in “normal improvement at medical

activities as well as work because of appointments. (Tr. 1192). Stephen’s

the medication.” (Tr. 1192, 286.) reporting that treatment alleviated his

Stephen also reported that his pain undermines his extreme

medication did not cause any side testimony. For example, Stephen

effects. (Tr. 286.) In September 2009, testified that pain affected his ability

7

to concentrate when it was above six work because of medication. (Tr.

(Tr. 1220-21), but he told his treating 1192; 286 (2/6/09 (“[H]e is able to

doctor that his pain was “4 out of 10” partake in his normal activities as well

and Lyrica brought it “down to 1 to 2 as work because of the medication.”);

out of 10.” (Tr. 248; see also Tr. 263, 279 (11/14/08 (“able to perform his

286.) Stephen argues that it was activities of daily living”).) The ALJ

wrong for the ALJ to consider his also noted that in July 2010, Stephen

treatment regimen of injections and reported that he was working full

pain medication as conservative time. (Tr. 1192; see Tr. 364, 306; 383.)

because intercostal neuralgia is And he estimated 75-85% pain relief

difficult to treat and those were his with his current medications. (Tr.

only treatment options. Docket Entry 364.)

12 16. But he admitted this

conservative approach was effective at Evidence of work during the relevant

relieving his symptoms. That is, period is a legitimate factor the ALJ

doctors chose to treat his condition may consider when determining the

this way, and it worked. Stephen thus consistency of a claimant’s subjective

asks this Court to reweigh the claims of disability. See Sigmon v.

evidence and find in his favor. Califano, 617 F.2d 41, 42-43 (4th Cir.

However, an effective and 1980) (“The general rule is one amply

conservative treatment regimen is supported by common sense: the

probative evidence that the ALJ must [ALJ] can consider work done by the

consider. See 20 C.F.R. claimant after the alleged onset of

§404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v) (ALJ disability as tending to show that the

considers kind of treatment and its claimant was not then disabled.”).

effectiveness in evaluating subjective Stephen’s reporting at appointments

allegations); Gross v. Heckler, 785 that he could perform normal

F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986) (“If a activities and worked is inconsistent

symptom can be reasonably with his testimony alleging complete

controlled by medication or disability. See 20 C.F.R. §

treatment, it is not disabling”). 404.1529(c)(4) (ALJ considers

inconsistencies in evidence and extent

Third, the ALJ also appropriately to which there are conflicts between

considered Stephen’s daily activities claimant’s statements and rest of the

in evaluating his alleged symptoms. evidence in evaluating subjective

(Tr. 1192.) See 20 C.F.R. § complaints). Based on the foregoing,

404.1529(c)(3)(i) (ALJ considers substantial evidence supports the

claimant’s activities in evaluating ALJ’s finding that the degree of

subjective allegations). She Stephen’s alleged symptoms was not

considered that in February 2009, entirely consistent with the evidence.

Stephen reported being able to (Tr. 1192.)

partake in normal activities, as well as

Fourth, this is not a case where an ALJ

8

disregarded all of a claimant’s consider other evidence in the record,

allegations. Instead, the ALJ only “his opinion indicate[d] that the lack

partially disregarded Stephen’s of objective medical evidence was his

allegations and accounted for his chief, if not definitive, reason for

complaints of pain and difficulty with discounting” the plaintiff’s

restrictions relating to movement, complaints. Id. at 97. This error was

positioning, sitting, standing, and “particularly pronounced” as the

walking for long periods by assessing claim involved fibromyalgia—a

an RFC for light level work with disease “that does not produce”

postural and environmental objective medical evidence, and thus

limitations and the ability to change “normal clinical and laboratory

positions every two hours. (Tr. 1191- results simply have no relevance to

92, 299, 345, 348, 352, 354, 1215-17, the severity, persistence, or limiting

1220.) And the ALJ further found that effects . . . of the disease.” Id.

Stephen could perform the

requirements of a range of sedentary Given the nature of the disease, the

to light level jobs. (Tr. 1194.) This Fourth Circuit concluded that ALJs

tracks with Stephen’s testimony that “may not rely on objective medical

he could lift up to 20 pounds and evidence (or the lack thereof)—even

sit/stand each for two hours at one as just one of multiple factors—to

time. (Tr. 1215-17.) The ALJ was discount a claimant’s subjective

required to account for the limitations complaints regarding symptoms of

supported by the evidence, not every fibromyalgia or some other disease

limitation Stephen alleged. See 20 that does not produce such evidence.”

C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). In light of all Id.; see also Shelly C. v. Comm’r of

this, the subjective complaints Soc. Sec. Admin., 61 F.4th 341, 361

analysis is legally correct, well (4th Cir. 2023) (finding depression to

supported, and susceptible to judicial be one of those other diseases). As to

review. diseases that do produce such

objective evidence, the Fourth Circuit

Stephen’s reliance on Arakas v. held that ALJs are still prohibited

Comm’r. Soc. Sec. Admin., 983 F.3d from disregarding a claimant’s

83, 95-97 (4th Cir. 2020) is subjective complaints “solely”

misplaced. Docket Entry 12 at 12-13. because they are not substantiated by

In that case, the United States Court objective medical evidence. Arakas,

of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 983 F.3d at 95 (emphasis added).

reversed an ALJ’s decision because he

“effectively requir[ed]” that the Here, to the extent Stephen contends

claimant provide objective medical that Arakas prohibits the discussion

evidence to support her subjective of objective medical evidence at all

complaints. See 983 F.3d 83, 96 (4th when it comes to intercostal

Cir. 2020). While the ALJ did neuralgia, he is mistaken. While an

9

ALJ should not discount a claimant’s And here, unlike with fibromyalgia,

subjective complaints related to normal movement and gait were

fibromyalgia based on objective probative of Stephen not being in

medical evidence (or a lack thereof), debilitating pain. Consequently, the

Arakas itself indicates that an ALJ ALJ here did not run afoul of Arakas.

can “substantiat[e] the claimant’s Finally, even assuming arguendo that

impairment” with that evidence. the ALJ erred in considering objective

Arakas, 983 F.3d at 97-98 (“Objective medical evidence to assess Stephen’s

indicators such as normal clinical and subjective symptoms, there is no

laboratory results simply have no evidence that Stephen was prejudiced

relevance to the severity, persistence, as a result. See, e.g., Howard v.

or limiting effects of a claimant’s Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:22-CV-

fibromyalgia, based on the current 00127-FDW, 2023 WL 4111395, at *7

medical understanding of the disease. n.5 (W.D.N.C. June 21, 2023) (“The

If considered at all, such evidence— ALJ mentioned objective imaging

along with consistent trigger-point findings in her discussion of evidence

findings—should be treated as of the record; however, in contrast to

evidence substantiating the Claimant’s assertions, the ALJ did not

claimant’s impairment.”). indicate in the opinion that it played a

‘chief,’ if any, role in her decision to

Additionally, the Fourth Circuit discredit Claimant’s subjective

remanded in Arakas on this issue complaints.”). For all of these reasons,

because the ALJ’s decision the ALJ’s subjective complaints

“indicate[d] that the lack of objective assessment is legally correct,

medical evidence was his chief, if not supported by substantial evidence,

definitive, reason for discounting and susceptible to judicial review.

Arakas’s complaints.” Id. at 97. The

same cannot be said here, where the Last, Stephen asserts that his “claim

ALJ did not “effectively require[ ]” should be remanded again because

objective evidence or offer objective not only did the ALJ apply the

medical evidence as the “chief” or incorrect legal standard again when

“definitive” reason to discount the evaluating [Stephen’s] pain, but she

intensity of Stephen’s subjective also copied, word-for-word, the same

complaints. See id. at 96. Instead, the improper reliance on objective

ALJ amply demonstrated that she medical evidence that led to a consent

relied upon other evidence in the remand during the preceding civil

record, including Stephen’s action before this Court, and should

improvement upon treatment and lead to remand once again in the

activities of daily living (which present case.” See Docket Entry 12 at

included working), as justification for 12. However, in her current decision,

partially discounting Stephen’s ALJ Stefanelli used the correct legal

related symptoms. standard, and provided sound

10

reasons supported by _ substantial

evidence for partially discounting

Stephen’s subjective complaints. To

the extent Stephen addresses ALJ

Stefanelli’s prior decision, the

argument fails because it was vacated

and is not the decision subject to

review in this action. See Hancock v.

Barnhart, 206 F. Supp. 2d 757, 763-

64 n.3 (W.D. Va. 2002) (on remand,

the ALJ’s prior decision has no

preclusive effect, as it is vacated and

the new hearing is conducted de

novo). The decision under review now

is legally correct, well supported, and

susceptible to judicial review. It

should be affirmed.

V. CONCLUSION

After careful consideration of the

evidence of record, the Court finds

that the Commissioner’s decision is

legally correct, supported by

substantial evidence, and susceptible

to judicial review. Accordingly, IT IS

HEREBY ORDERED that

Stephen’s motion for summary

judgment, Docket Entry 11, is

DENIED and that the final decision

of the Commissioner is upheld.

J as | McFadden

Uriited States Magistrate Judge

May 13, 2026

Durham, NC

11