Shaw

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

SIMIN NICHOLAS SHAW CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-0587

VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS MAGISTRATE JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES

ENFORCEMENT

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion to Terminate Mandatory ICE Detention (Record

Document 3) filed by the pro se habeas petitioner in this case, Simin Nicholas Shaw

(“Petitioner”). A final order of removal was entered as to Petitioner on February 18, 2014.

See Record Document 1 at 4. She was taken into custody on July 13, 2025. See id.

Petitioner is presently detained at the South Louisiana ICE Processing Center in Basile,

Louisiana. See Record Document 3 at 1.

On February 24, 2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Record

Document 1) along with the instant Motion. In the Habeas Petition, Petitioner challenges

the legality of her continued detention and seeks immediate release from custody. See

Record Document 1-2 at 8. Likewise, in the instant Motion, Petitioner seeks substantially

identical relief—namely, immediate release from mandatory ICE detention. See Record

Document 3 at 1.

Petitioner’s request in the instant Motion is one for injunctive relief. An applicant

for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) must demonstrate each of the following: (1) a

substantial likelihood his cause will succeed on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of

irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) the threatened injury outweighs the

threatened harm the injunction may do to the opposing party, and (4) granting the

injunction will not disserve the public interest. See Misquitta v. Warden Pine Prairie ICE

Processing Center, 353 F. Supp. 518, 521 (W.D. La. Nov. 16, 2018) (citing Piedmont

Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1981)). The decision of

whether to grant or deny a TRO lies in the district court’s discretion. See Moore v. Brown,

868 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 2017). Courts should deny such motions more often than not.

See Albright v. City of New Orleans, 46 F.Supp.2d 523, 532 (E.D. La. 1999) (explaining

that temporary restraining orders are “extraordinary relief and rarely issued.”); see also

Suburban Propane, L.P. v. D & S GCTX LLC, 2025 WL 2429087, at *2 (W.D. Tex. 2025)

(holding that the extraordinary relief under Rule 65 must be “unequivocally show[n].”); see

also Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Only under

‘extraordinary circumstances’ will this court reverse the denial of a preliminary

injunction.”).

In this case, Petitioner seeks injunctive relief that mirrors the relief requested in her

Habeas Petition, that is, immediate release. In Pema Sherpa v. Judith Almodovar, et al.,

another judge within this District decided a similarly situated case, stating:

The Supreme Court, very recently, reminded lower courts that

preliminary injunctions are, as their name suggests, preliminary and should

“not conclusively resolve legal disputes.” Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192,

200 (2025). In other words, they should not be used to rule on the final,

merits question.

Rather, TROs and preliminary injunctions help “preserve the status

quo until a trial” or other final disposition is rendered. Id. at 193. That begs

the question: what does it mean to preserve the status quo? While the

words “status quo” do not appear within Rule 65 . . . , it is implicit in the

“irreparable harm” prong. . . . Irreparable harm must also take away “the

court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits.” Canal Auth. of

the State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1974); see also

Samuel L. Bray, The Purposes of the Preliminary Injunction, 78 Vand. L.

Rev. 809, 823–26 (2025) (concluding the same after probing Founding-era

sources). Put differently, “[t]here is always a status quo. There should not

be a preliminary injunction to protect it, however, unless the court’s ability to

render a meaningful decision on the merits would otherwise be in jeopardy.”

Callaway, 489 F.2d at 573.

No. 3:25-CV-01718 SEC P, 2026 WL 74401, at *2 (W.D. La. Jan. 9, 2026). A ruling on

the instant Motion should not resolve the legal disputes in this case. Thus, to the extent

Petitioner asks for an order of immediate release from custody, the Court views this

request as an effort to obtain a ruling on the merits of her Habeas Petition through

injunctive relief. Petitioner's motion for injunctive relief is essentially a motion to decide

the habeas petition now. See Garcia-Aleman v. Thompson, No. SA-25-CV-00886-OLG-

HJB, 2025 WL 3769302, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2025).

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Terminate Mandatory ICE Detention

(Record Document 3) is hereby DENIED.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 9th day of April, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE