Harris

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RAYCHELLE MARIE HARRIS * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 25-2519

MIKE TREGRE, ET AL. * SECTION “L” (2)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Raychelle Marie Harris filed a complaint and Ex Parte Motion for Leave to

Proceed in forma pauperis on December 30, 2025. ECF Nos. 1, 2. The Court granted the motion

but ordered that summons not be issued until completion of the statutorily mandated review in

accordance with the duties imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and (e)(2)(B). ECF No. 3. The Court

also ordered Plaintiff to file a written response setting forth the specific facts upon which she bases

his claims, with a deadline of Wednesday, February 4, 2026. Id. at 7. The Order further advised

Plaintiff that her failure to respond in writing as directed may result in dismissal of her complaint.

Id. Plaintiff did not file a response.

I. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the St. John the Baptist Parish

Sheriff’s Office, the Sheriff Mike Tregre, and his Detectives Michael Shard, Denis James, and

Michael D’Amato; St. John the Baptist Parish District Attorney’s Office, the District Attorney

Bridget Dinvaut, and Assistant District Attorney Eusi Phillips; and former Assistant District

Attorneys Craig Stewart and Geoffrey Michel of Terrebonne Parish and Orleans Parish,

respectively. ECF No. 1 § I(B).

Plaintiff alleges:

On December 15, 2023, Saint John the Baptist Parish Sheriff Department

filed warrant for Raychelle Harris' arrest without thorough investigations, no

probable cause, publicized false allegations about Raychelle Harris and Harris

Legal Support Services, LLC. On December 18, 2023, Saint John the Baptist Parish

Sheriff Department wrongfully arrested Raychelle Harris at Harris Legal Support

Services, LLC office. On December 20, 2023, Saint John the Baptist Parish Sheriff

Department publicized false allegations about Raychelle Harris and Harris Legal

Support Services, LLC. In February 2024, 40th JDC District Attorney Office filed

bill of information and accepted chargers against Raychelle Harris.

Id. § III. Plaintiff does not indicate whether the charges remain pending or were dismissed or

whether any conviction based on same was vacated, set aside or otherwise invalidated.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Statutorily Mandated Review

Section 1915(e)(2)(B) grants the court authority to summarily dismiss in forma pauperis

complaints if the asserted claims are frivolous or malicious or fail to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.1 Indeed, the statute specifically mandates that the court “sua sponte dismiss

[the case] at any time if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune.”2

This review mandate applies to both prisoner and non-prisoner in forma pauperis cases.3

A claim is “frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”4 A claim

“lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if

the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.”5 A court may

not dismiss a claim simply because the facts are “unlikely.”6 A factually frivolous claim alleges

only facts that are “‘clearly baseless,’ . . . are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional’ . . . [or] rise

1 Tam Vo v. St. Charles Par., No. 10-4624, 2011 WL 743466, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2011), R.&R. adopted sub nom.

Vo v. St. Charles Par., No. 10-4264, 2011 WL 740909 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2011).

2 Amrhein v. United States, 740 F. App’x 65, 66 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)).

3 James v. Richardson, 344 F. App’x 982, 983 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Section 1915(e)(2)(B) requires dismissal of frivolous

IFP actions even if those actions are brought by non-prisoner plaintiffs.”); see also Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227,

231 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying § 1915(e)(2)(B) to a non-prisoner whose complaint was frivolous).

4 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

5 Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir.

1997)).

6 Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992)).

to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable

facts available to contradict them.”7

A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when the factual

allegations do not rise above a speculative level, with the assumption that all factual allegations in

the complaint are true, even if doubtful.8 The Supreme Court clarified the standard for a Rule

12(b)(6) motion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007). To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face (i.e., the factual allegations must “be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level”).9 If the “facts” alleged are “merely consistent” with

those minimally required to establish liability, the complaint “stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility.”10 “Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim.”11

Although the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and consider the complaint in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court does not accept as true “conclusory allegations,

unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.”12 The court may consider not only the

allegations but also any documents attached to the complaint, referenced documents that are

central to the claim, and documents that are part of the public record or subject to judicial notice.13

7 Id. (quoting Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33).

8 Garrett v. Thaler, 560 F. App’x 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007)).

9 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.

10 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

11 Roy v. Cobb, No. 20-0167, 2020 WL 2045791, at *2 (W.D. La. April 7, 2020) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

12 Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544

(5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see also SGK Props., L.L.C. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n for Lehman Bros. Small

Balance Com. Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-3, 881 F.3d 933, 943–44 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding

conclusory fraud allegations that the defendant intended plaintiff to act upon representations and plaintiff acted in

reliance on representations insufficient to withstand Rule 12(b)(6) challenge).

13 See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (directing courts to “consider the

complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to

dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take

In comparing a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and Rule

12(b)(6), the Supreme Court in Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), held that a claim that is

dismissed under one rule does not “invariably fall afoul” of the other.14 If an in forma pauperis

complaint lacks even an arguable basis in law, dismissal is appropriate under both Rule 12(b)(6)

and § 1915(e).15 “When a complaint raises an arguable question of law which the district court

ultimately finds is correctly resolved against the plaintiff, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is

appropriate; however, dismissal under [§ 1915(e)’s] frivolousness standard is not.”16

B. Required Elements of a § 1983 Claim

Section 1983 creates a damages remedy for the violation of federal constitutional or

statutory rights under color of state law:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action

at law . . . .17

“The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using their badge of authority to deprive

individuals of federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.”18

Generally, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements to establish § 1983 liability:

(1) deprivation of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal law;

(2) that occurred under color of state law; and

(3) was caused by a state actor.19

judicial notice.”); Wolcott v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that a court may rely on the complaint,

its proper attachments, documents incorporated by reference, and matters of judicial notice).

14 Moore, 976 F.2d at 269 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (current version at 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)).

15 Id.

16 Id.

17 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

18 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978)).

19 Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

Because § 1983 merely provides a remedy for designated rights, rather than creating any

substantive rights, “an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to liability.”20

This requires the plaintiff to identify both the constitutional violation and the responsible person

acting under color of state law.21 Plaintiff must specify the personal involvement of each defendant

in a cause of action under § 1983.22 A plaintiff cannot make generalized allegations, nor can he

support a claim based on any vicarious liability theory.23 There must be an affirmative link

between the incident and some act by the defendant.24

C. Availability of Amendment

Although frivolous claims may be dismissed with prejudice,25 before doing so, the Court

should allow the pro se Plaintiff the opportunity to state his best case:

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff with an arguable claim is ordinarily accorded notice of a

pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and an opportunity to amend the

complaint before the motion is ruled upon. These procedures alert him to the legal theory

underlying the defendant's challenge, and enable him meaningfully to respond by opposing

the motion to dismiss on legal grounds or by clarifying his factual allegations so as to

conform with the requirements of a valid legal cause of action.26

Thus, the court should generally allow an opportunity to amend before dismissing an action for

failure to state a claim.27 Indeed, unless it is clear that a plaintiff is unwilling or unable to amend

in a manner that will avoid dismissal, the court errs in not providing a pro se plaintiff with at least

one opportunity to cure pleading deficiencies before dismissing.28 When, however, the “complaint

20 Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

21 Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978).

22 Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983).

23 Howard v. Fortenberry, 723 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1984).

24 Rizzo v. Goods, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976).

25 See Marts v. Hines, 117 F.3d 1504, 1506 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

26 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 329-30.

27 See, e.g., Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 247 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P.

15(a)(2); F.D.I.C. v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1385 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that Rule 15(a) “evinces a strong bias in favor

of granting . . . leave to amend a pleading”).

28 Dierlam v. Trump, 977 F.3d 471, 478 n.44 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean

Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 503 (5th Cir. 2011) (cleaned

up); Brown v. Brown, 842 F. App'x 948, 949 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Generally a district court errs in dismissing a pro se

alleges the plaintiff's best case,” a further factual statement from the plaintiff need not be allowed.29

III. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s Claims Cannot Proceed under Heck and/or Wallace

As the Court previously explained,30 in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the

Supreme Court held that a claim under § 1983 is barred if success in the suit would necessarily

imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal conviction or a plaintiff's present confinement.31

In other words, a claim for damages that would render a conviction or sentence invalid is not

cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared

invalid or called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.32 This is the “favorable-

termination” requirement.33 Where a plaintiff has not established that the criminal proceedings

have terminated in her favor, any claim for malicious prosecution, a due process claim, a Brady

violation, or other § 1983 claim challenging the constitutionality of her conviction and sentence is

barred pursuant to Heck and should be dismissed with prejudice until the conditions of Heck are

met.34

The Supreme Court has established a modified version of the Heck bar in the pretrial

context in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). In Wallace, the Court explained that, if a plaintiff

files civil rights claims related to the validity of a pending criminal proceeding, the best practice

complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend.”

(quoting Mendoza-Tarango v. Flores, 982 F.3d 395, 402 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up))).

29 Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

30 See ECF No. 3 at 4-5.

31 512 U.S. at 487.

32 Id. at 486-87.

33 Johnson v. Thibodaux City, 887 F.3d 726, 732 (5th Cir. 2018).

34 See Cook v. City of Tyler, 974 F.3d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (upholding dismissals with prejudice of

claims barred by Heck described in accordance with Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 1996)).

is for the district court to stay the claims until the pending criminal case is resolved to determine

the impact of the Heck limitations.35 The Court explained:

If a plaintiff files a false arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any other

claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal

trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common

practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal

case is ended. If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit

would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil

action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit.36

Thus, when a plaintiff’s criminal charges remain pending, a determination of whether Heck bars a

suit is premature. Instead, the court should stay the § 1983 proceedings until the pending criminal

case has run its course, as until that time it may be difficult to determine the relation, if any, between

the two.37

Plaintiff’s only basis for her claims is § 1983. ECF No. 1 § II(A). Considering her brief

allegations and requested relief, Plaintiff is asserting “malicious”/false arrest, defamation, and

malicious prosecution claims. Id. §§ III, IV.38 Plaintiff does not, however, indicate whether any

charges remain pending or were dismissed, nor does she indicate whether any conviction based on

same was vacated, set aside or otherwise invalidated. Without any allegation of a favorable

termination of a conviction or sentence, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim is barred by

35 549 U.S. at 393-94; see Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (finding stay of pretrial

§ 1983 challenges to an ongoing state criminal proceeding to be the best practice).

36 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-94 (citations omitted).

37 Mackey, 47 F.3d at 746; Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-94 (endorsing stay of civil proceedings until completion of

criminal action where Heck may bar damages claims); Hopkins v. Ogg, 783 F. App’x 350, 355 (5th Cir. 2019) (“If a

pretrial detainee brings claims that may ultimately be barred by Heck, the best practice is for the district court to stay

the proceedings until the pending criminal case is resolved.”).

38 See Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 862 n.9 (5th Cir. 1999) (“We construe [plaintiff]'s claim of a ‘prosecution

unsupported by probable cause’ as a claim of malicious prosecution, because a prosecution that is unsupported by

probable cause but does not rise to the level of malicious prosecution is not a clearly established constitutional

violation.”), overruled in part on other grounds, Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 948–49 & n.36 (5th Cir. 2003).

Heck.39 Even if Plaintiff is only awaiting trial in state court, the claim still cannot proceed and

must be stayed in accordance with Wallace.

Although a malicious/false arrest claim “does not necessarily implicate the validity of a

criminal prosecution following the arrest,”40 Plaintiff’s claim does. While Plaintiff’s Complaint

does not make clear what charges were filed against her, if there were probable cause for any of

them, then her claim fails.41 Thus, she must allege that there was no probable cause to arrest her

for the charges to establish her false arrest claim, thereby implying the invalidity of a conviction

and implicating Heck.42 Again, because it is unclear whether Plaintiff is only awaiting trial, this

claim too should be stayed in accordance with Wallace.

As to the defamation claim, “damage to an individual’s reputation as a result of defamatory

statements made by a state actor, accompanied by an infringement of some other interest, is

actionable under § 1983.”43 This is known as the “stigma-plus-infringement” test.44 The necessary

stigma consists of “concrete, false factual assertions”; infringement occurs if the state “sought to

remove or significantly alter a life, liberty, or property interest recognized and protected by state

law” or the federal constitution as incorporated against the states.45

39 See, e.g., Nicolais v. Cheramie, No. 23-7094, 2025 WL 1231868, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2025) (citing Lavergne v.

Harson, 583 F. App'x 361, 362 (5th Cir. 2014); Cormier v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, 493 F. App'x 578, 583

(5th Cir. 2012)), R.&R. adopted, 2025 WL 1220819 (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 2025).

40 Mackey, 47 F.3d at 746 (citing cases).

41 Cf. Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[T]o state a § 1983 claim for false arrest/false

imprisonment, Arnold must plausibly allege that Williams ‘did not have probable cause to arrest him.’” (quoting

Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655 (5th Cir. 2004))).

42 See Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Cormier v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 493 F.

App’x 578, 583 (5th Cir. 2012) (“We have specifically noted that false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims

challenge the existence of probable cause and, thus, by their essence are collateral attacks on a criminal judgment's

validity. Such attacks run afoul of Heck 's ‘policy of finality.’” (citations omitted)).

43 Texas v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-12

(1976)).

44 Id. (citing San Jacinto Sav. & Loan v. Kacal, 928 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1991)).

45 Tebo v. Tebo, 550 F.3d 492, 503 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Thompson, 70 F.3d at 392).

Plaintiff’s defamation claim against the St. John the Baptist Sheriff’s Office appears to be

based on the alleged “false allegations” that support her arrest and charges. ECF No. 1 § III. To

establish the stigma, Plaintiff would have to demonstrate the allegations were false, which could

necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction on those charges; in other words, the claim is barred

by Heck.46 Moreover, because the false arrest is the predicate infringement for the defamation

claim and it is already barred by Heck, so goes the defamation claim.47 Staying Plaintiff’s

defamation claim is also proper in accordance with Wallace.48

B. Grounds for Early Dismissal

Although Heck and Wallace would normally compel a stay of premature civil claims

intertwined with ongoing state criminal proceedings, a stay does not preclude the Court from

screening “claims against certain party-defendants on other grounds apparent in the record.”49 For

the defendant individuals, Plaintiff does not indicate whether she is pursuing her claims against

them in their respective official or individual capacity, so the Court will address both avenues.50

1. Improper Defendants

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 provides in pertinent part that the “capacity to sue or

be sued is determined . . . by the law of the state where the court is located.” FED. R. CIV. P.

17(b)(3). Article 24 of the Louisiana Civil Code states there are two kinds of persons that are

46 Bell v. Police Dep’t City of Shreveport, No. 18-964, 2018 WL 4926342, at *2 (W.D. La. Sept. 19, 2018) (citing Price

v. Cnty. Ct. Clerk of Hill Cnty. Tex., 73 F. App'x 80 (5th Cir. 2003)), R.&R. adopted, 2018 WL 4924019 (W.D. La. Oct.

9, 2018).

47 Id. at *3 (“If Plaintiff is convicted of attempted murder, Heck would foreclose using false arrest as the predicate

infringement for his defamation claim.” (citing Cormier, 493 F. App'x at 584 (“Cormier cannot satisfy this ‘stigma-

plus-infringement’ requirement, however, because applying Heck precludes using false arrest and malicious

prosecution as predicate infringement claims.”))).

48 Id. at *4 (staying defamation claim (citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-94 (“If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before

he has been convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated

criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court ... to stay the civil action until the criminal case ... is ended.”)

(emphasis supplied))).

49 Busick v. City of Madison, 90 F. App’x 713, 714 (5th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that the district court should consider

grounds for dismissal other than Heck (citing Sojourner T v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1992)).

50 Garrett v. Stephens, 675 F. App’x 444, 447 (5th Cir. 2017)

capable of being sued, natural persons and juridical persons. A “juridical person is an entity to

which the law attributes personality . . . .” LA. CIV. CODE art. 24.

Louisiana law affords legal status to Louisiana sheriffs, not their offices.51 Thus, while a

plaintiff may file suit against a Louisiana sheriff, that sheriff’s office is not a proper party.52 This

same principle applies to Louisiana district attorneys and their offices; a Louisiana district attorney

may be sued but not her office because her office lacks the capacity to be sued and thus is not a

proper party.53 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the St. John the Baptist Sheriff’s Office and

District Attorney’s Office in general are legally frivolous and thus should dismissed with prejudice

and without leave to amend.54

2. Duplicative Claims

A suit brought against a defendant in his official capacity is, effectively, a suit against the

governmental entity that employs the defendant.55 “[W]here a plaintiff brings claims against both

a public official, such as a law enforcement officer, in his official capacity and the public entity

for which he works, the claims ‘essentially merge,’”56 making the former claims redundant and

51 Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council—President Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 283 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Porche v. Saint

Tammany Par. Sheriff’s Off., 67 F. Supp. 2d 631, 635 (E.D. La. 1999)).

52 Edminston v. La. Small Bus. Dev. Ctr., 931 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Louisiana sheriffs are juridical entities

that can be sued, but Louisiana sheriff’s offices are not.”).

53 See Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 268 n.4 (5th Cir. 2023) (“‘Louisiana law does not permit a district attorney's

office to be sued in its own name.’ Thus, when attempting to sue a Louisiana DA's office under Monell, the current

DA, rather than the office, is the proper defendant.” (quoting Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677, 680 (5th

Cir. 1999))); accord. Delta Fuel Co. v. Maxwell, 485 F. App’x 685, 686 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of § 1983

claim against Louisiana district attorney’s office based on the office not having the capacity to be sued under Louisiana

law).

54 See Pittman v. Campbell, No. 24-2168, 2025 WL 358922, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2025) (Africk, J.) (finding claims

brought against state courts frivolous under § 1915(e)(2) because the court lack the capacity to be sued); Graves v.

Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that dismissal with prejudice without leave to amend is proper

when claims are legally frivolous or subject to an obvious meritorious defense), overruled in part on other grounds,

Arvie v. Broussard, 42 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 1994)

55 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978).

56 Frericks v. Rockwall County., No. 25-2148, 2025 WL 2858904, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2025) (quoting Turner v.

Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 485 (5th Cir. 2000)).

thus dismissal proper.57

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Detectives Shard, James, and

D’Amato should be dismissed because they are duplicative of the official capacity claim against

Sheriff Tregre. Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against Assistant District Attorney Phillips

should also be dismissed because it is duplicative of the official capacity claim against District

Attorney Dinvaut. The claims should be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend.58

3. Lack of Necessary Factual Specificity

Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims against former Assistant District Attorneys Stewart and

Michel of Terrebonne Parish and Orleans Parish, respectively. However, there are no allegations

of personal involvement of these individuals nor the respective district attorney’s office that

employed them. In the absence of any alleged personal involvement, Plaintiff fails to state a claim,

which requires dismissal.59

4. Prosecutorial Immunity

A “prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from personal liability for damages under section

57 Carpenter v. Webre, No. 17-808, 2018 WL 1453201, at *6 (E.D. La. Mar. 23, 2018) (Morgan, J.) (citing Castro

Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2001)) (dismissing official capacity claim against deputy as it was

duplicative of official capacity claim against the sheriff); Quatrevingt v. Landry, No. 19-1171, 2019 WL 4112051, at

*5 n.52 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2019) (Milazzo, J.) (noting official capacity claims against deputies would be dismissed as

duplicative of official capacity claim against the Sheriff of St. Tammany Parish (citing Castro Romero, 256 F.3d at

355)); see also Frericks, 2025 WL 2858904, at *3 (citing Flores v. Cameron Cnty., 92 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 1996)

(where the district court had dismissed claims against county commissioners in their official capacities “because those

claims were duplicative of the claims against the County”)).

58 See Notariano v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 266 F. Supp. 3d 919, 928 (E.D. La. 2017) (Milazzo, J.) (dismissing

duplicative claims with prejudice); Breaux v. Assumption Par. Sch. Bd., No. 21-1405, 2021 WL 5579789, at *3 (E.D.

La. Nov. 30, 2021) (Ashe, J.) (same); Hankins v. Wheeler, No. 21-1129, 2022 WL 2208848, at *10 (E.D. La. June 21,

2022) (Fallon, J.) (same).

59 See Moore v. Texas, No. 11-749, 2011 WL 6968294, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2011) (Ramirez, M.J.) (finding claim

against sheriff should be dismissed as frivolous because plaintiff made no allegation of personal involvement by the

sheriff for his claim of an excessive bond), R.&R. adopted, 2012 WL 75744 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2012); Greer v. Fowler,

No. 19-1017, 2020 WL 2745544, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 27, 2020) (dismissing claim against sheriff as frivolous because

plaintiff alleged no personal involvement); Walton v. Valdez, No. 08-2166, 2009 WL 89666, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9,

2009) (same), appeal dismissed, 340 F. App’x 954 (5th Cir. 2009); Harvard v. Rankin Cnty., No. 20-128, 2022 WL

1256664, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 27, 2022) (dismissing claims as frivolous for failure to make specific allegations

against certain defendants).

1983 for actions ‘initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case’ and those ‘intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’”60 Furthermore, “[a] prosecutor’s

absolute immunity will not be stripped because of action that was in error, was done maliciously,

or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in

the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”61 The prosecutorial immunity also applies during “actions

apart from the courtroom.”62

As to the individual capacity claims against District Attorney Dinvaut and Assistant

District Attorney Phillips,63 and setting aside Plaintiff’s failure to allege either defendant’s

personal involvement in the events underlying her claims, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against them

are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Construing the St. John the Baptist Parish District

Attorney’s Office as either defendant, Plaintiff appears to have alleged, at most, the defendant has

filed a bill of information against her based on a wrongful arrest and false allegations unbeknownst

to that defendant. Regardless, absolute immunity is not stripped from a prosecutor because of

error. Thus, the § 1983 claims against individual capacity claims against District Attorney Dinvaut

and Assistant District Attorney Phillips should be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to

amend for seeking monetary relief against defendants immune from such relief.64

60 Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 677 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31(1976));

accord. Quinn v. Roach, 326 F. App’x 280, 292 (5th Cir. 2009).

61 Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 337 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman,

435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)), abrogated in part on other grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir.

2003); Champluvier v. Couch, 309 F. App’x 902, 903 (5th Cir. 2009).

62 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33.

63 See Laird v. Spencer, No. 20-30237, 2025 WL 79826, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2025) (noting the Fifth Circuit “has

held that absol ute immunities are personal defenses inapplicable to official-capacity actions” in the context of § 1983

actions (citing Turner, 229 F.3d at 483 (explaining that “defenses such as absolute quasi-judicial immunity, that only

protect defendants in their individual capacities, are unavailable in official-capacity [§ 1983] suits”); Johnson v.

Kegans, 870 F.2d 992, 998 n.5 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[Absolute i]mmunity does not bar suits against defendants in their

official capacities.”))).

64 See Hunter v. Rodriguez, 73 F. App’x 768, 770 (5th Cir. 2003) (“A dismissal of a claim for damages based on

absolute immunity . . . is a dismissal with prejudice.” (citing Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 283-84, 285 (5th Cir.

1994))).

IV. CONCLUSION

On the face of the complaint, Plaintiff’s claims are subject to Heck and/or Wallace, with

certain claims subject to immediate dismissed apart from Heck/Wallace.

RECOMMENDATIONS

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Raychelle Marie Harris’s § 1983 claims against

the St. John the Baptist Sheriff’s Office and District Attorney’s Office be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED Plaintiff’s § 1983 official capacity claims against

Detectives Michael Shard, Denis James, and Michael D’Amato and Assistant District Attorney

Eusi Phillips be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), as

duplicative.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED Plaintiff’s claims against former Assistant District

Attorneys Craig Stewart and Geoffrey Michel be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) as frivolous and for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against

District Attorney Bridget Dinvaut and Assistant District Attorney Eusi Phillips be DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) for seeking relief against immune

defendants.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Mike Tregre;

individual capacity claims against Detectives Shard, James, and D’Amato; and official capacity

claim against District Attorney Bridget Dinvaut be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant

to Heck if the charges have resulted in a conviction until the conditions of Heck are met, or

alternatively, if the claims remain pending, STAYED and the case ADMINISTRATIVELY

CLOSED for statistical purposes pursuant to Wallace. If stayed and Plaintiff thereafter intends to

proceed with the claims, she must file a motion to lift the stay within 30 days after the date that

the criminal proceedings terminate in her favor by either an acquittal or a failure to convict. Ifthe

stay is lifted and the Court finds that Plaintiff’ s claims would impugn the validity of his conviction,

the action will be dismissed under Heck; if no such finding is made, the action will proceed, absent

some other bar to suit.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and

recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days

after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from

attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by

the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will

result from a failure to object.

Dated this _ [st day of April, 2026.

DONNA PHILLIWB*CURRAULT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

6 Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)).

Douglass referred to the previously applicable ten-day period for filing of objections, which was extended to fourteen

days by amendment effective December 1, 2009, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

14