Vodi

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Smith Kwame Oliver Vodi, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Civil No. 8:24-02879-CDA

University of Maryland – Dept. of *

Transportation Services, et al.,

*

Defendants.

*

* * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BEFORE THE COURT is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants, University of

Maryland—Department of Transportation Services, Brandon Christopher Harrison-

Difranco, Jay Rossello, and Frank Richard Taitano, asserting both lack of jurisdiction and

failure to state a claim. ECF 27. The Court has reviewed all papers, and no hearing is

necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the following reasons, Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff Smith Kwame Oliver Vodi (“Plaintiff” or “Vodi”) brought this suit against

his former employer, University of Maryland Department of Transportation Services and

several of its employees in their individual capacities (collectively “Defendants”).

Complaint, ECF 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff alleges that he is a Christian Ghanian-American

1 For the purpose of deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-

pleaded facts in the complaint and construes such facts, as well as reasonable inferences

drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See, e.g., Harvey

v. Cable News Network, Inc., 48 F.4th 257, 268 (4th Cir. 2022).

who began working for the University of Maryland Department of Transportation

Services as “Special Event Staff” on July 30, 2023.2 Compl., at 5; First Supplement to

Complaint, ECF 4 (“EEOC Supp.”), at 1. He contends that during his employment, his

supervisors, Brandon Harrison-DeFranco and Frank Taitano, “discriminated, harassed,

retaliated, and defamed against [him.]” Compl., at 7. Plaintiff also claims that his

supervisors overburdened him with work, refused to allow him overtime pay, were

“[c]onfrontational and aggressive[,]” gave him “false evaluations[,]” and put him to work

in “isolation [because of his] [r]eligion, [n]ational origin, etc.” Id.; EEOC Supp., at 1.

Plaintiff further alleges that he was subjected to verbal abuse and “forced [] to perform

tasks beyond the scope of [his] job description, such as cleaning the cage and picking up

trash.” Id., at 2. When he attempted to address these issues with human resources

personnel, his concerns were ignored and he was “unjustly suspended on April 30, 2024,

May 22-24 without pay, and upon [his] return from a three-day suspension on May 28,

2024, [he] was [terminated].” Id. He was told the reason for his suspension was for “not

following supervisors’ directives” and his discharge was “for not adhering to suspension

mandates.” Id. He asserts that this reason is “nothing but hate” and that “the worst”

started when he “reached out to HR that [he] graduated and [informed them that] they

should update his employment record with [his] degree.” Id.

On October 3, 2024, acting pro se, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, alleging violations of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967 (“ADEA”), and the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). Compl., at 4.

2 Plaintiff notes in his first supplement to the complaint that his termination incorrectly

classified him as “a Parking Enforcement Associate[,]” though he was hired as Special

Events Staff. ECF 4, at 1. This appears to be the basis of his claim under the False Claims

Act, discussed infra.

On October 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed his first “supplement” to the complaint, which appears

to be his “Amended Charge of Discrimination” filed with the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and Prince George’s County Office of

Human Rights. EEOC Supp., at 1. This filing also includes Plaintiff’s EEOC notice of his

right to sue. ECF 4-1, at 1. On March 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a second “supplement” to

his complaint, which adds a new party and cause of action. ECF 16 (“Amend. Compl.”).3

In this filing, Plaintiff added Jay Rosello, University of Maryland Vice President for Legal

Affairs and General Counsel, as a defendant, and a claim under the False Claims Act

(“FCA”) for “discharging an employee from where he never worked.” Amend. Compl. at

5.

On June 13, 2025, Defendants filed the pending Motion to Dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. ECF 27 (“MTD”). Plaintiff filed an opposition on

July 30, 2025. ECF 35 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”). Defendants replied on August 20, 2025. ECF 39

(“MTD Reply”). Although not typically permitted by either the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure or the Local Rules, Plaintiff filed a second opposition to the Defendants’

Motion on September 16, 2025.4 ECF 43 (“Pl.’s Surreply”).

3 Although filed as a “supplement,” Defendants’ Motion treats this filing as an amended

complaint and does not contest its timeliness. ECF 27, at 2.

4 On September 2, 2025, the Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part,

Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time to respond to Defendant’s reply to its Motion to

Dismiss. ECF 42; ECF 40. The Court, “[a]ffording Plaintiff the liberal construction

applied to pro se filings, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), [interpreted] this

filing as a request to file a surreply brief[.]” ECF 42, at 1. Though surreplies are

disfavored, the Court exercised it discretion and allowed Plaintiff to file a surreply to the

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Id., at 2-3.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

a. Rule 12(b)(1) Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of claims or suits

where the Court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss under this

rule “challenges a court’s authority to hear the matter brought by a complaint.”

Medigrow, LLC v. Natalie M. LaPrade Med. Cannabis Comm’n, 487 F. Supp. 3d 364, 370

(D. Md. 2020) (citation omitted). Where a defendant has sovereign immunity, the court

“must dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Cunningham v. Gen.

Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., 888 F.3d 640, 649 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any

time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Where

a defendant challenges subject matter jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds, the

plaintiff must demonstrate “an unequivocal waiver of immunity.” Davis v. Thompson,

367 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799 (D. Md. 2005) (quoting Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299,

304 (4th Cir. 1995)).

b. Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal is appropriate where the

complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts “accept all factual

allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”

Washington v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Columbia, 58 F.4th 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2023)

(citing Singer v. Reali, 883 F.3d 425, 437 (4th Cir. 2018)). “To survive a motion to

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). “The complaint must offer ‘more than labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]’” Swaso v. Onslow Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,

698 F. App’x 745, 747 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). At the same

time, a “complaint will not be dismissed as long as [it] provides sufficient detail about [the

plaintiff’s] claim to show that [the plaintiff] has more-than-conceivable chance of success

on the merits.” Owens v. Balt. City State’s Att’ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 396 (4th Cir. 2014).

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court

generally does not consider evidence outside the complaint. However, the court may

consider “documents integral to and relied upon in the complaint . . . so long as the

plaintiff does not question their authenticity.” Fairfax v. CBS Corp., 2 F.4th 286, 292

(4th Cir. 2021); see also Wongus v. The Benedictine School for Exceptional Children, Inc.,

No. JRR-24-03635, 2026 WL 795597, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2026). An integral

document is one “that by its very existence, and not the mere information it contains,

gives rise to the legal rights asserted.” Corrigan v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, No. ELH-24-

03497, 2026 WL 73800, *9 (D. Md. Jan. 9, 2026) (quoting Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.

v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 794 F. Supp. 2d 602, 611 (D. Md. 2011)). “In

employment discrimination cases, courts often take judicial notice of EEOC charges and

EEOC decisions.” Id. (citation omitted). “‘[I]n the event of [a] conflict between the bare

allegations of the complaint and any exhibit attached . . . the exhibit prevails.’” Goines v.

Valley Community Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Fayetteville

Inv’rs v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991)).

III. ANALYSIS

In their motion, Defendants assert that Vodi’s complaint must be dismissed

because (1) the FCA does not apply to state agencies or authorize claims by pro se litigants;

(2) state sovereign immunity bars the ADEA and ADA discrimination claims; (3) Vodi

failed to exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing the ADA claim; (4) Vodi fails

to state retaliation and employment discrimination claims under Title VII; and (5) the

claims against individual defendants are not permitted under Title VII, the ADEA, and

the ADA, and, to the extent the individuals are named in their official capacities, are

redundant of the claims against the University. MTD, at 2.

Two preliminary matters guide the Court’s analysis of these contentions and Vodi’s

opposition to the same. First, the Court is mindful that pro se filings “must be construed

. . . so as to do substantial justice” and are held to less stringent standards than filings

drafted by trained lawyers. Elijah v. Dunbar, 66 F.4th 454, 460 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal

quotation omitted). “In practice, this liberal construction allows courts to recognize

claims despite various formal deficiencies, such as incorrect labels or lack of cited legal

authority.” Wall v. Rasnick, 42 F.4th 214, 218 (4th Cir. 2022). “Such liberal construction,

however, does not absolve Plaintiff from pleading a plausible claim, and this court ‘may

not act as an advocate for a self-represented litigant’” by ‘conjur[ing] up” issues not

presented.” Williams v. EEOC Baltimore Field Office, et al., No. JRR-25-0205, 2026 WL

656938, *3 (D. Md. Mar. 9, 2026) (quoting Desgraviers v. PF-Frederick, LLC, 501 F.

Supp. 3d 348, 351 (D. Md. 2020)) (alteration in original).

Second is the matter of what allegations or documents the Court considers to

constitute the pleadings and proper allegations. Courts generally do not consider

evidence outside of the operative complaint, unless documents outside the complaint are

“integral and authentic,” such as EEOC charges attached to employment discrimination

lawsuits. See Wongus, 2026 WL 795597 at *3 (citing Fairfax, 2 F.4th at 292, and then

citing Chesapeake Bay Found., 794 F. Supp. at 611); Corrigan, 2026 WL 73800, at *10.

Guided by these observations and the regular practice in this District, the Court will

consider Plaintiff’s EEOC Supplement filed at docket entry 4. The Court also construes

the second supplement, ECF 16, as an amended complaint for the purposes of this Motion

to Dismiss. The Court notes that Defendants treat the filing similarly, and such

construction is appropriate considering that it does two things commonly accomplished

by amended pleadings: adding a new party (in this instance, a new defendant) and a new

cause of action. However, the Court does not consider the thirty-three exhibits attached

to the Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or any facts alleged for the

first time in his opposition. See S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v.

OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 184 (4th Cir. 2013) (“It is well-established

that parties cannot amend their complaints through briefing or oral advocacy.”); Wongus,

2026 WL 795597 at *3 (declining to consider “exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s opposition”

because they “are not integral to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint”); Smith v. Mr. Cooper

Grp. Mortg., No. PJM-23-3008, 2024 WL 1179075 at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 19, 2024)

(“Deficiencies in a pleading cannot be cured by identifying new facts or making new

allegations in an opposition to a motion to dismiss.”). Any allegation that does not appear

in the original or amended complaint or the EEOC Supplement does not factor in the

Court’s analysis in resolving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.5

5 Vodi’s Opposition references Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and suggests his

attachment of exhibits relates to that standard. See MTD Opp’n at 8. Of course, that Rule

governs summary judgment, which is not the current posture; Defendants’ Motion

invokes only Rule 12, not Rule 56.

a. The False Claims Act cause of action is dismissed because

Plaintiff, being self-represented, cannot bring this claim.

First, Defendants argue that Vodi’s FCA claim must be dismissed because (1) the

FCA does not apply to state agencies; (2) a pro se plaintiff cannot bring a claim under the

Act; and (3) Vodi has otherwise failed to comply with the FCA. MTD, at 5. Vodi’s response

focuses on a pro se litigant’s ability to pursue claims under Title VII before stating that he

brings an FCA claim because “defendants’ claim is false” and the University of Maryland

is a government institution. Pl.’s Opp’n, at 9-11; Pl.’s Surreply, at 7. The Court agrees

with Defendants and dismisses the claim under the False Claims Act because Vodi, as a

pro se litigant, cannot bring an action under the statute and in his own name.

The False Claims Act “prohibits any person from making false or fraudulent claims

for payment to the United States.” 31 U.S.C. §3729(a). Under the FCA, “private

individuals may bring qui tam actions in the Government’s name for § 3729 violations.”

Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 545 US 409, 411

(2005); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). The private individual, however, cannot be self-

represented in a qui tam action under the FCA. Wojcicki v. SCANA/SCE&G, 947 F.3d

240, 244-45 (4th Cir. 2020); Downey v. U.S.A., No. PX-19-1872, 2019 WL 2921788, *2

(D. Md. Jul. 8, 2019), aff’d sub nom. Downey v. United States, 780 F. App’x 54 (4th Cir.

2019). This is because, in a qui tam action, “the United States is the real party in interest,

and the need for adequate legal representation of the United States counsel against

permitting pro se suits.” Wojcicki, 947 F.3d at 245 (quoting U.S. ex rel. Brooks v.

Lockheed Martin Corp., 237 F. App’x 802, 803 (4th Cir. 2007)); see also United States ex

rel. Doe v. Credit Suisse AG, 117 F.4th 155, 158 n.1 (4th Cir. 2024) (“The term derives from

the Latin phrase, qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which

translates to ‘who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.’” (quoting qui tam

action, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)). Accordingly, Vodi, as a pro se plaintiff,

may not pursue a False Claims Act suit. Thus, FCA claim is dismissed.6

b. Sovereign immunity bars the discrimination and retaliation

claims under the ADEA and ADA.

Defendants contend that Vodi’s claims against the University of Maryland

Department of Transportation Services and the individual defendants in their official

capacities are barred by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the

Constitution. MTD, at 6, 12. The Court agrees.

“The Eleventh Amendment embodies the principle of sovereign immunity and

prohibits suit by private parties against states in federal courts unless a state has waived

its immunity.” Weller v. Dept of Soc. Servs. for City of Balt., 901 F.2d 387, 397 (4th Cir.

1990); see also Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (“The

ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be

sued by private individuals in federal court.”). “The doctrine of sovereign immunity is

firmly embedded in Maryland law, long recognized as applicable in actions—contract,

tort, or otherwise—against the State of Maryland, its officers, and its units.” Magnetti v.

Univ. of Md., 402 Md. 548, 556 (Md. 2007). “It is well established that the University is

considered to be an arm of the State Government for the purposes of the sovereign

immunity doctrine.” Magnetti, 402 Md. at 557; see also Md. Code, Educ. § 12-102(a).

Congress, however, “may abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity

when it both unequivocally intends to do so and acts pursuant to a valid grant of

6 Finding dismissal required by binding precedent due to Vodi’s pro se status, the Court

does not address Defendants’ arguments regarding the FCA’s application to state agencies

or whether Vodi’s factual allegations survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny.

constitutional authority. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363. But it has not done so in the ADEA or

the ADA. See Altevogt v. Kirwan, No. WDQ-11-1061, 2012 WL 135283, *4 (D. Md. Jan.

13, 2012) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) and Kimel v.

Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 79 (2000)). And the State of Maryland has not waived its

immunity from suits in federal court, generally, or from claims arising under the ADEA

or ADA. Id. (citing Dixon v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, 345 F.Supp. 2d 512, 513 (D. Md.

2003)); see also McCray v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2014). Thus,

there being no waiver of sovereign immunity, Vodi’s ADEA7 and ADA claims against the

University and the individual defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed.8

McCray, 741 F.3d at 483.

c. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for Title VII employment

discrimination but clears the bar for a retaliation claim.

Plaintiff alleges that he was subject to discrimination, retaliation, and harassment

by his supervisors on the basis of his race, national origin, age, disability, and religion in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Pl.’s Opp’n, at 1, 17; MTD, at 1. Defendants

argue that Vodi’s discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII should be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. MTD, at 9. The

7 Because the claim is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court declines

to reach Defendants’ additional argument that the ADEA claim should be dismissed for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See MTD, at 8-9.

8 While this opinion finds Vodi’s ADEA and ADA claims barred in federal court, it takes

no position on whether he may have a claim in Maryland state court under Maryland law.

See Laney v. Morgan State Univ., No. CCB-04-1719, 2005 WL 1563437, at *3 (D. Md.

June 30, 2005); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 (“Our decision today does not signal the end of the

line for employees who find themselves subject to age discrimination at the hands of their

state employers. We hold only that in terms to the ADEA, Congress did not validly

abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity to suits by private individuals.”).

Court agrees in part, will grant the Motion as to the Title VII discrimination claim, and

will deny the Motion as to the Title VII retaliation claim.

i. Plaintiff fails to state a Title VII discrimination claim.

Defendants argue that Vodi does not plausibly allege facts to suggest that that any

allegedly discriminatory employment action was related to his race, religion, or national

origin, nor does he identify any similarly situated co-workers whose treatment would

“give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” MTD, at 9-10. The essence of

Plaintiff’s response falls beyond the bounds of what the Court can consider. Plaintiff

contends that he has included evidence—in the form of 33 attached exhibits—supporting

his discrimination claim and, in his opposition brief, names two co-workers who he

alleges received more favorable treatment from his supervisors. Pl.’s Opp’n, at 18.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “prohibits an employer, inter alia, from

discriminating against ‘any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin.’” Angelini v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 464 F. Supp. 3d 756, 776 (D. Md.

2020) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). “Absent direct evidence,” a prima facie Title VII

discrimination claim contains four elements: “(1) membership in a protected class; (2)

satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment

from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.” Coleman v. Md. Ct. of

Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals of

Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012). Though a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case at the

motion to dismiss stage, a “reference to the elements of a claim is helpful to assess

whether the plaintiff has stated a plausible claim.” Allgaier v. Microbiologics, Inc., No.

ELH-22-01900, 2023 WL 2837336, at *8 (D. Md. Apr. 7, 2023) (citations omitted).

Defendants argue that Vodi fails to allege sufficient facts to support the last two

elements of a prima facie discrimination case.9 MTD, at 9-10. Defendants aver that Vodi

lacks facts connecting any alleged adverse treatment to his race, religion, or national

origin, MTD at 9, and fails to sufficiently identify similarly situated comparators outside

his protected classes, the favorable treatment of whom would permit an inference of

unlawful disparate treatment, id., at 10.

The Court agrees with the Defendants, finding an absence of allegations connecting

the alleged disparate treatment to any protected classes. “A plaintiff is not required to

identify a similarly situated [] comparator to prove [his] discrimination claim, so long as

[he] can establish an inference of unlawful discrimination through other means.” Swaso,

698 F. App’x at 748 (citing Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs., Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 545-45

(4th Cir. 2003)). We “may infer discriminatory intent from evidence of a general pattern

of racial discrimination in the practices of a defendant.” Id. (quoting Woods v. City of

Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 649 (4th Cir. 2017)). Here, Vodi does not rely on comparator

evidence or a general pattern of alleged discriminatory practices by the Defendants.

Rather, the pleadings and EEOC supplement contain only conclusory statements alleging

that he was harassed, discriminated against, and retaliated against without any mention

of how his race, national origin, or religion related to those actions. His opposition and

attachments—which include allegations regarding his membership in a protected class

9 By asserting that he is a Christian Ghanian-American, Vodi invokes membership in three

potential protected classes based on race, national origin, and religion. Compl. at 5.

Defendants do not contest that these classes have been sufficiently alleged and are

protected for purposes of Title VII. Plaintiff does not offer much on whether his work

performance was satisfactory but notes that he “worked diligently” despite the alleged

grievances. Id. at 7. While there is no other mention of satisfactory job performance in

the pleadings or EEOC charges, Defendants do not challenge the existence of this element.

and certain comparators—cannot cure the deficiencies in his pleadings, even if the

opposition and attachments provide more information about potential comparators. See

Smith, 2024 WL 1179075, at *3. Thus, the Title VII discrimination count is dismissed for

failure to state a claim.

ii. Based on the standards governing the pro se pleadings at this stage,

Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a Title VII retaliation claim.

Turning to the Title VII retaliation claim, Defendants argue that Vodi fails to state

a claim because his complaints “lack any allegation that [Plaintiff] engaged in any Title

VII-protected activity[.]” MTD, at 11. Instead, Defendants aver that Plaintiff only

complained about his workload to his supervisors, not about any unlawful discriminatory

actions, thus his complaints were not a protected activity. Id. As with his other Title VII

claim, Plaintiff responds that he attached exhibits to his opposition supporting his claim

of retaliation. Pl.’s Opp’n, at 20. While Vodi’s opposition and its exhibits cannot patch

any alleged deficiencies, the EEOC Supplement can.

Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful “for an employer to

discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made

an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge,

testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or

hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. The Fourth Circuit recognizes that a

Title VII plaintiff “may prove a Title VII retaliation claim either through direct evidence

of retaliatory animus or via the application of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework.” Roberts v. Glenn Indus. Grp., Inc., 998 F.3d 111, 122 (4th Cir. 2021). To

establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the familiar McDonnell Douglas

framework, a plaintiff must prove that he: (1) was engaged in a protected activity, (2) that

an adverse employment action was taken against him, and (3) that there was a causal link

between his protected activity and the employer’s adverse action. Id.

Defendants contest that Vodi lacks facts supporting any of the three retaliation

elements. MTD, at 10-11. They argue that Vodi’s complaints to his supervisors were about

his workload, not about unlawful discriminatory actions, and thus they were not protected

activity. MTD, at 11 (citing Compl. at 6). While Defendants are correct that the complaint

refers to only his workload, they overlook Plaintiff’s allegations in his EEOC charge, which

is appropriate to consider at this stage. E.g., Wongus, 2026 WL 795597, at *3. In his

EEOC Supplement, Plaintiff alleges that he faced harassment, verbal abuse, and was

forced to perform tasks beyond his job description. EEOC Supp., at 1-2. Plaintiff then

contends that after he attempted to address this treatment verbally and through e-mail

with Colleen Thompson, Assistant Director of Human Resources, he was suspended and

later terminated. Id. at 2.

In evaluating the sufficiency of the claims, the Court accepts the factual allegations

in the complaint and integral documents, such as the EEOC Supplement, as true and

construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. At this early stage of litigation,

the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged a protected activity (reporting alleged

harassment to human resources) and an adverse employment action (suspension and

termination after making such reports). Though Plaintiff has neither detailed his

interactions with Ms. Thompson nor definitively connected the complaints to his

termination, at this stage, a plaintiff does not bear a heavy burden to sufficiently allege

causation. See Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 335 (4th Cir. 2018) (“As this

Court has held, establishing a ‘causal relationship’ at the prima facie stage is not an

onerous burden. Purported victims of retaliation do not have to show at the prima facie

stage that their protected activities were but-for causes of the adverse action.” (citations

omitted)). “[T]emporal proximity is sufficient to establish a causal connection at the

prima facie stage.” Id. at 336-37. While Vodi’s EEOC charge does not indicate the date

of the alleged complaints to human resources, it reflects his employment for a nine-month

period and alleges suspension and termination within six months of several alleged

discriminatory or retaliatory acts. EEOC Supp. at 1-2. Upon affording the complaint the

liberal reading required for pro se pleadings and inferring that complaints to human

resources occurred after at least some of the suspected harassment, the Court finds the

totality of allegations sufficient to allege causation at the motion to dismiss stage. Cf.

Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 1994) (five-month gap between protected

activity and adverse action was sufficient to establish prima facie case). Of course,

discovery demands and burdens at later stages of this case will require more than is

currently before the Court. But because of the principles governing the motion to dismiss

analysis of a pro se pleading, Defendants’ Motion is denied insofar as it involves

retaliation after Plaintiff’s complaints to Ms. Thompson.

d. Any remaining claims against the individual defendants are

dismissed as either unavailable or duplicative.

As noted above, Vodi brings claims under the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII against

Brandon Harrison-DiFranco, Frank Taitano, and Jay Rosello. Compl., at 1; Amended

Compl., at 4. The Court already concluded that these same claims as alleged against the

University of Maryland are barred by sovereign immunity. As the claims pertain to the

individuals, Defendants argue that the claims are not permitted against these employees

and, in any event, any claims against them in their official capacities are duplicative of the

claims against the University. The Court agrees.

The ADA, ADEA, and Title VII statutes “do not provide for causes of action against

defendants in their individual capacities.” Jones v. Sternheimer, 387 F. App’x 366, 368

(4th Cir. 2010); see also Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 472 (4th Cir. 1999)

(collecting cases holding “that Title VII does not provide a remedy against individual

defendants who do not qualify as ‘employers’”); Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30

F.3d 507, 511 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that the “ADEA limits civil liability to the employer”

not allowing liability to extend to an individual employee.). Consistent with this

longstanding principle, numerous decisions of this Court dismiss ADA, ADEA, and Title

VII claims brought against employees in their individual capacity. E.g., Bell v. Medline,

No. GLR-24-3368, 2025 WL 934275, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2025); Scott v. Walmart Inc.,

No. LKG-23-2228, 2025 WL 359059, at *9 (D. Md. Jan. 30, 2025); Davis v. Md. Parole

Comm’n, No. ELH-21-3164, 2022 WL 17833422, at *10 (D. Md. Dec. 21, 2022). That

approach continues here, and Vodi’s ADA, ADEA, and Title VII claims against individual

employees in their individual capacity are dismissed.

As an alternative ground, Defendants contend that any claims against the

individuals in their official capacities are duplicative of the (barred) claims against the

University and thus should be dismissed. Plaintiff does not address this argument. “A

suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but

rather is a suit against the official’s office, and as such, it is no different from a suit against

the State itself.” Innes v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Md., 29 F. Supp. 3d 566, 575 (D.

Md. 2014) (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 71) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)

(emphasis in original); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“As long

as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-

capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”);

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978) (noting that

official capacity lawsuits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action

against an entity of which an officer is an agent”). A lawsuit against the individuals in

their official capacities is in essence a lawsuit against the University of Maryland; for the

purposes of this lawsuit, the individuals and the University are one and the same.

Therefore, permitting Vodi to proceed against the individual defendants is “pointless

[because] a suit brought in that manner would still be, in effect, a suit against [the

University], which is already a defendant under these counts.” Bradley v. Balt. Police

Dep’t, No. JKB-11-1799, 2012 WL 4321738, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 19, 2012) (citations

omitted). Accordingly, for both of these reasons, the claims against Harrison-DiFranco,

Taitiano, and Rosello are dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Claims arising under the FCA, ADEA, and ADA are dismissed without prejudice based on

the Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The FCA claim cannot proceed as long as

Plaintiff is self-represented. The ADA and ADEA claims cannot proceed without a waiver

of sovereign immunity. The Title VII discrimination claim is dismissed without prejudice

to re-plead with additional facts that would demonstrate the required elements for such

a claim. Claims under the ADEA, ADA and Title VII against the individual defendants are

dismissed without prejudice because they are not available against the individual

employees here and are otherwise duplicative of the barred claims against the University.

The Motion is denied as to the Title VII retaliation claim. A separate implementing Order

will follow.

Date: March 31, 2026

________/s/

Charles D. Austin

United States Magistrate Judge