Bonneau

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

RYAN BONNEAU, Case No.: 3:26-cv-00878-AN

Plaintiff,

v.

OPINION AND ORDER

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES –

STATE OF OREGON,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Ryan Bonneau, who is self-represented and thus proceeding pro se, brings this action

against defendant Department of Motor Vehicles – State of Oregon (the “Oregon DMV”). On April 30,

2026, plaintiff filed a verified complaint; an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), i.e., to

proceed without paying filing fees; a motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary

injunction; and a motion for appointment of pro bono counsel. Defendant has not been served or appeared

in this case. For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff’s IFP application is GRANTED and plaintiff’s verified

complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend. Plaintiff’s motion for TRO and

preliminary injunction and motion for appointment of pro bono counsel are DENIED as moot, with leave

to refile.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. IFP Applications

District courts are authorized by statute to permit a party to commence litigation “without

prepayment of fees or security therefor” if that party submits an affidavit showing that, in light of the assets

of that party, they are “unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Section

1915 “applies to all persons notwithstanding” its references to incarcerated litigants. Andrews v. Cervantes,

493 F.3d 1047, 1051 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Lister v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th

Cir. 2005)). When determining what, if any, filing fee a plaintiff must pay, “‘the court may consider the

plaintiff's cash flow in the recent past, and the extent to which the plaintiff has depleted his savings on

nonessentials.’” Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 768 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Alexander

v. Carson Adult High Sch., 9 F.3d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1993)).

In addition to permitting litigants to proceed without paying filing fees, Section 1915 also requires

a court to dismiss a complaint on its own accord, even before service of process, if it determines that the

complaint is “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an

arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint fails

to state a claim if it does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted);

see Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The standard for determining whether a

plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same

as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.”). “[S]ection 1915(e)

not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.” Lopez,

203 F.3d at 1127. Additionally, a court must dismiss a complaint on immunity grounds once it has

“sufficient information to make a determination” that a defendant is entitled to absolute or qualified

immunity. Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2016).

B. TROs and Preliminary Injunctions

Generally, motions for TROs and preliminary injunctions are subject to substantially the same

factors. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). A

TRO or preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing

that plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). The

movant must show (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm

in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction is

in the public interest. Id. at 20-22. In the Ninth Circuit, “serious questions going to the merits and a

hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of an injunction, assuming the

other two elements of the Winter test are also met.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127,

1131-32 (9th Cir. 2011).

C. Self-Represented Litigants

Pleadings filed by self-represented litigants “are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted

by lawyers.” Graves v. Nw. Priority Credit Union, No. 3:20-cv-00770-JR, 2020 WL 8085140, at *2 (D.

Or. Dec. 16, 2020) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). “In cases involving a [self-

represented] plaintiff, the court construes the pleadings liberally and affords the plaintiff the benefit of any

doubt.” Kali v. Bulk Handling Sys., No. 6:18-cv-02010-AA, 2019 WL 1810966, at *4 (D. Or. Apr. 23,

2019) (citing Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004)). Finally, “[u]nless it is absolutely

clear that no amendment can cure the defect,” a self-represented litigant proceeding IFP “is entitled to notice

of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.” Garity v.

APWU Nat’l Labor Org., 828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

BACKGROUND

On April 30, 2026, plaintiff filed this action against defendant. Verified Compl., ECF 1. Plaintiff

additionally filed an IFP application, ECF 2; a motion for TRO and preliminary injunction, ECF 3; and a

motion for appointment of pro bono counsel, ECF 4. Plaintiff primarily alleges that defendant violated his

civil rights by withholding his driver’s license without notice or hearing. Verified Compl. 2. More

specifically, plaintiff alleges that that he was hospitalized in July 2024 and that he lost his driver’s license

upon discharge. Id. He appears to allege next that he sought and received a temporary paper-copy license,

but to-date has yet to receive a permanent replacement. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff also alleges that he was not

given notice “that the hospitalization could, in and of itself cause the suspension of his already issued—and

valid—driver license.” Id. at 2. It is not clear from the pleadings whether plaintiff’s license was suspended

due to this hospitalization or merely lost upon his discharge. See id. Regardless, plaintiff alleges that

without a driver’s license, his daily activities are restricted, he has been unable to return to work or access

his storage unit, and as a result, he is now house-less. Id. at 3. Based on these allegations, plaintiff brings

claims for (1) violation of his right to due process under the Oregon and United States Constitutions,

(2) breach of contract, (3) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and (4) negligence.

Id. at 3-4.

DISCUSSION

A. IFP Status

Plaintiff has satisfied the economic eligibility requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and his IFP

application is granted accordingly. See IFP Appl. However, as described below, the complaint does not

establish a legally coherent theory of liability and therefore must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

B. Section 1915 Screening

To begin, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh

Amendment confers immunity upon states and their agencies from being sued. Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999). Eleventh Amendment immunity bars actions against states and their agencies

unless the state waives its immunity or that immunity is abrogated by Congress. Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc.

v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 254 (2011). “[A] suit against a state agency is considered to be a suit against the

state, and thus is also barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Shaw v. Cal. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage

Control, 788 F.2d 600, 603 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, plaintiff brings suit against the Oregon DMV, a state

agency. States and their agencies are immune from Section 1983 actions under the Eleventh Amendment.

See Dittman v. State of California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held

that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.” (citation and quotation

marks omitted)). Cf. Banks v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles for Cal., 419 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1193 (C.D. Cal.

2006). Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is therefore dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff’s ADA claim must also be dismissed. Plaintiff appears to assert a claim under Title II of

the ADA—meaning a claim for “discrimination in public services.” Sharkey v. O’Neal, 778 F.3d 767, 770

(9th Cir. 2015); see 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such

disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities

of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”). Unlike plaintiff’s Section 1983

claim, claims brought under Title II of the ADA are not barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See

United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006); Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1051 (9th Cir.

2002). However, plaintiff has not sufficiently stated a claim under Title II of the ADA for which relief may

be granted. To state a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must allege that:

(1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was either excluded from

participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities,

or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) this exclusion, denial,

or discrimination was by reason of his disability.

Cohen v. City of Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 2014). The second prong additionally requires

public entities to “‘make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the

modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can

demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program,

or activity.’” Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1215 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 C.F.R.

§ 35.130). As pleaded, the complaint does not sufficiently allege any of these required elements. Plaintiff’s

ADA claim is therefore dismissed without prejudice. Should plaintiff choose to file an amended complaint,

he is reminded that the allegations therein must be sufficient to plausibly state a claim under these legal

standards.

Having dismissed plaintiff’s federal claims, all that remains are plaintiff’s state law claims for

breach of contract and negligence. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

state law claims. See Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2021). Plaintiff’s claims for breach

of contract and negligence are accordingly dismissed without prejudice.

C. Additional Pending Motions

Having dismissed all claims in plaintiff’s complaint, the Court does not reach the merits of

plaintiff’s motion for TRO or preliminary injunction or plaintiff’s motion for appointment of pro bono

counsel. Both motions are thus denied as moot with leave to refile if plaintiff successfully amends his

complaint. If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he is advised to first review the District of

Oregon’s website, which contains a webpage titled “Information about Representing Yourself in Court,”

available to the public at https://ord-uscourts.gov/index.php/representing-yourself/information-about-

representing-yourself.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, plaintiffs IFP application, ECF 2, is GRANTED and plaintiff's

verified complaint, ECF 1, is DISMISSED. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim is dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff’s ADA, breach of contract, and negligence claims are all dismissed without prejudice and with

leave to amend. Plaintiffs motion for TRO and preliminary injunction, ECF 3, and motion for appointment

of pro bono counsel, ECF 4, are DENIED as moot, with leave to refile. Any amended complaint must be

filed within thirty (30) days, i.e., by May 31, 2026. If no amended complaint is filed within that time,

plaintiff risks dismissal of this action without further notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this Ist day of May, 2026. .

Adrienne Nelson

United States District Judge