Singh

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

BHUPINDER SINGH, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-26-289-R

)

SCARLETT GRANT, )

et al., )

)

Respondents. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Bhupinder Singh, a noncitizen proceeding pro se,1 seeks a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1.2 United States District Judge

David L. Russell referred the case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for

initial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 3. Respondents

1 This Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as

equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578

n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)). This Court construes pro se pleadings

liberally, but may not act as a pro se party’s advocate, advancing arguments or

facts on their behalf. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d

836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he court cannot take on the responsibility of

serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and searching the

record.”).

2 Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation

and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless

otherwise indicated.

filed a response,3 and the time to reply has passed. Doc. 7. So the matter is at

issue. For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends the Court grant the

petition and order Petitioner’s immediate release.

I. Factual background and procedural history.

Petitioner, an Indian citizen, entered the United States on August 14,

2016, without admission or parole after inspection. Doc. 7, at 1. The

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued him a Notice to Appear on

August 30, 2017, placing him into removal proceedings and charging him as

removable under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(INA). Id. Ex. 2. On Petitioner’s request for change in his custody status under

8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c), an Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered Petitioner’s release from

custody on a $25,000 bond on September 20, 2017. Id. Ex. 3. Petitioner states

he complied with GPS monitoring and all conditions of his release. Doc. 1, at

6. Petitioner applied for asylum on February 22, 2018. Doc. 7, Exs. 1, 4. The IJ

issued a final order of removal on January 24, 2024, which Petitioner appealed.

Id. Ex. 1. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s

3 Respondents’ response is not filed on behalf of Respondent Scarlet Grant,

Warden of the Cimarron Correctional Center because she is not a federal

official. See Doc. 7 n.1.

2

appeal on March 20, 2026. See Bhupinder Singh, A-209-945-392,

https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited Apr. 20, 2026).

Petitioner asserts he was taken into immigration custody on December

12, 2025, without notice or a hearing. Doc. 1, at 4. Since his arrest, Petitioner

has remained in custody without a bond hearing.

II. Petitioner’s claims.

Petitioner raises three grounds for relief:

Ground One: arbitrary and unlawful detention;

Ground Two: unlawful detention in violation of his Fifth Amendment

right to due process;

Ground Three: violation of INA regulations and Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (ICE) policies and procedures for failure to give

any notice of his bond revocation and follow the procedures for bond

revocations.

Id. at 6. Liberally construing his petition, he argues that the revocation of his

bond without notice and his continued detention without an individualized

bond hearing violates the INA and his due process rights by depriving him of

his constitutional liberty that accrued during the eight years he has been living

in the United States. See id.

Petitioner asks this Court to (1) order his immediate release; or (2) order

his release on an order of supervision; or (3) order his release on his previous

bond conditions; or (4) order Respondents to provide him a bond hearing where

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the Government hears the burden of proof; and (5) order the Government to

show cause why he should not be released.4 Id. at 7.

III. Standard of review.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in

custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of

the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are

properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d

1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88

(2001)).

IV. Respondents violated their own regulations and Petitioner’s due

process rights when they revoked Petitioner’s bond without

notice.

Respondents argue that Petitioner does not specify what type of due

process violation he raises. While Respondents are correct his substantive due

process claim is not ripe, the undersigned finds that Petitioner adequately

4 Petitioner’s latter request was rendered moot in the Court’s order for

response. See Doc. 5.

4

asserts that Respondents violated their own regulations and in turn his due

process rights when they revoked his bond without notice. Doc. 1, at 6, 7.

“The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids the Government to

deprive any person of liberty without due process of law. Freedom from

imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical

restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533

U.S. at 690 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); cf. Trump v.

J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (“‘It is well established that the Fifth

Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the context of removal

proceedings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Individuals who have been

conditionally released from detention have a protected interest in their

“continued liberty.” Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147 (1997). “This is true

even when the released individual is subject to extensive conditions of release.”

Villanueva v. Tate, 801 F. Supp. 3d 689, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2025).

When the government promulgates regulations “with the force and effect

of law,” agencies are bound to follow their own “existing valid regulations.”

United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265, 268 (1954).

Pertinent here, “[t]he statutes and regulations governing immigration and

removal proceedings afford important procedural safeguards to detainees.”

Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 698-99.

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A. Statutory and regulatory framework.

Petitioner entered the United States in 2017 and was released on bond

on September 20, 2017. Doc. 7, Exs. 2, 3. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b) provides that DHS

“at any time may revoke a bond or parole authorized under subsection (a),

rearrest the alien under the original warrant, and detain the alien.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(b); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(9), 1236.1(c)(9) (“When an alien who,

having been arrested and taken into custody, has been released, such release

may be revoked at any time in the discretion of the district director [and certain

other federal officers] in which event the alien may be taken into physical

custody and detained. If detained, unless a breach has occurred, any

outstanding bond shall be revoked and canceled.”).

B. There is no evidence in the record that Respondents

complied with the applicable regulations before revoking

Petitioner’s bond.

Petitioner argues Respondents violated “INA Regulation and ICE

policies and procedures” when they failed to give him notice of his bond

revocation. Doc. 1, at 6. Respondents argues this claim is too vague, that they

followed 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(9), and that a regulatory violation does not amount

to a constitutional violation. Doc. 7, at 7-8.

While Respondents cite § 236.1(c)(9) to support the revocation of

Petitioner’s bond, they provide nothing more. The Secretary of Homeland

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Security and the immigration officials listed in § 236.1(c)(9) have broad

discretion to revoke such bond or parole “at any time . . . .” But with that

discretion comes responsibility. After an authorized official exercises discretion

to revoke the bond granted under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the noncitizen is to be

rearrested under the original warrant. See id. § 1226(b) (“The [Secretary of

Homeland Security] at any time may revoke a bond or parole authorized under

subsection (a), rearrest the alien under the original warrant, and detain the

alien.”). No evidence in the record indicates that any authorized official chose

to exercise their discretion to revoke Petitioner’s release on bond. That alone

is sufficient to find that proper procedures were not followed in effectuating

Petitioner’s detention. There is no evidence that Petitioner was arrested

pursuant to his original warrant of arrest. Consequently, Respondents’ re-

detention of Petitioner violates both his statutory rights under the INA and his

procedural due process rights.

The proper remedy here is immediate release as a bond hearing would

not adequately address Respondents’ improper re-detention of Petitioner. See,

e.g., E.A.T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1324 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“[A]

post-deprivation hearing cannot serve as an adequate procedural safeguard

because it is after the fact and cannot prevent an erroneous deprivation of

liberty.”).

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Furthermore, “notwithstanding the breadth of [§ 1226(b)’s] statutory

language, the [BIA] has recognized an important implicit limitation on DHS’s

authority. The BIA has held that ‘where a previous bond determination has

been made by an immigration judge, no change should be made by a District

Director absent a change of circumstance.’” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp.

3d 1168, 1196-97 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Matter of Sugay, 17 I. & N. Dec.

637, 640 (BIA 1981)), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137

(9th Cir. 2018); see also Sing v. Hale, 2026 WL 765623, at *3 (D. Vt. Mar. 18,

2026) (finding that no change should be made to a previous bond decision

“absent a change in circumstances”); Hernandez-Parrilla v. De Anda-Ybarra,

2025 WL 3632769, at *5 (D.N.M. Dec. 15, 2025) (same).

Based on this record, the Court concludes Respondents violated their

own regulations when they revoked Petitioner’s bond without notice of a

change in circumstances.

C. Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process rights when

they summarily revoked his bond.

This Court analyzes Petitioner’s due process claim to determine whether

he has a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and what

process is necessary to ensure any deprivation of that liberty interest aligns

with the Constitution. See Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460

8

(1989). In examining the necessary process, the Court turns to the three factors

set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge: (1) “the private interest that will be affected

by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest

through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest,

including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that

the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S.

319, 335 (1976).

“When the government grants [a noncitizen] parole into the country, it

creates a liberty interest intimately tied to freedom from imprisonment.”

Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2770629, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025); see also

Iza v. Arnott, 2026 WL 67152, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2026) (“Individuals

released on parole or other forms of conditional release have a liberty interest

in their ‘continued liberty.’” (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482

(1972))); Sahil v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2026 WL 560216, at *3 (D.N.M. Feb. 27,

2026) (finding “that noncitizens acquire a liberty interest once released from

immigration detention”). Petitioner’s interest in physical freedom “is the most

elemental of liberty interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004);

see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (stating that an individual’s interest in

being free from detention “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process]

9

Clause protects”). Respondents deprived Petitioner of his protected status

when they revoked his bond and placed him in custody.

Turning to the Mathews factors, the Court finds that Petitioner has a

significant private interest in remaining free from detention after spending

years on bond. To be sure, “Congress may make rules as to aliens that would

be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003).

But that power remains “subject to important constitutional limitations.”

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695. And it does not erase Petitioner’s significant

interest in remaining free from detention.

Respondents do not challenge Petitioner’s assertions that he was

released on bond in September 2017 and that he abided by the terms of his

release. During his eight years of release, his interest in release grew even

stronger as he presumably “form[ed] the other enduring attachments of normal

life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. The first Mathews factor favors Petitioner.

Second, the Court considers “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such

interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of

additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The

risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest is considerable

where he has received no notice of the reason for his bond revocation and

simple procedures exist that would mitigate those risks.

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“Constitutionally inadequate notice also often leads to constitutionally

inadequate opportunity to be heard, because opportunity to be heard must be

meaningful to be constitutionally sufficient.” Saqib v. Andrews, 2026 WL

350830, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026). Nothing in the record shows that

Petitioner received any procedural safeguards to determine whether the

revocation of his bond and his detention were justified, and thus Respondents

have detained him without any stated cause. This factor weighs in Petitioner’s

favor. See, e.g., E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1322 (W.D. Wash.

2025) (“That the Government may believe it has a valid reason to detain

Petitioner does not eliminate its obligation to effectuate the detention in a

manner that comports with due process.”); see also Gualpa-Lumbi v. Hoover,

2026 WL 452351, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2026) (“[Petitioner] was previously

released and permitted to go about living for years in the United States during

the pendency of his immigration proceedings before being detained in 2025 . . .

[which] show[s] that [Petitioner] is at risk of being erroneously deprived of his

freedom.”).

Finally, the Court considers the Government’s interest, including any

fiscal or administrative burdens. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. “While this Court

recognizes that the government has an interest in enforcing immigration laws,

the government’s interest in re-detaining [P]etitioner without adequate notice

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and an opportunity to challenge the revocation of his release is low.” Saqib,

2026 WL 350830, at *6; see, e.g., Diaz v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D.

Cal. June 14, 2025) (“[T[he Court concludes that the government’s interest in

re-detaining Petitioner . . . is ‘low,’ particularly in light of the fact that

Petitioner[] has long complied with his reporting requirements.”). And the

Court can discern no significant administrative or fiscal burden associated

with placing the burden on the government to follow its own regulations. See,

e.g., Iza, 2026 WL 67152, at *3 (“An alien’s opportunity to be heard regarding

the revocation of his parole is only meaningful if the government comports with

its own internal standards regarding parole revocation.”). Especially given that

Petitioner’s detention was deemed not necessary for eight years.

The undersigned concludes Respondents breached their own regulations

and violated Petitioner’s due process rights when they summarily revoked his

bond.5 Based on these findings, the undersigned recommends the Court grant

5 Petitioner’s initial detention was governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The

authority for Petitioner’s detention shifted to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) on March

20, 2026, when the BIA dismissed his appeal. The shift in detention authority

occurred shortly after Petitioner filed this habeas action in February 2026. The

undersigned finds that the detention clock does not restart to zero by virtue of

a change in the statute that arguably authorizes a noncitizen’s ongoing

detention. Despite the shifting statutory authority, Petitioner did not receive

the process he was due, giving rise to an as-applied constitutional challenge to

that detention. Respondents make no argument that Petitioner’s detention

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the habeas corpus petition and release Petitioner from detention subject to the

same conditions that governed his earlier parole.6

V. Recommendation and notice of right to object.

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court

grant Petitioner’s habeas petition and order his immediate release from

detention under his previous bond conditions. Specifically, the undersigned

recommends the Court:

• order Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from

their custody under his previous bond conditions;

• enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner without

notice and compliance with §§ 241.4 and 241.13 and a pre-

deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker;

• order Respondents to submit a declaration pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1746 affirming they have released Petitioner from

custody.

authority shifted to § 1231(a)(2) or that Petitioner’s redetention complied with

8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 or 241.13.

6 Because the undersigned recommends the Court grant habeas relief and

order Petitioner’s immediate release, Petitioner will no longer be subject to

prolonged detention, rendering his remaining claims moot.

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The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to

this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by April 27,

2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 686 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

72.7 The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to make timely

objections to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate

review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v. United

States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and Recommendation

disposes of the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the

captioned matter.

ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2026.

hea “ered _

SUZANNE MITCHELL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

7 Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has

reduced the typical objection time to this Report and Recommendation to three

days. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition

(noting that rule establishing 14-day response time “does not extend to habeas

corpus petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to proceedings

under Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484

F. App’x 227, 231, 231 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases

may be applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that

“while the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in habeas

proceedings, they need not be in every instance — particularly where strict

application would undermine the habeas review process’).

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