Peterson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

CLYDE PETERSON, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Civ. No. DLB-24-3582

PRIMECARE MEDICAL INC., et al., *

Defendants. *

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Clyde Peterson, who is proceeding without counsel and who at all times relevant to this

action was a pretrial detainee at Charles County Detention Center (“CCDC”), filed this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against PrimeCare Medical, Inc. (“PrimeCare”), Zachary

Rottman, M.D., Erlande PierreSaint, FNP, Teresa Beddow, AA, Ceirra Reynolds, RN, and Kari

White, LPN for failing to provide appropriate medical care and against Correctional Officer Grant

Evitts and Sgt. Sean Craig for interference with prescribed medical care.1 All defendants have

moved for dismissal or for summary judgment. ECF 16, 24, 27 & 28. Beddow, PierreSaint,

Reynolds, Dr. Rottman, and White have filed a motion to seal. ECF 29. Peterson opposes the

dispositive motions, requests appointment of counsel, and seeks discovery. ECF 21, 37, 42, see

also ECF 1-11 at 70 (request for counsel). Peterson also has filed motions for extension of time,

ECF 18 & 34, for leave to amend, ECF 19, for leave to file a surreply, ECF 32, and for default

judgment, ECF 36.

No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For following reasons, Craig

and Evitts’s motion, treated in part as a motion to dismiss and in part as a motion for summary

1 Peterson is currently incarcerated in Eastern Correctional Institution.

judgment, is granted in part and denied in part. PrimeCare’s motion to dismiss is granted.

PierreSaint and Dr. Rottman’s dispositive motion, treated in part as a motion to dismiss and in part

as a motion for summary judgment, is granted in part and denied in part. Beddow, Reynolds, and

White’s dispositive motion, treated in part as a motion to dismiss and in part as a motion for

summary judgment, is granted in part and denied in part. Beddow, PierreSaint, Reynolds, Dr.

Rottman, and White’s motion to seal is denied. Peterson’s motion for default and for leave to file

a surreply are denied, his motion for leave to amend is denied as moot, and his motions for

extension of time are granted nunc pro tunc. Peterson’s individual-capacity deliberate indifference

claims against Craig, PierreSaint, Beddow, Reynolds, and White survive and will proceed to

discovery. To prosecute these claims, Peterson will have the benefit of counsel. His request for

appointment of counsel is granted.

I. Background

The following is from Peterson’s complaint and the exhibits he has attached to his

complaint, which are part of the complaint for all purposes. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).

On October 19, 2021, Peterson was detained at CCDC. ECF 1, at 4. At that time, he was

recovering from a right knee injury sustained on July 13, 2021, and he was wearing a hinged leg

brace that had been prescribed by his orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Adams. Id. Peterson had undergone

one surgery to his knee and required a second surgery. Id. at 5.

On October 20, 2021, Peterson was interviewed by PierreSaint. Id. During this interview,

Peterson informed PierreSaint that he was scheduled to receive a second surgery on his knee on

November 2, 2021. Id. PierreSaint told Peterson that her bosses and CCDC officials would have

to give their approval for Dr. Adams to perform the second procedure. Id. Before the interview

ended, Peterson told PierreSaint that the condition of his knee limited his daily life and caused him

pain. Id.

That same day, Peterson was seen by Dr. Rottman. Peterson repeated what he had told

PierreSaint. Id. at 5–6; see also ECF 1-11, at 9.

On November 5, 2021, PierreSaint made an entry in Peterson’s medical record confirming

that a second surgery was supposed to take place to Peterson’s right knee “after he had an internal

fixation of his right patella” following a gunshot wound and attempted physical therapy. ECF 1-

11, at 9. PierreSaint noted that an ice pack would be ordered and that she would contact Peterson’s

surgeon’s office for “significance of surgery.” Id. A medical record states: “Pt also inform that

brace was not medically necessary per his MD.” Id.

PierreSaint spoke with Dr. Adams on December 1, 2021. ECF 1, at 6. Dr. Adams informed

her that the second surgery Peterson required could not be delayed “due to stiffness that will get

worse in time[.]” Id.; see also ECF 1-11, at 15 (note entry dated December 1, 2021 documenting

PierreSaint’s conversation with Dr. Adams).

On December 16, 2021, Peterson was transported to Washington Hospital Center in

Washington, D.C., to receive the second surgery to his right knee. ECF 1, at 6–7. Peterson describes

this surgery as “irrigation and debridement with [open reduction & internal fixation] of right patella

arthroscopic lysis of adhesions and manipulation under anesthesia[.]” Id. at 7. After the surgery,

the post-operative nurse provided transportation officers with discharge paperwork and

handwritten post-operative instructions from Dr. Adams which included: “physical therapy starting

12/17 for aggressive knee [range of motion].” Id.; see also ECF 1-1, at 3 (discharge instructions).

Once Peterson returned to CCDC, the transportation officers gave the medical paperwork

to the attending nurse. ECF 1, at 7. The following day, Peterson began asking PrimeCare

employees about his prescribed knee brace and why he had not yet started physical therapy. Id. at

7–8. Each time Peterson asked about physical therapy his questions were either ignored or he was

told it was being scheduled. Id. at 8. While waiting to start physical therapy, Peterson “started

trying [daily] exercises” on his own accord. Id. Nevertheless, as the delay continued, Peterson’s

knee began to stiffen. Id.

On December 21, 2021, Peterson met with PierreSaint to talk about his knee and to change

the dressing for his wound. Id. at 11. During this appointment, Peterson asked PierreSaint about

physical therapy and she responded that “Teresa [Beddow] was scheduling it.” Id. Peterson did not

know who Beddow was at that time, but each time he brought up physical therapy her name was

mentioned. Id.

On January 10, 2022, Peterson was taken to Washington Hospital Center for his first

follow-up visit with Dr. Adams. Id. at 19. Beddow scheduled this appointment. Id. at 11. Two

officers escorted Peterson to his appointment, one of whom was Evitts. Id. at 19. When Dr. Adams

learned that Peterson had not started physical therapy yet, he asked why; Peterson responded that

it was still being scheduled. Id. Dr. Adams “emphasized the importance of physical therapy” and

gave Peterson some simple exercises to perform on his own while he waited for therapy to begin.

Id. Dr. Adams prepared a physician’s report, which he sent back with Peterson to CCDC. ECF 1-

2, at 1. The report states that Peterson “needs aggressive [physical therapy] for [range of motion],

quad strengthening,” indicates that Peterson’s incisions are healed, and recommends a follow up

in six weeks. Id.; see also ECF 1-3, at 1 (final report stating that “lack of physical therapy” for

over three weeks after surgery has “certainly set [Peterson] back.”). Before Peterson left, Dr.

Adams told him to continue using his hinged knee brace because it would help him walk and

relieve pain. ECF 1, at 19. Dr. Adams also told Peterson that he no longer needed to have wound

dressing or an ace bandage since the surgical incision had healed. Id. Dr. Adams never spoke with

the transport officers about Peterson’s condition or his need, or lack thereof, for a brace. Id. at 19–

20.

When Peterson arrived back at CCDC with the transport officers, he was escorted back to

the medical department where Evitts gave Dr. Adams’s report to Beddow. Id. at 20. Evitts told

Beddow that “the doctor said he doesn’t need the knee brace anymore.” Id.; see also ECF 1-11, at

12 (medical record note by Beddow dated January 10, 2022 confirming that Evitts reported that

the surgeon said the knee brace was no longer needed). Peterson attempted to correct what Evitts

was saying and asked Beddow and Evitts to read the report or to call Dr. Adams to confirm that he

did not say he no longer needed the brace, but Beddow and Evitts ignored him. ECF 1, at 20.

Peterson’s knee brace was confiscated. Id. at 12.

The following day, Peterson saw PierreSaint again. Id. at 11. He told her that Dr. Adams

had asked why he had not started physical therapy yet. Id. Peterson explained to PierreSaint that

Dr. Adams had stressed that he needed to be working with a physical therapist. Id. at 12. Peterson

told PierreSaint that Dr. Adams had given him some alternative exercises to do until he started

physical therapy. Id. PierreSaint responded that she needed to “double check with Teresa.” Id.

Peterson also told PierreSaint that he was in pain because his hinged knee brace was improperly

confiscated the day before. Id. Peterson asked PierreSaint if she had read Dr. Adams’s report. Id.

She told him she had. Id. Peterson then asked where in the report it stated that the brace was no

longer needed. Id. PierreSaint did not directly answer the question but said that she would call Dr.

Adams. Id. Peterson told PierreSaint that Dr. Adams had told him that he no longer needed the

wound dressing and the ace bandage because the surgical incision had healed, but “this made no

sense to her.” Id.

On January 18, 2022, Peterson again met with PierreSaint and complained about not going

to physical therapy and his continued need for the return of his knee brace. Id. at 12–13. At this

point, Peterson began to believe that his medical needs were intentionally being ignored and that

PrimeCare staff were disregarding Dr. Adams’s instructions. Id. at 13. Peterson again asked

PierreSaint again about the physical therapy he was supposed be receiving and she again told him

that “Teresa is scheduling it.” Id. Peterson replied that other detainees who had not even had

surgery were being taken to physical therapy, but PierreSaint did not respond. Id. Peterson asked

twice if he could have his knee brace back while he waited for PierreSaint to talk to Dr. Adams.

Id. PierreSaint responded, “I can’t.” Id.; see also ECF 1-11 at 8. Peterson had now been denied his

brace for eight days. ECF 1, at 14. Peterson told PierreSaint that his knee was starting to stiffen up

again. Id.

On January 27, 2022, a nurse working for Dr. Adams sent a letter to CCDC indicating that

Peterson could wear his brace “at night as needed for pain.” Id. at 22; see also ECF 1-5 at 1 (letter

from Carolyn D. Tadiarca, RN). Reynolds, the head administrative nurse at CCDC who “over saw

[sic] the nurses and medical files,” came to the medical unit where Peterson was housed and

returned his knee brace. ECF 1, at 22. Peterson asked Reynolds about his physical therapy. Id.

Reynolds replied, “you were suppose[d] to have physical therapy? I have to check with Teresa.”

Id. Peterson told Reynolds that Dr. Adams had instructed that he receive physical therapy and that

all she needed to do was check his discharge and follow-up visit instructions. Id. at 22–23.

Reynolds left and never addressed Peterson’s concerns regarding the delay in receiving physical

therapy. Id. at 23.

Peterson eventually had another follow-up visit with Dr. Adams. Id. at 14. During this visit,

Dr. Adams expressed disappointment that Peterson had not yet started physical therapy. Id. Dr.

Adams stated that he could not “understand why they approved [Peterson] to have the surgery if

they were not going to provide the routine care after[.]” Id. When Peterson responded that “they

continue to say [physical therapy] is being scheduled,” Dr. Adams replied that it made “no sense

to bring [Peterson] all the way to D.C. to see [him]” when CCDC medical personnel had not

“followed [Dr. Adams’s] instructions to date.” Id. at 14–15. Dr. Adams told Peterson to continue

doing individual exercises but that he needed to engage in “formal physical therapy.” Id. at 15.

On March 1, 2022, Peterson again met with PierreSaint. Id. at 14. Peterson told PierreSaint

about the follow-up visit with Dr. Adams and how disappointed Dr. Adams was that Peterson had

not yet started physical therapy. Id. at 14–15. Peterson again asked PierreSaint about physical

therapy and this time, instead of telling him that it was being scheduled, she told him that he was

“supposed to do exercises on [his] own[.]” Id. at 15. Peterson objected, telling PierreSaint that he

had asked her about physical therapy every time they had met and that up until this point, she had

always said that it was being scheduled. Id. at 15–16. He also told her that Dr. Adams had

repeatedly sent CCDC written instructions that he needed physical therapy. Id. at 16. At this point,

Peterson was in chronic pain on the right side of his body between his hip and foot. Id.

On August 2, 2022, Peterson met with Dr. Rottman and complained that he was having

headaches and was grinding his teeth in his sleep. Id. at 29. Peterson told Dr. Rottman that he

attributed his headaches and teeth grinding to pain in his knee, right hip, and lower back, as well

as to poor circulation in his right foot. Id. Peterson also explained to Dr. Rottman that he was not

receiving physical therapy despite Dr. Adams’s orders and that he was getting “the run around”

from nursing staff. Id. Dr. Rottman took notes during this appointment and did not acknowledge

Peterson’s complaints, but did approve him for a mouth guard. Id. at 30. During this appointment,

Peterson saw Dr. Rottman put a note in the computer indicating that he had a “normal gait,” which

Peterson states “couldn’t be farther from the truth.” Id. at 33.

On August 11, 2022, Peterson met with PierreSaint for a prescheduled asthma check-up.

Id. at 16. During this appointment, PierreSaint told Peterson that medical personnel and CCDC

administrative staff wanted to move him out of the medical unit. Id. Peterson asked PierreSaint

about his physical therapy, and she replied, “you want to go to physical therapy?” Id. at 17.

Peterson responded, “you can’t be serious, I have asked you about physical therapy since I came

back from surgery in December and Dr. Adams has sent written instructions on different occasions

that I needed physical therapy[.]” Id. PierreSaint again stated that she would have to talk to Teresa

and a doctor employed by PrimeCare. Id. Peterson replied, “you have said this before.” Id.

On August 29, 2022, White and Craig came to Peterson’s housing unit and presented him

with a new knee brace “to replace [Peterson’s] medically approved hinged knee brace.” Id. at 25.

The new brace was too small for Peterson’s knee and had a “rubber donut-like cushion” that

covered the kneecap. Id. Peterson explains that this cushion would aggravate his pain because his

knee was very sensitive and contained a screw. Id. Peterson objected and told White and Craig that

the new brace would make his pain worse, was too small, and would not give him necessary

support. Id. at 25–26. White and Craig told Peterson that it was “either the new brace or nothing[.]”

Id. at 25. They then took away Peterson’s medically-approved brace “without any consultation

before hand [sic].” Id. at 26. Peterson states that no doctor had asked White and Craig “to make

this change[,] nor was an evaluation conducted by the medical staff that would make these

decisions to see what would be the appropriate change[,] if any.” Id. By taking away his medically-

approved brace, White and Craig made Peterson’s condition worse. Id.

The next day, Peterson saw Dr. Rottman regarding his knee. Id. at 28. An LPN named Fatu

Turay was present during this appointment.2 Id. at 30. During the appointment, Dr. Rottman did

not appear to be aware that the nurses had decided to confiscate Peterson’s hinged knee brace

without first consulting with him or Dr. Adams. Id. Dr. Rottman also was unaware that Peterson

had not yet received physical therapy. Id. Dr. Rottman asked Turay who had made the decision to

take away Peterson’s knee brace. Id. Turay gave an evasive response. Id. Dr. Rottman then asked

Turay when Peterson last saw Dr. Adams or when someone from the medical department had last

consulted Dr. Adams. Id. Turay responded that a transport officer had reported that Dr. Adams said

he no longer needed to see Peterson. Id. at 30–31. Dr. Rottman then asked Turay for the physician’s

report that Dr. Adams had filled out after Peterson’s last visit. Id. at 31. Turay replied that Beddow

had the report, and Dr. Rottman sent Turay to retrieve it. Id. After Turay left, Peterson told Dr.

Rottman that Dr. Adams never said he didn’t need to see him again. Id. Rather, Dr. Adams had

stated that he did not know what to do because the lack of physical therapy was impeding

Peterson’s recovery. Id.

Turay eventually returned to Dr. Rottman’s office with Beddow. Id. Dr. Rottman asked

Beddow why Peterson had not seen Dr. Adams again. Id. at 32. Beddow said that the transportation

officer had stated that Dr. Adams did not need to see Peterson anymore. Id. Dr. Rottman then asked

Beddow for the physician’s report. Id. Dr. Rottman read the report and then asked Beddow to point

out where in the report it stated that Peterson no longer needed to see Dr. Adams. Id. Beddow had

no answer. Id. at 32–33. At the end of this appointment, Dr. Rottman told Beddow and Turay to

2 Peterson sometimes refers to Turay as a “defendant” in the body of his complaint, but the Court

presumes that this is a scrivener’s error because Peterson has not listed Turay as a defendant in the

case caption and has not sought to amend his complaint to add Turay as a defendant.

return Peterson’s hinged knee brace, stated that he was going to call Dr. Adams, and scheduled

Peterson for physical therapy. Id. at 33.

It was not until ten months after his knee surgery, in September 2022, that Peterson was

taken to physical therapy. Id. at 9. By this point, however, “it was too late.” Id. The physical

therapist told Peterson that “with the type of surgery [he] had [he was] suppose[d] to start physical

therapy right after the surgery, which was routine.” Id. at 38.

On December 10, 2024, Peterson filed this lawsuit. He states that as of filing the suit, he

“still ha[s] chronic pain in [his] right knee, [his] right hip and lower back has continued to get

worse . . . and [his] right foot blood circulation is poor whenever [he] tr[ies] to sleep, sit down, or

use the bathroom.” Id. at 9. He sues all defendants in their individual and official capacities. He

accuses them of violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights.3 He seeks compensatory and punitive

damages as well as declaratory relief.

On May 9, 2025, Evitts and Craig filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for

summary judgment, ECF 16, which is fully briefed, ECF 16-1, 21, & 23.4 PrimeCare filed a motion

3 In his complaint, Peterson identifies the Eighth Amendment as the basis for his claims. Because

Peterson was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events alleged in his complaint, the Fourteenth

Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment, governs his claims. See Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295,

300 (4th Cir. 2021). In their dispositive motion, Craig and Evitts argue that Peterson’s claims

should be dismissed because he has identified the incorrect constitutional amendment as the basis

for his lawsuit. ECF 16-1, at 7. Peterson subsequently filed a motion for leave to amend his

complaint to identify the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for his claims. ECF 19. This motion

is fully briefed. ECF 20 & 22. Because Peterson is pro se, the Court liberally construes his original

complaint to assert his claims under the Fourteenth, rather than the Eighth, Amendment. Thus, the

motion for leave to amend is denied as moot, and the Court will not dismiss Peterson’s claims for

failure to identify the correct constitutional amendment.

4 Peterson has sought leave to file a surreply to Craig and Evitts’s dispositive motion. ECF 32.

Craig and Evitts oppose the motion. ECF 33. Surreplies are disfavored. See Chubb & Son v. C &

C Complete Servs., LLC, 919 F. Supp. 2d 666, 679 (D. Md. 2013). “Surreplies, however, ‘may be

permitted when the moving party would be unable to contest matters presented to the court for the

first time in the opposing party’s reply.’” Medish v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 272 F. Supp.

3d 719, 722 (D. Md. 2017) (quoting Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F. Supp. 2d 600, 605 (D. Md. 2003)).

to dismiss on July 16, 2025. ECF 24. On July 19, 2025, PierreSaint, Dr. Rottman, Beddow,

Reynolds, and White filed motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. ECF

27 (PierreSaint & Dr. Rottman mot.) & 28 (Beddow, Reynolds, & White mot.).5 Peterson filed an

omnibus opposition to PrimeCare, PierreSaint, Dr. Rottman, Beddow, Reynolds, and White’s

motions on September 19, 2025. ECF 42.6

II. Standard of Review

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may seek dismissal for failure “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Robertson v. Anderson Mill Elementary Sch., 989 F.3d 282, 290 (4th Cir.

2021) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). To survive the challenge, the opposing party must have

pleaded facts demonstrating it has a plausible right to relief from the court. Lokhova v. Halper, 995

F.3d 134, 141 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A plausible claim

Craig and Evitts did not raise any new matters in their reply. Peterson’s motion for leave to file a

surreply is denied.

5 Peterson has filed a motion for default judgment against Beddow, Reynolds, White, and Dr.

Rottman. ECF 36. Beddow, Reynolds, White, and Dr. Rottman oppose the motion. ECF 38. Under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), default may be entered “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for

affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by

affidavit or otherwise.” The failure to plead or defend does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to

entry of default judgment. The decision to enter default is left to the discretion of this Court. See

Dow v. Jones, 232 F. Supp. 2d 491, 494 (D. Md. 2002). Entry of default judgment is not favored

and is reserved for cases where the adversary process has been halted by an unresponsive party.

See United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 453 (4th Cir. 1993). The adversary process

has not been halted here. The motion for default judgment is denied.

In addition, PierreSaint, Dr. Rottman, Beddow, Reynolds, and White have filed a motion

to seal the medical records they have attached to their dispositive motions, citing the need to protect

Peterson’s personal identifying information and privacy. ECF 29. However, many of these records

are already on the public docket because Peterson himself filed them. The motion to seal is denied

with instructions to counsel to redact Peterson’s date of birth and social security number if either

appears anywhere in the records.

6 Peterson filed motions for extensions of time to respond to the defendants’ dispositive motions.

ECF 18 & 34. Those extension motions are unopposed. The Court grants them, nunc pro tunc, and

deems Peterson’s oppositions timely filed.

is more than merely conceivable or speculative. See Holloway v. Maryland, 32 F.4th 293, 299 (4th

Cir. 2022). The allegations must show there is “more than a sheer possibility that the defendant

has acted unlawfully.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 961 F.3d 635, 648 (4th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). But the claim does not need to be probable and the pleader need

not show “that alternative explanations are less likely” than their theory. Jesus Christ Is the Answer

Ministries, Inc. v. Baltimore Cnty., 915 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Houck v. Substitute

Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015)).

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept the allegations as true and

“draw all reasonable inferences in favor of” the pleader. Williams v. Kincaid, 45 F.4th 759, 765

(4th Cir. 2022) (quoting King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016)). But the court does

not accept “legal conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable

conclusions, or arguments.” United States ex rel. Taylor v. Boyko, 39 F.4th 177, 189 (4th Cir. 2022)

(quoting United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455 (4th Cir.

2013)). Merely reciting a claim’s elements “and supporting them by conclusory statements does

not meet the required standard.” Sheppard v. Visitors of Va. State Univ., 993 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir.

2021) (quoting ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. City of Buena Vista, 917 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2019)).

The court “does not resolve contests surrounding facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability

of defenses.” Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d

379, 387 (4th Cir. 2013)).

The court’s review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion typically is limited to the pleadings,

documents attached to the complaint, and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 12(d);

see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). The court also may consider judicially noticed facts and documents

integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint when their authenticity is not disputed. See Zak

v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 606–07 (4th Cir. 2015); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

Peterson does not have counsel. “[P]ro se filings are ‘h[e]ld to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Folkes v. Nelsen, 34 F.4th 258, 272 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Accordingly, the court must construe pro se pleadings

liberally. Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020). But “liberal construction does

not require [the court] to attempt to ‘discern the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff[;]’” the court

need only “determine the actual meaning of the words used in the complaint.” Williams v. Ozmint,

716 F.3d 801, 805 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006)

(en banc)). Thus, a pro se complaint “still ‘must contain enough facts to state a claim for relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Thomas v. Salvation Army S. Territory, 841 F.3d 632, 637 (4th Cir. 2016)

(quoting King, 825 F.3d at 214).

Several defendants seek summary judgment as alternative relief. The Court notified

Peterson that he had the right to respond to their motions, that the motions could be construed as

motions for summary judgment, and that if Peterson did not file a timely and adequate written

response to each motion, the Court could enter judgment against him without providing him

another opportunity to respond. ECF 17, 30, 31. Moreover, the motions, which identify summary

judgment as possible relief, provided sufficient notice for Peterson to have a reasonable

opportunity to present relevant evidence or to notify the Court that he needed an opportunity for

discovery before fully responding to the motion. See Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149

F.3d 253, 260–61 (4th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). The Court is satisfied that Peterson has

been advised that the motions could be treated as motions for summary judgment and he has had

a reasonable opportunity to present relevant evidence or to notify the Court that he needed an

opportunity for discovery before fully responding to the motion. The Court will resolve the

motions, in part, under Rule 56.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party establishes that “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To meet its burden, the party must identify “particular parts of materials in

the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” in support of

its position. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Then, “[t]o avoid summary judgment, the opposing party

must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Perkins v. Int’l Paper

Co., 936 F.3d 196, 205 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986)). A dispute of fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The opposing party must identify

more than a “scintilla of evidence” in support of its position to defeat the motion for summary

judgment. Id. at 252. The court “should not weigh the evidence.” Perkins, 936 F.3d at 205 (citing

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). However, if “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier

of fact to find for the non-moving party,” then summary judgment is proper. Id. (quoting Teamsters

Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1991)); see also Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court

“view[s] the facts and inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to . . . the

nonmoving party.” Perkins, 936 F.3d at 205 (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80

F.3d 954, 958 (4th Cir. 1996)).

III. Discussion

The United States Code provides a federal cause of action for any individual who believes

a state actor has deprived them of a constitutional right. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; City of Monterey v.

Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). The statute “is not itself a source

of substantive rights, but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.

137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Two elements are essential to state a claim under § 1983: (1) the plaintiff

must have suffered a deprivation of “rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution

and laws” of the United States; and (2) the act or omission causing the deprivation must have been

“committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 45 n.3, 48

(1988) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Peterson accuses the defendants of deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords pretrial detainees the

right to receive adequate medical care. Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir.

2001) (stating that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth

Amendment, mandates the provision of medical care” to pretrial detainees “who require it”)

(citation omitted)). “To state a claim of deliberate indifference to a medical need,” a pretrial

detainee must plausibly allege that

(1) they had a medical condition or injury that posed a substantial risk of serious

harm; (2) the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act

to appropriately address the risk that the condition posed; (3) the defendant knew

or should have known (a) that the detainee had that condition and (b) that the

defendant’s action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as

a result, the detainee was harmed.

Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023).

A. Official Capacity Claims

Peterson sues all individual defendants in their official capacities.7 An official-capacity suit

“generally represent[s] only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which [the]

officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). A plaintiff suing a defendant

in their official capacity must allege that “the entity’s ‘policy or custom’. . . played a part in the

violation of federal law.” Id. at 165–66 (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978)). Peterson does not plausibly allege that any of the individual defendants’ actions were

taken pursuant to a “policy or custom” of either PrimeCare or CCDC. Thus, all official capacity

claims against the individual defendants are dismissed without prejudice. The remainder of this

opinion addresses Peterson’s individual capacity claims.

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Evitts and Craig argue that they are entitled to dismissal of Peterson’s claims against them

and summary judgment because Peterson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, states that “[n]o action

shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The phrase “prison

conditions” encompasses “all inmate [and pretrial detainee] suits about prison life, whether they

involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or

some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); see Chase v. Peay, 286 F. Supp.

2d 523, 528 (D. Md. 2003).

7 Peterson also purports to sue PrimeCare in its “individual and official capacity.” The Court

resolves the claim against PrimeCare in part III.C.

Exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is mandatory. A plaintiff must exhaust their available

administrative remedies before this Court will hear their claim. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632,

639 (2016); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215–16 (2007); Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs.,

Inc., 407 F.2d 674, 682 (4th Cir. 2005). Consequently, if Peterson has not properly presented any

of his claims through an available administrative remedy procedure, that claim must be dismissed

pursuant to the PLRA. See Ross, 578 U.S. at 639. Administrative exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is

not, however, a jurisdictional requirement and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement

on the detainee. Jones, 549 U.S. at 215–16. Rather, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies

is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proven by defendants. See id.; Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d

358, 361 (4th Cir. 2017). The Court may dismiss a claim on this ground only if “the defendants

raise the issue as an affirmative defense and the [detainee] has had an opportunity to respond to

the affirmative defense” or in “the rare, exceptional instance where administrative exhaustion”—

or lack thereof—is “apparent on the complaint’s face.” Custis, 851 F.3d at 362 (citing Moore v.

Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008)).

To properly exhaust administrative remedies, an inmate must complete “the administrative

review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines.” Woodford

v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 93 (2006); Moore, 517 F.3d at 725. Under this requirement, an inmate

must use “all steps that the agency holds out, and [do] so properly (so that the agency addresses

the issues on the merits).” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93 (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022,

1024 (7th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis in original). A court will not dismiss a claim as unexhausted “if a

prisoner, through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing himself of [an administrative

remedy].” Moore, 517 F.3d at 725. Nor must a detainee name particular defendants in the grievance

if the applicable grievance procedure does not require him to do so, so long as the grievance allows

the facility in which he is confined “to address complaints about the program it administers before

being subjected to suit[.]” Id. at 726 (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007)).

An inmate need only exhaust “available” remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Ross, 578

U.S. at 635–36. The Court will not grant the defendants summary judgment on an exhaustion

defense “if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing himself of [an

administrative remedy].” Moore, 517 F.3d at 725. “The Supreme Court has identified certain

circumstances in which an official grievance policy is not ‘capable of use’ in this sense,” including

“situations in which officials ‘thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through

machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.’” Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 621 (4th Cir.

2021) (quoting Ross, 578 U.S. at 644).

Here, the evidence submitted by Craig and Evitts establishes that CCDC has a four-step

grievance process. ECF 16-5, at 3. First, a detainee should raise concerns with a supervisor. Id.

Second, if that does not resolve their concern, the detainee must complete an inmate request form

that “explain[s] [their] concern in detail, and describe[s] [their] efforts to resolve the issue.” Id.

Third, once they receive a response to the inmate request form (which must occur within five

business days), they may be given the option to file a grievance, which they must do within five

days by completing and returning the appropriate form. Id. Finally, once they receive a response

(which must occur within seven business days), they may appeal to the director within three

business days. Id. The policy does not state what happens if the detainee does not receive a

response to their inmate request form or their grievance or if they are not given the option to file a

grievance. The policy does not require that detainees name the CCDC personnel responsible for

their alleged injuries. The policy states that “[i]f you fail to follow these steps, you will not have

exhausted your administrative remedies.” Id. at 4.

The record reveals that Peterson filed an inmate request on August 30, 2022. That request

is addressed to “Captain Dixon,” and reads:

Capt. Dixon; I need security video confirmation from January 2022 until present of

me exercising my knee. I saw the Doctor today and the nurses tried to switch blame

on me concerning the poor condition of my knee. As prescribed by the operating

orthopedic surgeon I was suppose[d] to start aggressive physical therapy after my

surgery back in December 2021. Medical was made aware of this several times by

myself and the surgeon. Today the Doctor was unaware of the poor condition of my

knee and that the nurses took my knee brace and replaced it with a brace that is

harmful and inefficient. He recommended I get the original brace back and told me

I was scheduled for physical therapy. Can you please confirm this with the Doctor

here? You can also get confirmation from various officers here at CCDC during this

time-frame that they have witnessed my daily exercises.

ECF 1-11, at 1. A notation at the bottom indicates that Captain Dixon forwarded the letter to

“medical” on August 31, 2022. Id.

Craig and Evitts make two arguments as to why they are entitled to dismissal and/or

summary judgment on failure-to-exhaust grounds. The Court limits its consideration to those

arguments. See Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. 7, 9 (2025) (discussing principle of party presentation).

First, Craig and Evitts argue that the claims against them should be dismissed because Peterson

failed to allege that he pursued the remaining steps necessary to exhaust his remedies after filing

his request. But Peterson was not required to so allege. See Moore, 517 F.3d at 725. Nor is this one

of the “rare, exceptional” instances where an exhaustion defense can be adjudicated on the face of

the complaint. Custis, 851 F.3d at 362.

Second, Craig and Evitts seek summary judgment, arguing that Peterson’s request was

insufficient because it does not mention them or “challenge their alleged actions.” ECF 16-1, at 6.

The mere fact that Peterson’s request did not mention Craig and Evitts by name is not dispositive

because CCDC policy does not require detainees to name the individuals responsible for their

injuries when filing an inmate request. See Moore, 517 F.3d at 726 (prisoner not required to name

defendants in grievance where grievance policy did not require him to do so). Moreover, even

though Peterson does not specify that Craig was involved, his request describes the incident in

which his medically-approved knee brace was confiscated and replaced. His request provided

CCDC with sufficient information to investigate his complaint and identify the officers involved.

Craig has not shown that he is entitled to summary judgment on Peterson’s claim against him for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The analysis is different, however, as to Evitts. Nowhere in Peterson’s request did he

describe the incident he now complains of in this lawsuit: Evitts falsely telling Beddow that Dr.

Adams had discontinued the brace. Peterson thus failed to follow all necessary steps to exhaust his

administrative remedies as to Evitts per the procedure prescribed by CCDC because he failed to

describe his complaint against Evitts in any detail. Evitts is entitled to summary judgment because

Peterson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against him. The Court will dismiss

Peterson’s claim against Evitts without prejudice to Peterson’s right to bring that claim in a new

civil action if he first exhausts it. See Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 623 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2021)

(affirming grant of summary judgment and dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust and

noting it was “consistent with precedent” to grant summary judgment yet dismiss without prejudice

if the claims might later be exhausted).

C. Craig

Craig argues that Peterson fails to state a claim against him for deliberate indifference under

the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court disagrees. Peterson alleges that he had an objectively

serious medical condition—a knee injury--and required a prescribed brace to provide his knee with

adequate support. He further alleges that, without consulting with Peterson’s doctor and over

Peterson’s protestations, Craig took this brace from him and replaced it with one that was too small

and made his pain worse. This is sufficient to allege that Craig acted knowingly or recklessly in

the face of a serious risk of harm that Craig should have known about and that Craig caused harm

to Peterson as a result.

Craig also argues that he is entitled to summary judgment. He argues that he lacked the

authority to provide Peterson medical care and claims that, as a nonmedical professional, he was

entitled to rely on White’s judgment in determining that Peterson no longer needed the brace. Craig

has submitted an affidavit in which he states that, when he accompanied White to Peterson’s cell,

his “only role was to provide security, not to determine what knee brace [Peterson] would wear”

and that “the Detention Center” relies on PrimeCare’s judgment and assessment to address

detainees’ complaints about their medical care. ECF 16-3, at 3. Craig adds that as a correctional

officer, he lacks “the authority to make any decisions . . . concerning the appropriate medical care

for an inmate.” Id. at 2. Craig also contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity for the same

reasons. ECF 16-1, at 10.

In his opposition to Craig and Evitts’s motion, Peterson argues that summary judgment on

his claim against Craig would be premature because he has not yet had the opportunity to engage

in discovery. The Court understands Peterson to be invoking Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, which allows a district court to defer summary judgment to allow for discovery

when a nonmovant shows that they “cannot present facts essential to justify [their] opposition[.]”

A party invoking Rule 56(d)’s protections ordinarily must submit a Rule 56(d) declaration setting

forth their reasons for opposition. Evans, 80 F.3d at 961. Even without a Rule 56(d) declaration,

the court may consider whether the nonmoving party “adequately informed the [ ] court that the

motion [for summary judgment] is [premature] and more discovery is necessary.” Harrods Ltd. v.

Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002). The Fourth Circuit has

emphasized that discovery is “broadly favored” before granting summary judgment and district

courts are to afford pro se plaintiffs leniency in regard to the requirements of Rule 56(d). See,

e.g., Farabee v. Gardella, 131 F.4th 185, 193–95 (4th Cir. 2025). Relief under Rule 56(d) should

be “liberally granted,” especially “in the context of pro se litigation,” Jenkins v. Woodard, 109

F.4th 242, 251 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing Pledger v. Lynch, 5 F.4th 511, 526 (4th Cir. 2021)), “when a

case involves complex factual questions about intent and motive,” or “the relevant facts are

exclusively in the control of the opposing party,” Harrods Ltd., 302 F.3d at 247 (quoting 10B

Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2741, at 419 (3d ed.

1998) (“Wright & Miller”)).

Peterson asserts that security footage will show that, when Craig and White came to his

cell, Peterson attempted to explain to White that he could not use the replacement brace, but instead

of letting him explain himself to White, Craig cut him off and demanded that he give up his

prescribed brace. ECF 21, at 13–14. Peterson also claims that discovery will allow him to learn

who authorized Craig and White to take his brace from him. Id. at 15. Craig is correct that

nonmedical correctional personnel are generally entitled to defer to the opinions of medical

personnel. See, e.g., Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 1995) (“supervisory prison officials

are entitled to rely on [the] professional judgment of trained medical personnel”) (citing Miltier v.

Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Fidrych v. Marriott Int’l,

Inc., 952 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 2020)). However, discovery will reveal whether Craig was merely

acting in reliance on the opinions of White or other medical officials or whether he was in fact

acting on his own initiative and/or on the orders of nonmedical CCDC personnel. Peterson has

adequately informed the Court that Craig’s request for summary judgment is premature. Given

these “complex factual questions about intent and motive,” Harrods Ltd., 302 F.3d at 247 (quoting

Wright & Miller § 2741), the Court denies summary judgment on Peterson’s Fourteenth

Amendment claim against Craig.

That Craig has asserted a qualified immunity defense does not change the Court’s analysis.

In adjudicating a qualified immunity defense, the Court must consider “first, whether the facts

viewed in [Peterson’s] favor make out a violation of his . . . constitutional rights, and second,

whether that violated right was clearly established at the time.” Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227,

233 (4th Cir. 2022). Peterson bears the burden of proof on the first prong, and Craig bears the

burden of proof on the second prong. Id. To be sure, “when a plaintiff files a Rule 56(d) request in

opposition to a dispositive motion by a defendant who has asserted qualified immunity, the

plaintiff’s burden is ‘somewhat elevated . . . because officials have a right, not merely to avoid

standing trial, but also to avoid the burdens of such pretrial matters as discovery.’” Gardner v.

United States, 184 F. Supp. 3d 175, 185 (D. Md. 2016) (quoting Gomez v. Martin, 593 F. App’x

756, 760 (10th Cir. 2014)). But Peterson has satisfied the Court that discovery is warranted. Craig

has not argued that any right he may have violated was not clearly established. Thus, Craig has

failed to meet his burden on the second prong of the qualified immunity test. And, as discussed

above, Peterson has forecast that discovery on the first prong—namely, whether Craig violated his

Fourteenth Amendment rights—is necessary for him to oppose summary judgment. Adjudicating

Craig’s qualified immunity defense at this stage is premature.

Craig’s request to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment claim against him is denied. His

motion for summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment claim is denied.

D. PrimeCare

PrimeCare asserts that the claim against it should be dismissed because Peterson has not

alleged the existence of a corporate policy or custom that has resulted in a violation of his

constitutional rights.

A private corporation that acts on behalf of a state actor, such as PrimeCare, may be found

liable under a Monell theory of liability under limited circumstances. See Monell, 436 U.S. at

690 (municipal liability under § 1983); Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 728 (4th

Cir. 1999) (liability of a private corporation under § 1983). To state a Monell claim against a

private corporation acting under color of state law, the plaintiff must “identify a . . . ‘policy’ or

‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403

(1997). A policy or custom may be established in any of four ways:

(1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through

the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an

omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that “manifest[s] deliberate

indifference to the rights of citizens”; or (4) through a practice that is so “persistent

and widespread” as to constitute a “custom or usage with the force of law.”

Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 217 (4th

Cir. 1999)). An entity “may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor,”

and the court will not impose liability “under a theory of respondeat superior.” Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 403 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); see Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co., 678

F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that liability of a private corporation under § 1983/Monell,

like local government liability under § 1983/Monell, requires more than respondeat superior).

Peterson accuses PrimeCare of “repeatedly ignoring their own policy of employee review

and audit of patient care” and “let[ting] their employees make decisions and prescriber care outside

of their purview and knowledge.” ECF 1, at 37–38. These conclusory allegations do not plausibly

allege the existence of a company-wide policy or practice that caused Peterson’s injuries. Peterson

also contends that PrimeCare should be held “liable for each of its employee[s’] illicit

actions[]when they don’t uphold company policy.” Id. at 37. But the mere fact that PrimeCare

employs the people who harmed Peterson is not a basis for holding PrimeCare liable under § 1983.

Because Peterson fails to plausibly allege that his injuries resulted from a PrimeCare policy or

custom, his claim against PrimeCare must be dismissed without prejudice.

E. Dr. Rottman

Dr. Rottman argues that Peterson’s claims against him should be dismissed for failure to

state a claim. The Court agrees.

Most of Peterson’s allegations against Dr. Rottman suggest that Dr. Rottman acted with the

opposite of deliberate indifference. On Peterson’s account, Dr. Rottman challenged Beddow and

Turay when he learned that Peterson’s brace had been confiscated, ordered them to return the brace

to him, and ensured that Peterson finally received the physical therapy that had been so long

delayed. Peterson otherwise alleges that, during an earlier appointment, Dr. Rottman incorrectly

noted that his gait was normal. But without more details, the Court cannot plausibly infer that Dr.

Rottman’s entry of this note into Peterson’s medical record impacted the type or promptness of the

treatment Peterson received.

Peterson’s claim against Dr. Rottman is dismissed without prejudice.

F. PierreSaint, Reynolds, Beddow, and White

PierreSaint, Reynolds, Beddow, and White argue that Peterson fails to state a claim against

them.

Peterson plausibly alleges that PierreSaint violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. He

alleges that he had a serious knee injury that, if not properly treated, could cause substantial harm.

He further plausibly alleges that PierreSaint, despite knowing that Peterson’s doctor had ordered

physical therapy, delayed and deflected his requests for physical therapy for months—at first by

repeatedly telling him it was being scheduled, then by telling him he simply needed to do exercises

on his own, and eventually by feigning ignorance that he had ever asked about it. And he alleges

that as a result of this delay in receiving medically necessary treatment, the condition of his knee

deteriorated and physical therapy became nonviable as a treatment option. These allegations

plausibly suggest that PierreSaint knowingly failed to act to address a substantial risk of serious

harm of which she was or should reasonably have been aware and that her inaction caused Peterson

serious harm.

Peterson also plausibly alleges that Reynolds violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. A

supervisory employee such as Reynolds may be found liable only if the plaintiff shows that the

official “acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff[’s] rights.” Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d

926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (quoting Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D. Md.), aff’d, 451

F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971)). To state a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983 based on

a subordinate’s conduct, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the supervisor had “actual or

constructive knowledge” that a subordinate’s conduct “posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of

constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff”; (2) the supervisor responded in a manner that

was so inadequate that it showed “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization” of

the subordinate’s conduct; and (3) there was “an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s

inaction” and the plaintiff’s constitutional injury. Timpson ex rel. Timpson v. Anderson Cnty.

Disabilities & Special Needs Bd., 31 F.4th 238, 257 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13

F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)).

Peterson alleges that he spoke directly to Reynolds, a head administrative nurse, about his

need for physical therapy. He further alleges that he urged her to look at his medical records to

verify that he had been ordered to receive physical therapy. And he alleges that, although Reynolds

told him she would look into the matter, he never heard from her again and continued to experience

difficulties obtaining physical therapy after he spoke to her. At this stage, these allegations are

sufficient to raise a plausible inference that Reynolds was aware that her subordinates were not

providing Peterson physical therapy, that she responded with deliberate indifference or tacit

authorization to this information, and that if she had taken action, Peterson would have received

physical therapy.

Peterson also plausibly alleges that Beddow and White violated his Fourteenth Amendment

rights. He alleges that he had a medically-prescribed brace that supported his knee and alleviated

his pain. He further alleges that Beddow relied on the word of Evitts, a correctional officer who

was not a medical professional, to conclude that he did not require this brace any longer, even

though Beddow had in hand a report from Peterson’s orthopedic surgeon that said nothing about

Peterson no longer needing the brace. Peterson also alleges that White later confiscated his brace

again without consulting with his doctor. These allegations suggest that, in taking away his brace,

Beddow and White acted recklessly in the face of a risk of harm to Peterson about which they

should have known. And Peterson plausibly alleges that not being able to use his prescribed brace

caused him pain and worsened the condition of his knee.

Peterson has alleged sufficient facts to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim against

PierreSaint, Reynolds, Beddow, and White.

PierreSaint, Reynolds, Beddow, and White argue, in the alternative, that they are entitled

to summary judgment on Peterson’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. In conclusory fashion, they

assert that Peterson “received consistent and comprehensive care for his right knee . . . and that

medical personnel communicated with . . . Dr. Adams[]regarding his care and reviewed Dr.

Adams’[s] records to get a better understanding of his problems.” ECF 27-1, at 14; ECF 28-1, at

11. They also contend that the medical records do not support Peterson’s account. See, e.g., ECF

28-1, at 10–11, ECF 27-1, at 13. Beddow further argues that when she took away Peterson’s brace

she did so “in good faith based on information provided by detention center personnel[.]” ECF 28-

1, at 11. PierreSaint contends that there is no evidence that she had the “ability or authority to make

a decision regarding whether or not [Peterson] required formal physical therapy” and that the

medical records do not support Peterson’s account of events. ECF 27-1, at 13. Reynolds states that

she “adopt[s]” PierreSaint’s arguments on this issue. ECF 28-1, at 12 n.1. White, for her part,

argues that there is no evidence that she was responsible for the decision to take Peterson’s brace

and that she was really attempting to help him when she did so. ECF 28-1, at 10.

In response, Peterson argues that his medical records are incomplete and unreliable and

that the defendants are not credible. See, e.g., ECF 42, at 10, 23–24. Throughout his opposition,

he urges that discovery will allow him to marshal more evidence to support his account and

demonstrate that there are genuine disputes of material fact precluding summary judgment. See,

e.g., id. at 10, 13, 23, 33. Peterson also has filed a “motion for discovery” making substantially the

same arguments, which the Court construes as a Rule 56(d) request. ECF 37. For instance, Peterson

claims that in discovery, he will be able to obtain evidence that White was not authorized to take

his knee brace. Peterson insists that that if Dr. Adams is deposed, he will be able to shed light on

his communications with CCDC staff and explain what he told them about Peterson’s medical

care. Id. at 6–8. Peterson contends that without such discovery, summary judgment is premature.

ECF 42, at 23.

Although Peterson has not submitted a formal Rule 56(d) declaration, the Court affords

him leniency as to this requirement, in light of his pro se status. By repeatedly emphasizing the

need for discovery and by specifying that he needs specific forms of discovery such as depositions

and interrogatories to fully address the defendants’ claims, Peterson has “adequately informed the

[ ] court” that granting summary judgment to PierreSaint, Reynolds, Beddow, and White would be

premature. Harrods Ltd., 302 F.3d at 244. Thus, insofar as PierreSaint, Reynolds, Beddow, and

White seek summary judgment on the current record, the Court denies their motions.

G. Request for Counsel

Peterson requests that the Court appoint counsel. In civil cases, a federal district court judge

has the discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) to appoint counsel, but only if an indigent claimant

presents exceptional circumstances. See Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975); see

also Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982). “Courts consider ‘the type and complexity

of the case,’ whether the plaintiff has a colorable claim, and the plaintiff’s ability to prosecute the

claim.” Giddings v. Montgomery Cnty., No. GJH-21-959, 2021 WL 5921382, at *1 (D. Md. Dec.

15, 2021) (quoting Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other

grounds by Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989)), aff’d, No. 22-6057, 2022 WL

1284296 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 2022).

This case warrants appointment of counsel. Peterson has colorable claims against several

defendants. He has skillfully prosecuted this suit thus far, submitting well-written and often

persuasive filings that accurately cite relevant caselaw and use it to his advantage. However, this

case is proceeding with discovery. Discovery likely will involve depositions of medical

professionals and analysis of medical records. It will be difficult for Peterson, who is not a lawyer

and is currently incarcerated, to engage in this process without the assistance of counsel. The Court

appoints counsel to represent Peterson in this matter.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Craig and Evitts’s dispositive motion, treated in part as a motion

to dismiss and in part as a motion for summary judgment, is granted in part and denied in part.

PrimeCare’s motion to dismiss is granted. PierreSaint and Dr. Rottman’s dispositive motion,

treated in part as a motion to dismiss and in part as a motion for summary judgment, is granted in

part and denied in part. Beddow, Reynolds, and White’s dispositive motion, treated in part as a

motion to dismiss and in part as a motion for summary judgment, is granted in part and denied in

part. The motion for leave to amend is denied as moot. The motion to seal, motion for default

judgment, and motion for leave to file a surreply are denied. Peterson’s motions for extension of

time are granted nunc pro tunc.

Peterson’s individual-capacity deliberate indifference claims against Craig, PierreSaint,

Beddow, Reynolds, and White will proceed to discovery. Peterson’s request for appointment of

counsel is granted.

A separate Order follows.

Se

Date: March 31, 2026 Kobe

Deborah L. Boardman

United States District Judge

30