The opinion
Affirmed; Memorandum Opinion filed May 6, 2026.
In The
Fifteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 15-25-00079-CV
MISTY STRAUSS, Appellant
V.
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Appellee
On Appeal from the 12th District Court of Walker County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2330794
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Misty Strauss, an inmate with the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice (TDCJ), was injured during transport to substance-abuse treatment. She sued
the TDCJ, and the TDCJ filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court granted.
We conclude that Strauss’s injuries during transport were in connection with her
substance abuse treatment, making TDCJ immune from her negligence claim. Tex.
Gov’t Code § 497.096; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.20. We affirm the trial court’s
order granting TDCJ’s plea to the jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
The facts relevant to deciding this appeal are few. While TDCJ transported
Strauss between prison units, the transport vehicle was involved in an accident,
which caused Strauss injuries. TDCJ transported Strauss so she could participate in
its Substance Abuse Felony Punishment program, a drug abuse treatment program.
It is undisputed that was the sole reason for her transport between units.
Strauss sued TDCJ for negligence. TDCJ filed a plea to the jurisdiction
asserting sovereign immunity. After a hearing, the trial court granted TDCJ’s plea
and dismissed Strauss’s claim. Strauss then filed this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo
review. See Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855
(Tex. 2002). When considering a plea to the jurisdiction, our analysis begins with
the live pleadings. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012).
We first determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the
court's jurisdiction to hear the case. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). In doing so, we construe the pleadings liberally in
favor of the plaintiff, and unless challenged with evidence, we accept all allegations
as true. Id. at 226–27. The plea must be granted if the plaintiff's pleadings
affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction or if the defendant presents
undisputed evidence that negates the existence of the court's jurisdiction. Heckman,
369 S.W.3d at 150.
When a jurisdictional challenge implicates the merits of the plaintiff's cause
of action and the plea to the jurisdiction includes evidence, the trial court reviews
the relevant evidence to determine whether a fact issue exists. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
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at 227. In evaluating an evidentiary plea to the jurisdiction, the standard of review
“generally mirrors that of a summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
166a(c).” Id. at 228. The plaintiff bears the burden to allege facts that affirmatively
demonstrate the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just. v.
Rangel, 595 S.W.3d 198, 205 (Tex. 2020). The evidence is reviewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant to determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists. Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 552 (Tex. 2019). If
the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, the trial court
may not grant the plea, and the fact issue will be resolved at trial by the fact finder.
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28. “However, if the relevant evidence is undisputed
or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the
plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law.” Id. at 228.
A plaintiff may overcome a sovereign immunity defense if the plaintiff
demonstrates that the Legislature has clearly and unambiguously waived the
government's immunity by statute. See State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1,
17 (Tex. 2018). Without such a waiver, the trial court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to proceed, and the causes of action alleged against a state agency are
barred. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855. The trial court must dismiss the suit if the
plaintiff cannot satisfy the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the trial court's
subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the case by showing that the causes of
action asserted by the plaintiff fall within a statutory waiver of immunity. Rattray
v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. 2023).
ANALYSIS
The parties agree our decision in this case is controlled by two statutes that
outline the scope of TDCJ’s immunity in this case and the Texas Supreme Court’s
interpretation of those statutes in Tarrant County v. Bonner, 574 S.W.3d 893 (Tex.
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2019). We will begin by outlining the statutory framework governing immunity in
this case, and the Texas Supreme Court’s interpretation of those statutes. We will
then apply that interpretation to the facts before us.
Strauss sued TDCJ for negligence under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.025. The Act creates liability and therefore waives
immunity for certain specific tort claims. State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 283
(Tex. 2006). When a statute waives immunity from suit “to the extent of liability,”
like the Act does, various immunities from liability are merged with immunity from
suit. Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Tex. 2022).
The Act creates liability for personal injury caused by the negligence of a state
employee acting within the scope of his employment if: (1) such injury arises from
the operation or use of a motor vehicle; and (2) the employee would be personally
liable to the claimant under Texas law. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021(1).
The government is liable only if the employee would be liable under Texas law. Id.
§ 101.021(1)(B). This analysis includes application of any immunities the employee
might have. Bonner, 574 S.W.3d at 896.
Two statutory provisions of immunity are relevant here. The first is in the
Government Code and provides that:
An employee of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
. . . is not liable for damages arising from an act or failure
to act in connection with community service performed by
an inmate imprisoned in a facility operated by the
department or in connection with an inmate or
offender programmatic or nonprogrammatic activity,
including work, community service, educational, and
treatment activities, if the act or failure to act was not
intentional, willfully or wantonly negligent, or
performed with conscious indifference or reckless
disregard for the safety of others.
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Tex. Gov’t Code § 497.096. The Code of Criminal Procedure contains a similar
provision:
(a) An individual listed in Subsection (c) of this article and
the governmental entity that the individual serves as an
officer or employee are not liable for damages arising from
an act or failure to act by the individual or governmental
entity . . . in connection with an inmate, offender, or
releasee programmatic or nonprogrammatic activity,
including work, educational, and treatment activities, if
the act or failure to act:
(1) was performed pursuant to a court order or was
otherwise performed in an official capacity; and
(2) was not performed with conscious indifference to the
safety of others.
(b) Chapter 101 Civil Practice and Remedies Code, does
not apply to a claim based on an act or a failure to act of
an individual listed in Subsection (c) of this article or a
governmental entity the officer serves as an officer or
employee if the act or failure to act is in connection with a
program described by Subsection (a) of this article.
(c) This article applies to:
...
(5) an officer or employee of a state agency[.]
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.20(a)–(c). A summary of these provisions, as relevant
here, is that an employee of a state agency is not liable for damages to an inmate “in
connection with” “programmatic or nonprogrammatic activity, including work,
educational, or treatment activities” absent proof of gross negligence. See Bonner,
574 S.W.3d at 897.
The parties do not dispute that Strauss was an inmate and that the sole purpose
of her transportation between units was for her substance abuse treatment. As a
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result, the sole issue in this appeal is whether transporting Strauss from one unit to
another so that she could receive such treatment was “in connection with” her
“treatment activities.” In deciding the meaning of “in connection with” and whether
it includes the facts alleged here, we must keep in mind that in construing any statute
that waives immunity, we must strictly construe it in a manner that favors retention
of immunity. Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 513 (Tex. 2012).
The Texas Supreme Court has considered the scope of the phrase “in
connection with” in these immunity statutes. In Bonner, the Texas Supreme Court
was confronted with a situation in which an inmate, Bonner, was injured when his
chair collapsed while receiving treatment for diabetes. 574 S.W.3d at 894. The chair
had previously broken, and instead of discarding it, corrections officials placed it in
the multipurpose room often used by the jail to treat diabetic inmates, including
Bonner. Id. at 895. Bonner sued for his injuries.
The court in Bonner analyzed the immunity statutes quoted above and noted
that in past decisions, it had construed the phrase “in connection with” broadly. Id.
at 897–98 (citing ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 899–901
(Tex. 2017) (per curiam) and Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tex.
2015) (per curiam)). Consistent with its broad interpretation of the phrase, the court
ultimately concluded that because the County’s negligent acts intersected with
Bonner’s medical treatment, they were “in connection with” each other. Id. at 899.
“The two statutes immunize negligent acts and omissions that are reasonably related
to the covered programs or activities, even when the relationship is indirect.” Id. at
900.
The basis of Strauss’s contrary, narrow interpretation of Bonner is the next
sentence of that opinion, which states that “[a]s a practical matter, this includes acts
or omissions which give rise to damages during covered programs or activities.” Id.
Strauss contends this sentence limits the scope of Bonner to injuries occurring during
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a particular activity. We disagree. This sentence does not limit the Bonner opinion
in any way; it merely points out the obvious—that if an indirect relationship is all
that is required to be “in connection with” an activity, then it also follows that a
direct relationship would qualify. Strauss’s interpretation requires us to ignore the
remainder of the Bonner opinion, which we refuse to do.
Further bolstering our interpretation of Bonner and the relevant statutes is the
Bonner court’s citation of a case involving application of these statutes to
transportation of an inmate. Id. (citing Moncada v. Brown, 202 S.W.3d 794, 799–
800 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.). In Moncada, inmates were taken to a
field to trim trees and clear brush. 202 S.W.3d at 796. The inmates rode to the field
in a flatbed trailer behind a truck. Id. at 796–97. When the truck hit a pothole or a
bump, the trailer disconnected, and the inmates were injured. Id. at 797. Although
Strauss correctly points out that the court in Moncada assumed immunity applied
because transport was “in connection with” the inmates’ work and then proceeded
to decide whether there was evidence of gross negligence, id. at 802, the fact remains
that the Texas Supreme Court cited the decision with approval as part of its analysis
in Bonner. 574 S.W.3d at 900 (citing Moncada directly after the sentence relied
upon by Strauss, above). And, for Moncada to have been correctly decided, the
transportation of the inmates must have been considered “in connection with” the
work the inmates were to perform in the field even though it was not directly related
to such work; otherwise, the analysis would not have been limited to gross
negligence.
Turning to the present case and applying the reasoning of Bonner, Strauss’s
injuries intersected with her treatment for substance abuse. Again, it is undisputed
that the sole reason for her transport is so that she could receive treatment for her
substance abuse. Her transportation and resulting injuries were reasonably related
to her treatment, even if that relationship is indirect. With that in mind, the trial court
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correctly concluded that TDCJ had immunity from Strauss’s claim for negligence.
And, Strauss does not contend that she presented sufficient evidence of gross
negligence to overcome immunity.
CONCLUSION
Under these circumstances, we affirm the trial court’s order granting TDCJ’s
plea to the jurisdiction.
/s/Scott K. Field
Scott K. Field
Justice
Before Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris.
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