Basemore

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LARRY BASEMORE, )

M17380, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:26-cv-00145-GCS

)

ZACHARY HART, )

SGT. AGNE, )

AMANDA CHOATE, )

C/O WILSON, )

C/O FARRAR, )

B. KELLER, )

SANDY L. WALKER, )

ANTHONY B. JONES, )

ANTHONY WILLS, )

JACOB GUTERSLOH, )

KEVIN REICHERT, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Larry Basemore, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) who is currently detained at Menard Correctional Center, brings this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional

rights. Specifically, Basemore faults the defendants for their response to a mental health

emergency, their alleged use of excessive force, the medical care rendered, and

subsequent disciplinary proceedings.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1 Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b).

Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law

is immune from such relief must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

THE COMPLAINT

Basemore alleges on December 15, 2024, he was on crisis watch at Menard when

he informed Defendants Keller, Wilson, and Farrar that he had ingested a “line” covered

in staples. (Doc. 1, p. 5). The three defendants did not immediately act and left the

gallery. Farrar and Wilson then returned with Defendant Hart who yelled he would not

tolerate the behavior and commanded Basemore to take the line out of his mouth. Id.

Basemore asked Hart for a sergeant, but Hart responded by deploying mace and Hart

refused further aid. Id. at p.5-6.

Shortly thereafter Basemore saw Defendant Agne and informed Agne he had

swallowed the line and Hart had maced him. (Doc. 1, p. 6). Agne cuffed Basemore up

and walked him to the healthcare unit. Id. Once placed in a room, Basemore overheard

Defendant Amanda indicating she did not want to send him out for emergency care

because she did not feel like completing paperwork. Id. Basemore alleges Hart then

1 The Court has jurisdiction to screen Plaintiff’s Complaint in light of his consent to

the full jurisdiction of a magistrate judge (Doc. 7) and the limited consent to the exercise

of magistrate judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memorandums of Understanding

between the IDOC, Wexford, and this Court.

entered the room, ripped the line out of Basemore’s mouth, and beat him with the mace

can. Id. at p. 7.

At some point, Defendant Keller asked Basemore how he felt and Basemore

reported the pain and assault, but Keller did nothing. (Doc. 1, p. 7). Defendants Farrar

and Wilson then arrived, applied handcuffs, and refused Basemore’s pleas for care. Agne

stood by and directed Basemore to return to his cell. Basemore alleges that he was

escorted back to his cell, and upon arrival at the cell, Farrar, Wilson, Hart, and Agne all

participated in pulling his cuffs despite his exclamations of pain. Id. at p. 7-8.

Basemore was eventually escorted back to the healthcare unit, at which point

Defendant Amanda allegedly agreed with a doctor that Basemore would need to be seen

at an outside facility to assess his severely swollen wrist. (Doc. 1, p. 8). Basemore was

escorted to a hospital. He alleges upon return to the prison, he was placed in a crisis

watch cell with no running water. He remained in that cell until December 27, 2024. In

the interim, he saw his father on a video visit, and he alleged his father vowed to contact

the governor’s office. Id. at p. 9. Basemore alleges an officer photographed his injuries

after his father contacted Springfield.

After Basemore was released from crisis watch, he faced a disciplinary ticket

before Defendants Walker and Jones. (Doc. 1, p. 9). He alleges he told Jones and Walker

he did not assault anyone, but no investigation was done, and he received 3 months in

restrictive housing. Id. He faults Defendant Wills for signing off on the discipline and

Defendants Gutersloh and Reichert for signing off on his grievance about the discipline.

Id. at p. 9-10.

Basemore sues the defendants in their individual and official capacities. (Doc. 1,

p. 11-12). He seeks money damages, a prison transfer, and medical care for his alleged

injuries. Id. at p. 13. Basemore attached an assortment of documents to his complaint

including grievances, medical records, prison financial records, and disciplinary

documents. Id. at p. 15-45; (Doc. 1-1).

DISCUSSION

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide

the pro se action into the following counts:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendants Wilson, Farrar, Keller, Agne, and Hart for

declining initial medical/mental health assistance when

Basemore reported that he had swallowed a foreign object

on December 15, 2024;

Count 2: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against

Defendants Hart, Wilson, Farrar, and Agne for the alleged

force used on December 15, 2024;

Count 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Amanda for refusing initial medical care on

December 15, 2024;

Count 4: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against

Defendants Walker, Jones, Wills, Gutersloh, and Reichert

concerning discipline Basemore received as a result of the

December 15, 2024, incidents.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading standard.2

OFFICIAL CAPACITY CLAIMS

Basemore sues all defendants in their official and individual capacities. (Doc. 1, p.

11-12). Claims for monetary damages may only be pursued against state officials in their

individual capacities. See Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 918 (7th Cir. 2005); Shockley v. Jones,

823 F.2d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the official capacity claims against all

defendants are dismissed without prejudice.

Counts 1 & 3

Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate medical care. See

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish liability under the Eighth

Amendment, a prisoner must show: (1) his medical need was objectively serious; and (2)

the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical need. See Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). For the first step of the analysis, a serious medical

condition “is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one

that is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor's attention.”

Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Some of the indications of a serious

medical condition include whether if untreated it could result in “further significant

injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” it “significantly affects an

2 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (noting that an action

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”).

individual's daily activities,” or it features “chronic and substantial pain.” Gutierrez v.

Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997) (cleaned up). At the second step, to determine

if a medical professional acted with deliberate indifference, courts look to the provider’s

subjective state of mind. See Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 2016). An inmate

need not show that a doctor explicitly intended harm or believed it would occur, but he

must show more than negligence, medical malpractice, or even objective recklessness.

Id. Deliberate indifference is a culpability standard akin to criminal recklessness. See

Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 722 (7th Cir. 2021).

For an inmate to demonstrate that a non-medical prison employee exhibited

deliberate indifference to a medical need, he must establish a serious medical condition,

and he must establish that an official knew that a serious risk existed and recklessly

disregarded the situation or took woefully inadequate actions. See, e.g., Eagan v. Dempsey,

987 F.3d 667, 693-698 (7th Cir. 2021) (assessing an inmate’s deliberate indifference claims

against prison guards whom he interacted with during a bout of self-harming behavior).

Basemore’s allegations are sufficient to proceed at this juncture against the staff

and medical professionals that he associates with his first attempt to get care on

December 15, 2024. Basemore specifically alleges he was on crisis watch when he alerted

Defendants Keller, Wilson, Farrar, and Hart that he had ingested a “line” filled with

staples, and he alleges they refused care without further consulting medical staff. He also

alleges that once he arrived at the medical unit, Defendant Amanda—a medical

professional—refused care because she did not feel like completing paperwork. After

Amanda allegedly refused care, Basemore pleaded further with Agne and Agne refused

action. This series of events is sufficient to suggest at this early juncture that the named

Defendants knew of a serious risk to his health and refused to act.

Count 2

“Correctional officers violate the Eighth Amendment when they use force not in a

good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically for the

very purpose of causing harm.” Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1006 (7th Cir. 2018); see also

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010). Basemore alleges Hart gratuitously sprayed him with

mace, beat him with the mace can, and later participated in pulling his handcuffs and

injuring his wrist. He also alleges Wilson, Farrar, and Agne took turns pulling his cuffs

despite his shouts of pain, and his wrist was further injured. Basemore’s allegations

against Wilson, Farrar, Agne, and Hart are sufficient at this juncture to proceed under a

theory that they utilized force greater than necessary on December 15, 2024.

Count 4

Basemore faults Defendants Walker and Jones for finding him guilty in their roles

on the adjustment committee, Defendant Wills for affirming their finding, and

Defendants Gutersloh and Reichert for failing to investigate his grievance about the

discipline. Basemore alleges he received three months in restrictive housing, though he

does not say anything about the conditions he faced in that placement. Short terms of

discipline only require informal due process protections. Informal due process requires

only that an inmate is provided (1) notice of the reasons for his placement in segregation,

and (2) an opportunity to present his views in a written statement or hearing. See Ealy v.

Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 965 (7th Cir. 2024). Basemore does not allege that he lacked notice

of the disciplinary ticket, and he admits he spoke at the hearing, thus he has not

established a due process violation. Furthermore, he names Gutersloh and Reichert

solely in association with the grievance review process, but the mere handling of

grievances without any involvement in underlying misdeeds does not sustain a claim.

See Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). Thus, Basemore’s allegations in

Count 4 are insufficient to proceed, and the defendants associated with these allegations

will be dismissed without prejudice.

MOTION FOR RECRUITMENT OF COUNSEL

Basemore seeks counsel based on his limited reading and writing skills, limited

education, mental health, and inability to find his own counsel. (Doc. 4). When

confronted with a request under § 1915(e)(1) for recruited counsel, the district court is to

make the following inquiries: (1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to

obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the

difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself? See Pruitt

v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654–655 (7th Cir. 2007). The first inquiry “requires the indigent

litigant to reasonably attempt to get a lawyer.” Thomas v. Wardell, 951 F.3d 854, 859 (7th

Cir. 2020). Determining whether a plaintiff has made reasonable efforts to recruit counsel

himself “is a mandatory, threshold inquiry that must be determined before moving to the

second inquiry.” Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).

Basemore provided proof he contacted one entity, and attests that he wrote additional

entities or lawyers that did not respond. (Doc. 4, p. 1, 3).

Additionally, the Court must consider Basemore’s competence to represent

himself, and the complexity of the case. “Some of the circumstances that require judicial

consideration are the phase of the litigation, if the prisoner has been transferred between

facilities, if the claims involved the state of mind of the defendant such as those involving

deliberate indifference, and if the case involves complex medical evidence, including

expert testimony.” Thomas, 951 F.3d at 860; see Eagan, 987 F.3d at 682–683. A case becomes

increasingly complex as litigation enters later stages, particularly trial. See Walker v. Price,

900 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 2018). As for competence, “[a] judge will normally consider

‘the plaintiff's literacy, communication skills, educational level, and litigation experience’

along with any evidence in the record ‘bearing on the plaintiff's intellectual capacity and

psychological history.’ But these are merely factors that are ordinarily relevant. No one

factor is ‘necessary or conclusive.’” Jones v. Anderson, 116 F.4th 669, 675-676 (7th Cir. 2024)

(internal citations omitted). The court must examine specifically the plaintiff's ability to

litigate the case, as opposed to the ability of any “jailhouse lawyer” assisting the plaintiff.

Eagan, 987 F.3d at 682.

Here, Basemore alleges that his education, comprehension skills, and mental

health all limit his ability to represent himself. While Basemore has multiple factors that

weigh in favor of appointing counsel, this case is still at the very earliest phases of the

litigation when tasks remain relatively simple. Now that the Court has reviewed the

pleading, it will conduct service of process, and the next obligation lies with the

defendants to answer. Once answers are filed, the Court will then be able to determine

if this case will face an initial hurdle concerning Basemore’s exhaustion of administrative

remedies. The exhaustion stage of a case is usually rather straightforward and relies

primarily on an inmate’s own knowledge of the steps he took to file grievances. Even for

inmates with limited legal knowledge or communication skills, the exhaustion phase is

often manageable because it is closely led by the Court’s detailed scheduling order.

Given that this case is still at this very early phase, and that many of the next steps will

be led by the Court and the defendants, the Court is not yet persuaded that Basemore

needs counsel. However, as this case proceeds to later stages, the Court will gladly

entertain a new motion for recruitment of counsel so that it can better assess Basemore’s

ability to proceed as the case gets more complex.

DISPOSITION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Count 1 of the Complaint may proceed against

Defendants Hart, Agne, Wilson, Farrar, and Keller, Count 2 may proceed against

Defendants Hart, Agne, Wilson, and Farrar, and Count 3 may proceed against Amanda

Choate. By contrast, Count 4 is insufficient as pled against Defendants Walker, Jones,

Wills, Gutersloh, and Reichert, and the Clerk of Court shall TERMINATE Defendants

Walker, Jones, Wills, Gutersloh, and Reichert.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants Zachary Hart, Sgt.

Agne, Amanda Choate, C/O Wilson, C/O Farrar, and B. Keller: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a

Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service

of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint

(Doc. 1), and this Memorandum and Order to Defendants’ place of employment as

identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of

Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the

Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court

will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this

Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 14 days after a transfer or other change of address occurs. Failure to comply with

this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. See FED. R. CIv. PRoc. 41(b).

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability

and Accountability Act.

Basemore’s Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 4) is DENIED without

prejudice. Basemore’s Motion to Compel a Trust Fund Statement (Doc. 3) is DENIED as

MOOT because his in forma pauperis status has since been resolved, and he has already

paid his initial partial filing fee. (Doc. 9, 10, 11).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 21, 2026. iy signee

Aldine ©. Ddutyate: 20260421

12:21:10 -05'00'

GILBERTC.SISON

United States Magistrate Judge

Page 12 of 13

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,

the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will

likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,

but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants

have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important

information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed as a series of

hurdles that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a

hurdle, but it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial

screening only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff

to some relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

facts alleged actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for

recovery. Trial is the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.