recognizing that ORS 14.175 “leaves it to the court to determine whether it is appropriate to adjudicate an other- wise moot case under the circumstances of each case”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that ORS 14.175 “leaves it to the court to determine whether it is appropriate to adjudicate an other- wise moot case under the circumstances of each case”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
642 May 13, 2026 No. 424
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
JASON CAINE SEARLES,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
Respondent.
Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision
A186168
Submitted April 7, 2026.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Sara F. Werboff, Deputy Public Defender,
Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for
petitioner.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Michael A. Casper, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
PER CURIAM
Petition for judicial review dismissed as moot.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 349 Or App 642 (2026) 643
PER CURIAM
In this judicial review of a final order of the Board of
Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, petitioner assigns error
to the board’s imposition of a 90-day jail sanction, arguing
that sanction violated OAR 213-011-004, the administra-
tive rule governing the sanctions the board may impose.
Petitioner acknowledges that his challenge is “probably
moot” because his term of post-prison supervision (PPS)
expired while this judicial review has been pending but
requests that we review his claim pursuant to ORS 14.175,
as an error capable of repetition but likely to evade judi-
cial review. We conclude that petitioner’s challenge is moot,
decline to review his claim under ORS 14.175, and dismiss
the petition for judicial review.
“[W]hen it becomes clear that resolving the merits
of a claim will have no practical effect on the rights of the
parties, an appellate court may dismiss [a case] as moot.”
Dept. of Human Services v. P. D., 368 Or 627, 496 P3d 1029
(2021). However, under ORS 14.175, we have discretion to
review a party’s otherwise moot claim if we determine that:
“(1) The party had standing to commence the action;
“(2) The act challenged by the party is capable of rep-
etition, or the policy or practice challenged by the party
continues in effect; and
“(3) The challenged policy or practice, or similar acts,
are likely to evade judicial review in the future.”
ORS 14.175; Couey v. Atkins, 357 Or 460, 522, 355 P3d 866
(2015) (recognizing that ORS 14.175 “leaves it to the court to
determine whether it is appropriate to adjudicate an other-
wise moot case under the circumstances of each case”). “In
determining whether to exercise our discretion, we consider,
among other things, the adversarial nature of the parties’
interests, the effect of the decision on both the parties and
others not before the court, judicial economy, and the extent
of the public importance of the issues presented.” NewSun
Energy, LLC v. Public Utility Comm., 336 Or App 515, 522,
561 P3d 1135 (2024), rev den, 373 Or 815 (2025) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
644 Searles v. Board of Parole
We conclude that the expiration of petitioner’s PPS
term renders his claim on judicial review moot, as a deci-
sion on that claim can no longer have any practical effect
on his rights. Further, assuming without deciding that the
board’s decision that petitioner challenges satisfies the cri-
teria in ORS 14.175, petitioner has not persuaded us that we
should exercise our discretion to review his moot claim, and
we decline to do so. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for
judicial review.
Petition for judicial review dismissed as moot.