Wamsley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT WINCHESTER

SKYLAR WAMSLEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 4:24-cv-76

v. )

) District Judge Curtis L. Collier

BEDFORD COUNTY, ) Magistrate Judge Christopher H. Steger

)

Defendant. )

M E M O R AN D U M

Before the Court is a motion in limine by Plaintiff Skylar Wamsley to exclude seven pieces

of evidence. (Doc. 30.) This includes (1) evidence of Plaintiff’s prior employment discipline and

terminations (id. at 1), (2) evidence of sexual-harassment allegations at a job Plaintiff held after

being terminated from Bedford County (id. at 2), (3) testimony regarding Plaintiff’s fiancée’s

presence at work during his employment at the Tennessee Highway Patrol or during his

employment with any other employer (id.), (4) testimony regarding reasons Plaintiff gave for

missing drill (id. at 3), (5) testimony regarding Plaintiff’s employment with Allied Universal (id.),

(6) “anywhere where Plaintiff testified to matters that called for legal conclusions or to make

claims about the ultimate issue in the case” (id.), and (7) “tax issues and financial irrelevancies”

(id. at 4). Defendant has responded (Doc. 32) and Plaintiff has replied (Doc. 39).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has brought claims alleging discrimination, retaliation, and failure to reemploy

under §§ 4311 and 4312 of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act

of 1994 (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C.S. §§ 4301–4334. (Doc. 20 at 3–5.) Plaintiff alleges his

termination from that position was motivated in part by his military status. (Id.)

Plaintiff was hired by the Bedford County Juvenile Detention Center (“JDC”) on April 10,

2023. (Doc. 28 at 1.) During the hiring process, Plaintiff informed JDC Director Kellee Smith

that he was a member of the National Guard and, as such, would have to take time away for Guard

duty and drills. (Id. at 2; Doc. 27-3 at 30.) This consisted of both weekend training periods and

two-week-long training periods. (Doc. 27-3 at 30.) Plaintiff provided Ms. Smith with a screenshot

of his schedule, including the dates on which he would have to take leave. (Doc. 28 at 1; Doc.

27-2.) Ms. Smith informed Plaintiff that Bedford County would work with his National Guard

schedule. (Doc. 27-3 at 27.) For the first ninety days of his employment, he was a probationary

employee, which meant Ms. Smith had the right to terminate him without disciplinary action or

coaching sessions. (Doc. 28 at 2.)

One of Plaintiff’s two-week training periods began on June 15, 2023. (Doc. 27-2 at 1.)

The next day, on June 16, 2023, Ms. Smith sent an email to Human Resources (“HR”)

representative Shanna Boyette, stating that “[her] last hire, Skylar Wamsley, isn’t going to work

out,” and asking to keep his job posting up “until [she] can work out his release from work.” (Doc.

27-4 at 2.) Plaintiff was not terminated at this point.

On June 29, 2023, while on training leave, Plaintiff texted Ms. Smith to inform her that he

fell six feet onto his back and was rushed to the emergency room during his training. (Doc. 27-6

at 2.) Plaintiff told Ms. Smith he had been released from training for the past three days and had

physical therapy scheduled for one-and-a-half weeks later. (Id. at 2.) Ms. Smith told Plaintiff

that she would notify HR and told him to touch base with her in a few days. (Id. at 3.) On July

4, 2023, Ms. Smith informed Plaintiff that Bedford County would need a doctor’s note clearing

him before he came back to work. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff responded that he had an upcoming follow-

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up appointment, then he asked if he would get paid while he was out. (Id. at 4–5.) Ms. Smith

responded that he would not get paid because he did not have any leave built up. (Id. at 5.) On

July 7, 2023, Ms. Smith informed Plaintiff that his services were no longer needed and she would

be sending him a separation notice. (Id. at 5.) Defendant asserts his termination was “based on

his workplace conduct and temperament,” which included threatening detainees, eating detainees’

food, and visiting his girlfriend during shifts. (Doc. 24 at 13.) Plaintiff argues it was because of

his military status.

This case is set for trial May 11, 2026.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion in limine is “designed to narrow the evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate

unnecessary trial interruptions.” Louzon v. Ford Motor Co., 718 F.3d 556, 561 (6th Cir. 2013).

“Orders in limine which exclude broad categories of evidence should rarely be employed.”

Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975). “A better practice

is to deal with questions of admissibility of evidence as they arise.” Id. Courts have power to

exclude evidence through a motion in limine only when evidence is “clearly inadmissible on all

potential grounds.” Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004).

Motions in limine “are not proper procedural devices for the wholesale disposition of theories or

defenses.” Bell v. Prefix, Inc., No. 05-74311, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101889 at *3 (E.D. Mich.

Nov. 2, 2009). “A court enjoys broad discretion when it decides questions of relevance and

possible prejudice.” Clark v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, No. 3:17-CV-00419-GNS-

CHL, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 259653, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 16, 2025).

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III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff moves to exclude seven pieces of evidence or categories of evidence. The Court

will address each piece of evidence or category of evidence in turn.

A. Evidence of Plaintiff’s prior employment discipline and terminations

Plaintiff argues that evidence regarding prior discipline, write-ups, or terminations from

prior employers is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). “Evidence of [a] crime,

wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular

occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). But

evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible for non-character purposes. Under Rule 404(b)(2),

prior bad acts “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Both parties

agree “it is appropriate to prohibit this evidence from being offered to prove that Mr. Wamsley

was a bad employee.” (Doc. 32 at 2.) But Defendant argues that “it is premature to exclude this

evidence should it become relevant for a permissible purpose under the Rules.”

To determine whether Rule 404(b) evidence is admissible, the Court of Appeals uses a

three-part test.

Before the court may admit [Rule] 404(b) evidence, it must: (1) determine whether

this is sufficient evidence that the prior acts occurred; (2) determine whether the

other act is admissible for one of the proper purposes outlined in the rule; and (3)

apply Rule 403 balancing to determine whether the probative value of the evidence

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Eldridge v. City of Warren, 655 F. App’x 345, 348 (6th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting

United States v. Hardy, 643 F.3d 143, 150 (6th Cir. 2011)). The Court of Appeals “requir[es] the

proponent to identify the specific purpose for which the evidence is offered.” United States v.

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Merriweather, 78 F.3d 1070, 1076 (6th Cir. 1996). This requirement does not “mandate

hypertechnicality” and recognizes that “whether 404(b) evidence is admissible for a particular

purpose will sometimes be unclear until late in the trial.” Id. Notwithstanding this observation,

“[a] party may not simply recite a ‘laundry list’ of possible purposes, but instead must clearly

specify the permissible purposes of the proffered evidence." United States v. Busch, No. 3:18-cr-

079, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95752, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 7, 2019) (quoting United States v.

Brown, 90 F. Supp. 2d 841, 844 (E.D. Mich. 2000)).

Here, Defendant has not offered any evidence as to whether the prior events happened nor

has it identified the specific purpose for which the evidence will be offered. Indeed, Defendant

merely states that “it is premature to exclude this evidence should it become relevant for a

permissible purpose.” (Doc. 32 at 2.) It argues that evidence about these prior terminations “may”

be properly admitted during trial under any of the 404(b)(2) purposes without citing any specific

purpose. And the Court cannot identify a potential proper purpose for this evidence except the

impermissible use of establishing a propensity toward bad behavior at work.1 A listing of all

permissible purposes under Rule 404(b) is not a sufficient showing that such evidence is

admissible. Therefore, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion in limine and exclude evidence

1 Of course, the Court reminds the parties that “motions in limine yield only interlocutory

decisions”. Cooey v. Strickland, No. 2:04-cv-1156, No. 2:09-cv-242, No. 2:09-cv-823, No. 2:10-

cv-27, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8336, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2011). “The Court may reconsider

the admissibility of the evidence … and even change its ruling on a motion in limine ‘as the

proceedings give context to the pretrial objections.’” Henricks v. Pickaway Corr. Inst., No. 2:08-

CV-580, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113001 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2016) (quoting Bennett v. Bd. of

Educ. Of Washington Cnty. Joint Vocational Sch. Dist., C2-08-CV-0663, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

116412, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 7, 2011).

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of Plaintiff’s history of disciplinary issues and terminations from prior employment to show

propensity.

B. Sexual harassment allegations

Plaintiff moves to exclude “any of his deposition testimony regarding alleged sexual[-]

harassment accusations while employed at Archangel” and any related documentation in reference

to these allegations under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. (Doc. 30 at 2.) Defendant

acknowledges that because the allegations occurred after Plaintiff’s employment with Bedford

County ended, “they are irrelevant to Bedford County’s decision to terminate Mr. Wamsley.”

(Doc. 32 at 2.) However, it argues that such evidence may be relevant for other reasons, such as

for impeachment purposes and for backpay calculation. Specifically, it argues “the fact that Mr.

Wamsley was terminated for cause is relevant to whether his backpay should be tolled.” (Id.)

Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if “it has any

tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact

is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. “The Federal Rules of Evidence

set a low bar for relevance.” Cambio Health Sols., LLC v. Reardon, 234 F. App’x 331, 338 (6th

Cir. 2007). “A piece of evidence does not need to carry a party’s evidentiary burden in order to

be relevant; it simply has to advance the ball.” Dortch v. Fowler, 588 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir.

2009). But the Court may exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by a danger of … unfair prejudice” or “misleading the jury.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Defendant agrees this evidence is not relevant to its decision to terminate Mr. Wamsley. (Doc.

32 at 2.) The Court will address the other two grounds Defendant proffered for admissibility:

impeachment evidence and backpay.

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Defendant invokes Rule 613. (Doc. 32 at 2.) The Court does not see a reason for this

evidence to be offered for impeachment purposes under Rule 613. “Extrinsic evidence of a

prior inconsistent statement is admissible pursuant to FRE 613(b).” Nissan v. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co., No. 11-cv-13047, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117424, at *5–6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 2013).

It is unclear how allegations of sexual-harassment could even constitute extrinsic evidence of any

prior inconsistent statement by Plaintiff on a relevant matter. The allegations refer to conduct that

occurred after the termination. Any inquiry into Plaintiff’s character after the termination would

be irrelevant to the issues in this case, because such evidence would not be relevant to the

termination decision. Therefore, the Court does not see a reason for this type of impeachment

evidence to be offered to impeach irrelevant statements by Plaintiff. See Bowman v. Vankeuren,

No. 21-cv-12845, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218152, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 5, 2025) (“[T]he Court

does not see an opening for [evidence of prior convictions and a prior incarceration] to be offered

by Defendants even for impeachment purposes.”)

Defendant also invokes Rule 608(b). “Fed. R. Evid. 608(b)(1) allows a witness’s

credibility to be attacked on cross-examination with specific instances of misconduct relevant to

credibility.” Clark v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 652, at *6

(W.D. Ky. Jan. 5, 2026). This applies to misconduct that involves an element of truthfulness, like

forgery. See Steeg v. Vilsack, No. 5:13-cv-00086-TBR, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149491, at *9

(W.D. Ky. Oct. 27, 2016) (allowing Defendant to inquire into forged document because it is

conduct relevant to credibility). The Court does not find that sexual harassment is misconduct

relevant to credibility.

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Defendant also argues that this evidence is relevant to backpay calculations. The Court

agrees that the backpay calculation may be affected by whether the later termination was “for

cause.” But evidence of the specifics behind the termination is not relevant to a backpay

calculation. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to backpay is not dependent on the reason for the

termination, but rather whether there was or was not a reason for termination (i.e. whether it was

“for cause”). Evidence that the termination was for sexual harassment is more likely to inflame

the passions of the jury without bringing any probative value to this inquiry. Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Therefore, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion as to evidence of sexual harassment at work

after his employment with Bedford County.

C. Testimony regarding Plaintiff’s fiancée’s presence at work during his

employment at the Tennessee Highway Patrol or any other employers

Plaintiff moves to exclude “any testimony regarding Plaintiff’s fiancée[’]s presence at

work during Plaintiff’s employment with Tennessee Highway Patrol, or any other employers,

should Defendant move to admit any further such evidence” under Federal Rule of Evidence 404.

(Doc. 30 at 2.) See supra IIIA.

Defendant again argues that “the County might use this evidence for one or more of the

permitted uses provided by subsection (b)(2).” (Doc. 32 at 3.) But this falls short of the

requirement that the proponent “identify the specific purpose for which the evidence is offered.”

Merriweather, 78 F.3d 1076. And again, the Court cannot identify any specific purposes under

Rule 404(b)(2) which may make this evidence admissible. “A laundry list of the

enumerated 404(b) uses … is insufficient to demonstrate that the evidence has a proper purpose.”

Busch, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95752, at *3 (quoting United States v. Xavier¸ 1:08-CR-00018,

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26409, at *3 (D.V.I. Mar. 17, 2010)). The Court finds such evidence

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clearly inadmissible under Rule 404, and therefore will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion in limine as to

“any testimony regarding Plaintiff’s fiancée[’]s presence at work during Plaintiff’s employment

with Tennessee Highway Patrol, or any other employers, should Defendant move to admit any

further such evidence.” (Doc. 30 at 2.)

D. Attendance, drill absences, and excused absences

Plaintiff seeks to exclude evidence “regarding reasons he gave for missing drill or being

excused from attending drill.” (Doc. 30 at 3.) The Court understands “drill” to refer to the entire

period of training and instruction. 32 U.S.C. § 502(a)(1) (referring to “drill and instruction”);

Drill, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/drill (last visited May

6, 2026). While Plaintiff does not cite a rule of evidence, he argues such evidence would “only

serve to confuse the jury” and later that it “has no bearing on his claims in this case.” (Id. at 4.)

Therefore, the Court addresses this objection under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. See

supra IIIB.

Plaintiff “concede[s] that attendance at drill and, particularly, the injury Plaintiff suffered

that led to his termination, are in dispute, and require Plaintiff’s testimony and other supporting

documentation.” (Doc. 39 at 3.) But Plaintiff argues that the reason for missing drill is

inadmissible, and evidence from periods when he was not employed by Bedford County is

inadmissible. (Id.)

Some of this evidence is not clearly inadmissible. Whether Plaintiff missed drill in the

summer of 2023 would be relevant to whether he experienced an injury during his training, which

is a contested issue in this case. It would also be relevant to prove his presence at training.

Therefore, testimony about missing drill while he was employed at Bedford County is not clearly

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inadmissible. But the Court does agree that evidence about Plaintiff missing drill outside of his

employment with Bedford County (see, e.g. Doc. 31 at 49–52) is clearly inadmissible because it

is not relevant to whether Plaintiff was present at drill during the relevant time or experienced an

injury that tolled the convalescence period under 38 U.S.C. § 4312(e). The contested issue is

Plaintiff’s presence and injury at his National Guard training in June 2023 while he was employed

by Bedford County; other periods where he was employed by a different employer and may have

skipped drill make no fact in this case more or less likely and introduce a substantial likelihood of

unfair prejudice.

Therefore, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s motion as to evidence of attendance at drill and

excused absences during his June 2023 training and will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion as to evidence

of attendance at drill and excused absences as to periods in which he was not employed by Bedford

County.

E. Testimony regarding Plaintiff’s employment with Allied Universal

Plaintiff moves “to exclude detailed testimony regarding employment with Allied

Universal, including the fact that he only worked for them for three days, and that he quit working

for them over contract disputes.” (Doc. 30 at 3.) Plaintiff argues this evidence is irrelevant and

risks confusion. (Id.) Defendant argues that this evidence is relevant to show inconsistencies in

Plaintiff’s testimony because Plaintiff stated he was assigned to work at locations where Allied

lost contracts, but records demonstrate Plaintiff resigned in order to work at GardaWorld. (Doc.

32 at 4.) Defendant also argues this evidence is relevant because it shows Plaintiff withdrew from

gainful employment for an extended period of time, and therefore Defendant should not be

responsible for paying back pay. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he “is willing to stipulate to Plaintiff’s

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applications to Allied Universal, and his reasons for leaving his employment there. Plaintiff

maintains objections to any other documentation from Allied Universal that may have been

produced.” (Doc. 39 at 4.)

While the Court does not find this evidence clearly inadmissible, the Court finds the

relevance of such evidence depends on the theories and evidence offered at trial. Fed. R. Evid.

104(b). Defendant has provided the Court with a scenario under which such evidence could be

used for impeachment purposes under Federal Rule of Evidence 613. And this evidence could

also be relevant to a backpay calculation if Plaintiff did, in fact, deny gainful employment. But

such issues may not even arise at trial. The Court finds, then, that such relevance will depend on

the evidence offered at trial and the theories of each party. Therefore, the Court will RESERVE

RULING on Plaintiff’s motion in limine as to testimony about Plaintiff’s Allied Universal

employment.

F. Lay opinions and legal conclusions

Plaintiff moves to exclude “anywhere where Plaintiff testified to matters that called for

legal conclusions or to make claims about the ultimate issue in the case.” (Doc. 30 at 3.) Plaintiff

moves to exclude this evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 701, 702, and 403. Plaintiff

argues that conclusions and questions in Plaintiff’s deposition about his legal claims “leave room

for further interpretation of the fullness of Plaintiff’s claims as alleged in the complaint.” (Doc.

30 at 4.) And furthermore, Plaintiff argues that these opinions constitute legal conclusions

inadmissible under Rules 701 and 702. (Id.)

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, lay witness testimony is limited to testimony “(a)

rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s

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testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. Under Federal Rule of

Evidence 702,

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,

or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent

demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that: (a) the expert’s

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based

on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and

methods; and (d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the

principles and methods to the facts of the case.

And such opinion testimony either under Rule 701 or 702 may be excluded if the risk of unfair

prejudice or confusion substantially outweighs the probative value of such testimony. Fed. R.

Evid. 403.

The Court does not find this evidence clearly inadmissible. First, as to Plaintiff’s

contention that Plaintiff’s deposition testimony about his claims “leave[s] room for further

interpretation of the fullness of Plaintiff’s claims as alleged in the complaint,” this is easily

explored on direct examination or re-direct examination. Any risk of confusion is slight, and the

probative value of Plaintiff’s assessment of his own claims is high. And as to legal conclusions,

the Court finds that because these are statements about the claims Plaintiff himself brought, it

would be rationally in Plaintiff’s perception to state his understanding of the claims that he chose

to bring. See Gillespie v. City of Miami Twp., No. 3:13-cv-416, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186178,

at *6 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 11, 2022) (stating that “Rule 701 establishes limitations on opinion testimony

by lay witnesses but does not exclude it outright”). The Court agrees that “Mr. Wamsley cannot

simultaneously assert claims against the County and prevent the jury from hearing his own sworn

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description of the basis for those claims.” (Doc. 32 at 4–5.) Plaintiff’s vantage point as the person

who brought these claims suggests that his characterization of them and his injuries would be

admissible as a proper lay opinion. Therefore, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s motion as to

testimony about his own legal claims.

G. Tax issues

Plaintiff “moves to exclude testimony regarding his issues with filing taxes in a timely

manner” under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. See supra IIIB. Defendant argues “Mr.

Wamsley’s failure to file tax returns bears directly on the reliability, accuracy, and completeness

of his claimed lost wages and earnings history as well as his credibility.” (Doc. 32 at 5.) And

Plaintiff argues, “Plaintiff’s existent tax records and other financial records can be presented to the

jury, without any need for letting the jury know Plaintiff failed to file his taxes on time.” (Doc. 39

at 5.)

The timeliness of Plaintiff’s filing does not appear to be relevant to the amount of damages

or backpay to which he claims he is entitled, so long as the return was eventually filed correctly

and the amount listed on his records was accurate. The Court does not see, and Defendant does

not demonstrate, how such a failure to timely-file taxes bears on the reliability of those returns or

Plaintiff’s credibility. And such evidence introduces a substantial risk of unfair prejudice.

Therefore, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion in limine to exclude testimony about his

failure to file taxes on time.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court will GRANT IN PART, DENY IN PART, and RESERVE RULING IN

PART on Plaintiff’s motion in limine (Doc. 30). The Court will GRANT the motion in limine as

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to evidence of Plaintiff’s prior employment discipline and terminations (id. at 1), evidence of

sexual-harassment allegations (id. at 2), testimony regarding Plaintiff’s fiancée’s presence at work

during his employment at the Tennessee Highway Patrol or any other employers (id.), and

testimony regarding Plaintiff’s late-filed tax returns (id. at 4). The Court will GRANT IN PART

the motion in limine as to evidence of attendance at drill and excused absences during periods in

which he was not employed by Bedford County, and the Court will DENY IN PART Plaintiff’s

motion as to evidence of attendance at drill and excused absences during his June 2023 training

(id. at 3). The Court will DENY Plaintiff’s motion in limine as to his own opinion about his legal

claims (id.). And the Court will RESERVE RULING on Plaintiff’s motion regarding testimony

about his employment at Allied Universal Employment (id.).

AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.

/s/

CURTIS L. COLLIER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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