Valentine

TATES DIST,

COS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT S □□

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MAY 11 2026

LEB Morey ert

S W. MOELLER, CE □□

ERIC V.,} ERN DISTRICL OS

Plaintiff,

v. 24-CV-1118 (JLS)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Eric V. brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social

Security Act, seeking review of the decision of the Commissioner of the Social

Security Administration that he was not disabled. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff moved for

judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. 6. The Commissioner responded and cross-moved

for judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. 8. For the reasons below, the Court denies

Plaintiffs motion and grants the Commissionevr’s cross motion.

Pursuant to the Western District of New York’s November 18, 2020 Standing

Order regarding the naming of plaintiffs in Social Security decisions, this decision

and order identifies Plaintiff by first name and last initial.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action originates from Plaintiffs application for Disability Insurance

Benefits (“DIB”), filed on July 22, 2020.2 Tr. 182-86.3 Plaintiffs application was

initially denied, as well as upon reconsideration, and he requested a hearing before

an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Tr. 65-105, 112-28. Following the hearing, at

which Plaintiff was represented by counsel, ALJ Paul Georger issued a decision

finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 17-63. Plaintiffs request for Appeals

Council review was denied. Tr. 1-6.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a district court action, and on September 12,

2023, the Honorable Elizabeth A. Wolford remanded Plaintiffs case for further

administrative proceedings pursuant to the parties’ joint stipulation. Tr. 612.

Following a second hearing, ALJ Stephan Bell issued another decision finding that

Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 536-81. Plaintiffs request for Appeals Council

review was denied, after which he commenced this action. Tr. 582-97; Dkt. 1.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. DISTRICT COURT REVIEW

Judicial review of disability claims under the Act is limited to whether the

Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the

2 Plaintiff applied for DIB, which requires a claimant to show that he or she became

disabled while meeting the Act’s insured status requirements. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(1)(A); Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2022).

3 The filing at Dkt. 3 is the transcript of the proceedings before the Social Security

Administration. All references to Dkt. 3 are hereby denoted “Tr. __.”

correct legal standards were applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cichocki v. Astrue, 729

F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013). The Commissioner’s factual findings are conclusive

when supported by substantial evidence. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 589 U.S. 97, 99

(2019). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla” and “means such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation modified).

The Court does not determine de novo whether the claimant is disabled, but

the Commissioner’s conclusions of law are not given the same deferential standard

of review. See Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003). If there is a

reasonable basis of doubt about whether the ALJ applied the correct legal

standards, then upholding the determination “creates an unacceptable risk that a

claimant will be deprived of the right to have his or her disability determination

made according to correct legal principles.” Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986

(2d Cir. 1987); see Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (explaining that

the Court’s review for legal error ensures “that the claimant has had a full hearing

under the regulations and in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the Social

Security Act.” (citation modified)).

I. DISABILITY DETERMINATION

Disability under the Act is determined under a five-step test. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520; see Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71 (1986). First, the

ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). “Substantial gainful activity” is work

activity that involves significant physical or mental activities and is normally done

for pay or profit. Id. § 404.1572. If the ALJ finds that the claimant is engaged in

substantial gainful activity, the claimant cannot claim disability. Id. § 404.1520(b).

Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically

determinable impairment or a combination of impairments that significantly limits

the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. Id. § 404.1520(c). Absent

such impairment, the claimant may not claim disability. Id.

Third, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant’s impairments meet or

medically equal the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart

P, Appendix 1. Jd. § 404.1520(d). If such criteria are met, then the claimant is

declared disabled. Id.

Even if the claimant is not declared disabled under the third step, the ALJ

may still find disability under the next two steps of the analysis. The ALJ must

determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Id. § 404.1520¢(e).

The RFC is a holistic assessment of the claimant’s medical impairments, both

severe and non-severe, that evaluates the claimant’s ability to perform physical or

mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for

collective impairments. Id. § 404.1545.

In the fourth step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has the

RFC to perform past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant is capable of

performing past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled. Id.

§ 404.1560(b)(3). If the ALJ finds that the claimant is unable to perform past

relevant work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step. Id. § 404.1520(g)(1).

In this final analytical step, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant is

able to perform any other relevant work corresponding with his or her RFC, age,

education, and work experience. Id. § 404.1560(c). Here, the burden of proof shifts

from the claimant to the Commissioner to prove that a significant number of jobs in

the national economy exists that the claimant can perform given his or her RFC,

age, education, and work experience. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c); see Rosa v.

Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999).

DISCUSSION

I, THE ALJ’S DECISION

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since June 1, 2020. Tr. 542. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff suffered

from the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar

spine, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”), and obesity. Id. The ALJ

concluded, however, that Plaintiffs severe impairments did not meet or medically

equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

Tr. 546.

After considering the entire record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the

RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), with the following

additional limitations:

[Plaintiff can] occasionally reach[ ] overhead to the left, and [he

can] occasionally reach[ ] overhead to the right. [He] can climb

ramps and stairs occasionally, never climb ladders, ropes, or

scaffolds, balance occasionally, stoop occasionally, kneel

occasionally, crouch occasionally, [and] crawl occasionally. [He

can function] in humidity and wetness occasionally, in dust,

odors, fumes and pulmonary irritants occasionally, in extreme

cold occasionally, [and] in extreme heat occasionally. Requires a

sit/stand option, changing positions every 45 minutes, with

[Plaintiff] sitting for 45 minutes, standing long enough for

symptoms to resolve, then sitting again, staying on task

throughout the process.

Tr. 547.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work.

Tr. 552. But the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled because his age,

education, work experience, and RFC allowed him to perform jobs existing in

significant numbers in the national economy. Tr. 553. As such, according to the

ALJ, Plaintiff had not been under a disability since June 1, 2020. Tr. 554.

II. PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was unsupported by substantial

evidence for two reasons. See Dkt. 6-1 at 12-23. First, Plaintiff says that the ALJ

improperly found that his mental impairments were not severe at step two of the

disability determination. See id. at 12-20. Second, Plaintiff says that the ALJ

failed to consider adequately the combined effect of his mental impairments when

determining his RFC. See id. at 20-23. For the reasons that follow, this Court

disagrees.

Ill. ANALYSIS

A. Step Two Determination

At step two of the disability determination, “the ALJ determines whether the

claimant has an impairment, or combination of impairments, that is ‘severe’ within

the meaning of the Act, in that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant’s

ability to perform basic work activities.” Felix S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 630 F.

Supp. 3d 423, 427 (W.D.N.Y. 2022). Although the claimant bears the burden of

establishing severity, such burden “is de minimis and is meant only to screen out

the weakest of claims.” See id. at 427-28 (citing Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019,

1030 (2d Cir. 1995)).

Regarding a claimant’s alleged mental impairments, “the regulations instruct

the ALJ to apply a ‘special technique’ in determining whether [those] impairments

are severe.” Sharon J. v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 716 F. Supp. 3d 59, 64 (W.D.N.Y.

2024). This special technique “instructs the ALJ to consider [four] broad areas of

mental [work-related] functioning.” See id. Those four areas are: (1)

understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with others;

(3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing

oneself. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). If the ALJ does not find more than a

“mild” limitation in any of those four areas, then the claimant’s medically

determinable mental impairments are non-severe. See id. § 404.1520a(d)(1).

Here, the ALJ considered Plaintiffs schizoaffective disorder and post-

traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and concluded that they were non-severe

impairments because they did not “cause more than minimal limitation in

[Plaintiffs] ability to perform basic mental work activities.” See Tr. 542. More

specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had: (1) no limitation in understanding,

remembering, or applying information; (2) a mild limitation in interacting with

others; (3) a mild limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and

(4) a mild limitation in adapting or managing himself. See Tr. 544-45. Those

findings mirrored the opinions of state agency review consultants A. Chapman,

PsyD, and D. Brown, PsyD. See Tr. 69 (relevant portion of Dr. Chapman’s opinion);

Tr. 84 (relevant portion of Dr. Brown’s opinion).

More importantly, however, the ALJ’s findings were supported by the opinion

of consultative examiner Susan Santarpia, PhD, who concluded that Plaintiff only

had mild limitations in regulating emotions, controlling behavior, and maintaining

well-being. See Tr. 868. They also largely were supported by Plaintiffs longitudinal

treatment record and reported activities of daily living. See, e.g., Tr. 510-11, 834—

35, 1065-66 (normal mental status examinations on October 13, 2021, October 12,

2022, and January 24, 2024, respectively); Tr. 868 (acknowledging Plaintiffs reports

that he could dress, bathe, groom himself, cook, clean, do laundry, shop, manage

finances, operate a motor vehicle, and socialize with friends).

Accordingly, the ALJ’s step two determination was supported by substantial

evidence. See, e.g., Angela M.K. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 4591844, at *3 (N.D.N.Y.

Sept. 30, 2022) (concluding that the ALJ’s step two determination was supported by

substantial evidence where it was based on the plaintiffs “largely normal mental

status examinations, [her] symptoms and treatment, the longitudinal record, the

medical opinions, the majority of which reflected no more than mild

limitations, .. . [and her] daily activities, which did not reflect any functional

limitation regarding basic work activities” (citation modified)). Plaintiff

nevertheless argues that this Court should reach the opposite conclusion for two

reasons. See Dkt. 6-1 at 12-20. The Court will address each argument in turn.

First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ applied the wrong severity standard; in

Plaintiffs view, the ALJ’s severity standard “required Plaintiff to be hospitalized for

his mental health, be unable to care for himself and be placed in a residential

facility, or enter a psychiatric treatment facility.” See id. at 14. That argument is

without merit because, as required by the regulations, the ALJ assessed Plaintiffs

degree of limitation in the four areas of mental work-related functioning and found

that Plaintiff had no more than a mild limitation in any of the four areas. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c). What is more, as discussed above, those findings were

supported by substantial evidence. See Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 683 F.3d 443,

448 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The substantial evidence standard means once an ALJ finds

facts, [a reviewing court] can reject those facts only if a reasonable fact finder would

have to conclude otherwise.” (citation modified)).

Second, Plaintiff argues that “the ALJ improperly cherry-picked evidence to

find mild limitations [in his mental work-related functioning].” See Dkt. 6-1 at 19.

Plaintiffs argument is, essentially, a disagreement with the ALJ’s weighing of the

evidence, and it is “not the function of this Court to re-weigh evidence or consider de

novo whether [Plaintiff] is disabled.” See Teena H. 0/b/o N.LK. v. Comm’ of Soc.

Sec., 521 F. Supp. 3d 287, 292 (W.D.N.Y. 2021); see also Miles v. Harris, 645 F.2d

122, 124 (2d Cir. 1981) (“We are unwilling to require an ALJ explicitly to reconcile

every conflicting shred of medical testimony[;] [i]t is sufficient that the ALJ noted

that he carefully considered the exhibits presented in evidence in reaching his

conclusion.”); Malcom C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 801 F. Supp. 3d 175, 184 (W.D.N.Y.

2025) (explaining that “an allegation of cherry-picking is seldom successful because

crediting it would require a court to re-weigh record evidence, and what a claimant

may label as cherry-picking can often be described more neutrally as weighing the

evidence.” (citation modified)).

B. RFC Determination

An ALJ must “weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding

that [is] consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56

(2d Cir. 2013); accord Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2022). That does

not mean that an RFC must “perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of

medical sources cited in [an ALJ’s] decision,” Matta, 508 F. App’x at 56, or even be

based on opinion evidence, see Rubin v. O’Malley, 116 F.4th 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2024).

So long as an ALJ considers all the medical evidence and appropriately analyzes the

medical opinions, an RFC consistent with the record is not error. See Cichocki, 729

F.3d at 177 (explaining that remand is not necessary “where an ALJ’s analysis at

Step Four regarding a claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions affords an

adequate basis for meaningful judicial review, applies the proper legal standards,

and is supported by substantial evidence” (citation modified)).

10

In this case, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not including any mental

limitations in the RFC and failing to explain that omission in his analysis. See Dkt.

6-1 at 20-23. That argument misunderstands Plaintiffs burden. See Smith v.

Berryhill, 740 F. App’x 721, 726 (2d Cir. 2018) (Here, Smith had a duty to prove a

more restrictive RFC, and [he] failed to do so.”).

During the RFC determination, an ALJ “must consider limitations and

restrictions imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even those that are not

‘severe.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5 (July 2, 1996). Although a non-severe

impairment “standing alone may not significantly limit an individual’s ability to do

basic work activities, it may—when considered with limitations or restrictions due

to other impairments—be critical to the outcome of a claim.” Jd. Stated differently,

a non-severe impairment may, in combination with one or more severe

impairments, impact an individual’s RFC. See id.

Plaintiff, however, provides no explanation as to how his non-severe mental

impairments—schizoaffective disorder and PTSD—might interact with his severe

physical impairments—degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, COPD, and

obesity—to create a more restrictive RFC than that found by the ALJ. See, e.g.,

Lynette W. v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 868625, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 9,

2021) (“While it is true that nonsevere impairments and ‘mild’ limitations can cause

functional restrictions, Plaintiff does not articulate why the ALJ was compelled to

interpret Dr. Ransom’s [findings of mild mental limitations] in that manner”

11

(citation modified)). As such, Plaintiff not entitled to remand based on the ALJ’s

RFC determination.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the Commissioner’s cross motion for

judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 8) and DENIES Plaintiffs motion for judgment on

the pleadings (Dkt. 6). The Clerk of the Court will close this case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 11, 2026

Buffalo, New York

JO L. SINATRA, JR. □

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12