“A district court may exercise its discretion and use a percentage deduction ‘as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application.’”
How later courts described this case
- “A district court may exercise its discretion and use a percentage deduction ‘as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application.’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
JOHN R. ANDREWS, JR., DECISION
and
Plaintiff, ORDER
v.
21-CV-746-LJV(F)
TOWN OF WEST SENECA,
DONALD DRISCOLL
JEFFREY COIA,
JAMIE PAPPACENO,
GERALD FIBICH,
ROBERT DEPPELER,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
APPEARANCES: RUPP PFALZGRAF LLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
JONATHAN P. CANTIL,
MATTHEW E. GABALSKI,
PAUL D. JAGER,
YOUNG WOO KIM,
R. ANTHONY RUPP, III, of Counsel
1600 Liberty Building
424 Main Street
Buffalo, New York 14202
BAKER & SMITH PC
Counsel for Defendants
ARTHUR J. SMITH, of Counsel
125 Jericho Turnpike, Suite 302
Jericho, New York 11753
In a Decision and Order filed April 9, 2026 (Dkt. 103), the court directed
Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s request for an award of attorneys fees incurred in
connection with Plaintiff’s motion to compel filed January 16, 2026 (Dkt. 93) which was
granted in a Decision and Order filed March 26, 2026 (Dkt. 101). On May 5, 2026,
Defendants filed the Declaration of Arthur J. Smith in opposition to Plaintiff’s request of
$3,460.50, see Paul D. Jager Attorney Declaration (Dkt. 104) ¶ 4, filed on April 27, 2026
(Dkt. 105) (“Smith Declaration”). In the Smith Declaration, (Dkt. 105) ¶¶ 6-8, 12,
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s request is unreasonable given the relatively simple issue
raised by Plaintiff’s motion, viz. that Defendants’ discovery responses were overdue.
See March 26, 2026 D&O (Dkt. 101) at 2. Defendants further argue Plaintiff failed to
provide any information in support of Plaintiff’s counsel’s $250 hourly billing rate, Smith
Declaration ¶ 30, or that Plaintiff’s counsel has actually billed Plaintiff for the amount of
fees sought to be awarded. Id. at ¶ 31.
“[I]n determining a fee award, the typical [starting] point is the so-called lodestar
amount, that is ‘the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by
a reasonable hourly rate.’ ” New York v. Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., 2021
WL 4958653, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2021) (quoting Healy v. Leavitt, 485 F.3d 63, 71
(2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983))). “In calculating
the lodestar amount, the initial burden is on the requesting party to submit evidence
supporting the number of hours worked and the hourly rate claimed.” Grand River
Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., 2021 WL 4958653, at *2 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433).
“A reasonable hourly rate is a rate ‘in line with...prevailing [rates] in the community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, expertise and reputation.’”
McDonald ex rel. Prendergast v. Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA Pension Tr. Fund, 450
F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11 (1984),
and citing Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 885 F.2d 1053, 1058-59
(2d Cir. 1989)). “[O]nly those hours ‘reasonably expended’ are to be awarded.” Id.
(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434–35). Attorney fees awarded as a sanction are not
intended to provide the prevailing party with a windfall, but “merely to compensate [ ] for
additional expenses incurred on this single discovery matter.” Matteo v. Kohl's Dept.
Stores, Inc., 2012 WL 5177491, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2021). Further, courts often
employ an across-the-board reduction in hours to “trim the fat.” See McDonald v.
Pension Plan of the NYSA–ILA Pension Trust Fund, 450 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (“A
district court may exercise its discretion and use a percentage deduction ‘as a practical
means of trimming fat from a fee application.’”) (quoting Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148
F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir. 1998)) (further internal quotation). The fee application “must be
supported by contemporaneous time records, affidavits and other materials.” McDonald
ex rel. Prendergast, 450 F.3d at 96.
Here, based on Plaintiff’s computerized record of Paul D. Jager’s, Plaintiff’s main
attorney on Plaintiff’s motion (“Jager”), time and hourly rates, see Dkt. 104-1, the court
determines that Jager incurred 6.1 hours in preparing Plaintiff’s motion to compel
between January 12 and January 16, 2026, which consisted of Plaintiff’s counsel’s four
page Declaration (Dkt. 93-1), five exhibits (Dkt. 93-1-6) and a five page Memorandum of
Law (Dkt. 93-7), which at his then hourly rate of $250 resulted in a reimbursable fee of
$1,525. Further, in response to Defendants’ Attorney Declaration in opposition to
Plaintiff’s motion to compel, filed January 30, 2026 (Dkt. 98), Jager prepared Plaintiff’s
Reply (Dkt. 100), filed February 6, 2026, consisting of a four page Memorandum of Law
(Dkt. 100) and a three page Attorney Declaration (Dkt. 100-1) which required Plaintiff to
incur 2 hours, 42 minutes of lawyer time. At Jager’s then slightly increased hourly rates
of $275 per hour this resulted in a fee of $742.56. In sum, Plaintiff thus incurred a total
of 8 hours, 48 minutes of lawyer time in prosecuting Plaintiff’s motion for a total fee of
$2,267.50 which appears to the court to be a reasonable basis for making an award in
this case pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(A). Additionally, the fees of Charlie Morse
and Jonathan Cantil, incurred on February 6, 2026, and Jager’s post-February 6, 2026
fees, according to the computerized record, (Dkt. 104-1), are disallowed as
unsupported. However, finding some merit in Defendants’ opposition based on the
uncomplicated nature of the issue presented on Plaintiff’s motion, i.e., Defendants’
belated service of Defendants’ required discovery responses, the court will exercise its
discretion and reduce the amount of Plaintiff’s fees by $500 for a total award of
$1,767.50. As this amount is close to the $1,000 figure Defendants deemed
reasonable, see Smith Declaration (Dkt. 105) ¶ 29, the court presumes it is not
necessary to require Plaintiff to provide supplemental information regarding justification
for Jager’s hourly billing rates nor as to whether Jager’s firm has billed Plaintiff for the
fees requested as Defendants argued. See Smith Declaration ¶¶ 30, 31.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s application (Dkt. 104) is GRANTED in the
amount of $1,767.50 to be paid by Defendants’ counsel.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Leslie G. Foschio
_________________________________
LESLIE G. FOSCHIO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dates: May 13, 2026
Buffalo, New York