Webb

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER E. WEBB,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:25-cv-00455 MAL

CITY OF BRIDGETON, and BRADLEY

CASH,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant City of Bridgeton’s and Defendant Officer Cash’s

Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13). For the following reasons the motion is

GRANTED.

I. Facts & Background

Plaintiff Webb brought this suit against the City of Bridgeton (“City”) and

Officer Cash for violation of his First, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights

(Doc. 11, p. 1–3). The following facts make up almost the entirety of Webb’s

Complaint. Webb alleges Officer Cash attacked him multiple times, told him to “shut

the Fuck up” while Webb was protesting, chest bumped him to start a physical fight,

and attacked Webb with an open hand at his throat. Id. at 6. Webb also alleges Cash

grabbed his chains and ripped them off his neck while he was being held by a few

officers from behind. Id. Webb alleges that the City failed to protect him from Officer

Cash and allowed Officer Cash to make a false arrest and “tighten[] and retighten[]

the cuffs while officers watched.” Id. Defendants now move for partial dismissal of

Webb’s Second Amended Complaint.

II. Webb’s Untimely Response

Webb filed an opposition motion over a month out of time (Doc. 15). Defendants

urge the Court not to consider the motion because it is untimely (Doc. 16). The Court

construes Webb to argue that the motion should be considered because his delay

should be excused for “good cause.” (Doc. 17, p. 1). Webb argues he has physical and

emotional conditions that precluded him from filing on time, in addition to not

receiving notification from Defendants of their motion until the deadline to respond

had passed. Id. at 1–2. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), the Court may,

for good cause, extend time on a party’s motion after the time has expired. This

determination is “an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances.”

Chorosevic v. MetLife Choices, 600 F.3d 934, 946 (8th Cir. 2010). The Court will

consider Webb’s opposition brief in light of Webb’s pro se status and physical and

emotional conditions. However, the Court warns Webb that he is now on notice of all

filing deadlines, and the Court will more scrupulously consider future motions to

extend time.

III. Legal Standard

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what

the … claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). To survive a motion to

dismiss under 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (2007)). This standard

requires a plaintiff to show at the pleading stage that success on the merits is more

than a “sheer possibility.” Id. It is not, however, a “probability requirement.” Id. A

plaintiff need not provide specific facts in support of his allegations, Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007), but “must include sufficient factual information to

provide the ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests, and to raise a right to relief above a

speculative level.” Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir.

2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3). This obligation requires a plaintiff to

plead “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint “must contain

either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary

to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Id. at 562 (quoted case omitted).

This standard “simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that

discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim or element].” Id. at 556. At this stage, the

Court accepts as true the factual allegations in the complaint. Id.

Determining if well-pled factual allegations state a “plausible claim for relief”

is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The well-pled facts must

establish more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Id.

A “pro se document is to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

106 (1976). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (quotation and

citation omitted). While pro se complaints are to be liberally construed, “they still

must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d

912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).

IV. Application of Law to Facts

A. First, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment Violations Against

the City

The City of Bridgeton argues that Webb’s First, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth

Amendment claims should be dismissed because (1) the facts in the Complaint do not

amount to a constitutional violation, and (2) even if Webb adequately alleged

constitutional violations, he does not adequately plead a Monell claim against the

City because he has not stated a basis for liability resulting from an official policy,

custom, or failure to train or supervise (Doc. 14, p. 3).

i. Legal Standard

42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage of any State or Territory…subjects or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States…to the deprivation of any

rights…secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law….

The Monell doctrine states that municipalities count as “person[s]” who may be held

liable under § 1983 for unconstitutional actions. Monell v. New York City Dept. of

Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). But “Congress did not intend municipalities

to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature

caused a constitutional tort.” Id. at 691. “[S]ection 1983 liability for a constitutional

violation may attach to a municipality if the violation resulted from (1) an ‘official

municipal policy,’ (2) an unofficial ‘custom,’ or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to

train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2018).

ii. Application of Law to Facts

The Court agrees that Webb has not adequately alleged a Monell violation.

Even assuming that Webb adequately alleged constitutional violations, he does not

allege that the violations were a result of an official municipal policy, an unofficial

custom, or a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. See Mick, 883 F.3d

at 1079; Doc. 11 at 6.

Webb’s Memorandum in Opposition states that he adequately alleged a Monell

claim and cites two news articles (Doc. 17, p. 4). One of the news articles from 2011

describes a lawsuit brought after a physical altercation between Officer Cash and a

detainee. Id. The other is a news article about a 14-year-old boy having a mental

health crisis who Bridgeton police arrested. Id.

Even with reference to the news articles, Webb still does not identify whether

his Monell claim is grounded in an official municipal policy, an unofficial municipal

custom, or a deliberate indifference to train or supervise. Webb makes no reference

to an official policy, which requires “a deliberate choice of a guiding principle or

procedure made by the municipal official who has final authority regarding such

matters.” Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999). He also makes

no reference to an unofficial custom demonstrated by “a continuing, widespread,

persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity’s

employees.” Ware v. Jackson Cnty., Mo., 150 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir. 1998). Webb

likewise does not allege a “municipal action was taken with deliberate indifference as

to its known or obvious consequences.” Board of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl.

v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because

Webb does not state an adequate Monell claim, the Court dismisses his § 1983 claims

against the City.

B. First, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment Official Capacity

Violations Against Officer Cash

Officer Cash asks this Court to dismiss the official capacity claims1 against

him because official capacity claims against employees are really claims against the

employee’s employers, and Webb has not pled a viable claim against the City (see

supra). (Doc. 14, p. 4).

i. Legal Standard

Official capacity suits are “another way of pleading an action against an entity

of which an officer is an agent.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (internal citation

omitted). See also Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir.

1999) (“A suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit

against the public employer.”). “Although state officials literally are persons, a suit

1 It is unclear what Officer Cash wishes the Court to do with respect to the individual capacity

claims against him. Officer Cash’s Motion for Partial Dismissal asks the Court to dismiss

Webb’s Second Amended Complaint against the City and Officer Cash in his official capacity

(Doc. 13 ¶ 2). Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of their Partial Motion to Dismiss asks

for dismissal of Webb’s First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment claims because Webb does not

plead any underlying constitutional violations, but the Memorandum does not specify

whether the Complaint should be dismissed against Officer Cash in his official capacity,

individual capacity, both, or just against the City (Doc. 14, p. 2). Further, Defendants’

conclusion in their Memorandum asks for relief “against Defendant Cash in his official

capacity,” but not in his individual capacity. Id. at 6. Additionally, the parties do not explain

why they believe that Defendant’s allegations do not plead underlying constitutional

violations, e.g. what element is missing. Under the principle of party presentation, the Court

“rel[ies] on the parties to frame the issues for decision” while the “court[] [plays] the role of

neutral arbiter of matters the parties presented.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S.

371, 375 (2020); Ivey v. Audrain Cnty., Missouri, 968 F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2020). This

Court only “call[s] balls and strikes; [it] do[esn’t] get a turn at bat.” Clark v. Sweeney, 607

U.S. 7, 9 (2025). Thus, the Court will not create reasoning for why the First, Sixth, and

Eighth Amendment claims (much less the Fourth Amendment, which is mentioned even less)

do not plead any underlying constitutional violations.

against a state official in his official capacity is no different from a suit against the

State itself.” Association for Gov’t Accountability v. Simon, 128 F.4th 976, 978 (8th

Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because here the municipality is the

real party in interest, the municipality’s policy or custom must have played a part in

the constitutional violation. See Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d 1070, 1075

(8th Cir. 2016).

ii. Application of Law to Facts

Webb’s official capacity claim fails for the same reason his Monell claim fails.

See supra. The Court therefore dismisses his official capacity claims against Officer

Cash.

C. State Law Claims

Defendants argue that—to the extent any of Webb’s Second Amended

Complaint alleges violations of Missouri law—it fails to state a claim because

(1) Missouri does not have a law similar to 42 U.S.C § 1983 giving citizens a private

right of action to sue state actors, and (2) the City of Bridgeton and Officer Cash have

sovereign immunity from any Missouri common law tort.

i. Legal Standard

“The Missouri General Assembly has not enacted similar language” to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Moody v. Hicks, 956 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). As such,

“[t]he law is well-settled that an individual cannot maintain a common law tort action

for damages for violations of [] rights guaranteed under the Missouri constitution.”

Chen v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Missouri, 2008 WL 11429382, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Mar.

17, 2008). See Collins-Camden P’ship, L.P. v. Cnty. of Jefferson, 425 S.W.3d 210, 214

(Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (“No Missouri precedent exists permitting suits for monetary

damages by private individuals resulting from violations of the Missouri

Constitution.”).

Sovereign immunity bars suit against a government or public entity, Allen v.

32nd Jud. Cir., 638 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Mo. 2022), “unless waived or abrogated or the

sovereign consents to suit.” Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. City of Bellefontaine

Neighbors, 476 S.W.3d 913, 921 (Mo. 2016). In Missouri, “sovereign or governmental

tort immunity as existed at common law in this state prior to September 12, 1977,

except to the extent … modified by statutes in effect prior to that date, shall remain

in full force and effect; [except where expressly waived].” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600.1.

“Missouri courts have routinely held that sovereign immunity is not an affirmative

defense and that the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading with specificity facts

giving rise to an exception to sovereign immunity when suing a public entity.”

Richardson v. City of St. Louis, 293 S.W.3d 133, 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).

Along with sovereign immunity, Missouri also applies the doctrine of official

immunity. Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. banc 2008).

“This judicially-created doctrine protects public employees from liability for alleged

acts of negligence committed during the course of their official duties for the

performance of discretionary acts.” Id.

ii. Application of Law to Facts

The Court does not believe that Webb’s Complaint alleges any state law claims,

see Doc. 11 at 3 (expressly listing only federal claims), but to the extent it does, these

claims fail. To the extent Webb’s allegations are made pursuant to rights protected

by the Missouri Constitution, there is no mechanism for individuals to maintain a

common law tort claim for damages for constitutional violations.

Further, because the City is a “public entity entitled to sovereign immunity

within the meaning of Section 537.600,” and Webb has not pled any facts giving rise

to an exception to sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity bars these counts.

Richardson v. City of St. Louis, 293 S.W.3d 133, 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).

CONCLUSION

Defendants City of Bridgeton and Officer Cash’s Partial Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED (Doc. 13).

SO ORDERED,

This 10th day of April, 2026. ,

MARIA A. LANAHAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE