Hounmenou

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CORINE HOUNMENOU, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 6:26-cv-3249-MDH

)

SHERIFF JIM C. ARNOTT, et. al., )

)

Respondents. )

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner has been detained by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and her

Order of Supervision has been terminated without prior written notice. Petitioner argues federal

statutes and the Due Process Clause require she be released or granted a hearing. The Court agrees

with Petitioner’s arguments, and on that basis, it concludes the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

should be GRANTED.

Petitioner Corine Hounmenou1 has lived in this country for over two decades. Her close-

knit family lives in this country, including their two children. Corine has a job taking care of the

elderly. She has never had any issues with the law. The family is beloved by their community and

are devoted Catholics.

In 2004, Corine who was born on July 9, 1972, in Senegal came to the US on a valid visitor

visa. Once here, she filed for asylum. The case was unfortunately denied, and so were all appeals.

On June 9, 2011, the BIA dismissed the direct appeal of the asylum application. However, she

1 Petitioners are married and have filed jointly filed this habeas petition. Inherently, habeas is an individualized

remedy and each detainee’s custody must be evaluated separately. Further, 28 U.S.C. § 2242 requires each petitioner

to sign their own petition. Although no party has raised the issue of misjoinder, the Court may address it on its own

initiative. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Because habeas petitions must be individually filed and signed, and because the

petitioners’ claims cannot be jointly litigated, each petitioner shall proceed in a separate civil action, and the Clerk is

directed to open a new case for each petitioner and file a copy of the petition and all pleadings in each case.

appealed the case to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Hounmenou, et al v. Eric H. Holder, Jr,

11-1990 (8th Cir. May 5, 2011). Starting on March 4, 2013, she was placed on an order of

supervision (“OSUP”). For the next thirteen years, she, without fail, complied with every request

from Immigration and Customs (“ICE”). (See Doc. 1-3; OSUP compliance for Petitioners). On

January 15, 2026, Petitioner appeared with her husband for their regular check in and the check in

went as normal. They were told however, that they needed to return on April 14, 2026. Again, the

couple complied.

Suddenly, without notice, without reasoning, and without an opportunity to be heard, she

was detained (as well as her husband). Their attorney, who was with them, sought information

about the basis for the detention and revocation of the OSUP for each spouse, and was provided

only with a cursory reason without more. No other process was provided. (See Doc. 1-4;

Declaration of Hannah Sullivan). After repeatedly asking for documents that may have been given

to Petitioner, on April 25, 2026, at 5:43pm, Ms. Sullivan was finally provided by Deportation

Officer Andy Dunno, the Form I-205 and I-294 for Petitioner. (See Doc. 1-6, Form I-205/I-294).

The documents attest to witnessing Petitioner’s “departure” from the US; a factual impossibility

since she is detained in Greene County Jail currently. At no point were copies of the denial provided

to Ms. Sullivan or the Petitioner. She also was not given an informal interview or any Notice of

Revocation of the OSUP.

Petitioner has never left the United States since the order of removal was issued against

her. She has remained on an order of supervision since March 4, 2013, and has not been convicted

of any crimes.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Respondents argue that two statutory provisions—8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) and (g) deprive

this Court of jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claims. The Court disagrees.

Sections 1252(g) and (b)(9) apply narrowly to systemic challenges to regulations

implementing expedited removal, review of an order of removal, the decision to seek removal, or

the process by which removability will be determined, not to constitutional or statutory claims

which precede and are collateral to that process, including, as relevant here, unlawful arrest or

detention. See Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, No. 25-CV-493-LJV, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135986,

2025 WL 1953796, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. July 16, 2025); see also Hernandez-Cuevas v. Olson, No.

4:25-cv-00830-BP, at 3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 05, 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)); Cifuentes Rivera

v. Arnott, et al, 25-cv-00570-RK1, Doc.19 at 7 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 07, 2025) (“the narrow scope of §

1252(g) does not cover “claims [that] are collateral to the Government’s decision to execute the

final order of removal,” for instance, claims seeking relief based upon the Government’s alleged

failure to comply with its own regulations regarding the required administrative processes after an

alien is detained.”). Petitioners are challenging their unlawful detention, not any removal decisions

or actions, so the above provisions do not deprive the Court of jurisdiction.

II. The Due Process Clause

8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2) governs discretionary revocations because there is no claim, and

there has never been any claim, that Petitioner violated any condition of their OSUP. Subsection

(l)(2) grants the Executive Associate Commissioner and the District Director authority to revoke

and return a noncitizen to custody, but it does not limit process only “upon revocation.” In other

words, it defaults to constitutional notions of due process which do not authorize detain-first,

process-later.

The Due Process clause applies to all persons in the United States, “whether their presence

here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

Procedural due process constrains governmental decisions that deprive individuals of property or

liberty interests, as defined by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Matthews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601–03 (1972)

(reliance on informal policies and practices may establish a legitimate claim of entitlement to a

constitutionally-protected interest). Infringing upon a protected interest triggers a right to a hearing

before that right is deprived. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–

70 (1972). Petitioner’s order of supervision and stay of removal creates legitimate liberty and

property interests.

This case presents a serious chronological defect. This is not a technical irregularity, it is a

constitutional one. The Due Process Clause prohibits the government from imprisoning a person

and then, after the fact, completing the documentation purporting to authorize that imprisonment.

The liberty interest that attaches to her thirteen years of lawful supervised compliance cannot be

extinguished by a document signed after they were already in custody. That sequence is also

contrary to the plain language of the applicable regulation which contains no authorization to

detain first and complete the required process afterward.

Petitioner’s order of supervision and stay of removal create legitimate liberty and property

interests. Although the regulatory framework suggests that stays and orders of supervision may be

rescinded at the discretion of the government, both create vested liberty and property rights for

Petitioner.

By failing to provide written notice of revocation of the OSUP and a hearing to justify the

basis for re-detention or explain why Petitioner has violated the conditions of release, Respondents

have violated Petitioner’s constitutional right to due process.

Petitioner shall be immediately released. Release is the customary remedy in habeas

proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (the habeas shall "dispose of the matter as law and justice

require."); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,484 (1973) (finding "that the traditional function of

the writ is to secure release from illegal custody"). Additionally, ordering a bond hearing under

these circumstances would require the Immigration Judge to do that which he believes he lacks

authority to do following Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 220 (BIA 2025), and would

be futile.

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes Petitioner’s right to procedural due process has been violated, and

they are entitled to immediate release. Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is

GRANTED as follows.

1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody.

2. Respondents shall make accommodations available for Petitioners until such time as

arrangements can be made for Petitioner to be returned to the location of arrest or other

location agreed by the parties.

3. Petitioner shall promptly report to the Court any failure to comply with this Order by

Respondents.

4. Petitioner may submit an application for fees under the EAJA within thirty days of the

entry of final judgment.

5. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents are enjoined from relocating Petitioner

outside the jurisdiction of this Court prior to compliance with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 8, 2026

/s/ Douglas Harpool

DOUGLAS HARPOOL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE