The opinion
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D2026-0954
LT Case No. 2001-CF-000946-A
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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES,
Petitioner,
v.
KENNETH WILLIAMS, JR., AND
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents.
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Petition for Certiorari Review of Order
from the Circuit Court for Citrus County,
Joel D. Fritton, Judge.
Logan Bartholomew, Assistant Regional Counsel, of Department
of Children and Families, Orlando, for Petitioner.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Zachary L.
Wiseman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellee, State of Florida.
No Appearance for Remaining Respondents.
May 8, 2026
HARRIS, J.
The Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) filed a
petition for writ of certiorari seeking to quash the lower court’s
order committing Kenneth Williams, Jr. (“Williams”) to its care.
As conceded by the State, the lower court did not follow the
statutory requirements for committing Williams to DCF custody.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and quash the order of
commitment.
On May 21, 2002, Williams was adjudicated guilty of lewd or
lascivious battery and placed on probation. Five months later he
was charged with a violation of his probation. He was ultimately
found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to DCF
custody.
On June 27, 2025, DCF reported to the lower court that
Williams no longer met the criteria for commitment pursuant to
section 916.15(2), Florida Statutes, and recommended that
Williams be placed on conditional release pursuant to section
916.17, Florida Statutes. On July 22, 2025, the court placed
Williams on conditional release.
Shortly thereafter, Williams’ case manager wrote an
unsworn letter to the court stating that Williams failed to comply
with the terms of his conditional release. Williams was also
temporarily held pursuant to the Baker Act (Chapter 394, Florida
Statues).
Williams’ counsel filed a motion to appoint a mental health
expert to evaluate Williams, and on December 12, 2025, the court
granted the motion. The appointed expert, Dr. Harry Krop, Ph.D.,
authored a report following his evaluation of Williams. Dr. Krop
opined that Williams was competent to proceed and made no
mention of Williams being a danger to himself or others. Dr. Krop
further opined that Williams did not meet criteria for involuntary
commitment to a forensic or civil State hospital. Despite Dr. Krop’s
evaluation and opinions, the court entered an order committing
Williams to DCF pursuant to section 916.15(2), Florida Statutes,
which requires a finding that a defendant is “manifestly dangerous
to himself or herself or others.” § 916.15(2), Fla. Stat. The court’s
order contains no finding that Williams presents a danger to
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himself or others. DCF then filed the instant petition for writ of
certiorari seeking to quash the lower court’s order committing
Williams to its custody.
To demonstrate entitlement to certiorari relief, the
petitioner must show the following: (1) the trial court departed
from the essential requirements of the law when it issued a ruling,
(2) the ruling resulted in a material injury that will continue
throughout the case, and (3) the injury cannot be corrected on post-
judgment appeal. Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. Campbell, 295 So. 3d
868, 870 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020). The last two prongs are referred to
as “irreparable harm.” State v. Victorino, 372 So. 3d 772, 777 (Fla.
5th DCA 2023). For this Court to have jurisdiction, the petitioner
must demonstrate irreparable harm. Id. “As a general rule,
certiorari is the proper vehicle for seeking this court’s review of
orders committing an individual involuntarily.” Dep’t of Child. &
Fams. v. Despaigne, 348 So. 3d 1221, 1222 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)
(quoting Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. Lotton, 172 So. 3d 983, 985 (Fla.
5th DCA 2015)).
Once the petition demonstrates that the appellate court has
jurisdiction by virtue of irreparable harm, the Court may move on
to the question of whether the trial court departed from the
essential requirements of law. See AVCO Corp. v. Neff, 30 So. 3d
597, 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); O’Neill v. O’Neill, 823 So. 2d 837,
839 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). An error of law is not necessarily a
departure from the essential requirements of law. See, e.g., Rich v.
Fisher, 655 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). The district courts
should grant a petition for certiorari only when there has been a
violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a
miscarriage of justice. See Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.
2d 523 (Fla. 1995).
This Court has found that irreparable harm exists in
circumstances similar to the instant petition. Specifically, this
Court has held that DCF suffers a material injury because “it is
responsible for expending its appropriated funds in accordance
with the laws governing the agency and . . . because DCF has no
direct right of appeal.” Campbell, 295 So. 3d at 870; Dep’t of Child.
& Fams. v. Kirshner, 380 So. 3d 502, 504 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024).
Furthermore, because this is a criminal proceeding, DCF will not
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be a party in any post-judgment appeal and cannot obtain relief
pursuant to that appeal. Therefore, DCF has established
irreparable harm.
In turning to whether the court departed from the essential
requirements of law, we first look at the plain text of section
916.17(2), Florida Statutes, which states:
Upon the filing of an affidavit or statement
under oath by any person that the defendant has
failed to comply with the conditions of release,
that the defendant’s condition has deteriorated
to the point that inpatient care is required, or
that the release conditions should be modified,
the court shall hold a hearing within 7 days after
receipt of the affidavit or statement under oath.
After the hearing, the court may modify the
release conditions. The court may also order that
the defendant be returned to the department if
it is found, after the appointment and report of
experts, that the person meets the criteria for
involuntary commitment under s. 916.13 or s.
916.15.
In this case, neither an affidavit nor a statement under oath was
filed with the lower court, which is a prerequisite to the court’s
ability to revoke a defendant’s conditional release and commit the
defendant to DCF custody. The letter sent to the court from
Williams’ case manager was neither sworn nor in the form of an
affidavit. Therefore, the lower court erred in holding a hearing to
consider modification of Williams’ release and ultimately
committing him to the department. As we noted in Kirshner, “the
violation of the procedural requirements of section 916.17 here
constituted a departure from the essential requirements of law
because it results in DCF having to expend funds to care for and
treat an individual who may not qualify for commitment.” 380 So.
3d at 505 n.3.
DCF further argues that the lower court departed from the
essential requirements of the law when it failed to comply with
section 916.15(2), which requires that the court make findings that
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the defendant “has a mental illness and, because of the illness, is
manifestly dangerous to himself or herself or others.” We agree
that there was no evidence presented below, and no finding by the
court, that Williams is manifestly dangerous, especially given Dr.
Krop’s opinion that Williams “does not meet criteria for
involuntary commitment to a forensic or civil State hospital.”
Therefore, the lower court erred in committing Williams to DCF
custody.
Because the court not only failed to follow the requirements
of section 916.15(2), but also failed to follow the requirements of
section 916.17(2), we grant the petition and quash the lower court’s
order.
PETITION GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED.
WALLIS and SOUD, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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