Davis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

JAVONTE DAVIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No.: 3:26-CV-177-TAV-JEM

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et )

al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Javonte Davis, a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of

Correction (“TDOC”) incarcerated at the Morgan County Correctional Complex

(“MCCX”), filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the doctrine announced in Bivens

v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)1 [Doc.

1], along with an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 5]. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion [Doc. 5] and DISMISS

the complaint [Doc. 1] for failure to state a claim.

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner bringing a civil action

may apply for permission to file suit without prepaying the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). A review of Plaintiff’s motion [Doc. 5] demonstrates that he lacks sufficient

1 Bivens extends the protections afforded under § 1983 to parties injured by federal actors.

See Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 863 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A Bivens action is analogous to an

action under § 1983—the only difference being that § 1983 applies to constitutional violations by

state, rather than federal, officials.”), overruled on other grounds, Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d

939, 948–49 & n. 36 (5th Cir. 2003).

financial resources to pay the filing fee in a lump sum. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915, this motion [Doc. 5] will be GRANTED.

Plaintiff will be ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The custodian of

Plaintiff’s inmate trust account will be DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, 800 Market Street, Suite 130, Knoxville, Tennessee, 37902 twenty percent (20%)

of Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account for

the preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00),

until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Clerk will be DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to the Court’s financial

deputy and the custodian of inmate trust accounts at Plaintiff’s current facility to ensure

compliance with payment of the filing fee.

II. COMPLAINT SCREENING

A. Screening Standard

Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua sponte

dismiss any claims that are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted,” or “seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Benson v. O’Brian,

179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court

in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under [28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language

in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468,

470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Thus, to survive an initial review under the

PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570).

Courts should liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold

them to a less stringent standard than lawyer-drafted pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520 (1972). Even so, allegations that give rise to a mere possibility that a plaintiff

might later establish undisclosed facts supporting recovery are not well-pled and do not

state a plausible claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Further, formulaic and conclusory

recitations of the elements of a claim which are not supported by specific facts are

insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

B. Plaintiff’s Relevant Allegations

On or about March 25, 2025, Plaintiff was leaning over the guard rail outside of his

cell in 23D pod at MCCX, looking into the day-area of the pod [Doc. 1, pp. 3–4]. Sergeant

(“Sgt.”) Pappas and Correctional Officer (“CO”) Shelly were conducting rounds at the time

[Id. at 4]. “[C]onfirmed gang members” came onto the top tier and yelled “shower[,]”

which usually means that they are “running shower securing for one of their members”

[Id.]. Once Plaintiff noticed the gang members approaching him, he “back ped[aled]”

toward nearby cells [Id.]. The gang members walked past the officers and into a cell [Id.].

Sgt. Pappas and CO Shelly finished their rounds and went into 23C pod [Id.].

Plaintiff was still leaning over the railing in the same area when two of those gang

members stood by Plaintiff and asked him to come into the cell to talk [Id.]. When Plaintiff

told them they could “talk right here” and it became apparent that he would not go into the

cell with the gang members, one hit Plaintiff in the face with his hand [Id.]. The other gang

member “jumped in” and a fight ensued [Id. at 4–5]. At some point, Plaintiff realized that

he was being stabbed [Id. at 5]. Plaintiff “broke free[,]” walked quickly to his cell, shut

the cell door, and “hit the call button to notify the staff that something was wrong” [Id.].

Plaintiff had his hand pressed over wound, which was rapidly squirting blood [Id.].

The involved gang members came to Plaintiff’s cell door and tried to persuade him to

“patch” himself up and cover up the fight, with one of them stating, “so you the police”

[Id.]. Plaintiff’s cellmate even tried to persuade Plaintiff not to report the incident [Id.].

Plaintiff’s cellmate “put the blind up” so no one could see inside the cell [Id.].

After 5 or 10 minutes, Sgt. Pappas walked back into the pod [Id.]. Once he opened

Plaintiff’s cell door, which was being blocked by Plaintiff’s cellmate, Plaintiff walked

outside of the cell and got Sgt. Pappas’ attention [Id.]. Plaintiff told Sgt. Pappas, “You

have to walk me out[,] I just got stabbed” [Id.]. Sgt. Pappas escorted Plaintiff out of the

pod and asked who assaulted him [Id.]. Plaintiff told Sgt. Pappas that he had been assaulted

by two inmates who were called “Pablo” and “Phat Face” [Id. at 5–6]. After they reached

“the center core[,]” Sgt. Pappas and CO Shelly began attempting to provide Plaintiff with

medical care while they waited on medical to arrive [Id. at 6].

After medical arrived, Plaintiff was transported to the infirmary, where he “was

patched up” and provided into different clothing while they waited on the ambulance [Id.].

Plaintiff was first transported to Methodist Hospital and then UT Hospital, where he

received surgery [Id.].

Plaintiff “had already dealt with or reported a life endangerment on” December 16,

2021, from four confirmed gang members “attempting to come [and] stab [him]” [Id. at 7].

Plaintiff reported that incident to various non-Defendant officials and family members and

was put on administrative protective custody until October 31, 2024, when he was placed

into general population [Id.]. This move occurred without Plaintiff’s consent, and he did

not “have [his] security” [Id.]. Thus, Plaintiff was placed “around the same confirmed

gang members that put a hit out on [him]” and attempted to “ass[a]ssinate [him] once

before” [Id.]. Plaintiff “had multiple altercations with these members while in general

population[,] [s]ome of which the staff here was aware of” [Id.]. Additionally, “some of

[Plaintiff’s] property came up missing” [Id.].

Plaintiff should not be in TDOC custody, because he was falsely convicted and

imprisoned “on an invalid plea deal” [Id.]. Additionally, “[t]here is no reason for the

witness protection program knowing [Plaintiff] did nothing wrong [and his] identity is a

part of history [and] a source of income” [Id. at 8]. The attack on Plaintiff should not have

occurred, especially when agencies and individuals were aware of the threat to Plaintiff

[Id.].

Aggrieved, Plaintiff filed the instant action against the United States of America,

TDOC, President Donald Trump, former Department of Justice Attorney General Pamela

Bondi, TDOC Commissioner Frank Strada, Tennessee Governor Bill Lee, Warden Sean

Phillips, and all State and Federal Departments whose “job it was to protect” Plaintiff [Id.

at 3]. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief, security, and for Defendants and the gang members

to be “held accountable” [Id. at 9].

C. Analysis

To state a claim against any Defendant, Plaintiff must establish that a “person”

acting “under color of” state or federal law deprived him of “any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(requiring state action); Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting

Bivens claim requires federal actor).

In his complaint, Plaintiff does not specify whether he is suing the individual

Defendants in their official capacities, their personal capacities, or both. Out of an

abundance of caution, the Court presumes he intends to seek relief against Defendants in

both their official and individual capacities.

1. Official-Capacity Claims

Plaintiff cannot maintain suit against the United States, because the United States

cannot be sued without its consent. Block v. North Dakota, ex rel. Bd. of University &

School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 280 (1983). Nothing before the Court indicates that the

United States has consented to Plaintiff’s suit. Therefore, sovereign immunity precludes

Plaintiff’s suit against the United States. And a Bivens claim is not authorized against any

federal agency. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484–86 (1994).

Neither can Plaintiff maintain suit against the TDOC or any State agency, because

they are arms of the State of Tennessee. See Hix v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corrs., 196 F. App’x

350, 355 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding TDOC is equivalent of the “State”). And “a state is not

a person within the meaning of §1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

64 (1989).2

By seeking relief against any individual Defendant in his/her official capacity,

Plaintiff is actually seeking suit against the entity “of which an officer is an agent.” Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (“[O]fficial-capacity suits generally

represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an

agent.”); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (holding “an official-capacity suit

is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity”). Therefore,

Plaintiff’s claims against any named United States3 or Tennessee Defendant in his or her

official capacity is likewise impermissible. Accordingly, all official-capacity claims

against all Defendants will be DISMISSED.

2. Individual-Capacity Claims

Constitutional liability cannot attach to a Defendant solely based on his or her

position of authority. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[O]ur precedents establish . . . that

Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their

2 The Ex Parte Young doctrine allows a prisoner to obtain relief from an ongoing violation

of federal law from a state official sued in his or her official capacity. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.

123, 155–56 (1908). To determine if the exception is applicable, courts “need only conduct a

‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law

and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 412 (6th

Cir. 2017) (quoting Dubuc v. Mich. Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 342 F.3d 610, 616 (6th Cir. 2003)). Here,

Plaintiff does not allege an ongoing violation of federal law, and thus, his claims do not fall within

the Ex Parte Young exception.

3 The Court notes that the United States has given limited consent to be sued in the Federal

Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), but any FTCA action must be grounded in state,

not federal, law. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 653 F.2d 196, 198–202 (5th Cir. 1981).

subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (finding that liability under § 1983 may not be imposed merely

because a defendant “employs a tortfeasor”). Instead, to state a claim against the named

any named Defendant in his or her respective individual capacity, Plaintiff must adequately

plead that each Defendant, through his or her own actions, has violated the Constitution.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002)

(providing that “a complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in

the alleged deprivation of federal rights” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted).

Thus, “supervisory liability under § 1983 does not attach when it is premised on a mere

failure to act; it ‘must be based on active unconstitutional behavior.’” See Greene v.

Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048

(6th Cir. 1999)).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting active unconstitutional behavior

by any named individual Defendant. And without contentions to support “the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Plaintiff fails to state a

claim which relief may be granted against individual defendants President Trump, former

Attorney General Bondi, Commissioner Strada, Governor Lee, or Warden Phillips, and

they will be DISMISSED. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

3. Merits

Additionally, even if specific factual allegations were levied at a viable party,

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim. Liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint, the

Court finds it potentially raises three claims: (1) a failure to protect; (2) invalid/illegal

sentence; (3) loss of personal property. The Court addresses each in turn.

a. Failure to Protect

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment” “places

duties” on prison officials. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Those duties

require officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of” inmates. Id.

(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527–27 (1984)). “It is not, however, every

injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into constitutional

liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Id. at 834. Instead, “[f]or

a failure-to-protect claim to lie against a prison official, the plaintiff must show that:

(1) objectively, he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious

harm; and (2) the official acted with deliberate indifference to inmate safety, meaning the

official was subjectively aware of the risk and fail[ed] to take reasonable measures to abate

it.” Reedy v. West, 988 F.3d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 2021) (citations and quotations omitted)

(alteration in original).

Plaintiff has not set forth facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that any

Defendant knew of a specific threat to Plaintiff from gang members that they disregarded.

Plaintiff maintains that, based on his prior altercations with gang members, MCCX

personnel should not have placed him around those gang members. But he does not allege

that he asked to be moved (either out of general population or to a different unit) when he

was placed in general population in 2024. Neither does he allege that he made any named

Defendant aware of any continued threat to him by any person(s) or group. Moreover,

Plaintiff alleges that two officers were in the pod moments before the attack. Plaintiff did

not attempt to voice any concern to these officers. And there are otherwise no allegations

in the complaint to suggest that prior to the attack, Plaintiff was in objective, physical

danger of which any MCCX officer was subjectively aware. See Gant v. Campbell, 4

F. App’x 254, 256 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation for failure to

protect where the plaintiff expressed a general concern about his safety but did not identify

any particular gang members whom he feared).

The argument that Defendant(s) should have—but did not—realize that another

altercation might occur is, at best, negligence. And negligence does not state an Eighth

Amendment claim. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994) (“[A]n official’s

failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no

cause for commendation, cannot . . . be condemned as the infliction of punishment.”).

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient facts to render a failure-to-protect claim

plausible, and this claim will be DISMISSED.

b. Invalid/Illegal Sentence

Plaintiff also maintains that he should not be in TDOC custody, as he has been

falsely/illegally convicted. But Plaintiff cannot sustain a § 1983 action based on his

conviction or sentence unless he can first prove that his conviction or sentence has been

reversed or otherwise invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994);

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005) (holding a prisoner’s civil rights action “is

barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable

relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or

internal prison proceedings)–if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the

invalidity of confinement or its duration”).

Inasmuch as Plaintiff is currently incarcerated on the complained-of charges, it is

apparent that his convictions and sentences have not been set aside or invalidated.

Accordingly, this claim will be DISMISSED as frivolous. See Harris v. Truesdell, No.

03-1440, 2003 WL 22435646 (6th Cir. Oct.23, 2003) (affirming district court judgment

that Heck-barred claim fails to state a claim and is frivolous).

c. Loss of Personal Property

Plaintiff’s claim that some of his property “came up missing” is too vague and

conclusory to state a claim. But even if Plaintiff’s allegations were filled out with

additional factual detail, any potential remedy for Plaintiff would lie in state, not federal,

law. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment is not violated when a government employee deprives an

individual of property, provided that the state provides a post-deprivation remedy. Parratt

v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams,

474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (extending

Parratt’s holding to intentional deprivations of property). Tennessee law provides for the

recovery of personal property. See McQuiston v. Ward, No. 2001-201-COA-R3-CV, 2001

WL 839037, at * 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2001) (citing to Tenn. Code. Ann. § 29-30-

101 and § 29-30-201). Plaintiff has not pled that Tennessee’s procedures are inadequate

for addressing the alleged wrong, as is necessary to sustain his claim. See Vicory v. Walton,

721 F.2d 1062, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, this claim will be DISMISSED.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 5] is

GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00;

3. The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit

the filing fee to the Clerk in the manner set forth above;

4. Even with liberal construction, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim, and

this action will be DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A; and

5. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken

in good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules

of Appellate Procedure.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT ORDER WILL ENTER.

s/ Thomas A. Varlan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE