Opinion

Nathan Freidhoff, Individually, Michelle Freidhoff and Todd Freidhoff, Individually and as Parents and Next Friends of Nathan Freidhoff v. Johnston Community School District, Mitch Eagles and Brett Becker

Court
Court of Appeals of Iowa
Filed
May 13, 2026
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.6%

“[F]orm must give way to substance . . . .”

How later courts described this case

  • “[F]orm must give way to substance . . . .”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

_______________

No. 25-0610

Filed May 13, 2026

_______________

Nathan Freidhoff, Individually, Michelle Freidhoff and Todd Freidhoff,

Individually and as Parents and Next Friends of Nathan Freidhoff,

Plaintiffs–Appellees,

v.

Johnston Community School District, Mitch Eagles and Brett Becker,

Defendants–Appellants.

_______________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,

The Honorable Michael D. Huppert, Judge.

_______________

APPEAL DISMISSED

_______________

Jason T. Madden and Benjamin J. Kenkel of Dickinson, Bradshaw, Fowler

& Hagen, P.C., Des Moines, attorneys for appellants.

Steven T. Durick, Tyler S. Smith, and Jordan R. Reed of Durick Tuttle

Smith PLC, Des Moines, attorneys for appellees.

_______________

Considered without oral argument

by Tabor, C.J., Badding, J., and Bower, S.J.

Opinion by Tabor, C.J.

1

TABOR, Chief Judge.

The Johnston Community School District asked the Iowa Supreme

Court to retain this case and to overrule Doe v. Western Dubuque Community

School District, 20 N.W.3d 798, 804 (Iowa 2025). Doe decided that the

qualified immunity provisions of the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act

(IMTCA) did not apply to common law tort claims. Id. The supreme court

reaffirmed Doe in Fogle ex rel P.F. v. Clay Elementary School-Southeast Polk

Community School District, 27 N.W.3d 538, 544 (Iowa 2025), and In re

Davenport Hotel Building Collapse, 27 N.W.3d 270, 273 (Iowa 2025), and then

transferred this appeal to our court. Because we must follow Doe and its

progeny, 1 we affirm the district court’s denial of Johnston’s motion for

summary judgment and dismiss this appeal.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

In 2022, Nathan Friedhoff was enrolled in a welding class at Johnston

High School. He received serious burns when a spark ignited the synthetic-

blend crewneck sweatshirt sticking out under his cotton overshirt. Friedhoff

and his parents sued the school district and two of its employees,2 claiming

common law negligence, vicarious liability, negligent teaching and

supervision, premises liability, and loss of parental consortium.

Johnston moved for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity

from tort claims as provided in Iowa Code section 670.4A (2024) of the

IMTCA. The district court treated the motion for summary judgment as a

1

“Our court has no authority to overrule the controlling precedent established by

[Doe],” and thus we are bound by its holding. State v. Phillips, 996 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Iowa

Ct. App. 2023).

2

The employees were Mitch Eagles and Brett Becker, technology and engineering

instructors at the high school. We will refer to the defendants collectively as Johnston.

2

motion to dismiss because Johnston was attacking the sufficiency of

Friedhoff’s pleadings.3 Two months before the supreme court’s decision in

Doe, the district court found Friedhoff met the heightened pleading

requirement in section 670.4A(3) 4 and thus Johnston was not entitled to

qualified immunity. The school district brought this interlocutory appeal

under section 670.4A(4), which provides: “Any decision by the district court

denying qualified immunity shall be immediately appealable.”

During this pendency of this appeal, the supreme court decided Doe,

which the parties incorporated into their briefs. And after the parties filed

their briefs, Freidhoff provided three notices of additional authority. The

cited cases reaffirmed Doe’s conclusion that section 670.4A does not apply

to common law tort claims. See Fogle, 27 N.W.3d at 544; Davenport Hotel, 27

N.W.3d at 273; Larson v. Holmes, No. 24-1912, 2025 WL 3171291, at *2−3

(Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2025).

3

We also view Johnston’s motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss.

See Meade v. Christie, 974 N.W.2d 770, 775 (Iowa 2022) (“A motion to dismiss challenges

a petition’s legal sufficiency.”); Tigges v. City of Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 510 (Iowa 1984)

(“[F]orm must give way to substance . . . .”). We review a ruling on a motion to dismiss

for corrections of errors at law. Mead, 974 N.W.2d at 774−75. We will “accept[] the facts

alleged in the petition as true, and view[] the allegations in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Id. at 775 (internal citations omitted). A motion to dismiss will succeed only if

the plaintiff is not afforded a right to recover under the alleged facts. Id.

4

That section provides: “A plaintiff who brings a claim under this chapter alleging

a violation of the law must state with particularity the circumstances constituting the

violation and that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Iowa

Code § 670.4A(3).

3

II. Analysis

A. Iowa Code Section 670.4A

In 2023, the Iowa Supreme Court first interpreted the qualified

immunity provision and the heightened pleading standard enacted by the

Iowa General Assembly in 2021. See Nahas v. Polk Cnty., 991 N.W.2d 770

(Iowa 2023). A plaintiff alleged common law and statutory tort claims against

Polk County. Id. at 775. The court denied qualified immunity to Polk County,

finding the new provision did not apply retrospectively. Id. at 779. Despite

qualified immunity not being applicable to the case, the court analyzed the

heightened pleading standards. Id. As Nahas noted, the heightened pleading

standards for claims that fall under section 670.4A(1) require the plaintiff to

(1) “state with particularity the circumstances constituting the violation,”

(2) “plead ‘a plausible violation’ of the law,” and (3) state “that the law was

clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Id. at 777 (quoting

Iowa Code § 670.4A(3)). It found the first two requirements applicable to the

plaintiff’s claims, but not the third. Id. at 779–80. This delineation implied

that claims not subject to the qualified immunity defense could still be held

to the heightened pleading standard. See id.; Doe, 20 N.W.3d at 806; see also

Blanchard v. City of Des Moines, No. 23-1953, 2024 WL 4965865, at *2 (Iowa

Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2024) (applying heightened pleading standard and not

addressing application of qualified immunity).

The Iowa Supreme Court addressed this incongruity in 1000 Friends

of Iowa v. Polk County Board of Supervisors, 19 N.W.3d 290, 296 (Iowa 2025).

In that case, a non-profit sued a municipality seeking non-monetary relief.

1000 Friends of Iowa, 19 N.W.2d at 295. The district court dismissed the claim

under the heightened pleading standard. Id. at 294−95. The supreme court

noted the qualified immunity defense in section 670.4A(1) applies only to

4

claims for monetary damages. Id. at 295. Ultimately, the supreme court held

the legislature intended for the qualified immunity statute to have “a

coordinated, rather than an independent, interpretation within its

subsections about the type of claim it covers.” Id. at 296. Under 1000 Friends

of Iowa, the heightened pleading standard applies only to claims subject to the

qualified immunity defense. See id.

Less than a month later, the supreme court decided Doe. There, a

student brought a common law negligence claim against the school district

after being assaulted on school grounds. 20 N.W.3d at 802. The district court

dismissed Doe’s claim for failing to meet that requirement. Id. The supreme

court recognized that the qualified immunity statute was modeled after the

federal qualified immunity standard and incorporates the federal

interpretation. Id. at 804. The court noted, “Under federal law, the qualified

immunity defense applies only to alleged violations of statutory or

constitutional rights.” Id. at 806. And “[t]o keep step with federal law,” the

court held that section 670.4A does not apply to state common law claims.

Id. The qualified immunity provision coupled with the heightened pleading

standard only applies “where the plaintiff has asserted a state constitutional

tort claim or statutory claim and not where the plaintiff has asserted only a

state common law claim.” Id.

B. Applying Doe

Turning to this appeal, Friedhoff contends it is “undisputed” that he

is alleging only common law tort claims. Thus, under Doe, section 670.4A

does not apply. Seeking to preserve its qualified immunity defense, Johnston

argues that Doe was incorrectly decided and should be overruled. But we

cannot overrule Doe, so it controls. See Phillips, 996 N.W.2d at 423.

5

In its reply brief, Johnston contends that—assuming Doe remains good

law—Freidhoff’s “own pleadings allege claims beyond ‘common law’

negligence and the individual District defendants are entitled to have their

qualitied-immunity defenses reviewed on appeal.” We reject this contention

for two reasons. First, “we will not consider issues raised for the first time in

a reply brief.” State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Iowa 2009).

Second, even if this contention could be read into Johnson’s opening

brief, it is unpersuasive. In its reply brief, Johnston addresses the claims

brought against Eagles, Becker, and the school district separately, arguing

they are each entitled to qualified immunity under section 670.4A even if Doe

is not overruled. As to teacher Eagles, Johnston argues that Friedhoff “failed

to plead any recognized claim which could give rise to liability.” Johnston

notes that Eagles had not taught the welding class for more than one year

before Friedhoff was injured. As to teacher Becker and the school district,

Johnston argues that Friedhoff relies “almost exclusively on voluntary

professional standards of care” not formally adopted by the school district.

But these three defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity

under Doe unless Freidhoff’s claims are rooted in a statute or the

constitution. Despite arguing the claims go “beyond” common law

negligence, Johnston does not identify what statutory or constitutional

provision underlies Friedhoff’s claims. Instead, Johnston rehashes whether

Friedhoff met his pleading requirements. But Freidhoff only had to satisfy

Iowa’s notice pleading standard. See Doe, 20 N.W.3d at 805−06. A pleading

will satisfy that standard if it contains “factual allegations that give the

defendant ‘fair notice’ of the claim asserted so the defendant can adequately

respond to the petition.” Nahas, 991 N.W.2d at 776 (quoting Rees v. City of

Shenandoah, 682 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Iowa 2004)). Fair notice requires the

6

petition to apprise Johnston of the “incident giving rise to the claim and of

the claim’s general nature.” Id. (quoting Rees, 682 N.W.2d at 79).

The petition doesn’t need to peg a specific legal theory nor does it have

to plead “ultimate facts that support each element of the cause of action.”

Terrace Hill Soc’y Found. v. Terrace Hill Comm’n, 6 N.W.3d 290, 296 (Iowa

2024) (quoting Nahas, 991 N.W.2d at 776). Friedhoff’s thirty-page amended

petition sufficiently notifies the school district of the incident surrounding

Freidhoff’s injuries, his legal claims, and the facts supporting those claims.

Taking the alleged facts as true, Friedhoff’s amended petition satisfies the

notice pleading standard.

III. Conclusion

The district court did not err in denying Johnston and its employees

qualified immunity from tort liability. Because section 670.4A does not apply

to Friedhoff’s claims, Johnston is not authorized under 670.4A(4) to appeal

the district court’s ruling. See Fogle, 27 N.W.3d at 545. We therefore dismiss

the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

7

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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