Obamedo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

URBANA DIVISION

MARLO L. OBAMEDO, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 26-2071

)

DUNCAN et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 6)

filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff Marlo Obanedo, an inmate at Decatur

Correctional Center (“Decatur”). Plaintiff has also filed Motions for Counsel (Doc. 4, 8).

I. Complaint

A. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient

claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if

it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. Upon

reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, construing

them liberally in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).

However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be

provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States,

721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff alleges constitutional violations against the following individuals: Dr.

Duncan, Houser, Internal Affairs Officer Sleet, former Decatur Warden Thompson, and

Cook County Jail (“Jail”) Superintendent Botai.

Plaintiff asserts that she has been at Decatur for ten months, and aside from

receiving an X-ray, Dr. Duncan has only prescribed Tylenol and Voltaren, a nonsteroidal

anti-inflammatory drug, for her hip and knee, adding that the left side is “dead.” (Pl.

Amend. Compl., Doc. 6 at 6.)

Plaintiff also asserts that on an unidentified date, Defendant Sleet conducted a

compliance shakedown of her cell and confiscated an envelope of photos that Plaintiff

asserts she purchased. Plaintiff claims that although Defendant Houser provided her a

lock for her property box, Houser did not provide a key for the lock. However, Plaintiff

acknowledges that the combination lock on her property box does work. Plaintiff also

asserts that Defendant Thompson has not addressed any of her grievances and that

Decatur does not have a grievance officer on staff. Plaintiff alleges harassment claims

against Defendant Botai while detained at the Jail.

C. Analysis

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 6) is granted.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to docket Plaintiff’s amended pleading (Doc. 6 at 1-9.)

“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and

unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates ‘deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs of prisoners.’” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on a claim of deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must satisfy a test that contains both an

objective and subjective component. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996).

Under the objective component, a plaintiff must demonstrate that her medical

condition is sufficiently severe. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the

subjective component, the prison official must have acted with a “sufficiently culpable

state of mind.” Id. Thus, a plaintiff can establish deliberate indifference by showing that

a defendant “knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.”

Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005).

“A medical professional acting in his professional capacity may be held to have

displayed deliberate indifference only if the decision by the professional is such a

substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to

demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a

judgment.” Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d

886, 895 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs claim against Defendant Duncan. However,

Plaintiff does not state a claim against the remaining identified Defendants.

The unauthorized—negligent or intentional—loss, confiscation, or destruction of

a prisoner’s personal property does not violate due process where state law provides a

meaningful post-deprivation remedy. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).

In Illinois, a prisoner has an adequate remedy available to him in the Illinois Court

of Claims. See Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Sorrentino v.

Godinez, 777 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The Illinois Court of Claims has exclusive

jurisdiction over suits asserting damages to property.”); Court of Claims Act, 705 ILCS

505/8(d) (limiting damages against the State for tort claims and vesting the Court of

Claims with exclusive jurisdiction); Davenport v. City of Chicago, 653 F. Supp. 2d 885, 891

(N.D. Ill. 2009) (“Pursuant to state law, [arrestee] may file a tort claim in the Illinois Court

of Claims for her property losses.”). Therefore, any allegations regarding the

unauthorized confiscation of personal property alleged against Defendant Sleet must be

raised in the Illinois Court of Claims.

Plaintiff also does not state a claim against Defendant Thompson for her alleged

failure to address Plaintiff’s grievances. “Only persons who cause or participate in

[constitutional] violations are responsible.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir.

2007). “[T]he mishandling of [an inmate’s] ‘grievances by persons who otherwise did not

cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.’” Owens v. Godinez, 860

F.3d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953–54 (7th Cir.

2011)); see also Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he failure to follow a

state’s inmate grievance procedures is not a federal due-process violation.”).

Additionally, Plaintiff does not assert, and the Court’s legal research does not

identify a controlling case establishing Plaintiff’s freestanding constitutional right to a

key lock for a property box. Thus, Plaintiff does not state a claim against Defendant

Houser.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) guides the proper venue for federal civil rights actions

filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As provided, § 1983 suits may be brought only in (1) the

judicial district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same State, (2)

a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the

claim occurred, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found if there is

no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. 28 U.S.C § 1391(b).

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Botai during Plaintiff’s detention in the

Jail, which lies within Cook County, Illinois, must be filed in the Northern District of

Illinois. See 28 U.S.C. 93(a) (listing the Illinois counties that comprise the Northern District

of Illinois).

The Court also notes that Plaintiff identified Defendants Millican and Tate in her

initial pleading but does not mention them in her amended pleading. Thus, Millican and

Tate are dismissed as parties. See Carver v. Condie, 169 F.3d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Once

the amended complaint was filed . . . it became the governing document in the case and

any allegations . . . not brought forward fell by the wayside.”).

II. Counsel

Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel, and the Court cannot require an

attorney to accept pro bono appointments in civil cases. The most the Court can do is ask

for volunteer counsel. See Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992)

(holding that although indigent civil litigants have no constitutional right to counsel, a

district court may, in its discretion, request counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in

certain circumstances). In considering Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the Court must ask

two questions: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel

or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case,

does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654

(7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff’s Motions for Counsel (Doc. 4, 8) are denied because she has not satisfied

her threshold burden of demonstrating that she has attempted to hire counsel, which

typically requires writing to several lawyers and attaching the responses received.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 6) is GRANTED.

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to docket Plaintiff’s amended pleading.

2) Plaintiff’s Motions for Counsel (Docs. 4, 8) are DENIED with leave to renew.

3) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A, Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs claim against Defendant Duncan. Plaintiff’s claim proceeds in

Duncan’s individual capacity only. Additional claims shall not be included in the

case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown

or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

4) The Court directs the Clerk of the Court (“Clerk”) to terminate Botai, Houser,

Millican, Sleet, Tate, and Thompson as parties.

5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until

counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to give Defendant

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as

premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless

otherwise directed by the Court.

6) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing Defendant a waiver of

service. Defendant has sixty days from service to file an Answer. If Defendant has

not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within ninety days of the entry of

this order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After

Defendant has been served, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and

dispositive motion deadlines.

7) If Defendant no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for

whom Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk said

Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant’s forwarding

address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and

shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

8) Defendant shall file an Answer within sixty days of the date the Clerk sends the

waiver. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all

defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent

pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this order. In general, an

answer sets forth Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of

those positions unless and until Defendant files a motion. Therefore, no response

to the answer is necessary or will be considered.

9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant’s counsel

has filed an appearance, Defendant’s counsel will automatically receive electronic

notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does

not need to mail copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed

with the Clerk to Defendant’s counsel. However, this does not apply to discovery

requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed with the

Clerk of the Court. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses

directly to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk

will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to

compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s counsel has filed an

appearance, and the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the

discovery process in more detail.

10) The Court grants Defendant’s counsel leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of

confinement. Defendant’s counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.

11) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his

mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a

change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit,

with prejudice.

12) If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within thirty

days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal

service through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and will require that

Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(d)(2).

13) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order under

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

14) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendant under the standard

procedures.

ENTERED May 8, 2026.

s/ Colleen R. Lawless

____________________________________

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE